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The study engages with a controversial theoretical debate on ‘global resistance’ in 
the context of the anti-war movement. Through an empirical case study of four 
anti-war organizations in Britain, the thesis critically evaluates dominant globalist 
theoretical discourses and their state-centric critiques from the perspective of 
‘critical theory in political practice’ and seeks to develop the theoretical debate 
further. Acting as a critical mediator in between the metatheories and micropolitics 
of resistance, the author examines how the theoretical discourses ‘resonate’ with 
the premises of the current anti-war movement; what the theories fail to consider 
in terms of political practice; and to which extent the values and normative visions 
embedded in their broader political projects relate to the movement. 
The research demonstrates that the connection between the theories and the 
political practice is not only inadequate but also problematic in many regards. The 
divergences between the globalist frameworks and the premises of the movement 
are particularly substantial; convergence with the state-centric approach is found 
more often. Although it also succeeds in illustrating serious problems in the globalist 
frameworks, the thesis argues that the state-centric approach is not without 
problems either. All three theoretical approaches have a problematic tendency to 
resort to a dualistic ‘either-or’ logic in conceptualizing power, effective strategies 
and the primary context of resistance which represents a clear diversion from 
the understandings held within the movement where analyses and conceptions 
are overlapping and mixed, echoing often a ‘both-and’ approach. The globalist 
frameworks are problemactic also because in conceptualizing the multitude and 
global civil society as consensual global political collectives, they fail to take into 
account political conflicts and power struggles within the movement. The study 
shows that below the surface there are many political conflicts and struggles going 
on. Transforming the movement into something more permanent and global is an 
extremely challenging endeavor, one that cannot be established ‘from above’. 
Instead of defining their political projects of resistance in a way which enables 
their conceptualizations to be detached from practice and their normative visions 
and suggestions to diverge from the premises of the movement, the theories must 
closely engage with the movement in order to establish an emancipatory dialogue 
in the true sense of critical theory. The study contributes insights for developing 
the theoretical debate further, suggesting that a ‘both-and’ approach instead of 
an ‘either-or’ would not only reflect more accurately how the relationship between 
the local and global – and many other concepts as well – are conceived within 
the movement, but would also provide a more productive and comprehensive 
perspective for conceptualizing power and resistance in the context of social 
movements generally. While revealing many ongoing political conflicts and power 
struggles between the organizations studied, the thesis brings forward problems 
and tensions also within the movement and suggests it would benefit from a more 
open discussion about the complex relationship between unity and diversity.
Key words:  Global resistance,  power,  critical theory,  Iraq War, anti-war movement, unity,  diversity 
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Made the scene / Week to week / Day to day / Hour to hour
The gate is straight / Deep and wide
Break on through to the other side  
Break on through to the other side 
The Doors 
Years ago, when people said that only after finishing a PhD is it possible to 
understand completely what it was all about, I was skeptical. As a young 
and naïve scholar, I strongly resisted this view – how ridiculous it would 
be not knowing what one is doing! Looking back at my own process now, 
it is obvious that I was the one who was ridiculous, not foreseeing that I 
would redefine and even change my research subject many times. 
This thesis born out of somewhat idealistic interest in how to resist 
war more effectively in a constantly changing, but deeply unjust world. 
This move ‘to the other side’ – starting to study resistance against war 
instead of concentrating on war itself – was a long process involving many 
phases. It all started with an MA thesis on the media and the Kosovo War, 
moving on to the propaganda and image management strategies of the 
United States in the War on Terror in my licentiate thesis. First, this 
PhD thesis was supposed to analyze how the virtual anti-war movement 
resisted war on the Internet. This, too, changed along the way. I started 
to study resistance to war by analyzing concretely, not just virtually, 
operating anti-war organizations in Britain.   
Changing the subject might sound like too dramatic a turn if not 
properly put in context. That the concept of ‘global resistance’ and 
the movement against the Iraq War became the primary subjects of 
my research was the result of both theoretical considerations and 
empirical observations. The inspiration had much to do with theoretical 
dilemmas I was confronted with when completing my licentiate thesis, 
which reflected on, among other issues, the role and power of the US 
in the changing international system (Seppälä 2006). The ambivalence 
manifested in theoretical discourses concerning possible challengers to 
US power was striking. While some scholars argued that no state could 
(ever) challenge the US military might, others stressed that it could be 
9challenged by undermining its ‘soft power’, especially in a situation 
where the superpower was in the process of losing much of its prestige 
due to the Iraq War. The anti-war movement seemed to represent an 
interesting ‘challenger’, fighting not only against the war but also against 
US hegemony in more general terms. This led me to the concept of 
resistance, which then led me to the theoretical approaches analyzed in 
this study, which led me to the movement and the activists in London, 
and so the story continues…  
Undeniably, this research process has been long and complex but 
also an exciting and transforming experience. I have tried to learn from 
the comments and critiques of my distinguished and extremely patient 
supervisors and colleagues. I have learned not to bang my head against 
the (same) wall too many times. I have learned to let go sometimes. I 
have learned that there are wonderful people in academia with whom it is 
a delight to work, as they always bring up new perspectives. In all of these 
respects, the process of writing this thesis has certainly changed me. After 
this it is now time, once again, to break on through to the other side.
***
I dedicate this thesis to the memory of Jeff Taylor (1948–2007). Jeff was 
a dear friend, an innovative media scholar, an excellent songwriter, and a 
devoted anti-war activist. A man who lived fully. Freedom,Jeff, freedom! 
***
I want to thank first and foremost my supervisor Professor Vilho Harle 
(University of Tampere) from the bottom of my heart for encouraging 
me to pursue, and helping me to establish, an academic career but, more 
importantly, for not losing faith in me. Ville must be the most patient 
person on this planet. There are simply not enough words to describe 
my humble gratitude. The same goes for my second longstanding 
supervisor, Lecturer Aini Linjakumpu, who has an incredible sense of 
comprehensiveness – always seeing the ‘big picture’ – and an ability to 
be strict but very encouraging at the same time. She has posed many 
difficult but important questions that I have not always been able to 
answer. I thank her for all our seemingly endless conversations on those 
countless days. Her support and friendship have been truly sincere. 
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Professor Julian Reid’s contribution has been very helpful, especially 
in the process of finalizing the study. The fact that he came to Lapland 
has made a huge difference in the academic ambition now evident at 
our department. I warmly thank the pre-examiners Professor David 
Chandler (University of Westminster, London) and Professor Matthias 
Finger (EPFL, Lausanne) for their positive and constructive comments, 
which helped to develop the thesis further in many ways. 
I thank my dear colleagues Sanna and Jarno Valkonen for their 
invaluable support at a crucial moment of darkness when I was just about 
ready to give it all up. They saw that I was crumbling and stepped in to 
save me, helping me to regain my belief in what I was doing. Actually, 
Jarno managed to articulate explicitly to me what I was trying to say. I 
had lost the red line but – thanks to him – only temporarily. 
Leonie Ansems de Vries (King’s College, London) is one of the brightest 
persons I have ever met. She finalized her PhD at the same time, offering 
me spiritual peer support, but also amazing intellectual endorsement, 
which has helped to improve the thesis. Conversations with Karolina Kiil 
(TaiK, Helsinki) in the finalizing phase of her PhD last year reminded me 
of the importance of other things in life than academic work.  
Thanks are in order to all my colleagues at the University of Lapland – 
Petri Koikkalainen, Mika Luoma-aho, Anssi Kumpula, Monica Tennberg, 
Mika Flöjt, Lassi Heininen, Jari Koivumaa, Laura Junka-Aikio, Elina 
Penttinen, Susanna Hast, Seija Tuulentie, Saara Koikkalainen, Marjo 
Lindroth, and Tanja Joona, as well as many others who have contributed 
to this project in different phases. I have enormous respect for Marketta 
Alakurtti, Mervi Tikkanen, Sari Mantila, Rauni Räisänen and Riitta 
Laitinen – without them, our department would end up in chaos. I would 
also like to extend warm thanks to Richard Foley, who did great and 
extraordinarily thorough work in language-checking my manuscript.  
My gratitude also belongs to the ‘sponsors’ of this research: the 
University of Lapland, Kone Foundation and the Ella and Georg Ehrnroot 
Foundation, which have made it economically possible to study a subject 
that does not result in any kind of sexy ‘innovations’ to be applied directly 
or utilized in economical terms. I deeply appreciate the fact that I have 
been extremely lucky to have my research funded full time without any 
breaks, unlike so many others who would have deserved the same. To 
emphasize the importance of this, I express my appreciation to the people 
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with whom I had the pleasure of working with for five years when actively 
involved in the local association of the Finnish Researchers’ Union.
I am very grateful to the anti-war activists whom I interviewed for this 
study. One really has to admire their work. An opportunity to discuss 
with people who have so much passion for and dedication to the cause, it 
does give one hope. Special thanks to Linda from the CND, who helped 
me to organize several interviews.  
My family is small but all the more spicy. I want to thank my mother for 
teaching me not to care about stupid rules, and my sister Sirpa for taking 
care of our mother after she forgot not only all rules but everything else as 
well. Aunt Jenny is no longer with us, but continues to have an enormous 
influence on all of our lives. Thanks also go to all the males in the family – 
my brother Lasse, nephew Jyrki and his father Veikko. From my extended 
family I want to mention Saara who has turned into an amazing, clever 
and beautiful young woman while I have been writing this thesis.
Without my friends, I would be nothing. My dearest friends have 
brought light, love and laughter to my life. They have taken me through 
the most difficult times. Funnily enough, I have just realized how clearly 
they represent different political philosophies: Hannele (a radical  idealist), 
Sanna (clearly a political realist), Edurne (more or less of an anarchist) and 
Kaisu (a postmodernist with a pacifist twist). I also want to mention my 
friends Johanna, Kristiina, Elina, Helena, Linda, Anne, Riikka, Birgitta, 
Essi, Katja, Tuija, Jari, Sirpa and Sven, who have all shown their support 
and solidarity in one way or another.    
My partner Rehtonen has not only helped me to do the layout and 
the cover of this book. He has listened to and lived with all my academic 
(and other) despairs during the past twelve years. What can I say. I just 
love that man. 
Rovaniemi, September 2010,
Tiina Seppälä
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       INTRODUCTION
.     Global War, Global Resistance? 
On 15 February 2003, less than five weeks before the US launch of the 
military attack on Iraq, there was a chain of anti-war demonstrations 
taking place simultaneously across the world. The massive spectacle of anti-
war demonstrations, orchestrated internationally to oppose the Iraq War, 
was a clear manifestation that the anti-war movement had experienced 
a political revival. The demonstrations gathered over ten million people 
in the streets of major cities in Europe, the US, Asia and the Middle 
East. In the following three months, other, similar demonstrations were 
organized around the globe, and it has been estimated that around thirty 
million people participated in these. Anti-war activism on such a scale 
took many by surprise, because the anti-war movement had lived rather 
a quiet life since the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, there had been 
some opposition to the first Gulf War, and later on to the wars in the 
Balkans, but nothing to measure up to the kind of opposition that had 
now formed to resist the US military invasion of Iraq.
The anti-war movement experienced its political revival in a very 
specific political situation, that of the early twenty-first century, which was 
strongly characterized and shaped by the foreign policy of the US after the 
9/11 terrorist attacks. The movement clearly both reflected and inspired 
more opposition, not only to the war on Iraq, but also US hegemony and 
foreign policy in more general terms. Indeed, for many – although not all 
– peace and anti-war activists, the ‘Global War on Terror’, and especially 
the Iraq War, illustrated a new kind of oil-driven imperialism by the US 
that should be fiercely opposed. In this regard, it was maintained that the 
declaration of a ‘global war’ required a global response: resistance, too, 
was to be globalized. In other words, it was suggested that there should 
be a new political strategy of global opposition to the war, a strategy to be 
carried out by a new kind of anti-war movement.
Struggling intensely against one of the most controversial wars of 
our times, the new anti-war movement certainly provided an interesting 
context for the idea of ‘global resistance’, which was not, however, a 
concept invented by the anti-war movement or in the context of the Iraq 
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War. It was a slogan used and made popular first by the anti-capitalist 
movement, also known as the anti- or alter-globalization movement, 
which had advocated a political strategy of global resistance in its 
struggle against neoliberal globalization, global capitalism and corporate 
power since the mid-1990s. The movement brought together a broad 
array of organizations and groups from all over the world to protest in 
Seattle in 1999 against the World Trade Organization (WTO) and on 
many different occasions thereafter under the umbrella of the World 
Social Forum (WSF). During the first years of the new millennium, the 
imperative to ‘globalize resistance’ surfaced in many social movements, 
which started to use the slogan in their own political campaigning. The 
political strategy of global resistance has also been debated within the new 
anti-war movement and, at the same time, become enormously popular 
in the academic literature dealing with social movements.  
Although the internationally coordinated anti-war demonstrations 
did partly ‘echo the form of the ‘global days of action’ against economic 
globalization’ (Gillan et. al 2008: 113), in the academic literature the 
anti-war and the anti-capitalist movements have often been bundled 
together without taking seriously into account the important differences 
between the two. As some scholars suggest, analyses that tend to see the 
anti-war movement as a characteristically transnational movement ‘have 
developed from study of the ‘anti-globalization’ demonstrations that have 
targeted a range of international political and economic institutions’ 
(ibid: 103, also Tarrow 2005a). These analyses often fail to recognize that 
the primary targets of resistance and forms of political organization for 
the anti-war movement have traditionally been quite different from those 
which characterize the anti-capitalist movement (e.g. Gillan et al. 2008: 
103, 112–113, 119).
There is a second important difference that has not been critically 
reflected on in the academic literature. While advocating a strategy of 
global resistance, the alter-globalization movement has become well 
known for arguing that it seeks no power. However, this seems not to 
be the case with the new anti-war movement. The discourse of global 
resistance was soon accompanied by that of global power, originating 
from the often-cited piece ‘New Power in the Streets’, published in the 
New York Times two days after the demonstrations in February 2003. 
The article argued that anti-war demonstrations taking place all over the 
5
world proved that there are ‘two superpowers on the planet: the United 
States and world public opinion’ (New York Times 17.2.2003).1 Later on, 
the phrase ‘world’s second superpower’ was used increasingly often when 
referring to the anti-war movement, especially within the movement 
itself. In addition, many scholars started to argue that the new anti-war 
movement must be regarded as a noteworthy challenger to the global 
hegemony of the US due to its ‘soft power’ and its ability to influence 
public opinion on a world scale (e.g. Chomsky 2003; Kahn & Kellner 
2004; Cortright 2007b). It was thus suggested that the anti-war movement 
had become a global political counterforce to the US, a global movement 
whose power should also be conceptualized in globalized terms2. 
As exaggerated as the above interpretations may first sound, especially 
for political realists, they become less surprising when viewed in the light 
of the current state of theorization in International Relations (IR). As 
David Chandler (2009a: 1) points out, it is now commonly maintained 
that ‘politics, power and resistance make themselves felt at the global level 
rather than primarily at the level of nation states – the traditional subjects 
of international relations’. In the currently dominant theories, the global 
is generally viewed ‘as the key site for power, policy and resistance’ (ibid: 
3). For Chandler (2009b: 532), this uniformity represents ‘Global 
Ideology’, that is, ‘the globalisation of political discourse’, which he finds 
problematic because it subsumes the globalization of politics, power 
and resistance under the title of globalization as a mere reaction to 
external changes and social and economic transformations. Thus, in the 
mainstream the global level is regarded as ‘the explanatory one and the 
domestic level as secondary, responding to these changes’ (ibid).
In his critical analysis, Chandler (2009b: 532) does not argue that 
politics, power and resistance merely operate at local, national or regional 
1 The New York Times (17.2.2003) was highly optimistic about the political 
significance of this new phenomenon: ‘For the moment, an exceptional phenomenon 
has appeared on the streets of world cities. It may not be as profound as the people’s 
revolutions across Eastern Europe in 1989 or in Europe’s class struggles of 1848, but 
politicians and leaders are unlikely to ignore it.’
2 Interestingly, the discussion about the anti-war movement as the world’s second 
superpower coincided with a very heated debate concerning the hegemony and 
power of the ‘first’ superpower, the US (e.g. Cox 2004; Dunne 2003; Ikenberry 
2004; Fergusson 2004; Kagan 2004; Kaldor 2003b; 2004; Mann 2004; Nye 2004b; 
Posen 2003; Waltz 2000; Wendt 2003). 
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levels. Rather, he aims at ‘conceptually unpacking what is meant when 
we talk about global politics, power and resistance’ (ibid: 530). What 
is called ‘a more subjectivist or constructivist approach’ does not take 
it for granted that the globalization of politics is ‘a secondary political 
effect of primary social and economic transformations’, but enables 
critical evaluation of how the global is actually being constructed (ibid: 
532; cf. Risse 2007). Indeed, it is interesting that only very few scholars 
critically explore ‘why it is that our conceptualisation of politics and 
power has been transformed, or globalised, so rapidly’ (Chandler 2009a: 
1). Chandler (2009b: 533) criticizes IR especially, where analyzing global 
interactions is currently considered as relevant as, if not more relevant 
than, state-level interaction in the international system, the traditional 
focus of the discipline.3 
When the starting assumption is that the world has become increasingly 
globalized, the view that politics, too, is, and should be, taking place 
primarily at the global level becomes inevitable and those resisting this 
view are considered ‘unable to engage progressively with the world we 
live in and unable to understand the impact of external changes on the 
creation of new global threats and possibilities for social transformation’ 
(ibid: 533). Chandler (2009a: 5) argues that when the globalization of 
politics is understood ‘as a response to processes of social and economic 
change’, ‘the shift towards the global’ becomes ‘essentialised or reified’:
Rather than the shift from national to global conceptions of politics, 
power and resistance being a question for investigation, it has been 
understood as natural or inevitable, as a process driven by forces 
external to us and out of our control. 
Chandler’s critical analysis is extremely interesting and important from the 
perspective of this thesis, because it succeeds in revealing the essentialized 
nature of the globalized conceptualizations of politics, power and 
resistance found in the currently dominant theoretical discourses. This in 
3 Indeed, IR is currently very much characterized by the study of different kinds 
of global phenomena that have become increasingly popular objects of research and 
conceptualization within the discipline. It is almost impossible to read a textbook 
in IR without confronting a whole cavalcade of different sorts of ‘globals’: global 
politics, global political economy, global environmental problems, global networks, 
global movements, and so forth. On global resistance, see e.g. Amoore 2005.
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turn helps to explain why political strategies of resistance, as well as the 
power of the new anti-war movement, have been conceptualized in highly 
globalized and idealistic terms. Although the political significance of the 
movement should not be downplayed nor its increasingly transnational 
character denied, it must nevertheless be admitted that some of the 
interpretations are way out of proportion4. Indeed, many empirical 
studies have already shown that in practical terms the new movement 
is not as globally oriented as many wish to believe when it comes to, for 
example, political action and coordination5 or the use of new information 
and communication technologies (ICTs) in mobilization (e.g. Pickerill & 
Webster 2006; Gillan & Pickerill 2008; Gillan et al. 2008).6 
Moreover, the fact that the Iraq War continues – over seven years after 
the proclaimed birth of the ‘world’s second superpower’ – indicates that, 
generally speaking, there has not been too much critical discussion about 
the movement’s power and effectiveness, that is, how and with what 
criteria it should be evaluated7. Surprisingly few scholars have reflected 
on whether it is even realistic to expect that a social movement such as 
the anti-war movement could influence world politics to such an extent 
that wars could be prevented or stopped on the spot. Quite the contrary, 
despite (or perhaps because of ) the fact that many of the most optimistic 
4 Although international mobilization as such is not anything new, transnational 
elements of the new movement have been emphasized to such an extent that, as 
Gillan et al. (2008: 103) point out, transnationalism is regarded as its ‘defining 
feature’. On internationalization of movements, cross-national diffusion and scale 
shifts, see e.g. Tilly 2004: 63–64; Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 96–97, 170–172, 174–181; 
della Porta & Diani 2006: 186–188.
5 Gillan et al. (2008: 128) argue that although international demonstrations have 
illustrated the movement’s ability ‘to act on the world stage’, in terms of concrete 
political action the movement has yet remained ‘predominantly affixed to place and 
to the political context of the nation’ (ibid: 102, 113, also 117–118, 128).
6 In theory the Internet would be able to ‘offer the possibility of having detailed,            
regular meetings across borders without long-distance travel’ but in practice this 
possibility is not yet ‘utilized to any great extent’ (Gillan et al. 2008: 117, also 101).
7 However, there has been also critical discussion. For example, the former UN 
weapon inspector Scott Ritter (2007: 5) regards the anti-war movement as ‘a poorly 
organized, chaotic, and ... often anarchic conglomeration of egos, pet projects, and 
idealism that barely constitutes a ‘movement’, let alone a winning cause’. He argues 
that the movement ‘lacks any notion of strategic thinking, operational planning, or 
sense of sound tactics’, not to mention central leadership, and that it rationalizes its 
failures (ibid: 5, 7, 13).
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as well as globalized interpretations made in regard to the existing anti-
war movement can be easily challenged, some theorists have expressed 
even more optimistic and globalized views in regard to future resistance 
against war. 
A particularly interesting development has been the way in which 
social movements and other non-state actors are conceptualized as an 
‘answer to war’ in recent theoretical debate8. Very clearly, this debate has 
been dominated by two theoretical discourses, which can be labelled the 
liberal cosmopolitan approach and the radical poststructuralist approach9 and 
whose adherents can be described as belonging to the category of academic 
globalists10. Both have argued that resisting war and/or transforming the 
‘war system’ must take place ‘from below’, which requires transnational 
political engagement in global advocacy networks transcending the 
boundaries of nation states. While liberal cosmopolitans suggest that 
‘global civil society’ can become an important challenger of state power, 
contesting the status quo ‘from below’ (e.g. Beck 2000; 2005; Castells 
2008) and resisting war (e.g. Kaldor 2003a), radical poststructuralists 
argue that the current ‘global state of war’ can be challenged by the 
oppressed people of the world, who together form a ‘Multitude’11 which 
would wage a ‘war against war’ (Hardt & Negri 2000; 2004).
Both of the above-mentioned approaches – or, rather, visions – can 
be criticized on many grounds. From the perspective of concrete political 
practice, they seem to be very abstract and future-oriented, even utopian, 
in that they talk about global struggles and global political subjects that 
do not yet exist. As Chandler (2009b: 537) points out, ‘these struggles 
remain immanent ones, in which global political social forces of progress 
8 This kind of a debate has deep roots in the history of IR, especially in the 
traditions of communitarism and peace research. For example, Johan Galtung (1975: 
158) has called transnational non-state actors the ‘sixth continent’ of the world order, 
arguing that they have not only advanced international cooperation but also helped 
to prevent inter-state conflicts. Although these kinds of views have always existed 
within the discipline, they have never quite represented the mainstream.
9 For example, Chandler (2009a; 2009b) and Mouffe (2005) use these or similar 
categories in their work.
10 These theoretical approaches are defined and discussed in detail in chapter 2. 
11 ‘Multitude’ is a concept originally used in Machiavelli’s Discorsi, later also by 
Hobbes, Spinoza and most recently by Hardt and Negri. The term is used by other 
political thinkers as well, such as Lotringer and Virno.
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are intimated but are yet to fully develop’. In other words, there is no 
collective political subject that could ‘give content to the theorising of 
global struggle articulated by academic theorists’ (ibid). This means that 
theorizing actually ‘becomes a political act or statement in itself regardless 
of any link to social agency’ (ibid: 535; also Chandler 2009a: 125). 
Provocatively, Chandler (2009b: 537) goes on to argue that ‘politics has 
become globalised in the absence of political struggle rather than as a 
result of the expanded nature of collective political engagement’. 
Despite these obvious problems, it must be acknowledged that there 
is something very interesting indeed going on here, since many political 
theorists clearly invite us to take a closer look at the anti-war movement 
as an integral part of either global civil society (liberal cosmopolitans) or 
the Multitude (radical poststructuralists). Obviously, the debate has been 
taken far beyond the current anti-war movement when speculating on the 
possibility of establishing a global collective political subject dedicated to 
resistance against war. This does not mean, however, that the existing 
anti-war movement should or even could be totally left out of the debate. 
Although the movement is not conceived as being the forthcoming global 
collective political subject as such12, it is extremely difficult to imagine a 
global collective dedicated to resistance against war that would exclude 
the existing anti-war movement. 
Yet, the present anti-war movement seems to be essentially ignored 
by both liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists in their 
theorizations. In fantasizing about global struggles, suggesting global 
strategies of resistance and even constructing visions of a global collective 
political subject dedicated to resistance against war, the theorists in both 
camps are not engaging empirically with the current anti-war movement 
but ‘jumping’ directly into the future. In other words, their suggestions 
and visions are mainly based on what they assume about the anti-war 
movement and/or what they want it to become in the future. Taking 
place as it does on such a highly abstract and future-oriented level, the 
debate invites four critical questions, which together provide the overall 
rationale for this thesis. 
12 Although liberal cosmopolitans such as Mary Kaldor (2003a) often talk about 
the peace movement and radical poststructuralists (Hardt & Negri 2004) about 
the anti-war movement, they do not consider either of these movements to be the 
forthcoming global collective political subject as such.
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Firstly, the lack of empirical engagement with the current anti-war 
movement invites the question of the extent to which the globalized 
interpretations made by academic globalists in regard to the nature of 
new anti-war movement and its political strategies can be considered 
accurate. Secondly, one might ask whether their globalized normative 
assumptions and visions are even compatible with the values, beliefs 
and political premises of the current movement. This question directly 
relates to a third one – whether the kind of global political collective 
both liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists are dreaming of 
can be regarded as a possible, or even desirable, political project from 
the perspective of the existing movement. Fourthly, the lack of empirical 
engagement with the movement prompts one to ask whether academic 
globalists are able to provide any practical suggestions on how to organize 
resistance against war more effectively. 
The first question can be regarded as relevant especially from the 
perspective of traditional social movement research, which is characterized 
by its descriptive, usually non-normative methods of analysis. Any critical 
questions in such terms would address possible errors and shortcomings 
in existing interpretations, amounting to an assessment of the accuracy of 
the globalized interpretations made by academic globalists regarding the 
extent of global elements evident in the new movement and its strategies. 
This would require empirical analysis of the concrete political practices 
and processes of the movement, that is, observing actual political practice 
and thereby possibly challenging previous interpretations. Although this 
perspective is important and will be taken up in the study (but from 
a different point of view than would be the case in traditional social 
movement research), the three other questions are more fundamental.  
The second and third questions are significant because academic 
globalists clearly assume that the forthcoming global collective political 
subject will share their own normative ideals. For liberal cosmopolitans, the 
ideal towards which global civil society should be moving is based on liberal 
and social democratic values, regarded as international, if not universal – 
hence, the term ‘cosmopolitan’13. Indeed, radical poststructuralists accuse 
liberal cosmopolitans of normative universalism and imposing western 
13 As Chandler (2009a: 129) points out: ‘Whatever the agency, the ideal outcome 
is already established: grounding liberal claims without political subjects’.
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values and liberal governance on the rest of the world. For them, the ideal 
towards which the Multitude should lead the rest of world is based on a 
vision of a communistic, yet diverse and autonomous political collective. 
Regardless of the character of the normative ideal, however, the problem 
remains. As Chandler (2009a: 155) rightly puts it, both approaches ‘seek 
to ground their position on abstract framings of political struggle, rather 
than on concrete movements or practices’. 
This brings us directly to the fourth question, or problem. If academic 
globalists were to provide any practical suggestions for the anti-war (or 
any other) movement as to how they might organize resistance in a more 
effective and meaningful way, they should be communicating closely 
with the existing movement(s). At the moment, this takes place only at 
a very abstract level. If one considers IR, this is hardly surprising: it is 
not the most empirically oriented discipline in the first place and social 
movements have not been very popular subjects of research, given the 
discipline’s primary focus on interactions between nation states within the 
territorial and state-based international system14. Not even the anti-war 
movement has been a major subject of research within the discipline15, 
although in light of the movement’s fundamental commitment to the 
questions of war and peace16, it could be argued that no other social 
movement is nearly as significant from the perspective of IR. 
In this regard, the problem is that unless political theorists engage 
14 It has been argued that ‘the preoccupation of political scientists with the state, 
particularly those concerned with interstate relations – usually less precisely labeled 
as “international” relations – has inhibited their capacity to perceive realistically other 
actors crossing state boundaries’ (Alger 1997: 260–261). However, this is to put 
things a bit too simplistically. Already in the early 1970s Keohane and Nye showed 
that international relations models were ‘contaminated’ by transnational actors to 
such an extent that international policy outcomes could not be explained without 
taking them into account (Smith et al. 1997: 74). Since then there has been a wide 
range of studies and research literature on the matter. However, social movements as 
subjects of empirical studies are still not very popular in IR.
15 However, IR is not the only discipline that can be blamed for a lack of research 
in regard to the anti-war movement. Overall, there have not been too many studies 
related to the movement after the late 1980s (see chapter 3).
16 It can also be argued that there is not a more appropriate discipline to provide 
a proper context for analysis than IR when it comes to the anti-war movement. 
Although sociology surely can, due to its long-term engagement with social movement 
research, provide important insights to social movement activity in general, the 
substance of the anti-war movement is more closely related to IR theory.   
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in a dialogue with social movements, they risk rendering their own 
conceptualizations useless in terms of political practice; in other words, 
their contributions are likely to remain merely utopian. Furthermore, the 
theorists are not capitalizing on the experience that social movements 
have of political practices of resistance; they may totally overlook 
opportunities to benefit from the ‘knowledge of the field’. Despite being 
objects of contradicting theorizations and criticisms, social movements 
are continuously engaged in many sorts of political struggles and their 
experiences could offer some insights for developing theories further. 
Moreover, when social movements are studied empirically, which 
usually takes place only in the field of social movement research, the 
main focus seems to be on their concrete processes and practices, 
with ideological factors and the movements’ self-understandings often 
regarded as secondary. Although it should be obvious that the political 
practice of social movements is directly shaped by their understandings, 
it is a small mystery why many scholars view empirical studies of the self-
understandings of social movements very skeptically. 
As Kevin Gillan (2006: 38–39) explains, it is more common to study 
the processes and practices of social movements than the understandings, 
beliefs and values that underlie them. That is, it is more common to 
study how-questions than why-questions,17 although analyzing the 
understandings that guide the political practice of social movements 
would clearly ‘offer reflections on the organisation of social, political 
and economic life which are of value to all those for whom a normative 
appraisal of current political and social structures is necessary’ (ibid: 
38–39). As Gillan points out, ‘understanding the various bases of the 
political projects in which movements engage’ can also help to understand 
their processes (ibid: 39). This in turn, I wish to add, would help social 
scientists and political theorists to offer more enlightened (reflective) and 
practical suggestions for social movements – which is in fact their main 
aim if their work is regarded from the perspective of critical theory.18
17 The distinction between these two approaches is generally characterized as a 
difference between American and European traditions, with American sociology and 
political theory considered more interested in processes and European in how certain 
socio-political contexts effect social movement activity (Gillan 2006: 23–24).
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An intimate link between theory and political practice has always 
been the basis of critical theory19, by definition. As Stephen Leonard     
(1990: 3) puts it, ‘a critical theory without a practical dimension would 
be bankrupt on its own terms’. When struggling for emancipation and 
social change, critical theory needs to have a practical element, because 
otherwise ‘the promise of a truly emancipatory social theory will remain 
hopelessly utopian’ (ibid: xxiv). In his analysis, Leonard criticizes both 
modern critical theorists (from Karl Marx to the Frankfurt School and 
Jürgen Habermas) and postmodern thinkers (mainly Michel Foucault) 
for not seriously pursuing their own stated aims – social and political 
emancipation (ibid: xiii). Interestingly, he argues that the problems 
in realizing their aims may partly ‘derive from the desire to avoid 
seeing critique lose its critical edge by becoming the ideology of any 
particular social movement’, leading them to define ‘the requirements for 
emancipation in a way that enabled critique to be autonomous from 
practice’ (ibid: 91, emphasis added).
Leonard (1990: xiv–xv) explicitly asserts that although critical theory 
has succeeded in its criticism of prevailing disciplinary orthodoxies, 
in both its modern and postmodern versions it has ‘simply failed to 
make clear its own political implications and how it is to be related to 
concrete political practices’.20 Thus, it has lost its politically engaged and 
18 The approach adopted here is partly, but not totally, at odds with that of 
Chandler (2009a: 88), as he explicitly criticizes, although in a different context, 
‘constructivist assumptions’ for taking discourses and ideas as ‘the ontological focus 
of study’ and regarding them as ‘explanatory of the practices and interactions of the 
subjects themselves’. He also warns against ‘critical theorising which starts from the 
level of policy rhetoric and abstract assertions of the nature of political struggle, 
rather than from a study of concrete practices’ (ibid: 25).
19 Critical theory is a very broad category that includes many different established 
approaches which all share one important element: they are normative by definition. 
Whereas so-called ‘normal science’ aims at ‘objectively’ describing and explaining 
social and political phenomena, critical social science ‘wants to explain a social order 
in such a way that it becomes itself the catalyst which leads to the transformation of 
this social order’ (Fay 1987: 27; also Harle 2004: 36–38). Critical social science must 
nevertheless also be ‘scientific’ ‘in the sense of providing comprehensive explanations 
of wide areas of human life in terms of a few basic principles, explanations subject to 
public, empirical evidence’ (Fay 1987: 23).
20 In IR, the approach has been manifested in the works of a great number              
of scholars during its history. Recently it has been, for example, referred to as 
‘emancipatory international relations’ (Spegele 2002: 383).   
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emancipatory forms of critique along with ‘an ever growing preoccupation 
with what might be called a radical “metacritique” of modernity’, which 
has made critical theory ‘look more like a form of academic, intellectual 
introspection’ (ibid: 6). However, unlike many other scholars who have 
criticized critical theory for losing its connection with practice, Leonard 
does not blame the metatheoretical turn from modern to postmodern as 
such for this. He regards it as ‘not in itself problematic for critical theory’ 
but argues that ‘critical theorists fail to heed the lessons they learn from 
the critique of scientism, thereby relegating questions of political practice 
to secondary status’ (ibid: 26, also 7).
As Leonard (1990: xiii) argues, advocates of critical theory ‘must play 
a role in changing the world’ and in a way which can help ‘emancipate’ 
its addressees ‘by providing them with insights and intellectual tools 
they can use to empower themselves’. Or, as Brian Fay (1987: 2) puts it, 
critical theory must be ‘explicitly constructed’ for social theories to have 
‘practical political impact’.21 In this kind of context, the term ‘critique’ 
is to be understood as a synthesis of theory and practice, one criticizing 
all possible forms of exploitation and oppression and simultaneously 
struggling for a better and more just society (Leonard 1990: 14; also Fay 
1987: 4, 22, 29).22 For Leonard, feministic theory, dependency theory 
and critical pedagogy are examples of truly emancipatory critical theories, 
as they have been directed to and adopted by certain social movements.
21 For example, peace research aims at building a more peaceful world and 
minimizing the amount of human suffering caused by wars and conflicts (e.g. 
Galtung 1969; 1996). It must ‘act consistently to prevent a transformation from 
world politics to violence and to promote a transformation towards peaceful, 
democratic world politics instead’ (Patomäki  2008: 159). Peace research differs from 
traditional political science in being ‘less neutral’ as it aims at obtaining knowledge 
on how a certain objective (peace) can be best pursued (Galtung 1969: 14–15). 
22 This is what ‘critique’ was all about for Marx, often regarded as one of the 
‘founding fathers’ of critical theory – a project with a practical intent: to ‘overthrow 
all those conditions in which man is an abased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptable 
being’ (Leonard 1990: 13). The class of persons suffering from enslavement to be 
freed was the proletariat, and the role of a critique was to become a part of the 
‘material force’ of revolutionary change (ibid: 14). As we well know, these aspirations 
never materialized and when Marx’s theory was ‘scientized’, it was used to provide 
‘the ideological justification for the domination of human beings by an “enlightened” 
avant garde party’ (ibid: 25). This does not, however, discredit the fact that Marx 
clearly articulated the idea that critical theory must have a practical intent.
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A recent example of creating a close linkage between political 
theory and a particular social movement is Jeremy Gilbert’s (2008) 
attempt to construct a bridge between cultural studies and the anti-
capitalist movement. According to Gilbert, cultural studies and radical 
politics should be regarded as intimately connected by definition since 
‘those conceptual resources which are most useful for analyzing power 
relationships in culture should also be of potential use in orienting political 
action, and vice versa’ (ibid: 135, emphasis in original). Hence, political 
theories can actually be read as strategies (of resistance) put forward to 
social movements (Massumi 1992: 103, quoted in Gilbert 2008: 212):
“Strategies” is the best word for ways of becoming: they are less 
theories about becoming than practical guidelines serving as 
landmarks to future movement. They have no value unless they are 
immanent for their “object”: they must be verified by the collectivity 
concerned, in other words submitted to experimental evaluation and 
remapped as needed.   
 
According to Gilbert (2008: 213), political theories must have ‘an 
emphasis on pragmatics – on the question ‘what is to be done’ – and 
an orientation towards at least partially determinant imagined future’.23 
Similarly, Cardoso and Faletto (1979: xiv, quoted in Leonard 1990: xix) 
argue that ‘verification’ of a theory as a critical theory depends on its ability 
to ‘show socio-political actors the possible solutions to contradictory 
situations’ and in this way help them to ‘implement what are perceived 
as structural possibilities’. In the same vein, I argue in this thesis that 
currently popular and dominant theoretical discourses can be understood 
as ‘proposals’ for certain types of political strategies of resistance and 
therefore should be immanent for their objects – social movements, in 
this case the anti-war movement. The problem is that there have been no 
serious attempts to engage with the existing anti-war movement; without 
understanding its political and normative premises, it is as easy to make 
wrong interpretations as it is difficult to offer concrete suggestions on 
how to organize resistance more effectively. 
23 However, Gilbert (2008: 213) points out that ‘strategies must always be 
experimental and therefore provisional: that’s the difference between strategy and 
dogma’. This does not, however, lead to abandonment of a concept of strategy 
‘because politics cannot be fought effectively without it’ (ibid).
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Of course, it must be noted that not all scholars even aim to be critical 
theorists in the above sense. Many of them merely aim at analyzing 
and describing social movements rather than providing them with any 
suggestions on, for example, how to organize resistance more effectively. 
Yet, this is not an excuse for their failure to engage more intimately and 
empirically with the objects of their analyses and conceptualizations. 
Moreover, although many theorists who reflect upon social movements 
suggest that they do so from an ‘objective’ and value-free perspective, this 
is not quite true. In fact, no social theory can be politically neutral. If 
this is accepted as an epistemological tenet of the social sciences in more 
general terms24, it must be admitted that the understandings and values          
of any social scientist are influenced by numerous different factors25 that 
they can never totally escape. For example, defining a research subject is 
always connected to understandings of the kinds of political phenomena 
that are regarded as important and worth studying in a certain context 
and at a certain historical moment by the researcher as well as the broader 
epistemic community. Choosing theories, empirical cases or methods is 
not a neutral process, either, because such choices always involve some 
sort of value judgements. (Harle 2003: 36–37; also Fay 1987; 1998.) 
On balance, it is not possible to merely ‘describe’ social movements or 
objectively explain their practices. Accordingly, one must deliberate what 
kinds of political choices are made in the course of research and what 
kinds of values are advanced by conducting a certain type of research. 
Understanding the intimate relationship between power and knowledge 
imposes clear responsibilities on a researcher. The ‘minimum’ requirement 
is that she should at least avoid exacerbating inequality and oppression. 
However, this passive definition leaves much to be desired where the 
ultimate aim is active struggle against injustices (Leonard 1990: 268–
269, emphasis added):
24 As one peace researcher states, ‘insofar as all social science is involved in the 
extended use of reason in society the social function of social science is linked to the 
conduct of politics and against the violence of conduct’ (Horowitz 1970: 113).
25 The fact that a researcher herself is member of a certain society and specific 
academic discipline necessarily influences her own understandings in various ways, 
for example, due to historical and contextual factors, the epistemological premises of 
the discipline, values and ideologies embedded in the contemporary society, personal 
beliefs, historical experiences, and the like.
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The real question is whether we will allow ourselves to recognize our 
own roles in the perpetuation of unredeemed suffering, or retreat 
from the world of that suffering by seeing ourselves as merely 
innocent bystanders. In either case, we are not now innocent, nor can 
we ever really be innocent – as social agents or social theorists. 26
Hence, it is necessary for social scientists to acknowledge and openly 
bring out their own premises as well as to reflect upon their role and 
responsibilities as scholars. And indeed, since all political practices are 
socially constructed and conventional, they can be changed, including 
those which produce violence, poverty and suffering. None of these has to 
be viewed as inevitable or acceptable facts as such: society becomes what 
we make of it27. This is exactly where critical social science, as a vehicle 
for social change and emancipation, should step in. Therefore, not only 
would it be more honest for many theorists to acknowledge and openly 
bring out their own premises when analyzing social movements, but it 
might prove more productive for developing the theoretical debate further 
in connection with political practice. For this to take place, however, 
there should also be more direct engagement with social movements on 
the part of theorists.  
The present study undertakes a concrete effort to engage with a 
particular movement, that is, the anti-war movement. I argue that in 
the context of the theoretical debate where academic globalists introduce 
concepts such as the ‘war against war’ or ‘global civil society’ as ‘an 
answer to war’, it is absolutely necessary to study the understandings 
and premises within the current anti-war movement empirically. Only 
by engaging with the actual movement will it be possible to improve and 
develop the theories further – in terms of both reflecting the movement’s 
political practice better and providing practical suggestions for organizing 
resistance against war more effectively. 
26 Or, as Fay (1998: 241–245) puts it, hiding behind the mask of neutrality is not 
only useless but potentially dangerous as it allows structural violence and all sorts of 
injustices to continue undisrupted.  
27 Therefore, it has been suggested that the term ‘society’ should be regarded as a 
verb instead of a noun, a process rather than a thing (Fay 1998: 65).
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.2 Aims and Research Questions
The above introduction illustrated many problems in the ongoing 
theoretical debate. The different theoretical approaches are not only 
contradictory in terms of their claims and interpretations but are also, 
more or less explicitly, normative in nature – a feature which can be 
regarded as an open invitation to evaluate them from the perspective of 
critical theory. Normativity in itself does not, however, make a theory 
critical and emancipatory. As was argued with reference to the work of 
Leonard and Fay, for a political theory to be critical it must involve a 
practical intent and be able to address its ‘objects’ in their own terms in 
order to become adopted by them. 
In an attempt to address the problematique described above, this thesis 
seeks to develop the theoretical debate further by critically evaluating it 
from the standpoint of what, using Leonard’s (1990) terms, will be called 
here ‘critical theory in political practice’. Only by first demonstrating 
where and how the theories fall short – revealing their main failures 
and shortcomings – does it become possible to discuss how they can 
be improved. Such critical evaluation is a prerequisite for discussing the 
conditions under which the theories may not only become more reflective 
of the current political practice but also more practical in the sense of 
truly critical theory. 
Hence, the aim of this thesis is to critically reflect on the ongoing 
theoretical debate dealing with the concept of resistance in the context 
of social movements – and especially the anti-war movement – from 
the above-mentioned perspective and thereby to develop the theoretical 
debate further. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to engage with 
both the theories and the anti-war movement.
Before introducing the research questions, certain crucial details need 
to be presented regarding how the political practice of the movement is 
approached here as an object of study. As explained in the introduction, 
in social movement research it is common to study social movements 
by analyzing their concrete political practices and processes. In contrast 
to this approach, another perspective is adopted here (for the reasons 
explained in introduction): the movement is studied from the perspective 
of the premises and self-understandings which guide its political practice. 
In this sense, this study does not represent an ideological analysis either, 
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which would be a different and distintive approach (e.g. Gillan 2006), 
likely to limit the range of possible interpretations. If the movement were 
understood only in terms of ideologies, the author would be ‘forced’ to 
rely on related analytical frameworks, which would not be useful from 
the perspective of this thesis.   
The thesis is based on the idea that analyzing how the premises and 
self-understandings of the existing anti-war movement ‘resonate’ with 
the theoretical debate makes it possible to see what the theories ignore 
or fail to take into account. In this way, the theoretical debate can be 
developed further and opportunities can be explored for establishing a 
more intimate dialogue between the recently popular theories of resistance 
and the current anti-war movement. In light of this context, the main 
research questions addressed are the following: 
1. How much common ground there is between the 
theoretical realm and the anti-war movement at the 
moment? More specifically, how do the dominant 
theoretical approaches and their critiques currently relate to 
the political practice of the movement? 
2. What do the theoretical approaches fail to consider in 
terms of the political practice of the movement? 
3. To what extent are the values and beliefs embedded 
in the normative political projects and visions proposed 
by dominant theoretical approaches similar, or at least 
compatible, with those of the current movement?
.3 Methodology
Due to the nature of the main research questions, the methodology 
employed must be based on interplay between the theoretical and 
empirical levels. Answering the research questions requires two different 
analyses – a theoretical and an empirical one. Since the specific units of 
analysis to be studied in both theoretical and empirical terms need to be 
same in order to see how much they ‘resonate’, the theoretical debate 
must be analyzed first in order to determine the questions to be asked 
when examining the empirical material. 
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This kind of methodology, as well as the relationship between the 
theories and empirical material, is different from that used in studies 
where theories are used as research theories in the traditional sense for 
interpretation of empirical findings. Here, the theories are themselves 
analyzed, which constitutes an analysis in its own right. In the empirical 
analysis the findings of the theoretical analysis are utilized when looking 
for convergences and divergences between the theoretical and the 
empirical realms. In other words, the findings of the empirical analysis 
are considered in light of those obtained through the theoretical analysis. 
The approach thus echoes the notion that empirical studies are ‘crucial’ 
when developing ‘theoretical arguments over concepts and approaches’ 
(Patomäki 2008: 222).
The methodology for analyzing the theoretical debate has already 
been discussed above when outlining the ‘critical theory in political 
practice’ approach and the research questions. How then is one to study 
empirically the premises and understandings espoused by the anti-war 
movement, which is an extremely broad forum that includes thousands 
of groups in different countries across the world? Instead of trying to 
study them all, which would be impossible, the more constrained 
perspective of an empirical study has to be taken. In this regard, there are 
at least two possible approaches available. The first one would be to study 
anti-war groups in several different countries, which would definitely 
enable a broad understanding of the phenomenon and also bring in 
comparative perspectives. The second approach, which will be that used 
in this study, is to concentrate on a single country. In the present case, the 
object of empirical analysis is the British anti-war movement and, more 
specifically, four anti-war organizations. The case study, its justifications 
and limitations as well as the organizations under investigation are 
presented in detail later when, importantly, addressing also the danger of 
equating organizations with a movement (see chapter 3).
It is obvious that this kind of an analysis will not provide as broad an 
understanding as a study where movements in several countries are studied. 
However, in some respects it may well enable a deeper understanding. By 
looking closely not only at the premises of the anti-war groups but also 
analyzing them in relation to a specific national framework, domestic 
politics and local concerns, it might be possible to make more enlightened 
interpretations. Concentrating on one country and on a certain socio-
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political context may thus facilitate a more holistic understanding.28 
Nevetheless, it must be acknowledged that this approach does limit the 
scope of generalizations to be made in regard to the relationship between 
theoretical and empirical materials. This dilemma is difficult to avoid in 
this kind of a research setting, but it can be to some extent alleviated by 
openly bringing it up and reflecting on it in the course of the study.  
One further remark needs to be made in regard to the methodology 
or, rather, the research orientation. Much as the analysis of the theoretical 
debate must do, the empirical analysis need recognize the political nature 
and political aspects of the object. Since the anti-war movement is clearly 
a political agent, resistance against war needs to be understood inherently 
as a political endeavour and phenomenon (Rochon 1988: 216), a fact 
which I, as a political scientist, need to accommodate in my analysis29. 
Political theorists must also always engage in critical evaluation of the 
political motives of the actors that are studied as well as critically reflect on 
the issue of power in the relationship between different political actors. 
In sum, this is simultaneously a study about recent and popular 
theoretical discourses of resistance and a study of politics of resistance 
in the context of the anti-war movement. My aim as a researcher is to 
act as a critical mediator between the metatheories and micropolitics of 
resistance.  To be sure, the aim is not to propose a new political theory of 
resistance for the anti-war movement but to evaluate, and thereby develop 
further, certain aspects of the currently dominant theoretical approaches 
and their critiques in relation to the anti-war movement.30 
28 Obviously, the most comprehensive approach would be to combine both 
of the above-mentioned perspectives and to study many anti-war groups in many 
different countries while also analyzing their local contexts in depth. However, it 
would be a very demanding, almost impossible, task to carry out in one thesis and by 
one researcher, as it would require collecting data from many countries.   
29 Here, the subjectivity of the researcher needs to be greatly emphasized. However, 
although it is impossible to be objective or totally neutral, subjectivity in this context 
should not mean outright political advocacy of any particular perspective.  
30 Cannot the researcher herself then be criticized for not ‘talking to the 
movement’ due to her being more concerned with analyzing the theoretical debate? 
This certainly is a relevant question since the thesis does not directly aim to inform 
practice through theory. However, as the study seeks to develop theories further by 
making them engage with an empirical case (informing theory through practice), it 
may be possible to indirectly inform practice through theory: as a result of improved 
theories, practice can be better informed through the theories.  
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At first glance, the present research setting, whose main aim has been 
translated into several research questions to be answered through two 
different sets of analysis, a theoretical and an empirical, may seem a 
complex one, but, as will be shown, all of the above-mentioned aspects 
are intimately connected to each other. To restrict the perspective to 
something less would mean that the approach adopted here would either 
follow the same logic as the theories under critical investigation or that it 
would represent more of a traditional kind of social movement research 
– a direction of scholarship that this thesis clearly diverges from, although 
social movement theory and related studies will be used for explaining 
and contextualizing certain findings31.
.4 Structure
Chapter 2 constitutes the theoretical analysis in relation to which the 
empirical analysis will be conducted. The chapter analyzes the ongoing 
contradictory theoretical debate first by evaluating two dominant 
theoretical discourses, the liberal cosmopolitan and the radical 
poststructuralist approach, and then the critique of them presented by 
the critical state-centric approach. The aim of the chapter is twofold. 
Firstly, by discussing each approach in detail the chapter seeks to 
outline the main differences between their conceptualizations and 
suggestions while also reflecting upon their normative premises. The 
chapter demonstrates that the approaches differ substantially in their 
conceptualizations of resistance, power and politics. For example, the 
approaches differ in how they generally regard the effectiveness and power 
of social movements (as well as the power of their primary opponents) in 
the international system; this then leads them to define political strategies 
of resistance either in terms of state-based or global strategies. In the 
context of the Iraq War, their interpretations of the main causes of the war 
and the extent of exceptionality of the US hegemony are also divergent. 
31 In this regard, the study draws on both general social movement theory (e.g. 
Tilly 2004; Tilly & Tarrow 2007; della Porta & Diani 2006; Walker 1988) and on a 
wide variety of literature on the anti-war/peace movement (e.g. Chatfield 1992;1997; 
DeBenedetti & Chatfield 1990; Cortright 2006; 2007a; 2008; Gillan et al. 2008; 
Gillan 2006; Hinton 1989; Overy 1982; Rochon 1988; Taylor & Young 1987a).  
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Secondly, drawing on the theoretical analysis, an outline of and a 
specific technique for the empirical analysis are formulated. These are 
presented in detail in chapter 3, which also introduces the case study, 
research materials and method of the empirical part. A short review of 
the history of the anti-war/peace movement is also provided in order to 
better illustrate the broader international and national context in which 
the organizations studied operate. 
The rest of the thesis consists of five empirical analysis chapters, each 
of which considers one major aspect of the theoretical debate in light of 
the empirical material, and a concluding chapter. Chapter 4 addresses 
the who-question of resistance, chapter 5 the what- and why-questions 
(aims, targets and causes of resistance), chapter 6 the how-question 
(strategies and tactics of resistance); chapter 7 discusses the question of 
power (elements and definitions of power) and chapter 8 that of effects 
(successes and failures of the movement). In each of the chapters, the 
findings based on the theoretical material are discussed in terms of the 
empirical material, with a summing up of the main convergences and 
divergences between the two perspectives, and concluding remarks on 
the extent to which the two seem to ‘resonate’ with each other.
Chapter 4 reflects on the theoretical debate on the character and 
ascendance of the movement against the Iraq War in which the movement 
is described with increasing frequency as a new kind of a global movement, 
thus emphasizing its political agency from that particular perspective. It 
analyzes how the the political agency of the movement, its ascendence as 
well as the new and global elements proclaimed by academic globalists are 
conceived within the movement itself. The chapter demonstrates that the 
organizations studied regard the movement more often from a national 
or international than a global perspective and that it is also common 
to regard the movement as a continuation of the ‘old’ movement, not 
something completely new and extraordinary. It also shows that the 
ascendence of the movement was not as easy or consensual process as 
academic globalists assume. Moreover, the chapter reveals internal 
disagreements and conflicts between the organizations in regard to 
leadership issues, cooperation, the preferred extent of centralization of 
the movement and its connection to other movements.   
Chapter 5 reflects on the theoretical debate concerning the aims, 
targets of resistance and causes of the war in its broader political context 
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by analyzing how these are defined and articulated within the movement. 
It is demonstrated that instead of citing the abstract global opponents of 
the radical poststructuralist approach, most of the organizations define 
the main targets of resistance in quite traditional terms, that is, nation 
states and governments, which locates them closest to the state-centric 
approach. In regard to the long-term aims, there is, however, also some 
resonance with the two other discourses. The fact that the results are mixed 
shows that the movement has simultaneously clearly articulated state-level 
opponents but also more abstract targets of resistance. In regard to the 
causes of the war and the role of the US, the analysis discovers that many 
organizations hold views that differ substantially from those put forward 
by the theoretical approaches. Moreover, the chapter illustrates divisions 
and tensions between the organizations in regard to how they consider 
the relationship between the short- and long-term aims of the movement 
as well as to which broader struggles they link the movement. 
In chapter 6 the theoretical debate concerning effective strategies as 
well as the primary context of resistance is reflected on by analyzing how 
these are understood within the movement. The chapter discovers most 
resonance with the state-centric approach but finds also some common 
ground with the globalist frameworks in regard to long-term struggles 
of the movement. These mixed results illustrate that instead of defining 
strategies in either nationally or globally oriented terms, as the theoretical 
approaches do, most of the organizations advocate a ‘both-and’ approach: 
they consider both state-based and global strategies important for the 
movement, although for different purposes. However, the organizations 
differ from each other in what they consider the primary context of 
resistance and there is also considerable disagreement regarding which 
strategies and, even more so, which tactics they regard as the most 
effective. Of all the internal divisions, that relating to main strategies and 
tactics seems to cause the most controversy.  
Chapters 7 and 8 are closely interrelated, as they consider the issue 
of the effects and the power of the movement. Chapter 7 reflects on 
the theoretical debate dealing with the power of social movements by 
analyzing how the organizations articulate the power of the current anti-
war movement. It shows that it is common to articulate it in relation to 
the national context in which the movement can seek to pressure those 
in power. Thus, the analysis shows most resonance with the state-centric 
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approach. This does not, however, exclude the view that also symbolic 
power at the global level is important. When compared to the theoretical 
debate, the chapter concludes that each of the organizations has generally 
a broader and more multifaceted understanding of power than any of 
the three theoretical approaches. While the theoretical debate is based on 
a clear ‘either-or’ logic, where power is conceptualized either in purely 
instrumental or purely symbolic terms, most organizations combine these 
two perspectives and consider both important in the struggle against (the) 
war. However, the chapter shows some tensions within the movement, 
regarding, for example, the celebration of diversity as a power resource. It 
is also problematic that hardly ever power of the organizations themselves, 
and even more rarely, power struggles between them are discussed openly 
or power of the movement is evaluated from a critical perspective. 
Broadening the discussion above, chapter 8 helps to contextualize the 
observations made in regard to the question of power by examining how 
the main achievements and failures are viewed within the movement in 
the context of the Iraq War. It demonstrates that in contrast to the ‘either-
or’ logic of the theoretical debate, the organizations usually conceive 
the successes in both instrumental and symbolic as well as in both 
global and national terms. Yet there are substantial differences between 
the organizations in regard to what they consider the most important 
successes of the movement and what they expect it to be able to achieve. 
Chapter 9 summarizes the conclusions of the thesis and discusses 
their relevance from a broader perspective. The findings of each analytical 
chapter are first presented separately, after which their implications for 
the theoretical debate are discussed. It is concluded that the theoretical 
approaches are based on an excessively simple ‘either-or’ logic in 
almost every possible respect, that is, regardless of whether the theory 
is conceptualizing aims, agency, opponents, primary context of political 
engagement, strategies, effects or the power of the movement. While this 
is to a large extent due to a lack of engagement with the existing anti-war 
movement, more clearly the ‘either-or’ logic derives from the tendency to 
emphasize either symbolic power (academic globalists) or instrumental 
power (critical state-centric approach), which in turn stems from their 
differing normative and political premises. Academic globalists view 
state-based representational politics in highly negative terms, suggesting 
that democracy in the context of traditional political institutions can no 
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longer serve the interests of the people. They believe that rather than 
trying to change specific policies of nation states and governments, social 
movements such as the anti-war movement should seek to challenge the 
whole traditional political system. In contrast, the state-centric approach 
strongly criticizes the idea of global forms of political engagement, which 
are regarded as not only undermining the democratic representational 
system but also escaping power due to the abstract, global and non-
strategic nature of ‘post-political’ struggle.  
It is suggested that the ‘either-or’ logic embedded in all three theoretical 
approaches is problematic from the perspective of the existing anti-war 
movement, because the organizations within the movement themselves 
conceptualize most of the issues covered in the thesis in mixed and 
overlapping terms, that is, they deploy a ‘both-and’ approach instead. 
Furthermore, the concluding chapter shows that the theoretical debate 
fails entirely to take into account internal divisions, political conflicts 
and power struggles within the anti-war movement. This is especially 
problematic for the academic globalists, who conceptualize the Multitude 
and global civil society as essentially consensual global political collectives. 
Although it may seem that there is a widespread consensus within the 
movement, below the surface there are many ongoing political conflicts 
and struggles. It is difficult to accommodate all these in one (inter)national 
movement, not to mention a global one. In a word, transforming the 
movement into something more permanent and global is an extremely 
challenging endeavor which cannot be established ‘from above’. 
From the perspective of ‘normal’ political theory, it is unfortunate 
that a lack of engagement with the existing movement leads theorists to 
make inadequate interpretations. More importantly, however, from the 
perspective of critical theory it is problematic that theorists define political 
projects of resistance in a way that renders their conceptualizations 
autonomous from practice and their normative suggestions and visions in 
many respects different from the values and beliefs within the movement. 
Therefore, it is suggested that the theories to can be developed further by 
adopting a ‘both-and’ approach which not better reflects the way in which 
the relationship between the local and global as well as many other issues 
are conceived within the movement and also provides a more productive 
and comprehensive perspective for discussing power and resistance in the 
context of social movements generally. 
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2          ANALYSIS OF THE THEORETICAL DEBATE 
2. Introduction 
This chapter analyzes theoretical discourses that have recently engaged 
in a debate concerning resistance in the context of social movements 
in the global era. This debate is ongoing and multifaceted and it is not 
possible or necessary to consider all the discussion it comprises. The aim 
here, as noted in the introduction, is to analyze those ‘globally oriented’ 
theoretical discourses that can be regarded as currently popular and even 
dominant in IR. Criticism of the dominant discourses presented by 
certain scholars is introduced and assessed as well. The analysis conducted 
here constitutes the theoretical part of the thesis, although not in the 
most traditional sense.
Since the aim is to critically analyze the theoretical debate in order 
to develop it further, there must be an intimate interplay between the 
theoretical analysis conducted in this chapter and the empirical analysis 
to follow in later chapters, which aims to determine how much common 
ground there is between the theoretical and practical realms at the 
moment. In practical terms, this means that the ‘findings’ or ‘conclusions’ 
of the theoretical analysis in this chapter are used later on for evaluating 
empirical findings to ascertain possible convergences and divergences 
with the theoretical debate. The aim of this chapter is thus twofold: to first 
analyze the theoretical debate and then, on that basis, to design a research 
outline for the empirical analysis. The latter will include formulating the 
units of analysis, that is, the questions that need to be asked in light of 
the empirical material to be able to reflect upon the theoretical debate; in 
other words, the units of empirical analysis must derive from theory.   
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is necessary to shortly reflect 
upon how ‘resistance’ is defined in the context of this study, as it is 
such a central concept1. Here, resistance is understood quite broadly as 
a conscious process of trying to change unwanted practices, a process 
1 The term ‘resistance movement’, although used before the Second World War, 
is often connected to that particular context, and especially to the French resistance 
movement;  and has been later used to signify basically any (underground) resistance 
movement in any country. 
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which takes place in the form of certain political strategies of oppositional 
action against something2. Resistance can thus be regarded as a form of, or 
way of organizing, power which aims at transforming unwanted political 
practices and/or existing power. As a concept it is intimately linked to 
the concept of power, which has been – and continues to be – the most 
fundamental concept in IR and Political Science. Until recently, however, 
resistance has been mainly understood in terms of resistance movements, 
usually defined as organized movements committed to resisting (trying 
to change) the policies of a government (or an occupying power) by 
either violent or nonviolent means. To be sure, a resistance movement 
in its common meaning is regarded as an organized effort that aims at 
changing the nature of current power, not overthrowing it3.
In postmodern and especially Foucauldian conceptualizations, power 
and resistance, as well as their relationship, are defined quite differently; 
the main argument is that they are intimately interrelated and cannot 
exist without each other (e.g. Foucault 1984: 93–95; 1980). This kind 
of an understanding of power and resistance is especially common in 
poststructuralist theoretical discourses, but with the ever-increasing 
popularity of Foucault, it has become popular in the social sciences 
and political theory also more generally. Indeed, it can be argued that 
these developments have had a significant influence on how the concept 
of resistance has recently been used in new and varying contexts:  as 
a concept it is no longer linked only to traditionally defined resistance 
2 In the context of the anti-war movement the concept of resistance refers to 
oppositional political action which aims at resisting war – either a particular war or 
war in general. It is important to note that within the field of anti-war studies there 
already exists a specific concept of ‘war resistance’ which is widely used in the research 
literature (e.g. Young 1987b: 23–48). However, in this study ‘war resistance’ is not a 
central concept due the fact that the theoretical framework to which the thesis seeks 
to contribute is not located in either the traditional social movement research (on 
anti-war/peace movement) or the field of traditional peace studies. 
3 If its aim is to overthrow a government, a movement is usually regarded as              
‘revolutionary’, potentially dangerous and destabilizing. The term ‘insurgency’ is 
often used in such cases by state and military officials. However, even resistance 
movements are sometimes defined in the above-mentioned way. For example, the 
US Department of Defense defines a resistance movement as an organized effort 
by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established 
government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability (DOD 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms). 
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movements, but is also associated with new social movements that are 
operating in liberal and democratic western societies. Indeed, it seems 
that postmodern theory has made it common to conceptualize basically 
any social movement as some sort of ‘resistance movement’, which is an 
extremely interesting phenomenon in itself. Moreover, with increasingly 
many social movements conceptualized as global movements, the idea of 
‘global resistance movements’ has become popular. However, as this thesis 
demonstrates, these conceptualizations are not without problems and it 
is necessary to acknowledge that accepting (or rejecting) them always has 
certain political implications. 
2.2 Three Theoretical Approaches to Resistance 
The theoretical approaches to be analyzed here are divided into two 
broader categories – those theoretical discourses which emphasize the 
transformative character of globalization, especially from the perspective 
of the role and power of social movements, and those which challenge 
these interpretations. These are not to be regarded as diametric opposites 
and, as will be demonstrated later, some of them may even share certain 
premises – a fact which is important when discussing the findings of the 
empirical analysis.4 For the purposes of this thesis, the theoretical discourses 
studied are referred to as ‘academic globalists’ and ‘academic globalization 
skeptics’. The emphasis on the term academic is intended to distinguish 
these theoretical thinkers from political actors and activists who, for 
example, David Held and Anthony McGrew (2002) have described as 
‘globalists’ and ‘globalization skeptics’. The academic globalists are further 
divided into two groups, liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists. 
To be sure, it is not argued that these are the only possible groups within 
the category of academic globalists, but they are the most relevant in this 
context as they have recently and very actively engaged in debates on how 
the problem of war can be tackled by social movements in the twenty-
first century. In contrast to the academic globalists, the second category 
4 It should be noted that some sort of simplification through categorization is 
required in highlighting the main differences between theoretical approaches. Any 
sort of categorization always risks losing some nuances but is nonetheless necessary 
when the aim is to illustrate main points of difference and similarity.
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can be called ‘academic globalization skeptics’, which in this study refers 
to an approach I have chosen to call the critical state-centric approach, 
which very well captures the main points of criticism directed towards 
theoretical discourses advocating globalism.  
These three theoretical approaches are studied through an analysis of 
works by certain central scholars. The liberal cosmopolitan approach is 
examined mainly through the work of IR theorists such as Mary Kaldor 
and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and sociologists such as Ulrich Beck and Manuel 
Castells. The poststructuralist approach is studied as it is reflected in 
theorizations by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, and the state-centric 
approach in light of the critique by David Chandler. These are by no 
means the only scholars taking part in the debate,5 but are here taken as 
examples, since it would be impossible to analyze all the related discussion. 
In sum, the theorizations of the scholars are treated here as illustrative 
examples of current political theories describing and conceptualizing the 
role and power of social movements from different perspectives.6 
Why then is it important and relevant to study precisely these three 
theoretical approaches and not some others? It can be argued that the 
first two approaches mentioned are currently dominant in the theoretical 
discourse and the third is a recent – and essentially the only comprehensive 
– critique of the two, although it fails to address some important aspects 
of the academic globalists which will be taken up in this thesis. The 
argument put forward here is that since they are all influential discourses 
that suggest more or less explicitly certain types of political strategies 
of resistance for social movements, it is important to study them from 
the perspective of ‘critical theory in political practice’. This necessarily 
requires analyzing their premises in relation to those espoused by social 
movements, the anti-war movement in the present case. Although these 
theoretical approaches are not ‘designed’ especially for the anti-war 
5 Just to give a few examples, IR scholars such as David Held and Martin Shaw can 
be labelled as liberal cosmopolitans and Chantal Mouffe as a critical state-centric. 
6 It is not an unusual approach to limit the number of scholars whose work is 
analyzed in a thesis and to treat them as examples of certain political traditions or 
approaches. In this case, it is also necessary due to the fact that there are two sets 
of analysis (theoretical and empirical) in one thesis, both of which include several 
categories. The theoretical analysis encompasses three different approaches, and the 
empirical the premises of four anti-war organizations. 
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movement, they do have many elements which concern it in particular. 
Firstly, as explained in the introduction, liberal cosmopolitans 
conceptualize global civil society as an ‘answer to war’, thus representing 
social movements (including the anti-war movement) as an integral 
element in resistance (political action) against war. In their analytical 
description of social movements, liberal cosmopolitans suggest – either 
in implicit or explicit terms – that movements should concentrate their 
efforts on global rather than state-based political strategies of opposition 
since liberal cosmopolitans are highly skeptical of working through or 
with established political institutions of representative democracy at a 
national level. Secondly, the radical poststructuralist approach, although 
it does not explicitly address the anti-war movement either, nevertheless 
talks about ‘a war against war’. This struggle against a ‘global state of 
war’ is supposedly taking place in the form of the Multitude, which 
consists of a diverse collection of social movements. In this regard, 
radical poststructuralists suggest that social movements should ‘globalize 
resistance’, that is, rely on a global strategy of resistance instead of favoring 
state-based political strategies. 
Thirdly, although the critical state-centric approach is not directly 
concerned with the anti-war movement, as a theoretical discourse 
it must be regarded as important and relevant in this context, for it 
straightforwardly challenges the two global approaches. In criticizing 
heavily global strategies of resistance, the approach suggests that 
social movements should rather invest in state-based political action 
(or resistance) and work together with, rather than in opposition to, 
democratic representative institutions. 
Importantly, it must be acknowledged that these three theoretical 
approaches differ in the extent as well as the nature of normativity 
embedded in them, which means that criticism of them stems from 
different perspectives of the ‘critical theory in practice’ approach used to 
evaluate them. Liberal cosmopolitans mostly describe social movements 
and their activities rather than aim at providing clear suggestions for 
political strategies. However, it is possible and necessary to analyze their 
conceptualizations from the perspective of critical theory, because in 
analyzing social movements in a certain way the scholars cannot avoid 
producing guidelines for social movements and thus at least implicitly 
promote a certain normative framework for the movements. In fact, 
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some liberal cosmopolitans explicitly argue that social movements should 
globalize political action. Liberal cosmopolitans also explicitly advocate 
the ideal of a globally oriented liberal cosmopolitan political regime. 
Thus, it can be argued that they do not merely describe and analyze social 
movements, although they often wish to give the impression that they are 
doing only that, and in an ‘objective’ and value-free manner. 
Radical poststructuralists clearly aim at providing suggestions for 
social movements and are very open about the normative character of 
their suggestions. They candidly promote increasingly global strategies 
for social movements from their own normative perspective based on 
the Multitude’s ‘war against war’, which is believed to be leading to a 
communistic revolution and global socialist regime. The difference when 
compared to the liberal cosmopolitans is that radical poststructuralists 
have an explicitly normative political project. On the one hand, this can 
be regarded as a positive element, because that is obviously what any 
critical theory should have; on the other hand, it can be also be regarded 
as problematic if it turns out that they are suggesting (or even imposing) 
a political project that does not resonate with the normative premises of 
social movements themselves. 
The state-centric approach does not so much describe or suggest as 
criticize, the object of its critique being not only both globalist theoretical 
discourses, but also the practices of certain globally oriented social 
movements. Nevertheless, the approach can also be regarded as open to 
evaluation from the perspective of ‘critical theory in political practice’. 
Firstly, it can be argued that although it strongly criticizes the two other 
approaches for lacking a political subject/movement to which they might 
direct their suggestions, it does not have one itself either. Secondly, while 
it criticizes global approaches for imposing their normative ideals on (yet 
non-existent) movements, it inevitably promotes a certain normative 
framework itself in suggesting that social movements should concentrate 
their resistance at the state level and work with the political establishment 
in the context of representative democracy. 
The logic of the analysis is the following. Each theoretical approach is 
analyzed separately in a dedicated section. Firstly, each is examined from 
the perspective of how it conceptualizes the Iraq War, and thus the role 
and power of the US in the current international system. Secondly, each is 
assessed from the perspective of the kind of strategies of resistance it offers 
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and suggests to social movements. In this connection, it is explored how 
the proposals are justified and the kinds of conceptualizations of power 
they are based on. With regard to both of these questions, the theoretical 
approaches are also analyzed in terms of the kinds of normative premises 
they base their conceptualizations and suggestions on.7 
2.3 The Liberal Cosmopolitan Approach 
2.3. The Iraq War and the Exceptionalism of US Hegemony
The liberal cosmopolitan approach is characterized by its firm trust in 
international institutions, agreements and cooperation between states as 
means to prevent and stop wars. After the end of the Cold War, liberal 
cosmopolitans were very optimistic, for the immediate threat posed by the 
Cold War was removed, and they put a great deal of hope in international 
institutions, especially the UN. It was believed that there were going to 
be fewer conflicts and wars, because liberal democracy, as a peaceful form 
of government, was now spreading all over the world while economic 
interdependence was growing as well. These views were put to the test by 
several international crises and conflicts during the 1990s, not least the 
Kosovo War in 1999. However, it was not until the US War on Terror 
that different realities started to appear. Since then, many of the most 
optimistic views of liberal cosmopolitans have been challenged, as the US 
unilaterally bypassed international law by ‘pre-emptively’ attacking Iraq 
militarily without authorization of the UN Security Council.     
However, it seems that not even these developments have eroded 
liberal cosmopolitans’ belief in liberal values and cosmopolitanism as 
such; rather, they have interpreted the war in terms of the exceptional 
role and power of the US. Indeed, in regard to the War on Terror and 
especially the Iraq War, many liberal cosmopolitans have stressed that the 
7 Although the theoretical approaches are here linked to the particular context 
of the Iraq War, the approaches as such are not ‘fixed’ to a specific context of any 
particular war. In this thesis, attention is paid especially to their views in regard 
to the Iraq War as intimately connected to the War on Terror, because in this way 
it is possible to confine and direct the perspective to the same context that the 
organizations studied concentrate on in the new anti-war movement.  
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problem of war in the current international system is intimately connected 
to the exceptional character of the US hegemony. Mary Kaldor, Joseph S. 
Nye, Jr. and Ulrich Beck, among others, have criticized the US for acting 
unilaterally instead of promoting a multilateral approach including 
all liberal and democratic western states and the broader international 
community. In this regard, some liberal cosmopolitans have gone even so 
far as to criticize the US for constructing a ‘permanent state of exception’ 
that serves its national interest by making it more sovereign than other 
states (Kaldor 2003b: 12; also 2004).
For example, Kaldor (2003b: 12; also 2004) has argued that this 
permanent state of (international) exception has made the US sovereign 
in absolute terms. According to this logic, all nations have to unite with 
the US to fight against rogue states threatening all of humanity; otherwise, 
they themselves risk being categorized as enemies of humankind. In this 
view, the failure or unwillingness of the US to recognize the need for 
a multilateral and cosmopolitan approach is regarded as a major threat 
to the proper working of the international system as well as a threat 
to international stability. The unilateralism of the US is regarded as 
diminishing the significance of international law, whose importance the 
liberal cosmopolitans strongly emphasize. 
The fact that the national (the US) perspective clashes increasingly 
often with the cosmopolitan is regarded as one of the main problems. As 
Beck (2006: 123) puts it: ‘The two images of world society clash, the one 
beholden to the national outlook, the other to the cosmopolitan outlook 
– on the one hand, world society viewed as a patchwork of nation-states 
(hence the sum of the sovereign states) and, on the other, an at once 
individualized and globalized world society as a cosmopolitan human 
rights regime’. A similar concern is presented, for example, by Tim 
Dunne (2003: 306), who is worried about the universalistic domination 
of the US over international society. Dunne sees two major threats here, 
the absence of a balance of power and a lack of consensus between the 
major powers in world politics (ibid): 
[W]hile [Hedley] Bull thought the primary challenge to international 
society was the ‘revolt’ against the West by newly decolonized states 
and peoples, the main threat today would appear to be a revolt against 
the institutions of international society by the US.
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Although some liberal cosmopolitans use the concept ‘permanent 
exception’, it seems that more generally the approach nonetheless believes 
that the exceptional situation is not going to last for long. Indeed, many 
adherents maintain that in the long run it will become impossible for the 
US to act unilaterally and violate international norms without sanctions. 
(E.g. Dunne 2003: 303–304, 315–316.) For example, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 
(2004a: 66) argues that the fact that unilateralism was transformed ‘from 
an occasional tactic to a full-fledged strategy’ in the case of Iraq has been 
very costly to the US in terms of soft power. Accordingly, he suggests that 
the US should ‘invest more in its own soft-power resources, and learn to 
wield its soft power more effectively’ (ibid: 98). 
Nye believes that soft power, related to persuading and tempting 
others, is challenging the role of military-related hard power. In his view, 
soft power is an ability of an actor to reach its goal in such a way that 
it can convince others to do as it wishes of their own ‘free’ will. As soft 
power denotes the ability to attract others and shape their preferences, 
it is based on persuasion and not on direct influence. (Nye 2004a: 2–5; 
2004b: 124–125; also Nye 1990; Keohane & Nye 2001.) According to 
Nye (2004a: 17), soft power is extremely important in the promotion of 
‘democracy, human rights, and open markets’ since it is easier ‘to attract 
people to democracy than to coerce them to be democratic’. In a word, 
he is very explicit about the core values held in liberalism generally. He 
stresses that these values may be challenged by unpopular foreign policy, 
which in the case of Iraq has resulted in the declining attractiveness of the 
US ‘as measured by the global opinion polls’ (ibid: 14, 38).
Similarly, Beck (2006: 123) refers to world opinion in arguing that 
the ‘hybrid illegal-legitimate’ Iraq War ‘both alarmed and individualized 
world opinion’. To him, it seemed as if ‘each individual was confronted 
with the existential choice between war and peace’ while being ‘drawn into 
a maelstrom of moral and political dilemmas or appealed to the available 
positions to take a clear stance for or against it’ (ibid: 123–124). This, in 
turn, showed ‘how US military unilateralism set in train an unintended 
and unwelcome cosmopolitanism of side effects’ (ibid: 124).8  
8 Suggestions by soft-power theorists such as Nye that the US should invest more 
in public diplomacy to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of Muslims and other ‘dissatisfied’ 
groups have been criticized widely (e.g. Islam 2006: 83–85; Chiddick 2006).
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The arguments by Nye and Beck illustrate the commonly shared view 
within the liberal cosmopolitan approach that war is a common problem 
which can be solved by states acting on shared values and principles, 
adhering to international law and seeking approval from the international 
community, which reflects as well as produces the norms of the world 
political society. Because liberal cosmopolitans believe that the norms 
and values which guide state level decision-making are constituted inside 
the international community and/or global civil society, they regard non-
state actors as very important. 
One of the shortcomings of this approach, however, is that it assumes 
that there really exist commonly shared cosmopolitan, that is, universal, 
values that can be rationally discussed; indeed, it has not always been 
possible to find reasonable and peaceful solutions to political conflicts 
by negotiating. A further weakness is that liberal cosmopolitans do not 
usually problematize their own perspective insofar as they seem not to 
find anything wrong with the ‘liberal way of war’9.  
Although typically uncritical of the humanitarian justifications of 
the liberal interventionism of western states generally, in regard to the 
War on Terror liberal cosmopolitans have taken a more critical stance. 
They strongly criticize the US and even argue that the Iraq War illustrates 
that the US has gained too much power in the international system. 
On the surface, the emphasis on the exceptionalism of US power and 
hegemony bears some resemblance to the criticism voiced by more 
radical approaches, as we will see later on. However, the difference is that 
radical poststructuralists not only point their finger at the US, but also 
emphasize broader ideological factors and power structures behind the 
problem of war, whereby they frame their proposed solutions in different 
terms. While criticizing the role and power of western states and the 
premises of liberalism more generally, radical approaches usually regard 
liberal cosmopolitanism as part (and sometimes even as a cause) of the 
problem rather than as a solution. 
In contrast, liberal cosmopolitans do not believe that radical structural 
changes are necessary; rather, they suggest that all that is needed is to put 
the US ‘back on track’ with the ‘rest of the world’. In this sense, the 
9 For a critique of the ‘liberal way of war’, see e.g. Reid 2006; Dillon & Reid              
2009. 
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approach more or less explicitly ends up favoring the current status quo, 
although in the long run the aim is the creation of a global cosmopolitan 
society, which, it is thought, will make the world more peaceful and 
secure. In other words, a liberal order is equated with peace and justice, 
although at the same time such an order is tantamount to violence and 
poverty for many outside the western world. 
Moreover, liberal cosmopolitans believe that this global political 
regime, a global society (and later a world government), can and should 
be constructed consensually, gradually and non-radically. Similarly, they 
think that global problems in general are best tackled by enhancements 
of global civil society together with more contracts and institutions; that 
is, peace can be achieved with more governance constituted at the global 
level.10 In this regard, the difference vis-à-vis critical approaches is quite 
substantial. While liberal cosmopolitans speak, for example, of ‘a new form 
of consensual global governance’ (Castells 2008: 91, emphasis added), the 
radical approaches regard precisely the increasing extent of governance by 
liberal states and institutions as one of the main problems. 
2.3.2 State (US) Power Challenged: Global Civil Society 
         
As regards the possibilities of political action against war (liberal 
cosmopolitans hardly ever use the term ‘resistance’; it does not seem to 
belong to their conceptual vocabulary), after the end of the Cold War 
the view that international institutions, legal agreements and cooperation 
between states are the best means to prevent and stop wars was especially 
strong. However, the events of 9/11, the consequent US War on Terror, 
and particularly the Iraq War have resulted in liberal cosmopolitans not 
only demanding more governance on the part of the (liberal) society of 
states, but also increasingly emphasizing the role of global civil society 
and non-state actors in this regard. Global civil society has even been 
characterized as ‘an answer to war’. For example, Kaldor (2003a: 3) argues 
that global civil society should be understood as ‘a way of addressing the 
10 On liberal global governance, see e.g. Held 1995; 2007; Held & McGrew 
2002. 
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problem of war, of debating, arguing about, discussing and pressing for 
possible solutions or alternatives’11.
What then is meant by ‘global civil society’ here? In describing Global 
Civil Society – An Answer to War as a book ‘about a political idea’, Kaldor 
(2003a: 3) argues that the term ‘expresses a real phenomenon, even if the 
boundaries of the phenomenon vary according to different definitions, 
and even if the shape and direction of the phenomenon are constantly 
changing’. In other words, global civil society is characterized as a real 
phenomenon that is nevertheless difficult to define or to describe. Indeed, 
the idea of global civil society is a very broad one and there is no single 
definition of it12. Yet, there are some commonly held understandings 
within the liberal cosmopolitan approach that help to explain why it is 
that global civil society can be concenptualized as ‘an answer to war’. 
First of all, the term itself makes it clear that global civil society refers 
to something regarded as being beyond the boundaries of nation states. 
Kaldor (2003a: 79; also 2002; 2003c) very explicitly points out that 
‘the central thrust’ of her argument is that ‘a strict distinction’ between 
‘national’ and ‘global’ cannot be drawn, because ‘those distinctions no 
longer make sense’. Her argumentation is very similar to that of sociologists 
such as Manuel Castells and Ulrich Beck. Castells (2008: 84, emphasis 
in original) argues that social movements and other non-state actors 
constitute global civil society in the sense that they have ‘a global frame of 
reference in their action and goals’. It is suggested that new transnational 
communities are creating a basis for social coexistence, cooperation and 
bonding (ibid: 49–50) as citizens-voters realize there are forces operating 
beyond the state and problems that national governments cannot solve 
on their own (Kriesberg 1997: 9; Smith et al. 1997: 60). For Castells 
(2008: 81), globalization represents a process constituting ‘a social system 
with the capacity to work as a unit on a planetary scale’. While it is not 
that ‘everything or everyone is globalized’, he argues that global networks 
‘structure the whole planet’, affecting ‘everything and everyone’ (ibid). 
Convinced of the break-up of ‘the nation-state orthodoxy of politics 
and society’, Beck (2000: 65) talks about ‘the emergence of new power 
11 Kaldor presented similar views already in the 1980s when she was actively 
taking part in British anti-nuclear campaigns (e.g. Kaldor 1987).    
12 Kaldor (2003a: 6–12) herself differentiates between five civil societies: societas 
civilis, bourgeois society, and activist, neoliberal and postmodern societies. 
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opportunities and new social spaces for action, living and perception’. 
Suggesting that these developments may lead people to demand ‘direct 
democracy – on a world scale’, he speaks of a ‘global nexus of responsibility’, 
where people take part in political decision-making directly, not via 
representatives (ibid: 70). As Beck himself notes, this bears a resemblance 
to the utopia of a cosmopolitan society outlined by Immanuel Kant two 
hundred years ago in Perpetual Peace.13 Kant contrasted cosmopolitan 
society with representative democracy, which he opposed as ‘despotic’, 
preferring global responsibility in which individuals would take part in 
decision-making directly. In that view, cosmopolitan society is regarded 
as a condition precedent to democracy. However, it presupposes some 
universally valid legal relationships and some form of a self-experience of 
global civil society. (Ibid: 70, 88–89.)
What then could be regarded as a self-experience of global civil 
society? How does the world society prove itself to itself, that is how can 
it come into being, become something of a subject? Beck (2000: 89) 
argues that negative experiences of conflict and repression not only divide 
but also unite people of the world. In his view, people are experiencing ‘a 
common global destiny’ which ‘first appears as an experience of danger’, 
this being most evident in the debate about climate change as people 
recognize that environmental problems affect everyone (ibid: 90–91). 
More than a matter of growing environmental consciousness, he argues 
that globalization itself generates this kind of bonding (ibid: 49) which 
exceeds national boundaries (ibid: 67, emphasis in original): 
Just like poverty or profits, compassion is also becoming global. Whereas 
the citoyen is still trapped in the framework of the national state, the 
bourgeois acts in a cosmopolitan manner – which means that when 
his democratic heart throbs, his action no longer has to obey the 
imperatives of national loyalty. 
Similar argumentation is common more generally in the liberal 
cosmopolitan approach (e.g. Kaldor 2003a: 112) characterized by the 
belief that ‘the human species increasingly recognizes that its members 
13 Kaldor (2003a: 37–38), too, argues that ‘the spread of democracy, increased 
global economic interconnectedness, and the emergence of a global public sphere 
based on global media and transnational social movements’ illustrate that ‘the factors 
which Kant believed would lead to a universal civil society are still in existence’.
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share a common fate, whatever that may be’ (Kriesberg 1997: 7–8). 
In other words, non-state actors and their global networks are thought 
to form a collective political force operating outside of nation states, 
a situation which Beck describes as a transition from the ‘first’ to the 
‘second modernity’. While the first modernity was characterized 
by ‘methodological nationalism’, state and society being conceived 
and organized as coextensive, Beck (2000: 102) argues that due to 
globalization the ‘unity of state, society and individual underpinning the 
first modernity is in the course of dissolution’, leading to an emergence 
of the second modernity. Alongside the world society of nation states 
there now exists, according to Beck, ‘a powerful non-state world society’, 
constituted by ‘transnational players of the most diverse kinds’ (ibid: 103, 
emphasis added). The most significant development here is that in this 
non-state world society the rules of publicly legitimated politics are said 
to be losing ‘their binding character’ (ibid: 102). In other words, these 
changes are seen as challenging the authority, control and legitimacy of 
nation states both in external and internal terms. Transnational non-state 
actors are even regarded as ‘more effective than the authorities of nation 
states’ in creating ‘inclusive sovereignty’ of their own (ibid: 103).
Interestingly, the above-mentioned process is described as a 
‘politicization through depoliticization of states’ that gives more scope for 
political action within world society (Beck 2000: 103, 107). Although 
social movements and other non-state actors are very different in their 
organization, goals and strategies, they are regarded as a link between the 
interests of people across borders of nation states, providing an interface 
between the more formal elements of politics (Smith et al. 1997: xiii–xiv; 
also Alger 1997: 260; Kriesberg 1997: 14; Mittelman 2000; Mittelman 
& Chin 2000). They are described as something of a ‘global conscience’ 
when representing public interests. Transnational interaction and links to 
non-state actors are considered significant, as they ‘multiply the channels 
of access to the international system’ and therefore help ‘to transform the 
practice of national sovereignty’ (Keck & Sikkink 1998: 1–2). This is 
regarded as a positive direction, as it makes it possible ‘to draw up a legal 
and institutional framework that will legitimate and permanently establish 
this important extension of democracy’ (Beck 2000: 99). However, 
transnational social movements are not a new phenomenon, for they have 
played an active part in the very construction of the international system 
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(Chatfield 1997: 21–22). Yet, since the mid-1900s there has been an 
enormous increase in their number. Growth has been particularly rapid 
in the issue areas of human rights, environment, economic justice, peace 
and development. (Smith 1997: 42, 48.)
Many social movements work for multiple goals and regard themselves 
as increasingly interrelated, a development believed to make them 
stronger. Accordingly, Castells (2001: 143) wants to reverse ‘the popular 
motto of twenty-five years ago’ by arguing that ‘social movements must 
think local (relating to their own concerns and identity) and act global 
– at the level where it really matters today’. In this regard, a leading social 
movement theorist, Sidney Tarrow (2004: 4–5) argues that globalization 
offers ‘incentives and causes of resistance for many (although not all) 
transnational activists’, bringing new characteristics to collective action: 
‘there is more of it, that it involves a broader spectrum of ordinary 
people and elites, and that it extends to a wider range of domestic and 
international concerns’. Its most important feature he considers its 
relation to ‘the current wave of globalization’ and ‘the changing structure 
of international politics’ (ibid: 5). 
These transformations are often viewed in similar terms in IR. Whereas 
sociologists talk about a ‘quiet revolution’ that has become visible after 
the end of the Cold War (e.g. Chatfield 1997: 19–20) or about a shift 
from the first to second modernity (Beck 2000), in IR the transformation 
has been described, among other things, in terms of denationalization or 
multidimensionality (Nye 2004a; also 1990a; Keohane & Nye 2001). 
For example, Nye argues that changes on the agenda of world politics can 
be viewed in terms of a transformation from a one- to three-dimensional 
chess game, which has a top, middle and bottom board. Whereas the top 
board represents classic interstate military issues and the middle board 
economic issues, the bottom board stands for transnational issues such as 
terrorism, international crime or climate change. The division of power 
between different players in this three-dimensional system is considered 
to be multidimensional. With its global military reach, the US is the only 
superpower on the top board, but the distribution of power is less clear 
on the other two. (Nye 2004a: 4–5, 137.) Whereas the distribution of 
power on the middle board is multipolar, on the bottom board it is more 
complex, being widely and ‘chaotically organized’ among state and non-
state actors alike (ibid: 4). 
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According to Nye (2004a: 90, 31–32, 106), non-state actors can 
challenge state power on the bottom board by developing their own 
soft-power resources for challenging official foreign policy goals. The 
information revolution has made states ‘more porous’ as they now share 
the stage with many other actors who use information as a power resource 
(ibid: 91; also 90, 97–98, 106). Regarding these ‘private sources of soft 
power’ as highly important, Nye argues that ‘[i]nformation is power, 
and today a much larger part of the world’s population has access to 
that power’ (ibid: 105, 137).14 While in the traditional view power is 
connected to military or economic might, politics in the Information 
Age ‘may ultimately be about whose story wins’, argues Nye, quoting 
other scholars (ibid: 106). This makes politics basically a competition for 
attractiveness (ibid: 31). In fact, Nye argues that politics has become a 
struggle over credibility – creation and destruction of it (ibid: 106). 
For Castells, too, information is power. He maintains that ‘shaping 
global views’ is ‘the new, and most effective, frontier of the exercise of power 
on the world stage’ (Castells 2001: 161, emphasis added). When politics 
is primarily practiced and played out in the media, image-making equals 
power (Castells 2002: 507). In this regard, liberal cosmopolitans are 
highly enthusiastic about the role of the Internet. It is thought to provide 
‘the material basis for social movements’ that reconstructs ‘the world from 
the bottom up’ (Castells 2001: 143). 
For Castells (2008: 90, emphasis added), exercise of ‘the power of the 
world’s public opinion through global media and Internet networks is the 
most effective form of broadening political participation on a global scale’. 
He argues that ‘global civil society now has the technological means 
to exist independently from political institutions and from the mass 
media’, referring to ‘the new global public sphere’ (ibid: 86, 90). Indeed, 
the connection between global civil society and the new information 
technology is usually discussed by liberal cosmopolitans in terms of the 
global public sphere. The need for this kind of a concept seems to arise 
from the fact that in order to be able to speak of global civil society, there 
must be some kind of self-experience of it. 
The concept of the global public sphere has been defined in many 
14 Nye (2004a: 6) suggests that which resources are soft-power resources can be 
‘measured by asking people through polls or focus groups’.
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ways, but Castells seems to be referring to a definition by Ingrid Volkmer, 
for whom the political system of a society no longer rests on the public 
and public opinion.15 Rather, she speaks of ‘a more or less autonomous 
global public sphere which can be considered not as a space between the 
‘public’ and the state but between the state and an extra-societal global 
community’ (Volkmer 2003). This notion of an autonomous global 
public sphere represents quite a substantial departure from the modernist, 
Habermasian idea of the public sphere, which was inseparably connected 
to the system of nation states and citizens with ‘rational’ political opinions. 
While for Habermas there is only one public sphere, in the new definition 
there are multiple public spheres, which increasingly often cross national 
boundaries. According to Volkmer, the global public sphere is a ‘multi-
discursive political space’ and a ‘sphere of mediation’ that has no center 
or periphery (ibid). 
It seems that it is impossible for liberal cosmopolitans to overstate 
the significance of the Internet, as it is regarded as much more than just 
a tool for social and political protest. It is believed to not only facilitate 
and enhance global civil society (e.g. Warkentin 2001: 32, 35–36), but 
also change the rules of the ‘socio-political game in cyberspace’, affecting 
also ‘the game itself – namely, the forms and goals of movements and 
political actors’ (Castells 2001: 137; also Beck 2000: 105). For Castells 
(2001: 139, 141; also Warkentin 2001: 35–36), the Internet has become 
the instrument for social movements of the network society in expressing 
and organizing manifestos that can influence political institutions by 
influencing public opinion. Very similarly, Nye (2004a: 31–32) argues 
that actors which have multiple channels of communication for framing 
issues and whose dominant culture and values are compatible with 
prevailing global norms will succeed.
Indeed, ‘global’ values and norms seem to lie at the heart of the 
discussion about global civil society and the global public sphere. For 
Castells (2001: 140), the essential purpose of social movements is 
communicating values, encouraging ‘mobilization around meaning’ 
and reaching out to ‘those who would adhere to their values, and from 
there to affect the consciousness of society as a whole’. Since transformed 
15 For different definitions, see e.g. Olesen 2007; Thörn 2007; Convay & Singh          
2009; Linjakumpu 2009: 110–118.
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consciousness has impacts ‘on political behavior, on voting patterns, and 
on decisions of governments’, state power becomes undermined by ‘the 
counterpower strategies of the global civil society’ (Castells 2008: 82). It 
is maintained that through their ‘horizontal networks of communication’ 
non-state actors ‘foster social change’ (ibid: 90) at the global level, 
meaning that state institutions can be largely bypassed (Castells 2001: 
142). This is justified on the basis of the ‘decreased ability of nationally 
based political systems to manage the world’s problems on a global scale’ 
(Castells 2008: 83). Hence, global civil society and nation states seem 
actually to be competitive entities. A description of non-state actors as 
‘the advocates of the needs, interests, and values of people at large’ (ibid: 
83) implies that states do not or cannot represent these. 
To sum up, liberal cosmopolitans regard the power of social 
movements and other non-state actors as depending on their ability to 
mobilize broad public support at the global level with their informational 
and soft-power resources. By communicating global norms and values 
in the global public sphere, social movements are said to help to build 
global civil society and ‘transnational solidarity’ beyond the nation 
state, with these even being able to give people a global identity with 
a higher loyalty. Moreover, it is argued that social movements enhance 
political participation and even new forms of democracy at the global 
level. Where movements are said to ‘help’, ‘foster’, ‘provide’, ‘facilitate’, 
or ‘generate’ opportunities for human progress and emancipation, states 
and democratically elected governments ‘restrict’, ‘manage’, or ‘control’ 
them. On balance, liberal cosmopolitanism quite clearly defines itself in 
opposition to states, governments and thus state-based representational 
democratic politics as well. 
2.4 The Radical Poststructuralist Approach
From a theoretical point of view, it is very interesting that some arguments 
and conceptualizations of the liberal cosmopolitan approach seem to bear 
a clear resemblance to those presented within another, quite different 
theoretical approach, namely that of radical poststructuralism. Both 
stress that the power of nation states has radically diminished and the role 
and power of non-state actors has greatly increased. In both approaches, 
55
the main framework for political action and resistance is regarded as 
global. However, these two approaches also have clear differences. In 
this section, the ‘basics’ of the theoretical thinking by the best-known 
poststructuralists of the decade, the post-Marxists thinkers Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri, are presented and analyzed in comparison to 
the liberal cosmopolitan approach. 
The two main works of Hardt and Negri, Empire (published in 2000) 
and Multitude (2004), have inspired an extensive amount of acclaim as 
well as criticism16. They are referred to continuously in academic journals 
and publications in disciplines ranging from IR to sociology and from 
cultural to media studies. In Empire, Hardt and Negri mainly concentrate 
on the constitution of Empire and its implications for state sovereignty. 
In the second book, the theme of resistance is more central and also the 
concept of ‘global war’ is discussed there in great detail. As suggested in 
the introduction to this thesis, Hardt and Negri’s conceptualizations are 
extremely interesting from the perspective of the anti-war movement for 
many different reasons. Firstly, they conceptualize resistance against war 
as the most important task of current political life. Secondly, they aim 
at outlining a global political project in which the people of the world 
would wage a ‘war against war’ in the form of the Multitude. Thirdly, they 
refer to social movements as the most relevant actors in resistance against 
Empire and the ‘global state of war’, and provide some suggestions as to 
how such how resistance should be organized. The sections to follow first 
discuss their main concepts – Empire, biopower and ‘global war’ – then 
take up the concepts of resistance and the Multitude.  
2.4. Empire, Biopower and Global War
Whereas the liberal cosmopolitan approach can be characterized as being 
highly optimistic about the possibilities brought by globalization, the 
poststructuralist approach regards the process very critically on the whole. 
For liberal cosmopolitans, globalization means that the power of nation 
states has significantly eroded, and while poststructuralists agree that 
16 Empire and Multitude are the first two volumes of a trilogy. The third, 
Commonwealth (2009), is not included in the analysis here.      
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globalization has diminished state power, they maintain that this power 
has devolved mainly to global corporations and economic elites instead 
of global civil society. Hardt and Negri (2004: 163) actually criticize the 
recent theoretical debate for maintaining that ‘either nation-states are still 
important or there has been a globalization of the figures of authority’, 
because for them globalization does not mean that nation states are no 
longer important or powerful but that ‘their powers and functions are 
being transformed in a new global framework’. Although states still have 
important roles in determining and maintaining legal and economic 
functions, they are simultaneously being ‘transformed by the emerging 
global power they tend increasingly to serve’ (ibid; also 168–169).
This global power Hardt and Negri describe as an economic and 
decentralized Empire. For them, power in Empire is globally divided 
between different actors in a pyramid-like model. The hierarchic 
‘Pyramid of Global Constitution’ consists of three tiers with several levels 
each. On the top of the pyramid, the very first level of the first tier, the 
US is holding ‘hegemony over the global use of force’17, followed on the 
second level by the G7 states, which ‘control the primary global monetary 
instruments and thus have the ability to regulate international exchanges’ 
(Hardt & Negri 2000: 309). On the third level of the first tier, cultural 
and biopolitical power is deployed by ‘a heterogeneous set of associations’ 
that, it is claimed, include ‘more or less the same powers that exercise 
hegemony on the military and monetary levels’ (ibid: 310). 
The second tier in the pyramid consists of transnational capitalist 
corporations and networks, below which are located the sovereign states 
that have some regional power. The role of nation states is reduced to 
serving as ‘filters of the flow of global circulation’, which mainly means 
distributing ‘the flows of wealth to and from the global power’ although 
states also ‘discipline their own populations as much this is still possible’ 
(Hardt & Negri 2000: 310). Where liberal cosmopolitans believe that 
despite difficulties in the international system led economically, culturally 
and politically by liberal and democratic western states, the system should 
not be regarded as subordinating or coercive by definition, this is exactly 
17 Although Hardt and Negri argue that the US is on the top the pyramid, their 
view has been criticized by those who think that they do not sufficiently take into 
consideration the role of the US as a motor of globalization (e.g. Abu-Manneh 2004; 
Harle & Moisio 2007). 
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the position Hardt and Negri take. They maintain that the liberal world 
order is being imposed on everyone whether they like it or not.
On the third, or lowest, tier of the pyramid, lies the Multitude which 
represents ‘popular interests in the global power arrangement’ (Hardt & 
Negri 2000: 311). This is the ‘People’, who are represented either by small 
(subordinate) nation states, NGOs, the media, and social or religious 
movements that are ‘at least relatively independent of nation-states and 
capital’ (ibid). Together they provide the structure of global civil society 
in ‘channeling the needs and desires of the multitude into forms that 
can be represented within the functioning of the global power structures’ 
(ibid). In other words, the Multitude of the radical poststructuralists is a 
counterpart of sorts to the global civil society of the liberal cosmopolitans, 
although its character and functions are defined differently. 
In Hardt and Negri’s Empire, capital holds the power, but Empire 
is dependent on the work of the people ‘renewing’ the capital. By 
‘proletariat’ Hardt and Negri do not refer only to workers, but to all those 
who are deprived by global capitalism. As ‘an open, inclusive concept’, 
the Multitude is not the same as ‘the working class’, which they regard 
as an excessively exclusive concept that separates the workers from ‘the 
poor, unpaid domestic laborers, and all others who do not receive a wage’ 
(Hardt & Negri 2004: xiv).18 In contrast, the Multitude is described as 
something of a creative power that invents new and innovative solutions, 
a power which in turn provides it with the ability to resist Empire. 
When it comes to the relationship between war and power, there are 
interesting parallels between the liberal cosmopolitan and the radical 
poststructuralist approaches. Liberal cosmopolitans regard the Iraq War in 
terms of the exceptionalism of the current situation, in which one nation 
state has temporarily gained so much power that it can act unilaterally 
without the consent of the international community. This interpretation 
as such is not in conflict with the views of Hardt and Negri. However, they 
do not concentrate as much on the role of the US, stressing instead much 
18 The Multitude can be viewed from a socio-economic perspective, but it is also 
‘a concept of race, gender, and sexuality differences’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 100–
101). Hardt and Negri point out that ‘something like a concept of the multitude has 
long been part of powerful streams of feminist and antiracist politics’ where instead 
of trying to transform the world into ‘a world without racial or gender difference’, 
the aim is to create a world ‘in which race and gender do not matter’ (ibid: 101). 
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broader structural aspects when describing Empire as something that ‘cuts 
diagonally across the debates that pose unilateralism and multilateralism 
or pro-Americanism and anti-Americanism as the only global political 
alternatives’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: xii). They regard unilateralism and 
multilateralism not just as undesirable, but as impossible in current 
conditions and argue that ‘attempts to pursue them will not succeed 
in maintaining the current global order’ (ibid: xiii). Indeed, Hardt and 
Negri introduced their concept of Empire and biopower before 9/11 and 
the US War on Terror. The analysis in their first book was not influenced 
by these events, but rather reflected the realities of the 1990s, the decade 
after the end of the Cold War. In their second book, they develop their 
insights further, especially in regard to the War on Terror.
For Hardt and Negri (2004: xiii), war is not a continuation of 
politics by other means but an essential instrument of rule in Empire for 
governing the global order. They argue that war has become ‘the basis 
of the internal politics of the global order, the politics of Empire’ as the 
concept of legalized war has collapsed (ibid: 22). In this regard, they draw 
on the work of Michel Foucault, applying it to IR while also invoking 
Giorgio Agamben’s reinterpretation of Carl Schmitt’s concept of the ‘state 
of exception’, in which law is to be regarded as an inseparable part of the 
hegemonic power of the US. The resulting concept, the ‘global state of 
war’, is very central in Hardt and Negri’s theory. They claim that ‘war has 
become a general condition’ in Empire, where ‘lethal violence is present 
as a constant potentiality, ready always and everywhere to erupt’ (ibid: 
4). Any conflict or war going on in the world today is regarded not as a 
manifestation of war but of civil war (ibid: 3). Hence, we are witnessing 
a ‘general global state of war’, which is eroding the difference between war 
and peace (ibid: 5, emphasis in original). Hardt and Negri explain this by 
drawing a clear distinction between traditional wars, which were conflicts 
between sovereign states, and the new war being waged between ‘sovereign 
and/or nonsovereign combatants within a single sovereign territory’ (ibid: 
3, emphasis in original). Importantly, this ‘sovereign territory’ is not a 
national but a global one, a conceptual position entailing an imperative 
to regard all possible conflicts as ‘imperial civil wars’, as they are taking 
place within Empire (ibid: 3–4). 
While war in the modern era was ‘a limited state of exception’, Hardt 
and Negri (2004: 6–7) argue that now ‘the exception has become the 
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rule, pervading both foreign relations and the homeland’, which makes 
the state of exception general as well as permanent. They emphasize that 
the global situation was not fundamentally changed by 9/11 although the 
terror attacks forced people to recognize the generality of the phenomenon 
of the global state of war (ibid: 4). Nonetheless, they argue that the legal 
concept of a state of exception has to be linked with the exceptionalism 
of the US, because only ‘the intersection between these two exceptions’ 
helps to understand the concept of global war (ibid: 8).
Since Empire is characterized by a never-ceasing exercise of power, 
as well as violence, war must be regarded as an instrument for the 
creation and maintenance of social order, a role which makes it ‘virtually 
indistinguishable from police activity’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 14). As such, 
these views resemble those of liberal cosmopolitans, for whom it is also 
commonplace to emphasize the exceptionalism of the US in the current 
world order. However, Hardt and Negri are more critical in this regard, as 
pointing out that the manner in which the new imperial system constructs 
and maintains global hierarchies resembles that in which ‘international 
law served in the twentieth century merely to legitimate and support the 
violence of the strong over the weak’ (ibid: 29). However, they admit that 
the growing inability of states to justify their violence partly explains the 
use of ‘increasingly strident and confused accusations of terrorism’ (ibid: 
27). Hence, difficulties in producing a clear definition of terrorism can 
be ‘intimately linked to the problem of establishing an adequate notion 
of legitimate violence’ (ibid).
In terms of other similarities and differences between the approaches, 
Hardt and Negri’s (2004: 14) view that the global state of war means 
that ‘international relations and domestic politics become increasingly 
similar and intermingled’ is reminiscent of the liberal cosmopolitan 
approach, which also maintains that politics has been globalized, blurring 
the distinction between the national and the global. Furthermore, both 
approaches emphasize that one consequence of the War on Terror has 
been the return of the concept of a just war. According to the radical 
poststructuralists, the concept serves to ‘universalize war beyond any 
particular interests toward the interest of humanity as a whole’ (ibid: 1; 
cf. Kaldor 2003b: 12). When an enemy is defined in terms of ‘evil’, as 
‘the enemy of all humanity’, it is regarded as operating outside the sphere 
of politics, which in effect enables the struggle against it to be defined 
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in absolute terms (Hardt & Negri 2004: 16). Defining the enemy in 
highly abstract terms ‘serves to prop up legitimation where legitimation 
has declined’ and thus becomes a ‘constitutive function of legitimacy’ for 
imperial violence (ibid: 30). The enemies are not ‘real’ enemies but should 
be regarded as ‘as symptoms of a disordered reality that poses a threat to 
security and the functioning of discipline and control’ (ibid: 31): 
The enemy must serve as a schema of reason in the Kantian sense, but 
in the opposite direction: it must demonstrate not what power is but 
what power saves us from. The presence of the enemy demonstrates 
the need for security.   
The quotation illustrates the point at which the liberal cosmopolitan and 
the radical poststructuralist approaches diverge. Whereas the first regards 
the problem of war (on terror as well as on Iraq) in more limited terms 
due to the exceptionalism of the US and does not criticize the premises 
of the liberal order, the second sees war as a defining characteristic of 
the system. For radical poststructuralists, at issue is not only the US and 
the current situation but something more fundamental about the way 
violence is being legitimated. While the first Gulf War was legitimated 
on the basis of international law as an effort to restore the sovereignty 
of Kuwait, and the Kosovo War similarly justified on humanitarian 
grounds, the Iraq War was represented as a pre-emptive war that sought 
its legitimation ‘primarily on the basis of its results’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 
30). It was justified ‘not on any a priori framework, moral or legal, but 
ony a posteriori, based on its results’ (ibid).
Where the divergence between the liberal and the radical approaches 
manifests itself most clearly is in Hardt and Negri’s (2004: 13) Foucauldian 
interpretation of Empire as a form of biopower that aims ‘not only at 
controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects 
of social life’.19 They argue that war ‘becomes the general matrix for 
all relations of power and techniques of domination, whether or not 
19 Whereas the concept of biopower explains ‘how the current war regime not 
only threatens us with death but also rules over life, producing and reproducing all 
aspects of society’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 94), biopolitical production relates to the 
Multitude. While biopower, as a sovereign authority, ‘imposes its order’ on society, 
the biopolitical production of the Multitude ‘is immanent to society and creates 
social relationships and forms through collaborative forms of labor’ (ibid: 94–95). 
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bloodshed is involved’ (ibid).  War is thus not an effort to bring peace 
but to maintain order (ibid: 30). Hardt and Negri argue that sovereign 
political power can only live by preserving the life of its subjects and 
therefore global war needs to ‘not only bring death but also produce and 
regulate life’ (ibid: 20). Although not regarding global war as a product of 
the US but of Empire, they stress that the US policy shift from ‘defense’ 
to ‘security’ is an ‘index of the new, active, constituent character of war’ 
(ibid). Here, their views come close to those of scholars emphasizing 
the strong relationship between biopower and the discourse of security, 
drawing on the notion that the world can be secure only if actively shaped 
(e.g. Reid 2006; Dillon & Reid 2009). Empire is a ‘regime of disciplinary 
administration and political control’ where war is ‘an active mechanism’ 
which ‘reinforces the present global order’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 21).
When viewed from this perspective, the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq become examples of ‘the productive project of biopower and war’ 
imposed militarily with the help of rhetoric of ‘nation building’ or 
‘regime change’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 23). Hence, the aim is to not only 
create stable and peaceful regimes, but also establish regimes suited and 
adaptable to the global economic-political system and capable of acting 
as ‘an organ of the global body politic’ (ibid: 179). According to Hardt 
and Negri, these mechanisms lead to a suspension of democracy since 
‘armed globalization’ makes democracy ‘entirely irretrievable, buried 
deep beneath the weapons and security regimes of our constant state of 
conflict’ (ibid: xi–xii). However, at the same time they are very explicit 
about the impossibility of Empire gaining total control over its subjects: 
‘Dominance, no matter how multidimensional, can never be complete 
and is always contradicted by resistance’ (ibid: 54). This is where they 
turn to resistance by the Multitude.
2.4.2 Empire Challenged: The Multitude and the Politics of 
               Resistance
In regard to the main subjects of resistance, that is, political actors capable 
of challenging the power of Empire, the views of radical poststructuralists 
bear a striking resemblance to those of liberal cosmopolitans, although 
they differ with respect to some of the causalities between different 
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developments and their political implications. Liberal cosmopolitans 
argue that globalization has given global civil society and non-state actors 
more power at the expense of nation states. Radical poststructuralists agree 
that globalization has eroded state power but maintain that this power 
has devolved mainly to global corporations and economic elites instead 
of global civil society. They believe that it is possible to resist unwanted 
practices and phenomena, but only if the resistance is organized in a 
correct manner – if it is globalized. Just like liberal cosmopolitans, they 
point to social movements as the most relevant political subjects in this 
regard. It is even argued that gaining an understanding of the development 
of the global state of war requires understanding the importance and 
‘the genealogy of social and political movements of resistance’ (Hardt & 
Negri 2004: 65).20
In their first book, Hardt and Negri do not discuss the theme of 
resistance as much as in the second. In Empire they develop the idea that 
as there is no outside, only an inside in Empire, resistance can only arise 
from within it, in the form of a counter-Empire (Hardt & Negri 2000: 
206–207). One of the most interesting contradictions in their theory is 
that on the one hand Empire is regarded as extremely powerful, yet on the 
other as quite vulnerable. Although an extremely powerful global regime 
of biopower, it is dependent on moral legitimation, which is also where 
and why it can be challenged (ibid: 35). The Multitude cannot challenge 
the military might of Empire as such, but can resist it with instruments 
of soft power, characterized as ‘moral intervention’ by various non-state 
actors (ibid: 35–36): 
What we are calling moral intervention is practiced today by a variety 
of bodies, including the news media and religious organizations, but 
the most important may be some of the so-called non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), which, precisely because they are not run 
directly by governments, are assumed to act on the basis of ethical or 
moral imperatives. 
20 Hardt and Negri (2004: 72–81) provide a detailed genealogy of resistance 
movements. It suffices to note here that resistance movements have developed from 
authoritarian and hierarchic forms (such as popular armies) to more decentralized 
guerrilla organizations, and then to plural, decentralized and networked forms of 
resistance movements. An important point they make is that postmodern resistance 
movements do not distinguish between the social and the political (ibid: 78). 
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In other words, just like liberal cosmopolitans (especially Kaldor, Beck 
and Castells), radical poststructuralists believe it is possible to challenge 
hard power through soft power. However, the broader context is quite 
different: for poststructuralists, the struggle is against Empire, not nation 
states. What also makes Hardt and Negri’s (2000: 313) perspective more 
critical is their understanding that non-state actors are not immune to 
distractions of power. They argue that many humanitarian organizations 
are ‘the most powerful pacific weapons of the new world order’, as they 
are involved in conducting ‘just wars’ although they do so ‘without arms, 
without violence, without borders’ (ibid: 36). At the same time, the 
organizations are regarded as ‘completely immersed in the biopolitical 
context of the constitution of the Empire’, anticipating ‘the power of its 
pacifying and productive intervention of justice’ (ibid).
Hardt and Negri thus invest their hopes in non-state actors of global 
civil society while simultaneously acknowledging that they might become 
satellites or instruments of Empire, re-enforcing its power. Generally, 
however, they seem to be more optimistic than pessimistic in this regard. 
They anticipate new figures and new subjectivities of struggle against the 
‘imperial biopolitical machine’ to ‘express, nourish, and develop positively 
their own constituent projects’ as well as to ‘work toward the liberation 
of living labor, creating constellations of powerful singularities’ (Hardt 
& Negri 2000: 61). Again, this view is quite similar to that expressed 
by liberal cosmopolitans in emphasizing the role of global civic actors 
in constructing global civil society ‘from below’. Thus, the idea of global 
political action by non-state actors emphasized by liberal cosmopolitans 
is quite similar to Hardt and Negri’s idea of global resistance. Their basic 
argument is that the Multitude must form ‘one big union’ to challenge 
Empire from within and they are very explicit about the impossibility of 
resisting Empire in any other way (ibid: 206–207, emphasis added):  
Empire cannot be resisted by a project aimed at a limited, local 
autonomy. We cannot move back to any previous social form, nor 
move forward in isolation. Rather, we must push through Empire to 
come out the other side ... Empire can be effectively contested only on 
its own level of generality and by pushing the processes that it offers 
past their present limitations. We have to accept that challenge and 
learn to think globally and act globally. Globalization must be met 
with a counter-globalization, Empire with a counter-Empire.
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The imperative to ‘think globally and act globally’ derives directly 
from the definition of Empire as a decentralized form of global power. 
Hardt and Negri strongly criticize traditional strategies and methods of 
leftist resistance, which still take the local as the most important level. In 
their view, the leftist strategy of local resistance is not only ineffective but 
dangerous, as it ‘misidentifies and thus masks the enemy’ against which 
the Multitude should be fighting (Hardt & Negri 2000: 45). In other 
words, local resistance is regarded as an old-fashioned and inefficient 
strategy for challenging Empire.21 Thus, there should be a new strategy: 
resistance should be globalized. It makes more sense ‘both theoretically and 
practically to enter the terrain of Empire and confront its homogenizing 
and heterogenizing flows in all their complexity, grounding our analysis 
in the power of the global multitude’ (ibid: 46). 
Although they use the word ‘practically’, Hardt and Negri do not have 
much to offer in concrete terms. In their first book, when considering how 
the Multitude could become a global political subject and organize itself 
against the repression of Empire, they openly admit they cannot offer 
simple answers (Hardt & Negri 2000: 399–400). They seem to believe 
that the Multitude will somehow automatically become political and 
its resistance more practical when confronting and becoming conscious 
of the dominating practices of Empire. In this regard, they talk of the 
necessity of ‘global citizenship’ (ibid: 396–400) (a concept sometimes 
used also by liberal cosmopolitans), which they nevertheless hardly discuss 
in their second book. There, too, they do not promise any direct answers 
or propositions for ‘a concrete program of action’, although they claim to 
give ‘numerous examples of how people are working today to put an end 
to war and make the world more democratic’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: xvi–
xvii). Although Hardt and Negri do stress that their main purpose is to 
‘work out the conceptual bases on which a new project of democracy can 
stand’, it is problematic that their abstract conceptual approach provides 
no real connection between theory and political practice (ibid: xvii). It 
means that their theory cannot easily become immanent for its ‘objects’. 
21 By no means are these kinds of views typical only of radical poststructuralists 
such as Hardt and Negri. Many other scholars have argued that the ‘conventional 
left lacks the theoretical and analytical tools to position itself ’ in regard to new social 
movements and, even more seriously, ‘does not understand the importance of doing 
so’ (Santos 2008: 252).
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The abstractness of Hardt and Negri’s theory of resistance partly 
derives from their refusal to define against whom or what resistance 
should be directed. They admit that identifying the enemy is difficult 
because ‘exploitation tends no longer to have a specific place’ (Hardt & 
Negri 2000: 211). Yet for them this does not pose a problem; in fact, 
they seem to celebrate the absence of a clearly defined enemy. Although 
it is not known where ‘the production of oppression’ is located, Hardt 
and  Negri believe it is possible to ‘resist and struggle’ (ibid). This is a 
clear illustration of their rationale of the will to be against, to resist which 
comes very close to Foucault’s notion of permanent resistance, often 
criticized for not providing any particular motivation to resist (ibid: 
210)22. However, all this becomes even more problematic when located in 
the global context (e.g. Selby 2007). Incorporating Foucault’s notions of 
agency and subjectivity, quite challenging in their own right, with Hardt 
and Negri’s desire for global agency and subjectivity makes the concept 
of resistance a daunting one when evaluated from a practical perspective. 
Nevertheless, this is the abstract formulation they put forward (Hardt & 
Negri 2000: 211, emphasis added):
If there is no longer a place that can be recognized as outside, we must 
be against in every place. This being-against becomes the essential key to 
every active political position in the world, every desire that is effective 
– perhaps of democracy itself. 
Since no concrete objectives or targets of resistance are identified, the 
problem is that basically nothing is offered in practical terms for those 
opposing and resisting. As such, the problem does not concern only the 
radical poststructuralist approach, since many liberal cosmopolitans 
also celebrate ‘global networks of opposition’, which are regarded 
as ‘essentially democratic’ (Castells 2008: 85–86). The difference is 
that liberal cosmopolitans do not aim at a revolution or anything else 
22 Simon (1995: 86) argues that since the Foucauldian motivation to resist derives       
from subjugation to power (in whatever form it takes place) rather than proposing 
a better alternative, it is important to show ‘frustration with and resentment of the 
present’. This kind of resistance needs to be permanent because it is not known if 
‘the state of affairs brought about by resistance will be better than the present, as any 
social arrangement or definition of community may become oppressive even if it is 
instituted by acts of resistance against a previous regime’ (ibid: 87).
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particularly radical but, rather, advocate a consensual, gradual approach 
to social change. Ontologically poststructuralists have also a very different 
understanding of political subjectivity, as they believe that resistance 
actually precedes power. Hardt and Negri (2004: 64, emphasis in original) 
challenge the whole idea of resistance as ‘a response or reaction’ and 
suggest that ‘resistance is primary with respect to power’. They argue that 
only by acknowledging ‘the primacy of resistance’ is it possible to view 
‘history from below’ and to create new subjectivities (ibid: 64–65).23 
A critical question remains, however: How can resistance be successful 
and effective when it rests only on the very act of resisting and there are 
no defined and articulated goals or targets? In this sense, Hardt and Negri 
resemble, to some extent, Foucault, who does not offer direct answers to 
these kinds of questions. What makes Hardt and Negri’s theory more 
challenging is that they take it to the global level. It is very difficult to 
grasp the idea of this abstract yet global resistance, which is supposedly 
evident everywhere although it has no other common ‘banner’ than that 
of being against. In their second book, Hardt and Negri (2004: 212) 
point out that the Multitude ‘needs a political project to bring it to 
existence’. They dedicate a chapter to this issue, in which they seek to 
‘address the most important task for resistance today, that is, resisting 
war’ (ibid: 63). They often talk about the movement against the Iraq 
War as some sort of a preliminary example (ibid: 264), although more 
commonly refer to ‘movements of resistance against the permanent, 
global state of war’ (ibid: 66–67). The strong emphasis put on resistance 
against war is understandable in light of their view that war has become 
the foundation of politics. 
Peace then, quite logically, for Hardt and Negri (2004: 67) is ‘the 
necessary condition for any liberation’. They stress, that it is ‘too simple’, 
however, ‘to identify the interests of the multitude immediately and 
exclusively with peace’ since resistance movements have always been 
forced to ‘confront war and the violence it imposes, sometimes with 
and sometimes without violent means’ (ibid). Hence, they argue that 
if ‘democracy of the multitude’ is ever to be realized, there needs to be 
23 They emphasize that just as ‘Marx’s exposition begins with capital, then, 
his research must begin with labor’ which is always primary, and argue that this is 
similarly true of resistance, although the term is usually used in precisely the opposite 
meaning (Hardt & Negri 2004: 64).
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a ‘war against war’ that must actively aim at destroying ‘the regime of 
violence’ supporting ‘the systems of inequality and oppression’ (ibid). In 
other words, democracy which opposes war is represented as ‘an absolute 
democracy’ and resistance against war becomes associated with resistance 
against the legitimation of the global order as ‘a common ethical task’ 
(ibid: 90–91). Struggle against war is regarded as ‘the summary of all the 
grievances’ as war prevents solutions to other problems such as global 
poverty and inequality (ibid: 284). When all forms of inequality and 
injustice are equated with the problem of war in this way, resistance 
against war necessarily means resistance against the regime of biopower. It 
is extremely interesting how closely linked Empire and the Multitude are: 
they are described as ‘hand-to-hand’ struggling ‘on the biopolitical field 
that pulls them together’, with Empire calling ‘on war for its legitimation’ 
and the Multitude ‘on democracy as its political foundation’ (ibid: 90).
What also makes Hardt and Negri’s vision problematic is that they 
suppose that the Multitude consists of people who all want democracy 
and peace on similar terms. When they describe the Multitude as 
a subject ‘which acts on the basis of what the singularities share in 
common’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 100), they do not discuss any possible 
internal contradictions or political struggles within it, although it must 
be clear that all singularities can have goals of their own which can be 
contradictory24. Who is to define what goals are better than others? It 
is unclear how it can be guaranteed that there is freedom to express 
distinctions and contradictions in the context of this global collective 
political subject. Hardt and Negri also fail to consider the possibility that 
the Multitude might misuse its power once in power. Moreover, instead of 
giving practical suggestions or describing how different acts of resistance 
relate to each other in concrete terms, these radical poststructuralists talk 
about an ‘accumulation of struggles’ almost in a romantic vein. 
In this context, Hardt and Negri often point to the role of networks 
and communication within them. They argue that networks are 
democratic when they are ‘completely horizontal and deterritorialized’ 
(Hardt & Negri 2000: 299). While regarded as ‘neither an identity (like 
the people), nor uniform (like the masses)’, the Multitude is ‘based 
fundamentally on communication’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: xv, 91, 100). 
24 Consider, for example, the efforts of feminists vs. those of Islamists. 
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The singularities of which it consists ‘must discover the common that 
allows them to communicate and act together’ (ibid: xv, emphasis in 
original) and thus become a new form of collective intelligence (ibid: 
91–93). Using almost the exact words of liberal cosmopolitans such as 
Castells and Beck, Hardt and Negri argue that social movements not 
only ‘employ techniques such as the Internet as organizing tools, they 
also begin to adopt these technologies as models for their organizational 
structures’ (ibid: 82). Similarly, they suggest that a ‘network has become a 
common form that tends to define our ways of understanding the world 
and acting in it’ (ibid: 142). The Internet is regarded as an ideal model 
for the Multitude, representing a democratic network structure (Hardt & 
Negri 2000: 299; 2004: xv.)
  
2.5 The Critical State-Centric Approach 
The theoretical approaches analyzed above, both of which emphasize 
the primacy of global-level resistance by social movements, are strongly 
criticized by an approach which can be labelled ‘critical state-centric’. It 
can be characterized as a critique of the above-mentioned approaches 
by definition. Instead of taking the globalization of politics and 
transformation of the role and power of nation states in the international 
system as a given, the critical state-centric approach explicitly challenges 
understanding of politics, power and resistance in globalized terms. As 
explained in the beginning of this chapter, liberal cosmopolitanism and 
radical poststructuralism have been challenged by many scholars and it is 
not possible or necessary to analyze all the related debate here. The aim is 
to concentrate on recent criticisms that can be regarded as relevant from 
the perspective of the main theme, the anti-war movement. The focus is 
not so much on the concepts of global power and resistance on a general 
level as on the particular context of social movements. 
In this regard, the most recent and important critique is that 
advanced by David Chandler, who criticizes liberal cosmopolitans and 
radical poststructuralists for maintaining that the primary framework for 
political engagement and resistance should be global. Chandler (2009a; 
2009b) presents the approaches as currently dominant frameworks in 
IR while straightforwardly questioning their ontological premises. For 
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him, uniformity of the liberal cosmopolitan and radical poststructuralist 
approaches represents ‘Global Ideology’, that is, ‘the globalisation of 
political discourse: the understanding of the world in globalised terms’ 
(Chandler 2009b: 532). It can be regarded as ‘an ideological framework 
which naturalises and reifies its subject matter’ because it takes the 
globalization of politics ‘as a matter of imposed necessity rather than 
a social construct which is open to critique’ (ibid: 536). Chandler 
convincingly illustrates that dominant frameworks take the globalization 
of politics as an inevitable fact while positing ‘changes at the global level 
as the explanatory factor for the breakdown of state-based forms of 
political identification and collective engagement, understanding these 
as marking the birth of global politics’ (ibid: 530).25 
For Chandler (2009a: 2), the ‘pre-eminence of the global’ actually 
‘highlights a lack rather than a presence’ whether the issue is sites and 
articulations of power, security threats, policy-making or political 
programs of resistance by social movements. In this sense, ‘Global Ideology’ 
can be regarded as a reflection of reality ‘where political relations have 
become much less focused on the strategic and instrumental aspects of 
representational politics’ (Chandler 2009b: 532). Liberal cosmopolitans 
and radical poststructuralists are criticized for turning ‘reality on its 
head’ (Chandler 2009a: 3) or inversing ‘the relationship of cause and 
effect’ (Chandler 2009b: 539) as they mistakenly conceptualize the lack 
of political engagement and contestation as the globalization of politics 
(ibid: 542). Instead, the globalization of politics should be understood 
as ‘a product of political disconnection between state elites and popular 
disengagement from politics’ (ibid: 531). According to Chandler, the 
25 Similarly, Chantal Mouffe (2005: 107) speaks of the ‘unexpected convergence’          
between poststructural and liberal cosmopolitan approaches manifested in the lack 
of a ‘properly political dimension’. She argues that Hardt and Negri represent ‘no 
more than an ultra-left version of the cosmopolitan perspective’ which, instead 
of providing an empowering perspective, ‘contributes to reinforcing the current 
incapacity to think and act politically’ (ibid). She explains ‘the success of such a      
flawed book’ which has been ‘hailed as ‘The Communist Manifesto for the Twenty-
first Century’ by arguing that its ‘messianic rhetoric has fired the imagination of            
many people eager to find in the ‘multitude’ a new revolutionary subject’ in the post-
political period where neo-liberal globalization is perceived as ‘the unique horizon’ 
(ibid: 107–108). For Mouffe, the main problem is that ‘instead of contributing to            
working towards an alternative to the current neo-liberal hegemony, Empire is in fact 
likely to produce the opposite effect’ (ibid: 108).
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world has not so much become global but ‘rather the breakdown in 
social connections framed through the political process of representation 
means that we have become increasingly ‘deterritorialized’’ (ibid: 540). 
He thus argues that when political engagement becomes less socially 
and collectively mediated, the global starts to seem like the primary 
framework (ibid: 530). 
Where, then, does the popular disengagement from politics stem 
from? Chandler (2009b: 539, referring to Laidi 1998) explains it as 
partly due to the end of the Cold War revealing ‘the weakness of political 
frameworks shaped by the articulation of politics on the axis of Left and 
Right’, which had institutionalized the meaning of political life during 
the Cold War despite the fact that people’s relation to them had already 
started to weaken. When the Cold War ended, it revealed the lack of a 
social basis and thus caused ‘a fundamental crisis of political meaning 
and the implosion of party-based social connections’ (ibid). This political 
context, argues Chandler, is ‘vital for the understanding of globalisation 
of politics’ (ibid). As such, this view is not dramatically different from 
those expressed within the liberal and radical theoretical frameworks 
stressing the social and political changes brought by the end of the Cold 
War. The difference lies in the way the changes are interpreted in terms of 
their consequences. According to Chandler, these developments do not 
lead to globalization of politics but rather demonstrate that ‘the limits 
of domestic politics’, as well as ‘the inability to create new collective 
frameworks of meaning’, have now been ‘projected into the global sphere’ 
(ibid: 540). 
The reason why Chandler’s alternative interpretation is so important 
from the perspective of this thesis is that deconstructing the ontological 
premises of the dominant theoretical approaches makes it possible to 
critically evaluate their conceptualizations of war, power and resistance. It 
is precisely these conceptualizations that form the basis of the suggestions 
made by each approach as to how social movements (such as the anti-
war movement) should organize their resistance in the so-called ‘global 
era’. The section to follow analyzes Chandler’s criticism of the main 
conceptualizations of the academic globalists in more detail, starting with 
his critique of the concepts of global war and Empire, and then moving 
on to the concept of resistance in the context of social movements.   
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2.5. The Concepts of Global War and Empire Challenged
In his critique of the radical poststructuralist approach, Chandler (2009a: 
157) questions the very concept of global war currently ‘advocated as 
much by governing elites as by their academic policy-supporters and their 
radical critics’. He argues that critical theorists have taken ‘the political 
claims of global policymaking and intervention at face value’ and thus 
are themselves reinforcing the idea of globalization of security (Chandler 
2009c: 244). This results in ‘cohering the globalised perspective that the 
stakes of the international sphere today are at least as much ‘life and death’ 
as they were in the middle of the last century’ (Chandler 2009a: 157). 
Although IR scholars do not regard a war between the major powers as 
‘a pressing threat’ or view international stability as threatened by ‘class 
struggle and revolutionary or nationalist movements’, Chandler (2009c: 
244) shows that the concept of global war is nevertheless ‘back at the 
forefront of academic and policy thinking’. He argues that in particular 
it has been the current reinterpretations of the works of ‘historically-
grounded political theorists’ such as Foucault and Schmitt that have 
led to ‘highly abstract frameworks of all encompassing global conflict, 
without territorial or legal bounds’ (ibid: 245).26 
Being extremely skeptical of claims of ‘new universalising hegemony 
fighting a war of annihilation against alternative ways of life’, Chandler 
(2009a: 182) proposes an alternative reading of global war, interpreting 
it rather as ‘a product of social dislocation and disconnection’. Although 
stressing that wars fought in an abstract and deterritorialized fashion do 
lack ‘clear relationship between means and ends’ and can thus gain ‘a 
destabilizing and irrational character’, he argues it is mistaken to interpret 
them as ‘a heightened desire for control’ (Chandler 2009c: 260). In other 
words, Chandler (2009a: 21) is very critical of claims of an emerging new 
order as ‘such a politically coherent and militarised framework of western 
hegemony that it makes nineteenth-century imperialism (hamstrung by 
inter-imperialist rivalries) appear weak in comparison’. As an example, 
he brings up Agamben’s notion of the War on Terror as a ‘permanent 
state of exception’, where ‘a global war machine’ constructs ‘the world 
in the image of the camp’ while reducing ‘its enemies to bare life’ (ibid: 
26 On the revival of Schmitt in IR, see Chandler 2008.
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180–181). Chandler himself interprets Guantanamo Bay, for example, as 
a US attempt ‘to create a more coherent and potent image of the vaguely-
defined security threat’ because ‘far from criminalising fundamentalist 
terrorists, the US has politically glorified them, talking up their political 
importance’ (ibid: 181). For him, Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib 
Prison ‘stem from the western inability to cohere a clear view of who 
the enemy is or of how they should be treated’, the status of ‘illegal 
combatants’ sacralizing enemies instead of reducing them to the status of 
‘bare life’ (ibid: 181). He regards the framework in which current wars are 
fought by western powers as ‘non-strategic’, ‘non-instrumental’, lacking 
‘a clear relationship between means and ends’ (Chandler 2009c: 260).
While providing a very interesting alternative reading of the War on 
Terror as essentially a weakness of the West, Chandler’s approach has some 
shortcomings as well. In concentrating on how IR scholars have started 
to uncritically repeat policy-makers’ rhetoric of a global war, which they 
then interpret as a manifestation of global biopower, he does not discuss 
other kinds of consequences that this political rhetoric may have. The fact 
that a concept such as the War on Terror has been accepted and circulated 
all over the world has had concrete political consequences. For instance, 
not only the US, but also other states, such as Russia and Israel, have 
started hunting terrorists; in the process there have been changes in laws 
in various countries, with civil rights becoming more tightly regulated 
and like changes. Thus, although Chandler was right in arguing that the 
rhetoric and concept of global war originates from a western failure to 
define and fight its enemies, the discourse of the War on Terror began 
to have concrete consequences when it became accepted in the political 
mainstream. Some of the consequences may indeed be interpreted as a 
desire for more control, as radical poststructuralists have suggested.  
It also seems that Chandler does not regard the concept of biopower 
in the same way as Hardt and Negri do, because if he did, he would 
probably notice that his view is not drastically different from theirs. 
Chandler’s claim that the War on Terror reflects the weakness of the West, 
which it tries to conceal, is actually not very far from Hardt and Negri’s 
argument that Empire has to fight all the time to secure itself (the global 
order), because it is by definition vulnerable to networked enemies such 
as suicide bombers. The difference is that while Empire is also vulnerable 
to resistance by organized labor and global social movements, Chandler 
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does not believe these can pose any significant challenge to state power, 
at least in their current forms. In regard to nation-states more generally, 
Chandler’s (2009a: 6) views differ markedly from those of the academic 
globalists, because he is extremely troubled by the fact that ‘the nation 
state is increasingly seen to be a barrier to progressive political movements 
rather than the object of political struggle’. He explicitly criticizes both 
approaches of the academic globalists for maintaining ‘that nation states 
restrict and constrain the possibilities for political progress’ (Chandler 
2009b: 534), representing them as ‘the central barrier to emancipatory 
political practice’ (Chandler 2004: 314).
2.5.2 State Power Unchallenged: The Illusions of Global 
               Resistance                                    
When it comes to global political action and resistance, Chandler 
straightforwardly challenges two of the main arguments of the liberal 
cosmopolitans and the radical poststructuralists. Firstly, he challenges the 
idea that scaling political action (or resistance) to the global level is a 
necessary reaction to external changes and, secondly, that political action 
(or resistance) is more effective at the global than at the national level. In 
addition to these criticisms, he argues that taking the global level as the 
primary context for political engagement has serious consequences which 
the dominant frameworks ignore or fail to recognize.   
In regard to the first point, Chandler suggests that rather than being 
a reaction to external changes such as transformations in the nature of 
politics or power brought by globalization, the popular view that resistance 
should be globalized has more to do with discourses emphasizing the 
globalization of politics and/or power. For him, the discursive shift from 
national to global politics or resistance ‘reflects the decline of strategic, 
instrumental, engagement concerned with transforming the external 
world, and the rise of a more atomised politics of self-expression – of 
awareness, of identity and of values’ (Chandler 2009a: 2). In other words, 
politics becomes globalized ‘when political actors experience a loss of social 
connection and political aspirations are expressed in increasingly abstract 
and unmediated forms’ (ibid). For Chandler, global political action and 
global activism represent thus an escape from political responsibility 
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since the state and state-based democratic accountability are no longer 
used as a reference point. Accordingly, he regards global activism as a 
‘refusal to play by the rules laid down by state-based territorial politics’ 
(Chandler 2004: 314). Moreover, he argues that ‘[w]ith the decline 
of representational forms of politics – which involved winning people 
over to ideas or political platforms rather than just expressing one’s 
own awareness – political practice becomes much more immediate and 
unmediated’ (Chandler 2009a: 17). 
Although all three theoretical approaches agree that some kind of a 
popular disengagement from traditional politics is evident, the difference 
is that while academic globalists regard this development as a positive one 
(since they strongly advocate global forms of political engagement), the 
critical state-centric approach views it as an extremely negative change. 
Scaling political action towards the global level is believed to do more 
harm than good for democracy, whether in terms of accountability or 
offering real political alternatives. Whereas Hardt and Negri, for example, 
suggest that the system of representative democracy presents a move away 
from real, ‘absolute democracy’, for Chandler the exact opposite is true: 
the effort to break up the traditional representational system by aiming 
at a similar system on a global scale should be understood as a dangerous 
endeavor. Instead of helping people to transform their societies and 
tackle their problems through the democratic political system, academic 
globalists are provoking even more distrust towards representative 
democracy and its political institutions.  
Basically, it seems that Chandler is concerned about the impacts of 
globalized forms of political engagement for the proper working of the 
democratic system. Arguments that there are new forms of political activity 
which are no longer linked to political parties or the parliamentary system 
ultimately reinforce the crisis of democracy, for they assert that problems 
cannot be addressed via the traditional political system anymore. This, 
in turn, decreases political engagement at the level where it would be 
most effective – the level of the nation state. All this also relates directly 
to the second critique and counter-argument by Chandler. In addition 
to questioning the necessity of global resistance, he challenges the belief 
that globalized resistance would be more effective. This view derives from 
his conceptualization of politics as a struggle for power, and instrumental 
power in particular. According to Chandler (2009a: 20), political 
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engagement or resistance is nothing ‘without the strategic, instrumental, 
struggle for power’. In other words, Chandler’s definition of politics as 
well as power is quite different from that of the liberal cosmopolitans 
and radical poststructuralists: both seem to define politics as more of 
an abstract exchange of opinions than a concrete struggle for power. 
And where they talk about the power of people or social movements, 
it is mainly in terms of soft or symbolic power, not instrumental power 
strategically focused for making a direct impact.
From the perspective of this thesis, one of the most interesting 
arguments put forward by Chandler is that adopting a strategy of global 
resistance ultimately leaves social movements less powerful while directing 
political action away from the level where it can have a real political 
impact – the representational and democratic system of a nation state. 
He argues in explicit terms that ‘operating outside the formal political 
sphere of electoral representation’ does not facilitate ‘a radical challenge 
to political power and existing hierarchies of control’ (Chandler 2004: 
334). In other words, a global orientation of resistance is tantamount 
to ineffectiveness: social movements scaling their political action to the 
global level are likely to be less influential in that they will fail to target 
the genuine subjects of power: nation states, their governments and other 
political institutions.  
Chandler (2004: 334) is convinced that new social movements based 
on advocacy ‘pose much less of a threat to the status quo’ than ‘genuinely 
‘political’ social movements did in the past. He argues that the idea of global 
civil society originates from ‘the politics of the left, whose lack of support 
within their own societies was historically softened by the illusion of being 
part of an international movement’ (ibid: 330). Therefore, groups working 
for issues such as peace and the environment have ‘sought legitimacy 
more in their international connections than their capacity to engage in 
a political struggle of ideas with a domestic audience’ (ibid). Chandler is 
critical of globally oriented symbolic struggles, because demonstrating, 
for example against WTO or G8 meetings, ‘does not involve winning any 
arguments’ but is rather ‘a matter of courtier politics and elite lobbying, 
shortcutting any attempt to win popular representative support’ (ibid: 
331). This kind of global activism does not involve a ‘struggle to win 
the argument with people in a genuine debate’ but rather illustrates how 
‘isolated activists’ are engaging with ‘international financial and inter-
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state institutions where there is no democratic discussion and they have 
no formal rights or responsibilities’ (ibid). Importantly, Chandler does 
not deny the deterritorialized character of ideas, values and beliefs which 
lie behind any political act by social movements or other actors. He 
explicitly points to the deterritorialized nature of struggles such as those 
for women’s rights or national independence ‘in terms of the aspirational 
content of political demands’ (Chandler 2009a: 16). However, when it 
comes to more concrete terms, politics must be regarded as ‘necessarily 
territorialised in terms of the specific strategies and articulations of those 
demands, with a view to influencing or gaining political power to put 
those demands into practice’ (ibid: 17). 
Chandler is also very critical of the idea of an accumulation of 
struggles, which Hardt and Negri regard as taking place. Many liberal 
advocates of global civil society also believe that there is some kind 
of a global common denominator in many actions and events taking 
place locally around the world. However, not everything local can be 
automatically and unproblematically connected to the global. This is 
one of the reasons why Chandler (2004: 325) claims ‘that the decline 
of traditional international social movements capable of generating mass 
support has led radical theorists to see a new importance in increasingly 
disparate and isolated struggles’. He uses the Mexican Zapatista case as an 
example where western academics have ‘turned the limited success of the 
Chiapas rising into a revolutionary ‘postmodern social movement’’ (ibid: 
326). Radical poststructuralists have argued that their struggle is not so 
much local as a part of the global civil society’s struggle against global 
capitalism and neo-liberalism. However, after ten years of rebellion that 
has not, Chandler argues, provided the Chiapas with any significant 
improvement, it seems that the ‘rhetoric of global resistance coexists 
with a remarkable failure of the struggle to achieve any relief from abject 
poverty for the indigenous villagers of the area’ (ibid: 327). The case 
illustrates a clear ‘contrast between the claims made for global civic actors 
and the reality of their marginal influence’ (ibid).
Clearly, Chandler does not ‘believe’ in global resistance, as he regards 
its political significance and effects as very limited. Global resistance and 
political struggles advocated by radical poststructuralists are regarded as 
utopian, since they lack ‘a clear focal point or political project capable 
of cohering theoretical ideas or of creating collective political subjects’ 
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(Chandler 2009a: 18). The idea of global resistance is problematic also 
because there is no global government in the form of an institutionalized 
political authority to claim ‘responsibility for formulating policy or for 
its implementation’ (Chandler 2009b: 541). Hence, there is nothing that 
could ‘become a strategic object of global resistance’ (Chandler 2009a: 
18)27. Similarly, with regard to the liberal cosmopolitans, Chandler 
(2004: 338–339) argues that ‘celebration of global civil society ‘from 
the bottom up’ appears to be based on ‘the desire of Western activists 
and commentators to justify their avoidance of accountability to any 
collective source of political community and elected authority’. He 
calls into question much of the discourse in which new movements are 
seen as influential despite their marginality and/or because of their new 
characteristics (ibid: 328, emphasis added):
One might wonder whether there is an inverse relationship between 
the amount of progressive ‘new characteristics’ these struggles have 
and their strength and influence. A sceptical observer would no 
doubt suggest that the more marginal an opposition movement is, 
the more able are academic commentators to invest it with their own 
ideas and aspirations. These normative claims can then be used by 
any institution or individual to promote their own importance and 
moral legitimacy. If this is the case, it seems possible that if global 
civil society did not exist it would have had to been invented. 
Furthermore, Chandler points to the elitist nature of social movements 
which claim to represent and speak on the behalf of the oppressed and 
exploited. He argues that ‘rather than expanding the sphere of inclusiveness, 
global civic activism tends to undermine community connections’ because 
‘the political ethics it advocates are deeply corrosive of social engagement 
and prone to elitist rather than inclusive consequences’ (Chandler 2004: 
313). Indeed, he considers problematic the notion embedded in the global 
approaches that it is no longer necessary for individuals to be politically 
active in political parties and other forms of traditional politics but that 
they should instead engage globally, and thus more individualistically. As 
Chandler puts it: ‘The argument that the individual should have no higher 
27 Also some social movement scholars have pointed out that ‘in world politics 
there is no stable focal point like a government around which to organize contention’ 
(Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 178; also Gillan et. al 2008: 112). 
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political allegiance beyond their own moral conscience merely reflects 
and legitimates the radical rejection of collective political engagement 
and its replacement by elite advocacy and personal solipsism’ (ibid). 
On the whole, Chandler’s (2009a: 18) critical analysis illustrates 
that ‘beneath the rhetoric of global values and global struggles we find a 
remarkable absence of strategic clarity and political engagement’. If it is 
maintained that global resistance can consist of any form of protesting 
‘from ethical shopping to protests against free trade or the destruction of 
the rain forests’ (Chandler 2009b: 536), it lacks strategic engagement and 
thus also escapes power. In other words, when ‘symbolic manifestations 
of political protest and resistance’ become ends in themselves ‘in the 
form of awareness-raising’, action in itself becomes defined as ‘valuable, 
regardless of its consequences’ (ibid: 541). Chandler is worried about 
political engagement and politics becoming more of a self-expression 
than a struggle for power: ‘Never in the history of political modernity 
have we been as alienated from the social power of humanity’ (ibid: 542). 
In his view, the increasing level of abstraction in global theorizations 
simply reflects ‘a lack of engagement’ (ibid: 545). The shift towards the 
global is, then, ‘a retreat from social engagement and political struggle’ 
(Chandler 2009a: 207):    
The freedom of action provided by escaping the frameworks of 
representation and the demands of territorial control is the freedom 
of disengagement. It is a flight from the concrete to the abstract. 
We, in fact, act much less as political subjects, capable of shaping our 
circumstances, when we engage ‘globally’. Global politics has nothing to 
do with space or geography but with social relations: when we engage 
‘globally’ we engage with less social connection, with less social 
mediation, making our actions less strategic or instrumental, less 
clearly goal-orientated. (Chandler 2009a: 208, emphasis added.)  
It is remarkable how exceptional a view Chandler actually represents in 
comparison to currently dominant theoretical discourses by academic 
globalists. Indeed, his main concept, the ‘Global Ideology’, very well 
describes the mainstream of theorizing based on uniform ontological 
premises and leading to very abstract and globalized conceptualizations of 
politics, war, power and resistance. However, Chandler’s approach is not 
totally without problems, either. Even if he is right in his interpretation that 
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the explosive increase in global discourses is due to ‘political disconnection 
between state elites and societies, and a popular disengagement from 
mass politics’ (Chandler 2009a: 2), it is questionable whether this can be 
regarded as the only explanatory factor. Moreover, he does not seem to 
consider seriously the possibility that states might no longer be the only or 
primary frameworks for political identification and human community. 
Moreover, although it is necessary to be critical towards the theoretical 
shift from state-based to globalized politics, it would be as pointless to 
argue that there is nothing global about politics today as to claim that 
everything is now global. It definitely needs to be realized that the extent 
of ‘globality’ is more often than not overemphasized, but although global 
frameworks for politics are not as important as currently assumed, it 
would be problematic to suggest that there is nothing to be regarded as 
global in politics, and the same applies to resistance as well. 
Chandler is absolutely right to argue that there is considerable 
overemphasis in theoretical discourses on the global aspect. The solution, 
however, is not to return to studying interaction only between states, 
as used to be the case, and thus to deny or ignore the effects produced 
by the very discourse of globalization of politics. The discourse of the 
globalization of politics is transforming – and has already transformed 
– understandings of political processes and thus has also influenced the 
behavior of political actors in their concrete political practices. Discourses 
are not only descriptive and rhetorical; they have impacts beyond the level 
of language, for they influence how politicians, states and other political 
actors behave in actuality. When discourses create a common belief that 
politics has gone global, whether true or not, the belief has effects on the 
behavior of political actors. It seems that Chandler does not consider the 
impacts and transformational aspects of the discourse of globalization of 
politics seriously or broadly enough28.
To sum up, Chandler emphasizes state-based political engagement 
and is very critical of anything outside it. Much of his criticism is based 
on the belief that states are still the most important and powerful actors 
28 One of his arguments is that the shift from national to global in political 
discourses has given rise to the academic discourse of globalized politics. In other 
words, he acknowledges that discourses can have concrete impacts but does not 
seem to consider how these discourses may also transform the political practices of 
different political actors.  
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in the world political system. In its skepticism regarding the power of 
current non-state actors and their proclaimed ‘globality’, the critical state-
centric approach is totally at odds with that of radical poststructuralists 
and liberal cosmopolitans. Instead of trying to construct global civil 
society as a response to the changing political structures or to globalize 
the resistance of the Multitude, the critical state-centric approach seems 
to imply that strengthening state-based political engagement within the 
representational political system would be more effective. However, this 
would require that citizens become more interested, for example, in 
traditional party politics, which seems not very likely at the moment. In 
other words, although criticizing academic globalists for being utopian, 
the state-centric approach does not present many realistic alternatives 
either. As Chandler (2009a: 222) himself admits when discussing ‘Marx’s 
consideration of a similar crisis of political subjectivity’, in the current 
situation it is ‘difficult to see an emerging political subject which can 
give renewed content to political concepts and reconstitute the political 
as a concrete sphere of contestation’. However, what he seems to have 
in mind are the traditional kinds of political subjects; the possibility of 
thinking about new kinds of political subjects is categorically ruled out in 
much the same way as academic globalists rule out the traditional political 
subjects and traditional forms of political action in their theorizations.       
2.6 Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to introduce and analyze the currently 
popular and dominant theoretical frameworks related to the main theme 
of the thesis, that is, resistance against war. From the perspective of the 
anti-war movement, the lively theoretical debate is extremely interesting, 
because social movements and other non-state actors are granted a highly 
important role in current theorizations. For example, it is suggested that 
global civil society is an ‘answer to war’ due to its ability to challenge state 
power, or that the oppressed people of the world can wage a war against 
(the global state of ) war in the form of the revolutionary subjects of the 
Multitude. However, the problem with these conceptualizations is that 
they have remained at a very abstract and future-oriented (even utopian) 
level in referring to global collective political subject and struggles that 
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do not yet actually exist. Indeed, this has been one of the main criticisms 
directed against the dominant globally oriented frameworks. 
In this chapter the conceptualizations, premises and suggestions of 
three different theoretical approaches have been analyzed in detail. The 
research has explored the kinds of conceptualizations of war, power and 
political engagement on which they base their understandings of effective 
strategies of resistance and has, to some extent, also reflected on their 
ontological and broader normative premises. The liberal cosmopolitan 
approach was examined first, after which the radical poststructuralist 
approach and its convergences and divergences in regard to the liberal 
cosmopolitan approach were discussed. In the third part, criticism of 
both approaches by the critical state-centric approach was presented, 
with this approach then analyzed critically as well.  
As regards the political context of the resistance against the Iraq War, 
liberal cosmopolitans are inclined to interpret the war as evidence of an 
exceptionally dominant but transitory role of the US in world politics 
which has enabled it to act unilaterally while trying to secure its national 
interests. Although the liberal cosmopolitan approach strongly criticizes 
the US for ignoring both international law and the international 
community, it regards the situation as transitory. Liberal cosmopolitans 
believe that the US cannot continue to promote its foreign policy by 
military force, because the pressure from the international community 
and global public opinion will constrain the country’s behavior. They 
do not consider radical structural changes in the existing global power 
structure necessary, because they think that convincing the US to return to 
the same path as the rest of the world (the other liberal democratic states) 
will solve the problem. In more general terms, such an interpretation of 
the political situation reflects a liberal understanding of war as a problem 
to be solved by enhancing global (liberal) norms and global (liberal) 
governance by strengthening the role of international institutions and by 
concluding legal agreements between nation states. It is also common to 
highlight the benefits of increasing economic interdependency between 
(liberal) states, as it is expected to generate peace and stability for the 
whole international system.   
Quite on the contrary, in the radical poststructuralist approach it is 
precisely the increasing governance by liberal states and institutions that is 
regarded as one of the main problems. Radical poststructuralists interpret 
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the Iraq War as a logical continuation – and one of the most obvious 
manifestations – of the global neoliberal governance that they believe has 
brought the entire international system into a permanent state of exception. 
The war is not conceived as stemming solely from US exceptionalism but 
as serving other purposes as well, since war as such is regarded as an 
essential instrument of rule in governance of the global order. Although 
the leading role of the US is regarded as highly important in the process 
of constructing and maintaining a global regime of biopower (Empire), 
the US role as such is not seen as explaining the transformation from a 
system led by nation states to a complex system of decentralized forms of 
power and governance. 
A significant difference between the liberal and radical approaches 
is reflected in their definition of war in more general terms. Being 
quite uncritical of the ‘liberal way of war’ in the first place, liberal 
cosmopolitans do not share the idea of a ‘global state of war’ with radical 
poststructuralists. For the latter, the Iraq War is merely one example of 
great variety of structural violence and suffering taking place continuously 
within Empire, where mechanisms of global neoliberal capitalism have 
started to control all forms of life, accelerating and deepening inequality 
and injustice in the world. In this interpretation, the problems to be 
tackled are much more profound than just the War on Terror or the Iraq 
War, which are viewed from a broader, structural perspective.  
Both liberal and radical analyses have been questioned by the critical 
state-centric approach, which challenges the whole idea of a global 
state of war as well as the argument that the international system or the 
power of nation states has been fundamentally transformed. The critical 
state-centric approach also questions the interpretation that the Iraq 
War manifests a heightened desire for control by a neoliberal Empire. 
Rather, it stresses that both the Iraq War and the War on Terror should 
be conceived as resulting from a lack of coherent, strategic foreign policy 
goals and an inability of the US and other western states to respond to 
new kinds of security threats.
In regard to conceptualizations of political action and resistance, 
liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists are somewhat closer 
to each other than in their analyses of war and power. They both maintain 
that non-state actors have become important and influential political 
actors in the global era. For liberal cosmopolitans, the project against 
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war is not, however, based on the struggle against decentralized forms 
of governance of Empire; rather, it is non-state actors that are regarded 
as struggling against state power. In fact, liberal cosmopolitans seem 
increasingly often to regard nation states and governments as opponents 
of global civil society, as they are believed to constrain human progress 
towards a cosmopolitan society. This leads liberal cosmopolitans also 
to regard traditional forms of political participation in representational 
democratic system as old-fashioned and ineffective ways to produce social 
and political change. They suggest that the primary context for political 
engagement should now be global and that non-state actors and their 
networks should adjust their political action to fit that scale. It is also 
stressed that globalization and the information revolution have increased 
the possibilities of non-state actors substantially. 
On balance, the liberal cosmopolitan approach maintains that non-
state actors such as social movements should bypass territorialized nation 
state boundaries altogether. It stresses that it is not only hard, instrumental 
power that counts in the global era, but that soft power, based on 
persuasion and tempting, has now become increasingly important. 
However, the approach can be criticized for not contemplating seriously 
enough whether it really is possible to challenge hard power with soft 
power and how this can be accomplished in practical terms. On the 
whole, it seems that the liberal cosmopolitan approach does not take the 
issue of power or power structures into account sufficiently in the context 
of social movements. 
The poststructuralist approach resembles the  liberal cosmopolitan in 
its advocacy of the global context as the primary context for political 
action (explicitly conceptualized as resistance). Radical poststructuralists, 
however, explain the rationale behind this in very different terms, for they 
believe that power has become decentralized in migrating from nation 
states to the deterritorialized regime of biopower (Empire). Believing that 
that power in the international system has become deterritorialized, they 
go on to argue that resistance must take on a similar, deterritorialized and 
global form in order to be effective. Although their approach is based on 
a very different kind of analysis of power, radical poststructuralists end 
up defining the role of social movements in terms quite similar to those 
used by the liberal cosmopolitans, ones that also reinforce a very negative 
view of traditional forms of political engagement while often also citing 
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the crisis of democracy. 
In addition, both approaches speak highly of the global public sphere, 
which is thought to be based on a similar logic but on a different scale 
than the public sphere in the context of nation states. They also praise 
global networks of opposition and regard the role of new ICTs as very 
important for political engagement as well as democracy. In fact, radical 
poststructuralists regard diffuse, global and networked forms of resistance 
as crucial in challenging global power structures. They stress that social 
movements, unlike states, have a capacity for this kind of action as they 
are organized in a non-hierarchical fashion. The main problem of the 
radical approach is that it offers basically no practical suggestions whereby 
social movements might organize their resistance effectively and it thus 
remains unclear how problems and injustices of the world can be tackled 
concretely. In sum, the approach can be criticized for conceptualizing the 
role, power and strategies of social movements in highly abstract terms.
Both of the theoretical discourses discussed above are strongly criticized 
by the critical state-centric approach, whose very point of departure 
is to challenge the very belief that politics has become globalized. It 
argues that both liberal and radical approaches are based on ‘Global 
Ideology’, which instead of empirically studying whether politics has 
been globalized, takes this as a starting assumption, leading to a vicious 
circle of misinterpretations in which everything is regarded as becoming 
increasingly globalized. From the perspective of social movements, the 
discourse of globalized politics is regarded as not only misleading but also 
counter-productive in that social movements which scale their resistance 
to the global level as a result of the discourses are likely to become less 
influential, because they will fail to target the genuine subjects of power, 
that is, nation states. 
The critical state-centric approach also emphasizes the negative impacts 
of globally oriented political action for the working of the democratic 
system as regards, for example, accountability and offering real political 
alternatives for people. In other words, by provoking even more distrust 
towards representative democracy, the academic globalists lead people 
away from collective power, a form of power that is crucial when the aim 
is to affect politics in concrete terms. The approach suggests that global 
and merely symbolic forms of political action (or resistance) are prone 
to elitism and are likely to result in even more radical disengagement 
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from politics. The belief that the global public sphere constitutes a public 
sphere similar to that at the national level also becomes challenged. It is 
maintained that global communication as such, in the form of expressing 
one’s own ideas, cannot be regarded as sufficient because political 
communication needs to be based on the aim of persuading people to 
agree with one’s own position. Engaging in a political dialogue and debate 
is necessary when attempting to gain broad support for one’s political 
views, which can then be utilized in political struggles (for power) within 
the representational and democratic political system.    
The analysis of three theoretical approaches indicates that their 
main differences stem from their different understandings of power and 
different interpretations of the impact of globalization on power relations 
between different political actors. The liberal cosmopolitan approach is 
characterized by its understanding of the process of globalization in mostly 
positive terms, emphasizing the possibilities for new and global forms 
of political action brought by globalization. It also maintains that social 
movements and other non-state actors are gaining more power at the 
expense of nation states. In this regard, power is mainly conceptualized 
in terms of symbolic or soft power. In contrast, radical poststructuralists 
regard economic globalization very critically, stressing that it is serving 
the unjust global power structure, which can, however, be challenged 
by social movements if they adapt their political strategies to suit the 
changing circumstances. In other words, the approach stresses the need 
to globalize resistance in order to be able to fight global power structures, 
which are regarded as beyond the power of nation states. Power is regarded 
as decentralized and networked, whether the issue is the global power 
structures to be resisted or the non-state actors engaging in resistance. 
Rather than an ability to exert direct influence, power is viewed in terms of 
soft or symbolic power, just like in the liberal cosmopolitan approach. 
The critical state-centric approach challenges both approaches, 
regarding the globalization of politics in highly skeptical terms and 
denying that there has been any serious transition from national to global 
in terms of political action (resistance) or power. Power in this approach 
is defined in more traditional terms as a struggle for instrumental power. 
A summary of these findings illustrating the main similarities and 
differences between the three different theoretical approaches is presented 
in the Appendix 1.  
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On the whole, the liberal cosmopolitan approach can be criticized 
for not taking the issue of power seriously or critically enough into 
consideration, and the radical poststructuralist approach for emphasizing 
global power structures too strongly. As it simultaneously has a very broad 
and somewhat idealistic view of the possibilities of global resistance to 
challenge the global power regime, the radical approach actually represents 
a strange mixture of unwarranted optimism and omnipotence, resulting 
in a sort of determinism. Another problem in the idea of globalized, 
generalized and being-against strategies of resistance is that they do not 
yield many concrete suggestions for political engagement and resistance. 
From the perspective of critical theory, these kinds of conceptualizations 
should always be integrated into political practice at least on some level.
The critical state-centric approach, which maintains that political 
action and resistance should stay primarily at the national level for the 
sake of effectiveness and political accountability, succeeds convincingly 
in illustrating many serious problems in the theoretical approaches that 
advocate globalism. Nevertheless, the critical state-centric approach 
perhaps has too strong a focus on the national context despite the fact 
that – as the approach itself acknowledges – most social movements are 
characteristically deterritorialized in ideological terms, this being case 
especially with the anti-war movement. Accordingly, there should be more 
reflection on this particular issue, which might also compel the critical 
state-centric approach to articulate more openly how it regards the power 
of social movements more generally and the difference between symbolic 
(or soft) power and instrumental power in particular.  
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3       OUTLINE OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In the previous chapter, three different theoretical approaches were 
examined, with the findings providing a particular framework for the 
empirical analysis to follow. Specifically, the theoretical inquiry makes it 
possible to design a particular technique to determine the units of analysis 
for the empirical part, that is, the questions to be asked. As explained 
in the introduction, answering the main research questions requires 
ascertaining how much common ground there is between theory and 
political practice at the moment, in other words, how the understandings 
and premises of the current anti-war movement ‘resonate’ with those of 
the three theoretical approaches. After analyzing the main convergences 
and divergences between the theoretical and empirical results, it becomes 
possible to move on to discuss what the theories can and fail to offer to 
the anti-war movement, which advances the overall aim of developing 
the theories further, especially in terms of their connection to the political 
practice of resistance.
The premises of the anti-war movement need to be investigated in 
terms similar to those used in analyzing the premises of the theoretical 
discourses. The theoretical analysis has revealed clearly that several 
different aspects of any approach or movement must be examined in order 
to get a comprehensive view. Firstly, given that the anti-war movement 
has been conceptualized in the theoretical debate as an increasingly 
global political subject – at least there are visions of it as becoming such 
– it is valuable to see how the movement regards itself in this regard as 
an ‘agent’ of resistance and a political subject. Secondly, to be able to 
reflect on the theoretical debate concerning the primary opponents of 
social movements and thus the targets of their resistance, it is necessary to 
analyze how these are defined within the anti-war movement, and why. 
In a word, one has to study what is resisted and why it is resisted.
Thirdly, in order to examine the theoretical discussion concerning the 
most effective political strategies and the primary context of resistance 
for social movements, it is necessary to study how these are understood 
within the anti-war movement; that is, the views on to how to resist need 
to be dissected. Fourthly, since the effectiveness of resistance, as well as 
the power of the movement, is conceptualized in various ways in the 
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theoretical debate, these, too, must be assessed in the context of the 
movement. What needs to be analyzed is how power of the movement as 
well as its achievements, successes and failures are understood within the 
movement, that is, how power as well as effects are conceptualized. 
In order to address the main research questions and thereby inform 
the theoretical debate, the empirical analysis will query the premises and 
understandings of selected organizations within the anti-war movement 
in terms of the following issues:  
1. Who is / who are the main agent(s)? This requires an analysis 
of how the movement and the organizations themselves 
are conceptualized as political subjects of resistance, and 
whether their political agency is regarded mainly from a 
national or a global perspective. (Chapter 4)
2. What to resist and why? This question will be addressed 
through an analysis of how the main aims, targets of 
resistance are defined and causes of (the) war articulated. 
(Chapter 5)
3. How to resist? This question pertains to how effective 
strategies and tactics of resistance are conceptualized.  
(Chapter 6)
4. What is power? Addressing this question illuminates how 
and from what perspective the power of the movement is 
conceptualized. (Chapter 7) 
5. What are effects? This analysis highlights what are regarded 
as the main achievements, successes and failures of the new 
anti-war movement. (Chapter 8)
To comprehensively analyze the organizations’ understanding of these 
quite broad issues, additional detailed questions need to be asked. These 
specific units of analysis are introduced in the beginning of each chapter 
dedicated to a specific issue.
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What exactly is meant here by ‘the anti-war movement’? Quite often 
the term is used as a synonym for the peace movement, especially in the 
media, but sometimes also in academic literature. However, it is possible 
to regard the two as separate movements that have a different emphasis 
in their political aims and their activities. Indeed, some researchers argue 
that it would be more appropriate to speak of ‘the anti-war and peace 
movements’, as this would encompass ‘the range of activists, from those 
wanting to see one side defeated to those who abhor all forms of violence’ 
(Gillan et al. 2008: 73; emphasis in original, also 188)1. Although some 
strongly emphasize that the anti-war and peace movements should not be 
equated with each other, many scholars have nevertheless used the term 
‘anti-war’ to describe them both, a choice usually justified on the basis of 
brevity (ibid: 73, also Pickerill & Webster 2006; Scherer 2004: 3). This 
is the choice here as well, although the movement consists of a mixture 
of both ‘branches’, the more traditional peace branch and the somewhat 
newer anti-war branch. Sometimes I also use the term ‘movement 
against the Iraq War’, which better accommodates both branches of the 
movement, but, as quite a long expression, is not very convenient to use 
all the time. 
It is extremely difficult to force a strict definition on whatever term 
is chosen, because we are dealing with a highly diverse social movement 
that has a very long and rich history2. Moreover, it should be noted that 
the movement is not a centrally led or strictly territorialized movement, 
but a heterogeneous network encompassing various political groups and 
participants from all over the world. As Taylor and Young (1987: 9) point 
out, it consists of ‘various strands and traditions, immensely diverse in 
character and often contradictory in their stances’. Therefore, instead 
of trying to impose a unified and clear definition, I opt to define the 
movement as a loose political community – an umbrella organization 
of sorts under which there is a broad spectrum of actors that may share 
some views but not others3.  
1 For ‘narrow’ and ‘wider’ definitions of the peace movement, see e.g. Overy 
1982: 4–6, 55–57.
2 The anti-war/peace movement is regarded as ‘the oldest continuously organized 
social movement’ and ‘one of the most diverse’ (Chatfield 1992: xxv).
3 Many scholars stress that the diversity within the movement makes it is difficult 
to speak of ‘the existence of a single peace movement’ (Chatfield 1973b: vii). 
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The British anti-war movement, which functions here as the context 
of the case study of four anti-war organizations, is introduced following 
a short historical review providing some historical and political context 
to illustrate the broader international and national framework in which 
the anti-war movement is currently operating4. Although the history of 
the movement definitely warrants a much more detailed examination, 
limitations of space preclude a more comprehensive treatment. Moreover, 
in this kind of research setting it unnecessary to replicate or repeat the 
whole history of the movement. There are many excellent textbooks and 
studies by distinguished scholars which cover these issues in a much more 
profound way than the present author ever could. Hence, the following 
review attempts to provide as many references as possible to relevant 
research literature for those who wish to find out more about certain 
historical events, particular campaigns or other points of interest.
3. A Brief History of the Anti-War/Peace Movement
The history of the peace movement dates back to the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. The first peace societies were formed in the US and 
Europe simultaneously in 1815. (Chatfield 1997: 23: Cortright 2008: 
16, 27.) In the US, the peace movement was first constituted by small 
religious societies, after which broader associations, such as the American 
Peace Society, were formed (Chatfield 1973b: x–xii; Boyer 2001; Cortright 
2008: 28).5 In Europe, Britain was the first country in which peace 
groups and associations were founded. From 1815 onwards, the number 
of peace-related associations started to grow steadily. The European 
peace movement was active, for example, in organizing international 
peace congresses, which first took place sporadically but later in a more 
systematic fashion until 1914 (Chatfield 1997: 23). By that time, there 
were already peace associations in most European states. 
4 As Shaw (1987: 51) importantly notes: ‘If peace activism meant certain things 
in the 1900s, it meant others in the First World War, others in the 1920s and early 
1930s, yet others in the later 1930s and during the Second World War’. 
5 The history and development of the American peace movement is not covered 
here in detail (see e.g. Chatfield 1973a–d; 1992; Cortright 2007a; 2008; DeBenedetti 
1973; Patterson 1973; Scherer 2004; Stassen & Wittner 2007).
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According to social movement scholars, the first peace movements 
worked independently of one another and arose mainly from essentially 
temporary political coalitions that typically concentrated on specific 
national issues (Boyer 2001). Sometimes they also tried to tackle 
intergovernmental disputes in opposing militarism-nationalism as well 
as mobilizing people for the cause of peace (Chatfield 1997: 23; also 
1973b: xii–xiv: Cortright 2008: 45). It has been noted that from the very 
beginning there were significant differences in terms of ‘constituency, 
philosophy, and emphasis’, as some groups ‘worked for international 
exchanges and understanding; one for a universal language; others against 
imperialism, and arms races, or for international law’ (Chatfield 1997: 23; 
also 1992: 1–27)6. Pacifism as a philosophical standpoint was especially 
common within the early peace groups in Britain and the US,7 which 
have remained the most active regions in this regard ever since (Prasad 
2005: 103). Although the main priorities varied between different groups 
within the peace movement, it has been argued that they shared ‘the 
goal of replacing warfare with the peaceful resolution of conflict’ (Boyer 
2001). However, they ‘rarely engaged in extensive debate over their 
different viewpoints’ and when they did, it was usually believed that they 
‘were more complementary than conflicting’ (Patterson 1973: 25–26). 
In the beginning of the twentieth century, peace associations 
mushroomed. Public pressure in Britain, France and the US, for example, 
‘provided the impetus for the Second Hague Conference of 1907’ (Chatfield 
1997, 24; also Cortright 2008: 42–43). In Britain, the National Peace 
Council (NPC) was founded after the 17th Universal Peace Congress in 
London in 1908, which brought together representatives from different 
national organizations working for peace and disarmament. As a coalition 
of mainly pacifist groups calling on the government to renounce war and 
to promote the idea of a world government (Hudson 2005: 26), the NPC 
was to become a long-term association8. 
6 For example, there were many internal divisions within the American movement 
during the First World War (Patterson 1973: 21, 24). While differing ‘fundamentally 
on the specific details for the realization of their goal’, pacifists, legalists and 
federationists ‘disagreed on the proper means to the idealistic end’ (ibid: 33). 
7 Pacifism was brought to the US by Christian groups that moved there from 
Europe (Prasad 2005: 103).
8 The NPC was discontinued almost a hundred years after its foundation, replaced 
in 2001 by the Network for Peace was set up to continue its networking role. 
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Due to the First World War, peace became an issue of utmost 
importance. Peace organizations of the time often believed that peace 
would be established ‘through making appeals to governments and 
organising conferences to declare their opposition to war’ (Prasad 2005: 
103; also Cortright 2008: 52–61).9 After the war, many started to doubt 
whether nation states could any longer fulfill their functions and protect 
their citizens. Hence, liberal internationalism gained more transnational 
characteristics (Chatfield 1992: 168; also 1973a) and many put their 
hopes into the newly founded League of Nations, which, it was believed, 
would become a ‘peace-maker’ and arbitrator of conflicts between nation 
states (e.g. Cortright 2008: 53). It was thought to effectively control ‘the 
unreasonable and self-righteous behavior of the winning governments 
towards the defeated nations’ of the war (Prasad 2005: 262)10. However, 
the League of Nations turned out to be a disappointment to many, as it 
was ‘helpless in a climate of distrust toward power centres created by the 
winning nations’ (ibid: 262; also Cortright 2008: 58, 64–65). 
Ultimately, the belief that the First World War was a war to end all 
wars proved to be an illusion (Prasad 2005: 262) and there was a growing 
recognition that it had in fact solved nothing (Hinton 1989: 75). Instead, 
it essentially paved the way for the Second World War. Between the 
world wars, pacifism gained more ground as an ideology of the peace 
movement. In Britain, for example, the Peace Pledge Union (PPU), which 
adhered to pacifist principles, was established. It is considered the oldest 
‘secular pacifist’ organization (Miles 2008: 50) and the largest pacifist 
organization in Britain (Hinton 1989: 102)11. It was a section of War 
Resisters’ International (WRI), an international organization founded 
already in 192112. According to Miles (2008: 50; also Cortright 2008: 
74–75), the PPU was founded ‘as a response to the failure of the 1919 
Peace Treaty and growing anxiety that Europe was drifting into another 
9 On the history of the British peace movement, see e.g. Byrd 1985; Hinton 
1989; Taylor 1983; 1988; Taylor & Young 1987a.
10  As Hinton (1989: 70) notes, ‘a victor’s peace, as pacifists had always understood, 
could be nothing but a temporary truce, setting the scene for new wars of revenge 
once the defeated powers had recovered their strength’. 
11 For more detail on the PPU, see e.g. Ceadel 1987: 91–92; Overy 1982: 10–12; 
Hinton 1989: 102–104; Cortright 2008: 74–75.
12 WRI is one of the organizations studied here. Its history is presented in more 
detail in chapter 3.3.
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war’. Prior to the Second World War, the Union had 150,000 members, 
but with the outbreak of war in 1939 its support decreased dramatically 
(Hudson 2005: 29; also Cortright 2008: 75). 
The Second World War left 55 million people dead. Where the First 
World War inspired a strong anti-war atmosphere and helped, for example, 
the anti-conscription movement, the Second World War created a sense 
of apathy and skepticism towards pacifism (Prasad 2005: 255, 261; 
Cortright 2008: 110). In Britain, the peace movement was even accused 
of being responsible for its government’s policy of appeasement (Hinton 
1989: 91–92). From the pacifist perspective, it was problematic that the 
Second World War ‘caused a very large number of people to believe that 
forces like Hitler’s Nazism and Mussolini’s Fascism were the real enemies 
of humanity rather than the institutions of war and militarism’ (Prasad 
2005: 262). After the war, it was a common view that ‘evil’ forces ‘had 
to be defeated by whatever means available or conceivable’, which meant 
that ‘militarism itself could be accepted as an essential tool for building 
peace’ (ibid). It has been argued that the most horrific result of this view 
becoming accepted was the use of atom bombs to destroy Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki although the Japanese were ready to surrender (ibid).  
After the Second World War, many hopes were invested in international 
organizations, mainly the United Nations, to maintain peace and security 
in the world (Cortright 2008: 111–115). There was also a quite active 
movement for establishing a ‘world government’ (ibid: 115–117; also 
Chatfield 1992: 162). For example, organizations such as the Federal 
Union and the Crusade for World Government worked towards this goal 
(Hudson 2005: 26; Cortright 2008: 117). In Britain, the philosopher 
Bertrand Russell was a central figure in the movement (he was later 
appointed president of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) (Hudson 
2005: 26; Cortright 2008: 134). 
After the Second World War, the British peace movement concentrated 
on the dissolution of the British Empire as well as the rejection of 
imperialism by both the US and the Soviet Union13. Together with 
these efforts, in the 1950s, there grew up within the broader movement 
13 James Hinton (1989: 2) has interestingly observed that Britain’s imperial role 
in the nineteenth century resulted, on the one hand, ‘in a stronger peace movement 
than anywhere else in the Europe’ but which was, on the other hand, deeply 
influenced ‘by often unrecognized imperialist assumptions’.  
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a specific anti-nuclear branch around the Direct Action Committee 
(DAC). It organized the first Aldermaston March in 1958. Later on, the 
small DAC merged into the Committee of 100, and over the decades 
the march ‘became synonymous with CND’ (Hudson 2005: 55; also 
Hinton 1989: 161–170; Day 1986: 171–172), the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament, which was founded in 1958. 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was a great deal of fear in 
regard to nuclear weapons due to the development of the first hydrogen 
bomb. The CND managed to channel popular opposition to nuclear 
weapons into anti-nuclear marches, of which the most famous was the 
annual Aldermaston March. The anti-nuclear campaigning continuously 
reflected changing developments, from the time when US air bases were 
accepted in Britain (after the founding of NATO) to the start of the 
nuclear arms race after the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon 
(1949) and the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 (Hudson 2005: 
30–32). As the Soviet Union became enemy number one within the 
liberal western hemisphere during the Cold War, the peace movement 
was often challenged by accusing it of communist leanings. For many, 
it was ‘difficult to accept that British communists wanted peace and 
disarmament and were not just working in the interests of the Soviet 
Union’ (ibid: 33).14 Anti-communism was also common within the 
British peace movement; initially it caused problems, but later it became 
accepted that the movement would ‘welcome dedicated peace activists 
whatever their personal convictions’ (ibid). 
Due to popular opposition to nuclear weapons, the Labour Party 
produced a resolution for unilateral nuclear disarmament in 1960. 
However, the resolution did not receive enough support, which 
disappointed many anti-nuclear activists who had put their trust in 
the party.15 This caused a strong anti-parliamentary climate within the 
peace movement and subsequently enhanced the ideology of anarchism, 
which later had concrete consequences for some organizations in the 
movement16. For example, philosopher Bertrand Russell resigned as 
14 On peace and communism, see e.g. Cortright 2008: 119–120. 
15 E.g. Cortright 2008: 135; Hinton 1989: 160–161; Rochon 1988: 157; Taylor 
1987a: 112–117.
16 Since then, it has been a widespread view within the British peace movement 
that it should not depend too heavily on political parties (Rochon 1988: 157).
95
a president of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and formed a 
new organization, the Committee of 100. This was to become more 
radical as well as more direct-action oriented, organizing campaigns of 
civil disobedience, for instance, in the form of protests and sit-downs in 
different locations near nuclear bases. This strategy can be characterized 
basically as mass-oriented direct action and civil obedience. At first, it 
was a very popular strategy, but its popularity faded quite quickly when 
arrests and imprisonment of demonstrators, as well as violence used by 
the police, started to increase. (E.g. Hudson 2005; Day 1986: 171–172; 
Overy 1982: 31–32.) 
Later in the 1960s, the Vietnam War became a major issue within the 
peace movement (e.g. Cortright 2008: 157–167). The first demonstration 
against the war was organized in 1965 in front of the American Embassy 
in London. In 1967 and 1968, there were large demonstrations against the 
war, which were organized by the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC), 
led by Tariq Ali. Some of these demonstrations became quite violent. It is 
a commonly acknowledged fact that during the Vietnam War there were 
many controversies and rivalries inside the anti-war movements in both 
the US (e.g. Chatfield 1973b: xxvii; DeBenedetti & Chatfield 1990) and 
Britain (e.g. Young 1987a: 18; Taylor & Young 1987b: 295).17 
During the 1980s, the anti-nuclear campaigns brought increasingly 
transnational aspects to anti-war and peace activism, and the European 
peace movement in particular was active in its opposition to the Cold 
War and to nuclear weapons. The period between 1981 and 1983 saw 
continuous and massive demonstrations against nuclear weapons all over 
Europe as hundreds of thousands of people took part in anti-nuclear 
campaigns (Rochon 1988: xvi). This ‘fanned out of the Netherlands to 
Germany and Britain, to Belgium to Italy; it elicited the first signs of 
an independent mood in Eastern Europe; it steadily expanded through 
Scandinavia and the Mediterranean; it reached the United States; and, 
last of all, France’ (Taylor & Young 1987b: 287).18 
17 On opposition to the Vietnam War in Britain, see e.g. Minnion 1989; Miller 
2008. On the American anti-war movement during the Vietnam War, see e.g. Boyer 
2001; Chatfield 1992: 117–145; Chatfield 1997: 23–25; DeBenedetti & Chatfield 
1990; Dumbrell 1989; Garfinkle 1995; Finn 1985; Klein 1989; Kronenwetter 1994: 
101–119; Hixson 2000; Horowitz 1970: 14–17; Small 2002. 
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The 1980s was also a time when human rights issues surfaced as a 
central theme and one increasingly often linked to the issue of peace. 
In addition, environmental and women’s rights movements started to 
play an important role (ibid: 288). The European Nuclear Disarmament 
(END) movement originated from Britain, helping to organize European 
Peace Conventions while also managing to attract activists from Eastern 
Europe (ibid: 291).  
One of the most significant forms of anti-nuclear campaigning in 
Britain has been the Women’s Peace Camp near the Greenham Common 
Air Base. It lasted for a remarkable 19 years (1981–2000). The campaign 
was a reaction to US plans to install cruise and Pershing missiles in 
Europe. The Women’s Peace Camp aimed at preventing the construction 
of silos for the missiles at the base through nonviolent direct action. 
Various methods were used, but the highlight was in December 1982, 
when over 30,000 women gathered at the base and joined hands around 
its perimeter fence. The action was called ‘Embrace the Base’.19 There was 
a peace camp in Molesworth and at least ten in other locations in Britain, 
and in other countries as well, such as Germany, France and Italy. 
Generally, the 1980s clearly marked an increase in extra-parliamentary 
politics in the peace movement, as well as growing skepticism towards 
politicians and political parties in society more broadly. (Taylor & Young 
1987b: 290.) During the 1990s, there was opposition to the Gulf War as 
well as the wars in the Balkans, but as has been already pointed out, the 
movement experienced a clear political revival only after 9/11 and the 
War on Terror that followed it.   
18 On the movement against nuclear weapons in the US, see e.g. Chatfield 1992: 
146–164; Davis 1985; McCullough 2007), in Europe and Britain, see e.g. Hinton 
1989: 182–194; Rochon 1988, and more generally e.g. Cortright 2008: 139–146). 
19 On Greenham Common, see e.g. Eglin 1987; Cortright 2008: 147–148; 
Hinton 1989: 183, 191–193; Miles 2008: 202, 208, 221; Rochon 1988: 7, 82, 92, 
102–104, 110–113. 
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3.2 Case Study:  The Anti-War Movement in Britain
Why would one study the British anti-war movement? It can be argued 
that it is a very interesting and relevant case for many reasons. First of 
all, as an influential member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and the closest partner of the US in the War on Terror as well as 
the War on Iraq, the United Kingdom (UK) represents a very important 
national context for analyzing the premises of resistance within the 
anti-war movement. Secondly, the fact that Britain went to war against 
the will of its citizens – the majority of British citizens opposed their 
country’s involvement – makes it a very compelling case. Indeed, this is 
one obvious explanation for the popularity of the anti-war movement 
in Britain. Thirdly, many British anti-war organizations have been very 
active in organizing and promoting international campaigns and events 
during the Iraq War, which adds the ‘global’ element to the case. The 
headquarters of an important international organization, War Resisters’ 
International, is also located in Britain. Fourthly, historically Britain has 
been a very important place for anti-war and peace activism over the past 
two hundred years. Lastly, another aspect of interest is that the British 
peace movement has been heavily influenced by the country’s colonial 
and imperialist history (e.g. Hinton 1989).
The choice of case study obviously has a clear bearing on the kinds of 
interpretations and conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis. I am 
well aware that the case study makes the perspective of the study western 
and, more specifically, European, which potentially gives room for 
criticism on grounds of Euro-centrism. However, the perspective provides 
an opportunity to critically analyze the premises of the European anti-
war movement, which seems to have been the most active in opposing 
the Iraq War, together with the American anti-war movement of course. 
The European anti-war movement has gained a great deal of international 
publicity particularly due to the European Social Forum (ESF), a ‘home 
base’ of sorts for many anti-war groups and organizations. Indeed, the 
Forum was where the idea of a worldwide demonstration against the 
Iraq War was first introduced and discussed among different groups in 
2002. Accordingly, it is reasonable to suggest that by empirically studying 
the premises of British anti-war organizations one might be able to say 
something that applies beyond the national framework and to reflect on 
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related theoretical debates on a more general, at least European, level.
When it comes to research in regard to the anti-war movement20, 
during the past few decades, there has not generally been particularly 
much research on the peace or anti-war movements. One obvious 
explanation is that the peace movement was ‘out of fashion’ for a long 
time after the 1980s; there was not that much to study. The end of the 
Cold War was probably one of the reasons why the anti-war movement 
was not a popular subject of research during the 1990s21. Another reason 
for the limited interest in studying the anti-war movement may be that it 
is often considered mainly from a historical perspective, as if nothing has 
changed. Especially those scholars who regard the anti-war movement 
as strongly international by definition might not see the need to study 
the supposedly new and/or global elements in it. At the same time, there 
has been a dramatic rise in social movements and NGOs related to other 
issues, especially environmental problems and human rights (Keck & 
Sikkink 1998: 10–11). The present decade has witnessed a very dynamic 
period of political activism, ranging from environmental, religious and 
human rights related movements to the alter-globalization movement. 
There has recently been growing interest in the anti-war movement 
and some interesting studies have been published. For example, the new 
American anti-war movement has inspired many studies (e.g. Anstead 
& Chadwik 2006; Heaney & Rojas 2007)22. European and especially 
British anti-war activism has been analyzed in several studies, for instance, 
from the perspective of anti-imperialism and critical geopolitics (Phillips 
2009) as well as from the perspective of its relationship to ICTs, which 
are increasingly used by all social movements. The role of the Internet for 
anti-war activism has been a particularly popular subject, and research 
has also often focused on the extent of the transnational characteristics 
20 Instead of a separate and detailed literature review of previous studies on the 
movement, the thesis draws on relevant and important research literature throughout 
the text. This can be seen in the chapters of empirical analysis in particular when 
discussing the findings of the analysis, much in the same way as was done in the 
historical review (see chapter 3.1). 
21 It has been argued that the European peace movement, as a part of a wider 
civil society, was one of the factors contributing to the end of the Cold War in 1989 
(Kaldor 2003a: 69–71; also Cortright 2008: 149–152).
22 For popular literature on the current anti-war movement in the US, see e.g. 
Benjamin & Evans 2005; Hayden 2007; Ritter 2007; Robbins 2008. 
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of the movement (Pickerill & Webster 2006; Gillan & Pickerill 2008; 
Gillan et al. 2008; also Gillan 2008). In his PhD thesis, Kevin Gillan 
(2006) analyzes ideational frameworks of Sheffield-based protests groups 
belonging to three different social movements – the alter-globalization 
movement, the anti-war movement and the social forum movement – 
which he regards as together constituting a particular type of a cycle of 
protest contesting globalization and war. Although this study differs from 
those mentioned above empirically and especially theoretically, all the 
research cited provides extremely valuable background material and can 
be used in many ways as a point of reference and comparison. 
3.3       The Anti-War Organizations Studied
The selection of anti-war organizations to study empirically was admittedly 
quite a challenging process. In the UK, there are dozens of anti-war groups 
and there is as much variation within the anti-war movement domestically 
as there is internationally. As Pickerill and Webster (2006: 415) point out, 
some organizations ‘link their resistance to war or broader anti-imperialist 
struggles or to a pacifist ideology, while others believe in the necessity of 
war but that the specific war against Iraq was not justified’. Thus, one 
can see the field as a continuum ranging from ‘an ideological pacifism 
through to opposition to one side’s involvement in a specific conflict’ (ibid: 
415, emphasis in original). Often anti-war/peace groups are categorized 
according to their primary ideologies and traditions (Young 1987a: 7) or 
their aims and objectives (Overy 1982: 2–9), which is quite challenging, 
since most organizations have many goals and their premises may also 
reflect different traditions. All of these aspects also vary to some extent at 
different times and in different contexts. 
Interestingly, some scholars define the movement ‘with reference not to 
policies but to theories’ because ‘defence policy is itself the expression of a 
theory – indeed the most popular theory – about international relations’ 
(Ceadel 1987: 73). Others may distinguish between anti-war groups 
linked with political programs, feminist-inspired or religious-oriented 
organizations, and activist/performance groups (Pickerill & Webster 
2006: 415–417). For the purposes of this study, it is not necessary to go 
into such a detailed categorization. 
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However, when selecting the organizations to study, different types 
were chosen in order to get a broad enough view and to be able to 
explore internal unity (diversity) within the movement. Hence, four 
organizations that each represent different approaches were chosen 
for closer examination. Two of them are established, long-standing 
organizations, while the other two have been founded quite recently. 
All four have engaged in resistance against the Iraq War in one way or 
another, and some have even worked closely together. The Stop the War 
Coalition (StWC) has been one of the most active organizations in the 
new movement, cooperating with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(CND), a well-known long- standing anti-nuclear organization. Globalise 
Resistance (GR) is a quite recently founded organization involved in a 
broader scale of issues such as promotion of anti-capitalism and global 
economic justice. War Resisters’ International (WRI) is a well-recognized 
pacifist organization that was founded back in 1921.23
The fact that only a limited number of organizations are studied might 
raise some critical questions in regard to the extent to which it is possible to 
talk about the ‘movement’ in the first place and whether it is admissible to 
study the movement through the perceptions of only a few organizations. 
Indeed, the fact is that ‘social movement organizations (SMOs) and social 
movements are by no means identical’, since movements are ‘interactive 
campaigns’ and not organizations (Tilly 2004: 48). Organizations do 
play a part in these campaigns but they are always mixed with other kinds 
of groups, networks, individuals, traditions and solidarities that sustain 
the campaign activities (Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 8). The difference between 
organizations and a movement is also manifested in the simple fact that 
many organizations often pre-date or outlive the movement (Rochon 
1988: 77). Some scholars further differentiate between social movement 
bases (where organizations are important) and campaigns in order to ‘sort 
23 The difficulty in defining organizations in terms of typologies and traditions is 
illustrated by the fact that the during its history the CND has been characterized as 
a pressure group, a mass movement of protest (Overy 1982: 7), a single-issue peace 
campaign trying to eliminate a particular aspect of war (ibid: 2, 22; Young 1987a: 
13) and a nuclear pacifist organization (e.g. Eglin 1987: 236). Similarly, WRI has 
been described as a revolutionary movement to end all wars (Overy 1982: 8–9), an 
anti-conscription movement, a socialist war resistance organization (Young 1987a: 
12), and a radical (secular) pacifist organization (ibid: 13). 
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out the organizations, networks, participants, and traditions that make 
up a social movement and constitute a movement campaign (Tilly & 
Tarrow 2007: 115, also 114, 119).24 
 Bearing these different definitions of a social movement in mind25, it 
is important to stress that it is not suggested in this study that the premises 
of four anti-war organizations could be equated with those of the British 
anti-war movement as a whole. These four organizations are understood 
as constituting only a part of the movement. Clearly, an analysis of 
their views does not provide a comprehensive picture of the movement 
in general terms. It can only be argued that an examination of the 
organizations’ views can constitute an understanding of how they regard 
the movement and their own roles as a part of it. Therefore, qualifying 
expressions such as ‘within the movement’ or ‘some organizations of the 
movement’ are used in the analysis chapters.  
Although social movement organizations cannot be equated with a 
movement, many social movement scholars have nevertheless analyzed 
organizations when studying movements. One peace movement scholar 
explicitly argues that for certain purposes ‘there are analytic gains to be 
had from adopting a more restrictive definition of a political movement, 
for example by looking only at the major organizations or at the local 
activists’ (Rochon 1988: 23). In other words, the choice of focus 
depends on the research aim and the context. Here, the analysis focuses 
to a large extent on certain leading anti-war organizations that are in a 
position to heavily influence the overall strategies and activities of the 
movement. Although they certainly cannot dictate or even steer the 
24 The role of social movement organizations (SMOs) is a controversial and 
debated issue among social movement scholars. While some scholars view SMOs 
very skeptically, arguing that they are irrelevant or even counterproductive from the 
perspective of movements since they may weaken their extent of radicalism, some 
regard SMOs as the only agents able to bring about change in a politically effective 
way (for discussion, see e.g. Rochon 1988: 79).
25 Generally speaking, there are many different kinds of definitions of a 
movement, some of which are more and some less restrictive (e.g. Tilly 2004: 3–7; 
Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 8; della Porta & Diani 2006: 20–22; Rochon 1988: xv). Walker 
(1988: 62) points out that some of the biggest and most well-known movements 
often resemble political parties, while smaller movements are not very different ‘from 
the normal groupings of everyday social life’. However, he is quite skeptical of any 
kind of categorizations, as there is a risk ‘of imposing premature classifications onto 
political processes that have not yet run their course (ibid). 
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whole movement26, these organizations are very influential in defining 
how the movement is constructed. In the present research setting, it is not 
necessary to study what all the organizations and groups and individuals 
within the movement believe, nor is it relevant to analyze the views of 
the adherents of the movement, although it definitely could help obtain 
a more holistic view on a more general level; the main focus of analysis 
is on the major organizations which lead the way, using their power to 
define the main goals and strategies for the movement. In fact, when 
taking part in different events and campaigns organizations and groups 
within the movement, many adherents probably do not even know (or 
care) what the main strategies of the movement are27.    
It is clearly justified to study three of the selected organizations (the 
StWC, the CND and GR) from the above-mentioned perspective, as 
they can be essentially regarded as the leading organizations within the 
current British anti-war movement. As they are in a better position to 
define the overall political strategies of the movement than some other 
organizations, they can be expected to be quite influential inside the 
broader movement. This is the reason why they have been selected for the 
study. The fourth organization, War Resisters’ International, was selected 
because it represents a very different kind of perspective than the other 
three. Next, all of the organizations are introduced in more detail.
 The Stop the War Coalition
The London-based Stop the War Coalition (StWC) is a relatively new 
organization within the British anti-war movement. It has been one of 
the leading organizations during the Iraq War and is regarded as a wide 
umbrella organization for the new anti-war movement. It was founded 
ten days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, on 21 September 2001, in a 
26 As the definition of strategies by social movements ‘depends on permanent 
negotiations between the individuals and the organizations involved in collective 
action’, it is impossible for any single actor to ‘claim to represent a movement as a 
whole’ (della Porta & Diani 2006: 21).   
27 Moreover, not even all members of one organization have similar views. As a 
survey of CND members revealed, adherents ‘found little agreement on the most 
important tactics for the movement’ (Rochon 1988: 125).  
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public meeting in London. A commonly acknowledged fact is that the 
major driving force behind the StWC is the Trotskyite Socialist Workers’ 
Party (SWP). Some scholars have argued that the StWC has greatly 
benefited from its ‘Socialist dominated centre’, because the SWP has a 
history of 30 years on the British Marxist Left as well as three thousand 
members (Gillan et al. 2008: xii–xiii). It has also played a significant 
part historically in the peace movement, especially from the late 1970s 
onwards (Taylor 1987b: 162). 
The SWP’s key role in the new movement has meant that the StWC 
has accommodated a strange ‘assortment of bedfellows’, of which the 
combination of secular Marxists from the SWP and Muslims from the 
Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) has been regarded as ‘the most 
unlikely partnership of all’ (Gillan et al. 2008: 5).
When organizing mass demonstrations against the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, the StWC has cooperated very closely with the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the British Muslim Initiative (BMI, 
formerly MAB), of which the former is studied in this thesis. Together 
with the CND and the BMI, the StWC was a major organizer of the 
national demonstration against the Iraq War in London on 15 February 
2003. The demonstration mobilized over a million protesters onto the 
streets of London. It has been described as ‘not merely the country’s 
biggest political protest’ but a protest ‘Britain had never seen before, all-
embracing in its diversity and imposing in its unity of purpose’ (Murray 
2008; also Murray & German 2005; Rees 2006). 
Since then, the StWC has organized well over 20 demonstrations in 
Britain. While I was in London conducting the interviews for the present 
research, the StWC, again and with the CND and BMI, organized a 
big demonstration, gathering over 50,000 people to mark the fifth 
anniversary of the War on Iraq in March 2008. 
The StWC also contributed to the coordination of demonstrations 
in a total of 58 cities in 24 countries across the world between 15 and 
22 March 2008 under the title ‘The World Against the War’. There were 
demonstrations, for example, in Turkey, Poland, Pakistan, Iceland, and the 
US (World Against War 2008b). The StWC took part in the coordination 
effort by setting up a website which was used for orchestrating the 
04
demonstrations (Interview 4/StWC).28 
The office of the StWC is described as ‘the organizational hub of a 
group that arranges regular demonstrations and protests round the 
country’ (Gillan et al. 2008: 134). Some scholars are impressed with the 
amount information ‘such an office can produce and process’ as it ‘answers 
a huge number of queries, maintains a current website, fixes speakers for 
meetings at local venues, produces a host of posters and flyers and regular 
news bulletins, plans demonstrations and campaigns as well as develops 
and implements strategies and goals for the group’ (ibid: 134). When I 
visited the office in March 2008, it was indeed evident that an enormous 
amount of work is done with just a few staff members.  
The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
The CND is a long-standing organization dedicated to opposing nuclear 
weapons, but it also engages in many sorts of more general anti-war 
activities. While concentrating ‘first and foremost on British nuclear 
weapons’, it opposes ‘all nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction: 
their development, manufacture, testing, deployment and use or 
threatened use by any country’, working with anti-nuclear groups in 
other countries ‘to eliminate the global threat’ (Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament 2008a). It defines its aims very concisely (ibid): 
Change Government policies to bring about the elimination of 
British nuclear weapons as a major contribution to global abolition. 
Stimulate wide public debate on the need for alternatives both to the 
nuclear cycle and to military attempts to resolve conflict. Empower 
people to engage actively in the political process and to work for a 
nuclear-free and peaceful future. Co-operate with other groups in the 
UK and internationally to ensure the development of greater mutual 
security.29  
28 The idea for a series of international anti-war demonstrations was put forward 
by a World Against War conference in London in  2007, which had delegates from 
around the world. The conference agreed to ‘launch global demonstrations’ on the 
fifth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq (World Against War 2008a).
29 In relation to the aims, there are four external strategic objectives. Moreover, 
each of the strategic objectives includes several sub-objectives (not discussed here).
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The original aims decided on when the organization was founded 
in 1958 were quite similar to those described above (Hudson 2005: 
45–46; also Miles 2008: 60; Day 1986: 171). The already 50-year-old 
organization has its national office in London and many regional offices in 
major English cities. Its network consists of regional organizations, local 
groups and individual members30, thus ‘covering the whole of Britain’ 
(Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 2008a). In this sense, it is a good 
example of a network organization. At the same time, it can be regarded 
as quite institutionalized since it has close relationships with trade unions 
and many established political parties on the left, especially the Labour 
Party (e.g. Hinton 1989: 153–170; Overy 1982: 22–24). In Britain, the 
CND is probably best known for organizing the annual Aldermaston 
March, and internationally it is famous for the universally recognized 
peace symbol produced by artist Gerald Holtom for the first march in 
1958 (Hudson 2005: 56; Hudson in Miles 2008: 8; Miles 2008: 12, 
63). The peace symbol, first used by the CND, became popular in the 
late 1960s when the hippies started to use the logo ‘to represent ‘peace’ 
rather than just nuclear disarmament’ (Miles 2008, 15; also DeBenedetti 
& Chatfield 1990: 29). 
During its half-century history, the CND has had a very broad agenda: 
it has ‘opposed all nuclear weapons from Polaris to Trident and before and 
beyond’ but also campaigned against wars where nuclear weapons may be 
used as well as ‘illegal wars that destroy the framework of international 
law’ (Hudson 2005: 3).31 It has also opposed ‘conventional wars’ such as 
the Vietnam War32, the first Gulf War33, the NATO bombing of Bosnian 
Serbs in 1995, and the NATO bombings in Kosovo in 1999 (ibid: 211–
216). The CND’s current campaigns are ‘Global Abolition’ (of nuclear 
weapons), ‘No to Trident’ (Britain’s nuclear weapon system), ‘No to US 
Missile Defence’, ‘No to NATO’, ‘Troops Out of Iraq, ‘Don’t Attack 
30 There are independent Scottish, Irish and Cymru CND organizations, as well 
as specialist groups such as Student, Christian, and Labour CND.
31 Moreover, the CND has campaigned ‘against weapons in space, NATO, illegal 
pre-emptive attacks; nuclear power, nuclear waste transportation, the militarization 
of Europe, the use of radio-active ‘depleted’ uranium in conventional weapons; the 
waste of spending on arms’ (Hudson 2005: 3). 
32 On the CND’s opposition to Vietnam War, see e.g. Hudson 2005: 87–102; 
Minnion 1989: 166–171.  
33 On the CND’s opposition to the Gulf War, see e.g. Hudson 2005: 176–182.
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Iraq’, as well as campaigns aiming at banning the use of depleted uranium 
and uranium weapons (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 2008c). In 
other words, although originally an anti-nuclear organization, the CND 
has expanded its aims substantially over the years. Nevertheless, the 
current chair, Kate Hudson (2005: 46), argues that the ‘original aims 
remain just as valid today’.
Internationally, the CND is part of a global network known as 
‘Abolition 2000’, which aims at elimination of nuclear weapons. It also 
supports other campaigning organizations, such as the Campaign Against 
Arms Trade and Landmine Action, and anti-nuclear weapons campaigns 
around the world, especially in countries such as France, India, Pakistan 
and the US. (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 2008b.)34 The 
CND also takes part in the UN and other international disarmament 
conferences. In the context of the new anti-war movement, the CND 
has worked closely with the StWC. In fact, many of the members of its 
steering group are also active in the StWC.  
Especially in the 1980s, the CND was regarded as a leading organization 
within the British anti-war movement, on which account it has been both 
praised and criticized. Typically, social movement scholars describe the 
CND as a centralized and hierarchical organization that values political 
effectiveness more than direct participation while nevertheless remaining 
able to maintain certain ‘movement-type aspects’ (Rochon 1988: 89).  
Globalise Resistance
A fairly new London-based organization, Globalise Resistance (GR), 
founded in 2001, can be characterized as more of an anti-globalization 
than anti-war organization, although it does have a clear anti-war stance 
in its campaigning. Its explicit objective to ‘globalize resistance’ is what 
drew my attention to the organization in the first place. The activities of 
GR have been closely connected to those of the European Social Forum. 
In Britain, it has a very close relationship to socialist groups. In fact, some 
34 Gillan et al. (2008: 114) argue that although the CND chair ‘considers             
international links to be ‘extremely important’, it is clear that domestic priorities may 
override such considerations’.   
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have described it as a ‘SWP front group’ (Gillan 2006: 137). On the GR 
website, a list of the steering group members and their political affiliation 
shows that six of the sixteen members are also members of the Socialist 
Workers’ Party, the rest being labeled as ‘Independents’. 
The website also states that the steering group was ‘elected at the 
National Conference of GR’ and that it meets on a monthly basis to 
organize ‘the general running of GR’. Furthermore, the site points out that 
there are specific working groups which concentrate on ‘different aspects 
of the work of GR, such as finance, specific protests and mobilisations 
and other issues as they come up’. (Globalise Resistance 2008b.)
War Resisters’ International
War Resisters’ International (WRI) is an international pacifist organization 
with its headquarters in London35. WRI was founded first under the 
name Paco36 in Bilthoven, Holland, in 1921 after the First World War 
(Prasad 2005: 20). The WRI history tells that it was founded due to the 
unimaginable amount of suffering and destruction caused by the First 
World War, which ‘motivated sensitive people to organise themselves to 
prevent anything like it happening again’ (ibid: 23). The first meeting 
formulated a declaration for the organization which still remains its main 
principle: war is regarded as ‘a crime against humanity’ and therefore 
WRI works for ‘removal of all causes of war’ (ibid). Members of the 
organization are expected to be ‘determined not to support any kind of 
war’ (War Resisters’ International 2009a).37 WRI says it will ‘never endorse 
any kind of war’ whether waged by a particular state, a liberation army, 
or in the form of a ‘humanitarian’ intervention authorized by the UN 
(ibid). The organization aims ‘to build a world inspired and motivated 
by the dynamics of nonviolence, a world free from war, all varieties of 
35 WRI headquarters was moved from London to Brussels in 1974 and then back 
to London in the early 1980s. 
36 Paco means ‘peace’ in Esperanto. The name was changed to War Resisters’ 
International in 1923 when the headquarters of the organization was moved to 
London (Prasad 2005: 91). 
37 Prasad (2005: 449) considers WRI a privileged organization, as it has a 
declaration which is ‘meaningful and of permanent nature’.    
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dictatorship – right or left, exploitation, inequalities – economic as well 
as social’ (Prasad 2005: 449). 
In addition to the above-mentioned broad and quite abstract 
objective of removing all causes of war, WRI strictly opposes conscription, 
compulsory national military service. Conscription is seen as injecting 
‘compulsory militarisation into the social structure’ (Prasad 2005: 82) 
while conditioning young men ‘to accept war as a legitimate method of 
social behaviour’ which, in turn, makes it ‘a psychological cause of war 
as well as a technical preparation for it’ (Draft presented at the WRI 
Council meeting in 1947, quoted in Prasad 2005: 256). WRI gives its 
support to individual war resisters38 in order ‘to advocate and to work 
for the elimination of the war institution as a policy and practice of the 
nation state’ (Willoughby in Prasad 2005: 19).
As a very long-established pacifist organization, WRI represents 
more of a traditional kind of a peace organization than the other three 
organizations studied in this thesis. Its work is based on the principle of 
nonviolence and promotes direct action in particular, in which regard it 
collaborates with like-minded groups in Britain and elsewhere in the world. 
Actually, WRI is a network of independent organizations from around 
the world. As far back as in 1923, it was decided that the organization 
should try to ‘gather together as many active and concerned pacifists as it 
could at one place and launch itself on a global level’ (Prasad 2005: 96). 
Currently, it consists of 90 groups in as many as 43 countries (Sheehan in 
Prasad 2005: 18). Many of them are Western European,39 but there are 
also WRI sections in Angola, Australia, Canada, Chile, Georgia, India, 
Japan, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, and the US (Prasad 2005: 469–475). 
Moreover, WRI has associate organizations in countries such as Chad, 
Georgia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe40. 
International seminars constitute an important part of the networking 
of WRI (Prasad 2005: 97). These usually focus on a particular theme 
important to the organization and can bring together two to three hundred 
38 Conscientious objectors, or COs.
39 In Europe, there are WRI sections in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden (Prasad 
2005: 469–475). 
40 The first International Conference was held in 1925 (Prasad 2005: 469–475).
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activists worldwide41. Moreover, WRI coordinates two international days 
of action annually in support of peace activists and conscientious objectors. 
May 15th is International Conscientious Objectors’ Day, organized since 
1982, and December 1st Prisoners for Peace Day. In more general terms, 
WRI has two main program areas, the Nonviolence Programme and the 
Right to Refuse to Kill Project. (War Resisters’ International 2009a). The 
organization stresses that during the past few of decades its activities have 
included ‘the incorporation of a feminist perspective and gender lens 
into our work, the movement against nuclear power which WRI helped 
to spread internationally, and the continual expanding of our global 
network’ (Sheehan in Prasad 2005: 18).
3.4 Empirical Research Materials
The primary empirical research material of the thesis consists of 
two different sets of data. The first comprises information that the 
organizations studied have produced themselves while describing their 
organization and its activities, especially in regard to the Iraq War. These 
mainly consist of statements, commentaries, pamphlets and books. All 
the organizations also have websites, and some of the material has been 
gathered from those sources. However, since three of the organizations 
have recently published their histories, it was only natural to use these 
as primary research material. Andrew Murray (the chair) and Lindsay 
German (the convenor) have together written the history of the StWC, 
titled Stop the War – The Story of Britain’s Biggest Mass Movement (278 
pages). Similarly, the CND has recently published its history: CND – 
Now More Than Ever: The Story of a Peace Movement (278 pages), written 
by Kate Hudson (the chair). The history of WRI, War is a Crime Against 
Humanity – The Story of War Resisters’ International (557 pages), was 
written by Devi Prasad (former general secretary).  
41 WRI has organized conferences, for example, in Brazil: ‘To Live is to Resist: 
undoing the chain of violence’ (1994), in Croatia: ‘Choosing Peace Together’ (1998), 
in Ireland ‘Stories and Strategies: nonviolent resistance and social change’ (2002) and 
in Germany: ‘Globalising Nonviolence’ (2006).
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Interestingly, all of these three histories were published in 2005. The 
fact that three different organizations published their histories in the 
same year cannot be regarded as a mere coincidence. Rather, it can be 
considered as a sign of a political revival of the anti-war movement after 
9/11. From the perspective of the two long-standing organizations, the 
CND and WRI, it can also be interpreted as an effort to restate their 
aims in a changing political situation and communicate their continuing 
importance within the movement, which now includes increasingly 
popular newer organizations. For the book Peace – 50 years of Protest 
1958-2008 (256 pages) the timing of publishing (2008) was predictable, 
as it came out to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the peace sign and 
the foundation of the CND. It was written by Barry Miles, chairman of 
the Youth CND in the early 1960s. Also used in this thesis as research 
material are Imperialism and Resistance (2006, 265 pages) written by John 
Rees, the co-founder of StWC, and Nonviolence and Social Empowerment, 
a publication edited by Chris Ney (2005) for WRI. 
However, it was quite difficult to find information in these sources 
concerning some issues relevant to this study. There is not much material 
in the histories or on the websites that would, for example, describe how 
the organizations concretely engage in international activities or what 
kind of difficulties they face while working together with other groups and 
organizations either at the national or international level. It thus became 
necessary to gain some first-hand information from people working 
in these organizations, whereby, in addition to the material described, 
personal in-depth interviews were used as a method of collecting research 
material. The purpose of interviewing was to gain an understanding of 
how the representatives of the anti-war organizations themselves define 
and articulate the issues, concepts and phenomena that are relevant 
for this thesis. Since the focus here lies in studying the premises of the 
organizations, in designing the interviews, I concentrated mostly on the 
organizational, level leaving aside many interesting questions regarding 
the more personal ‘lived experience’ of the anti-war activists.
I conducted thematic in-depth interviews with seven representatives 
of the four selected anti-war organizations in London in March 2008, 
just a few days before and after the World Against War demonstration, 
which was organized on March 15 to mark the 5th anniversary of the 
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War on Iraq42. I also took part in a demonstration organized by the 
StWC on 20 March in front of 10 Downing Street. One of the seven 
interviews was conducted during this particular demonstration when an 
unexpected opportunity to interview a leading StWC figure emerged43. 
This interview was the shortest of all, lasting only about ten minutes.44 
The other six interviews were in-depth interviews which lasted from 
thirty minutes to almost three hours. They were conducted as semi-
structured interviews, meaning in practical terms that they were carried 
out as conversations but nevertheless had a pre-structured framework. 
The framework included ten thematic areas,45 each comprising several 
(from five to ten) questions. In most cases, I was in contact with the 
interviewees beforehand by e-mail and sent them the list of themes in 
advance. The specific questions were not delivered to them beforehand. 
During the interviews, the themes were presented in a logical order, 
although the questions were not necessarily asked in the same order. I 
also came up with new questions in the course of the interviews. This 
kind of a setting allowed the interviews to be flexible yet organized at 
the same time. Due to time limitations and the ad hoc nature of several 
of the interviews, not all themes were discussed to the same extent with 
everyone. 
Before (and in some cases during) the interview I gave a short 
introduction to my research and explained how the information gained 
through the interviews would be helpful to the study. The interviewees 
were mainly from the steering committees46 of the organizations: two 
interviewees from the StWC, two from the CND, two from GR and one 
42 The interviews took place between 15 and 20 March 2008. I also interviewed 
some people taking part in the two demonstrations, but these interviews are not used 
as research material in this study. 
43 I would like to extend warm thanks to Linda from the CND for helping me 
to arrange the interview.  
44 The interview was short, because the person was to be interviewed also by 
several journalists and hence there was not much time. However, as the interviewee 
has written a book which is used here as a research material, I believe that I have been 
able to obtain enough information in this regard.
45 The thematic areas of the in-depth interviews are presented in Appendix 2. 
46 The second interviewee from the StWC is not a member of the steering committee 
but a staff member of the office. Since he has been working for the organization since 
its inception in 2001, he can be regarded as a very good informant.
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from WRI47. In the analysis, the interviewees are referred to by number 
(Interviews 1–7) and their organization. When the organization is 
explicitly brought up in the context or sentence preceding the reference, 
only the number of the interview is mentioned. The decision not to 
refer to the interviewees by name was not compulsory, because the 
interviewees did not request that they remain anonymous. However, in 
social movement research it is not common to reveal the identities of 
interviewees and this is also the stance adopted here. 
In quantitative terms, the number of interviews, seven, cannot be 
regarded as high48. However, it was sufficient to obtain quite a good 
understanding of the premises of the organizations. The fact that I 
had familiarized myself with the main objectives and statements of the 
organizations beforehand by regularly visiting their websites enabled me 
to formulate the themes and questions of quite cogently49. However, a 
certain level of improvisation also played a part in the process. Several 
of the agreed interviews were cancelled while I was already in London 
and, on the other hand, I gained an opportunity to interview two people 
unexpectedly. Altogether, I believe that the in-depth interviews, together 
with other primary material, provide the requisite amount of research 
material for the qualitative research approach used here.   
3.5 Empirical Method
In the social sciences, four different methodological approaches to research 
are generally distinguished: positivist, post-positivist, interpretivist 
and humanistic. Whereas positivist and post-positivist approaches to 
methodology are based on empiricism, which aims at ‘knowing the 
reality’ and essentially imitates the methods used in the natural sciences, 
47  Originally, the plan was to interview two representatives from each organization, 
but due to the timing of my trip to London it was unfortunately not possible to get 
two interviewees from WRI; the staff of the organization was going to travel to 
Brussels for ‘No to NATO’ demonstration on 18 March 2008. 
48 For example, Gillan et al. conducted over 60 interviews for their study, 
published in 2008.
49 As a point of critical self-reflection, it has to be admitted that the theoretical 
framework of the thesis was not completely clear at that time. Later, this caused 
certain problems in engaging with the empirical material. 
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the interpretivist and humanistic approaches focus on studying meanings 
and values in a certain context. Interpretivist studies usually have a clear 
emphasis on empirical cases while simultaneously stressing the significance 
of context. (della Porta & Keating 2008: 28–38.) The methodological 
approach of this study is clearly interpretivist, because it aims at a holistic 
understanding of the research subject, with questions of cause and effect 
as well as generalizability of the results being secondary, as there is, in 
any case, an ‘assumption of mutual influence among the many factors 
at work’ (ibid: 30). While humanistic approaches study meanings and 
values on the basis of concrete interactions between the researcher and 
her ‘objects’, the interpretivist approach usually seeks meaning through 
a textual analysis of some kind (ibid: 25–32; also Fay 1998). This is the 
case in the present study, which uses qualitative content analysis.
Qualitative content analysis is regarded as a suitable method especially 
for analyzing material obtained through theme interviews, as it enables 
the researcher to form a general description of the object of the study in 
a somewhat concise form. It is a textual analysis method like discourse 
analysis, but the main focus lies in studying what kind of meanings 
there are in a text rather than studying in detail how these meanings 
are constructed. (E.g. Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2002: 105–106, 110–115.) 
However, when analyzing the content by abstracting meanings and themes 
from the material, I did pay some attention to the textual construction of 
meaning. Instead of focusing on discourses, however, I found the concept 
of articulation more fruitful, because ideas are given meanings not only 
in relation to how they are linguistically represented but also on the basis 
of the other ideas, concepts and phenomena to which they are connected 
(e.g. Hall 1992: 368–369; Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 105).
In concrete terms, the analysis of all material was conducted 
systematically in similar terms50. The first phase was the categorization 
of the content, which meant that the material was divided into shorter 
text excerpts of from one to ten sentences according to what the main 
topic was. Some of excerpts could fit into several theme categories. The 
interview material suggested a total of twenty-three themes, not all of 
50 Naturally, the analysis of the interviews was different in the sense that the 
digitally recorded interviews had to be transcribed first. Since the transcribed interview 
material comprises 107 pages, it is not possible to include it in the appendix of the 
thesis. Instead, there are rather many quotations from the interviews in the text.   
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which were relevant or interesting from the point of view of the research 
questions. Therefore, some of the themes were combined with others, 
and some were left out completely51.52 In the second phase of the analysis, 
the units of analysis, designed on the basis of the theoretical analysis, 
took the form of direct questions to be in consideration of the research 
material. The findings were then categorized again, with meanings and 
themes being abstracted from the material.  
When it comes to information acquired through interviews, it is 
important to note the historicity as well as the context-relatedness of 
the views expressed by the interviewees. Interpretations that activists 
make of the present ‘are always coloured by their past experiences and 
their understanding of the history of current processes’ (Gillan 2006: 
88). Hence, it is very likely that between organizations and individuals 
within the anti-war movement there are multiple understandings and 
interpretations about the strategies, methods and effects of resistance, 
and like issues. The fact that the research material of this study consists of 
public material (which can be essentially regarded as ‘official’ views of the 
organizations), as well as material obtained through in-depth interviews 
with individuals, makes interpretation complicated in the sense that in 
the case of the interview material there is a risk of reading one (or two) 
individual’s opinions as an official position of the organization. 
However, it is not assumed here that there could even be a clear and 
unified collective understanding about any issue within any organization, 
and even less so between them. In other words, the concept of collective 
action frames, which is often used in the analysis of social movements to 
obtain an understanding of ideas that all members of a group agree upon, 
is not deployed as such here. The problem with that approach is that 
the ‘production of position papers and policies is taken as an indication 
of agreement within the group and the assumption is that individual 
members should all express these same ideas when the opportunity arises’ 
(Gillan 2006: 88). 
51 In the analysis of the non-interview material, this phase was not necessary, 
since the preset units of analysis guided the selection of relevant parts of text in 
advance; ultimately, little material was gathered that was not useful for the study. 
52 Some of the themes were presented as questions in the interviews (and were 
thus actually preset units of analysis), while some were brought up independently by 
one or more interviewees. 
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However, in reality there is very much heterogeneity within any group 
or organization and it must therefore be understood that ‘members of 
the group all share a particular set of ideas’ only in regard to ‘a particular 
set of topics’ (ibid: 88). I agree with Gillan when he points out that 
the ‘Meluccian challenge’ in analyzing any social movement is to be 
able to do it ‘without starting from an assumption of unity’ (ibid: 68). 
Nonetheless, as the purpose here is to discuss differences between the 
studied organizations, some generalizations and categorizations must 
be necessarily made. Although ‘there can be multiple collective action 
frames as no one organization cannot present the whole movement’ 
(ibid: 27; also della Porta & Diani 2006: 21), the fact is that some ideas 
are more popular than others and some organizations are somewhat more 
influential and powerful than others. These issues are reflected upon in 
this thesis.
As regards the presentation of the findings of the empirical analysis, 
I will adhere to the typical style of the interpretivist approach, in which 
the data are presented ‘in the form of thick narratives, with excerpts 
from texts (interviews, documents and ethnographic notes) presented as 
illustrations’ (della Porta & Keating 2008: 30). Italics are used in the 
excerpts to highlight particularly important words or phrases.
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4       A NEW AND GLOBAL ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT? 
      
4. Introduction
This chapter deals with the who of resistance. It reflects on the theoretical 
debate about the political agency of resistance against war – the current 
anti-war movement, its ascendance and central characteristics – by 
empirically analyzing how these three aspects are understood within 
the movement itself. The aim is to determine the extent to which the 
understandings within the movement ‘resonate’ with those of the 
theoretical approaches presented earlier and what the main convergences 
and divergences are in this regard.
In the theoretical debate, the political agent of resistance – the 
movement against the Iraq War – has been conceptualized in highly 
global terms by both liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists. 
In particular, they have celebrated the political meaning of the worldwide 
demonstration day on 15 February 2003, which also seems to be a 
source of inspiration for their conceptualizations of a more permanent 
kind of global political subject dedicated to resistance against war. For 
liberal cosmopolitans, the February 2003 demonstration day was as a 
manifestation of global civil society consensually united in its opposition 
to the war. They argue, for example, that the demonstration showed that 
‘each individual was confronted with the existential choice between war 
and peace’ while being drawn ‘into a maelstrom of moral and political 
dilemmas or appealed to the available positions to take a clear stance 
for or against’ (Beck 2006: 123–124). Representing a particular type of 
expression of global civil society, the February 2003 demonstration is 
described as ‘the movement of public opinion’ at the global level ‘full of 
political meaning’ (Castells 2008: 86, emphasis in original). 
While liberal cosmopolitans concentrate on the global civil society 
perspective, radical poststructuralists have referred to the anti-war 
movement and its worldwide demonstration as an example of the 
‘becoming’ Multitude, which in the form of a consensual yet diversified 
global body of opposition can ‘wage a war’ against the global state of war 
(Hardt & Negri 2004: 67, 215, 284). In this context, the ‘becoming’ or 
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‘birth’ of this new political subject has been described in quite similar 
terms by both schools of the academic globalists. Liberal cosmopolitans 
tend to explain the ascendance of the anti-war movement in the same 
way as that of the alter-globalization movement (e.g. Castells 2008: 85–
86). Radical poststructuralists even suggest that the anti-war movement 
should be regarded as a continuation of the alter-globalization movement. 
The movements are represented as being part of the same ‘new global 
cycle’, which has not only a  common enemy, but also ‘common practices, 
languages, conduct, habits, forms of life, and desires for a better future’ 
(Hardt & Negri 2004: 215, also 284). Radical poststructuralists argue 
that communication between these different struggles ‘reinforces the 
power and augments the wealth of each single one’ (ibid: 216).
The anti-war movement has not only been conceptualized as a new 
kind of a global political subject, thus emphasizing its political agency 
from that particular perspective, but also many other aspects of it 
seem to have had the labels ‘new’ or ‘global’ put on them by academic 
globalists. While regarded as an increasingly transnational or even global 
movement in terms of its political campaigning and mobilization, the 
anti-war movement has been attributed ‘new’ characteristics previously 
used to describe the alter-globalization movement or certain other new 
social movements (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: 67, 215). Although the 
critical state-centric approach has not analyzed or addressed the anti-war 
movement directly, on a more general level it has suggested that there 
might be ‘an inverse relationship between the amount of progressive 
‘new characteristics’’ argued to characterize global struggles by social 
movements and their proclaimed influence (Chandler 2004: 328). In 
other words, academic globalists may have a tendency to characterize 
social movements not only in excessively global, but also in overly ‘new’ 
terms. 
Indeed, academic globalists often explicitly stress that they are 
analyzing or describing ‘tendencies’ and processes of ‘becoming’ (e.g. 
Hardt & Negri 2004: xii–xiii; 103–114). While it is important to pay 
attention to tendencies, it is easy to interpret them such that they support 
any argument one wishes to make, because tendencies obviously go 
beyond what can be regarded as empirically true at the moment. In the 
case of the anti-war movement, academic globalists seem to base both 
their interpretations (descriptive) and visions (normative) mainly on 
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observations that they have drawn from the February 2003 demonstration 
day. In other words, instead of studying the ‘what, why and how’ of the 
anti-war movement, academic globalists have considered it more or less 
from above, examining it mainly in the form of concrete and visible 
political actions or processes and drawing conclusions on that basis.
To shed light on the theoretical debate referred to above, this 
chapter empirically analyzes how the questions of political agency of the 
movement, its ascendance and its central characteristics are understood 
within the movement itself. This inquiry poses the following questions: 
How is the political agency of the anti-war movement understood? How 
are the roles of different movement organizations and their relationship 
described? How is the ascendance of the movement described and 
explained; why and how has it happened? How is the role of the alter-
globalization movement regarded in the process? How is the political 
meaning of the February 2003 demonstration articulated? What kinds 
of new characteristics is the movement considered as having? What 
historical references and comparisons are made?
The chapter will demonstrate that the interpretations made by academic 
globalists are in many respects quite different from the understandings 
among the anti-war organizations studied. Both liberal cosmopolitans 
and radical poststructuralists tend to emphasize the global aspects and 
new characteristics of the movement substantially more than is the case 
within the movement itself. While there is some resonance, with some 
organizations conceiving certain characteristics of the movement in the 
above-mentioned way, it is nevertheless more common to regard the 
movement from a national or international than a global perspective. 
Moreover, rather than being seen as something completely new and 
extraordinary, the movement is usually characterized as a continuation 
of the long-term peace movement. The chapter will also show that the 
movement’s ascendance was not as consensual nor its relationship to 
the alter-globalization movement as harmonious, as academic globalists 
assume. While there were many internal contradictions already at the 
time of the movement’s ascendance, there are continuing disagreements 
within it, for example, in regard to leadership issues, cooperation between 
organizations, the preferred extent of centralization,  and its connection 
to other movements. 
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4.2 The Ascendance of the Movement against the War
4.2. Political Context and ‘Birth’ of the Movement
The most common argument put forward by the organizations studied is 
that the ‘new’ anti-war movement was born as a reaction to War on Terror, 
proclaimed by the US after 9/11. This is emphasized especially by the 
StWC. Referring to 9/11, the chair and the convenor of the organization 
explain that ‘The Stop the War Coalition was born out of one of the 
most remarkable historical events any of us has witnessed’ and it aims to 
‘prevent still worse events taking place’ (Murray & German 2005: 3–4; 
also Rees 2006: 224–225). It is submitted that the very first meeting of 
the StWC, held in London shortly after 9/11, created a broad platform 
for opposition to the war in Afghanistan, and later against the Iraq War 
(Interview 4; Murray & German 2005: 47–50). The first meeting is 
described as an event ‘which was to shape the anti-war movement that 
has thrived to this day’ (ibid: 47). It is emphasized that it was organized 
by three members of the Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP), namely Lindsay 
German, John Rees and Chris Nineham (ibid: 48). 
In this interpretation, the birth of the new British anti-war movement 
is closely connected to the founding of the StWC. This view is shared by 
some other groups, mainly those that have collaborated with the StWC 
and taken part in its demonstrations. For example, GR says it is ‘proud to 
be one of the founder organisations’ of the StWC, which it defines as ‘the 
biggest peace movement’ in the country (Globalise Resistance 2008i; also 
2008h). The CND also celebrates ‘the dynamism and good judgement 
of the leaders of the Stop the War Coalition’ when describing their close 
relationship (Hudson in Murray & German 2005: 68). Despite its 
collaboration with StWC, the CND emphasizes that it has not joined 
the StWC on the national level, although many of its local and regional 
groups have (Hudson 2005: 242). It shares the StWC’s understandings of 
the birth of the movement, pointing out that after 9/11 a ‘new’ movement 
was ‘initiated by the left – including a number of far-left organisations’ 
(ibid: 241). Simultaneously, the CND stresses, however, that during its 
fifty years of history, political circumstances have changed continuously 
and that it has always adapted to changing contexts ‘from the Cuban 
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Missile Crisis to the war on Vietnam, from the height of the Cold War to 
détente, from the ‘evil empire’ of Ronald Reagan to the end of the Cold 
War, through to the new nuclear aggression of Bush and Blair’ (ibid: 3). 
The CND thus clearly articulates that it not only is part of the new 
movement, but also belongs to the long-term peace movement and to 
the more specific movement against nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the 
role of the StWC is considered central in the new movement, both on 
the national and international level. Indeed, the British movement and 
London as its main ‘headquarters’ is ascribed highly important roles in 
the public material of both organizations. The CND chair argues that 
‘Britain is famous throughout the world for having a huge anti-war 
movement, and people watch our demos on television as far afield as 
Japan and the Philippines’ (Hudson 2005: 241). A CND interviewee 
characterizes London as ‘a good place to start the anti-war movement’ 
(Interview 6):  
London is a good place to start the anti-war movement because it’s so 
central to many people’s lives and identity. And Britain clearly, as a 
very close ally of the US is an important place to oppose the madness 
of the Iraq War. When we formed the Stop the War Coalition …we 
helped or supported the formation of similar movements elsewhere. 
The argument that the British movement has helped to create anti-war 
movements in other countries is commonly found elsewhere in the 
research material as well. Although this assertion occurs most often in 
the interviews, public material, too, contains references to the British 
movement as a model used elsewhere in the world (especially Murray & 
German 2005).1 While the StWC maintains that the British movement has 
inspired anti-war activism in other countries, it also recognizes that it has 
adopted some ideas from movements elsewhere. However, the latter view 
is not nearly as common as the former, an observation attributable at least 
in part to the common understanding that Britain has historically been 
such a central place for the movement, with ideas, strategies and tactics 
often originating in Britain and spreading elsewhere. All this becomes 
1 Moreover, the StWC argues that the model it has provided has been adapted 
elsewhere in the world for ‘uniting left across Communist, nationalist and socialist 
lineage with Muslims facing persecution’ (Rees in Murray & German 2005: 209). 
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more interesting when one considers that a particular organization, the 
StWC, is accorded an extraordinarily significant role in the creation of 
the new movement. It is emphasized to such an extent that one could get 
the impression that the movement against the Iraq War was more or less 
born in the city of London and initiated by the Stop the War Coalition 
(e.g. Benn 2005; Murray & German 2005: 1, 5.) The organization is said 
to have ‘helped to build a movement in Britain which has become one 
of the most significant in the world’ (ibid: 7). Its exceptional character is 
brought up in many other ways as well. For instance, the StWC describes 
itself as ‘the only organization that is dedicated to changing the destructive 
policies of the Bush-Blair axis’ (ibid: 15, emphasis added). 
However, not all organizations regard the ascendance of the movement 
or the StWC’s role in that process to be in keeping with this description. 
Even organizations which have been involved in joint campaigns with 
the StWC may disagree on these issues. The ‘newness’ of the movement 
is questioned especially by the CND and WRI. With their long histories, 
it is not surprising that they view the anti-war movement in different 
terms than the newer organizations. The issue as such is not a subject of 
great controversy, but it becomes more politicized when recent forms of 
anti-war activism are explicitly contrasted with long-term peace activities 
in a normative way. For example, the WRI interviewee draws a clear 
distinction between the old and new organizations (Interview 3): 
Of course we are reacting to the present wars going on but our work 
is much more deeply against militarism. So, it’s much more long-term 
ongoing work ... It’s less visible but it’s long-term work which tries to 
go more into the root causes of war, and it doesn’t jump from one war 
to the next war to the next war.
In this interpretation, long-term peace activism is portrayed as ‘more deeply’ 
against militarism, and hence it is implied that new activism is somehow 
‘less deeply’ against it. The assertion that long-term peace activism is ‘less 
visible’ but tries ‘to go more into the root causes of war’, indicates that the 
new activism is more visible but not analytical enough where the causes 
of war are concerned. It is also stressed that long-term peace activism 
does not ‘jump from one war to the next war’, suggesting that this is 
what the new movement does. Moreover, the new anti-war movement 
is characterized as a single-issue campaign that is likely to disappear 
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(Interview 3): ‘The problematic thing would be that organizations like 
my organization would just give up all their ongoing work and just focus 
on one issue. We need to have long-term work and when the movement 
disappears or it gets smaller again, the peace movement continues its on-
going work.’ The interviewee’s remark that, as a whole, the movement 
has ‘to be able to respond to the immediate crises’, acknowledges that 
traditional peace organizations do not always have enough resources for 
immediate responses. This is an implicit admission that the sort of work 
which the StWC does is also important. (Ibid.) 
Those organizations that maintain that there is something that can 
be called a ‘new’ anti-war movement usually have two main temporal 
reference points. The first is 9/11 and the War on Terror, which are 
usually articulated as the main factors contributing to the ‘birth’ of a 
new movement and the founding of the StWC. The second principal 
reference point is 15 February 2003, the worldwide demonstration 
day. Its being mentioned countless times in the public material of three 
organizations (the StWC, CND and GR) as well as in all the interviews, 
reflects the very important role it is accorded. For some, it seems to be 
sort of the ‘birthday’ of the new anti-war movement, both nationally as 
well as internationally. Especially the StWC and CND2 emphasize its 
political meaning, referring to it as the biggest demonstration to have 
ever taken place. The StWC is also said to be mentioned in the Guinness 
Book of World Records for organizing ‘the largest ever demonstration 
in British political history and the largest ever global demonstration’ 
(Interview 5).3
The February 2003 demonstration is imputed a somewhat different 
political meaning in the domestic context than in the international. In 
2 E.g. Murray & German 2005: 2, 99; Rees 2006: 221; Nineham in Murray & 
German 2005: 106; German 2007: 10; Nineham & Burgin 2008: 3; Hudson 2005: 
239–240; Miles 2008: 239, 241; Interview 1/CND; Interview 2/GR; Interview 4/
StWC; Interview 5/StWC; Interview 6/CND.
3 The estimates of the number of people taking part in the February 2003 
demonstrations vary significantly among different sources. While the estimate for 
London varies from one to two million, it is argued that internationally there were 
from six to ten million (Miles 2008: 239), thirty million (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 
3) or even thirty-five million people taking part in the demonstrations (Nineham in 
Murray & German 2005: 106). 
23
a commentary marking the fifth anniversary of the  demonstration, the 
StWC chair argues that its main lesson was ‘that it embodied the failure 
of representative democracy’ in Britain (Murray 2008). In his view, it 
proved that people were ‘smarter’ than political decision-makers, thus, it 
‘highlighted a gap between the electorate and the elected, a gap several 
hundred thousand lives have slipped down as a result’ (ibid). Elsewhere, 
too, it is stressed that the demonstration illustrated ‘the democratic aspect 
of the war crisis’ as people were ‘marching in their millions for one policy, 
while their representatives supported another’ (Murray & German 2005: 
177; also Interview 4). 
The crisis of democracy is articulated in other ways as well. Rees (2006: 
119) argues, for example, that ‘there could be no greater contrast between 
the political commitment’ of two million demonstrators and ‘the fact 
that the previous election had seen the lowest turnout in Britain’s modern 
democratic history’. For the StWC, the demonstration proved that there 
is no ‘political apathy’ but ‘plenty of appetite for extra-parliamentary 
politics’ (ibid; also Interview 4). Furthermore, it is argued that British 
politics still ‘remains in the shadow of that extraordinary day of protest, 
and what it is has meant for democracy’ (Murray & German 2005: 151; 
also Interview 4).
In the broader context, the demonstrations in February 2003 are 
often seen as illustrating the increasingly global character of the anti-war 
movement. This ‘globality’ is usually articulated either by referring to 
different localities where demonstrations took place – cities, countries, 
continents4 – or citing the different kinds of collective subjects which 
the demonstration activated, reflected or formed. Often these subjects 
are quite abstract, such as ‘global opinion’, ‘world public opinion’, ‘the 
majority of the world’s citizens’, or ‘most of the world’s people’. These 
references are especially common in the public material of the StWC 
(e.g. Murray & German 2005: 6, 10, 20; German 2007: 8; Nineham 
& Burgin 2008: 23). The global dimension is also emphasized by 
speaking of numbers such as ‘millions of people’ (ibid; also Interview 4; 
Interview 5). Sometimes it is even suggested that either the movement 
4 For instance, it is pointed out that demonstrations took place ‘in 600 towns and 
cities on every continent’ (Rees 2006: 221) or ‘all over the world in America, Europe 
and Asia, representing an unparallel expression of hostility to American aggression’ 
(Benn in Murray & German 2005).
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or its component organizations somehow represent the majority of people, 
not just in Britain, but all over the world5. One implication is that the 
crisis of democracy does not concern Britain only, where the government 
ignored the opinion of the majority of its citizen-voters, but that the 
phenomenon is more widespread. In these respects, some organizations 
clearly resemble academic globalists, especially liberal cosmopolitans, in 
their argumentation (e.g. Castells 2008: 82–86; also Beck 2006).  
It can be concluded that many organizations within the British anti-
war movement view the February 2003 demonstration not only as a 
manifestation of globally united opposition against the war, but also as an 
indication of growing mistrust towards representational democracy in the 
domestic context as well as more broadly. In other words, this particular 
demonstration is given a highly important symbolic value by both activists 
and academic globalists. The event seems to bear some resemblance to the 
celebration of the ‘Battle for Seattle’ in the alter-globalization movement 
(e.g. Gill 2000). Since different kinds of anniversaries can help to produce 
a collective history and ‘key experiences’ for activists, they constitute 
important symbols, especially for revolutionary social movements. 
Indeed, symbolism in the form of celebration of anniversaries ‘has always 
been a consistent element of the anti-war protest’ (Horowitz 1970: 43).
Interestingly, in the public material of WRI mention of the February 
2003 demonstration is extremely rare. The interviewee proves to be 
very skeptical of any sort of a mass demonstration due to his divergent 
conception of effective strategies against war, which reflects a different 
notion of power of the movement (Interview 3). Nonetheless, the 
understanding that the StWC played an instrumental role in the process 
of organizing demonstration is commonly shared by all the organizations, 
including WRI. Most often the major role of the StWC is brought up, 
not surprisingly, in material it has produced itself (e.g. Murray & German 
2005: 2, 158; Benn in Murray & German 2005). The StWC interviewees 
strongly promote the key role of their organization by indicating that it 
also has a global element to it (Interview 5):
5 There are also many references to ‘humankind’, ‘humanity’, ‘future of humanity’ 
and even ‘survival of the human race’ (e.g. Benn in Murray & German 2005; Shayler 
in Murray & German 2005: 15; German 2007: 9; Hudson 2005: 2). 
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I think you have to understand that we had a global role to play when 
you hear that marchers in Egypt described their demonstration as 
their Hyde Park. So, they clearly had seen what was happening in 
Britain and tried to recreate it. I think we led on a very important 
marker on the 15th of February 2003.
Although other organizations do not often challenge this view directly, 
many stress that the demonstration was not something that one or two 
organizations invented or organized, emphasizing that it had originally 
been discussed and decided upon in late 2002 during the European Social 
Forum (ESF) in Florence (e.g. Hudson 2005: 240; Interview 2/GR; 
Interview 4/StWC; Interview 7/GR). According to a GR interviewee, 
there was a debate at an assembly of social movements in Florence to 
determine whether the ESF should call people to action against the war. 
Since there had been a demonstration of one million people in Florence 
the day before, there was growing confidence that a large demonstration 
against the Iraq War could be organized. In December 2002, there 
was another European Summit in Brussels, and when the movement 
met again in Denmark, a decision was made ‘to call a worldwide 
demonstration’6. Although often described as ‘a snowball process’, many 
organizations emphasize strongly their own roles in it. For example, a GR 
interviewee argues that representatives of his own organization were ‘quite 
instrumental to win the argument together with some Italians comrades 
and some French leftish smaller cross-type parties that took part in the 
argument’ about organizing a very big, even a global, demonstration. 
(Interview 2.)
The above-mentioned description is not challenged by the StWC as 
such, but the organization does not put as much emphasis on the role of 
the ESF as many other organizations do7. The StWC also underscores 
its own role in the planning of the demonstration at the Florence 2002 
meeting (Murray & German 2005: 99; also Nineham in Murray & 
German 2005: 106–107). The organization in fact asserts that when the 
date for internationally coordinated anti-war action was decided upon, a 
6 After it became evident that there was more than just European-level interest in 
organizing demonstrations, further planning took place at the World Social Forum 
in January 2003 (Gillan et al. 2008: 113). 
7 The StWC refers to its own demonstration in London on 18 November 2001 as 
test case for the February 2003 demonstration (Murray & German 2005: 70).
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significant factor was that the StWC ‘had already fixed on 15 February as 
our protest day’, which then everybody eventually agreed upon with the 
result that ‘the European-wide demos would be centred on 15 February’ 
(Murray & German 2005: 99; also Nineham in Murray & German 
2005: 106–107). In other words, both the StWC and GR describe the 
process as rather strongly influenced by their particular deliberations. A 
GR interviewee makes additional interesting arguments in this regard 
(Interview 2): 
 
It was a snowball that started in Florence but really built up … 
and I don’t want to say we organized it because we were just sort 
of a tipping point across this. But I’m quite proud to say that we 
were quite instrumental to winning this argument inside the anti-
capitalist movement ... Let’s say if anyone will write a history of the 
left, the Globalise Resistance was very much part of it. I’m really lucky 
to be part of it, by almost accidentally, but I’m very proud of being 
part of it.
Here, it is stressed that GR contributed to something which can be 
considered part of the ‘history of the left’. The StWC and CND often 
emphasize in explicit terms their belonging to the general context of the 
left. Indeed, many organizations within the new anti-war movement in 
Britain regard the left and even the ‘far left’ as their political haven. The 
importance of the SWP, or of the Labour Party, cannot be overemphasized 
in this context, for they are both closely related to the movement via three 
of the organizations studied (the StWC, CND and GR). The relationship 
between them is discussed later on in the thesis (see chapter 6).
Although GR regards the process behind the February 2003 
demonstration in somewhat different terms than the StWC, it does 
share the interpretation of the event’s highly extraordinary character as 
‘the biggest demonstration that ever existed’ (Interview 2). However, 
for GR the movement against the Iraq War more generally represents 
something quite different. The ascendance of the movement is described 
as a continuum of the anti-capitalist movement rather than the birth of 
an independent movement, an account which clearly resonates with the 
interpretation of radical poststructuralists (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: 215, 
284). In connecting the new wave of anti-war activism directly to the 
ESF, GR indicates that it was the primary context where the movement 
started to rise in political terms. (Interview 2.) It is emphasized that there 
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had been ‘a lot of cynicism about left-wing activism’ but that the situation 
changed due to a new political awakening brought by the events of 9/11 
and the War on Terror (ibid): 
Suddenly, a huge demonstration and it was all caught with the 9/11 
… The war in Afghanistan started, the first group of Stop the War 
Coalition started to organize themselves ... So, the movement was 
starting to gear up to stopping the war in Iraq before it even started 
… My involvement was ... generally socialist and anti-capitalist in 
this sense. It was just natural to take further the effort into this anti-
war movement. 
In this interpretation, the connection between other ‘anti-movements’ 
and the anti-war movement is represented as self-evident, as seen in the 
remark that it was ‘just natural to take further the effort into the anti-war 
movement’. GR also suggests more explicitly that the broad character of 
the anti-war movement ‘takes its tradition from another global movement, 
the anti-globalization, the anti-capitalist, or alter-globalization, how you 
want to call it’. In other words, the alter-globalization movement ‘fed 
into the anti-war movement’. (Interview 2.) Similar views are presented 
on the GR website, which contains several reports on protests against the 
G8 and European Union summits as well as other gatherings of the alter-
globalization movement in the context of the ESF and WSF. 
The StWC acknowledges an intimate connection between the alter-
globalization and the anti-war movements. For instance, the ‘great 
gatherings of the global justice movement’ are said to have laid the basis 
for new anti-war activism (Nineham in Murray & German 2005: 106). 
Some StWC leaders even argue that the February 2003 demonstration 
should not be regarded as ‘a single moment of protest’ but as ‘a part 
of a longer and continuing radical movement’ (Rees 2006: 221). The 
connection between the two movements is articulated, for example, by 
stating that since the Battle of Seattle ‘the entire landscape of politics 
has been transformed by the growth of a worldwide anti-globalisation 
and anti-war movement’ (ibid). This interpretation clearly echoes that of 
radical poststructuralists and of those liberal cosmopolitans who connect 
the two movements in their analyses (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004; 215, 
284; Castells 2008: 85–86).  
Additionally, some interviewees from other organizations note that 
many activists ‘moved’ from the alter-globalization to the anti-war 
28
movement, taking their analysis of the root causes of war and social 
injustice with them (Interview 2/GR; Interview 4/StWC; Interview 7/
GR). This realignment will be an important point for discussion when 
analyzing these views in more detail (see chapter 5). For example, an 
StWC representative says that the anti-capitalist movement preceded 
the anti-war movement and suggests that it has now been ‘subsumed’ 
into it. Interestingly, he describes the anti-capitalist movement as ‘much 
more critical at the system’ than the StWC or any of the other anti-war 
groups. While the anti-war movement is regarded not as representing ‘a 
critique of the system as a whole’, it is characterized as a ‘much broader 
movement’ than other movements. Hence, the interviewee indicates that 
a movement which does not advocate ‘too’ radical a perspective can more 
easily acquire popular support. Some of the critiques developed within 
the anti-capitalist movement are regarded as ‘very relevant’, although it is 
admitted that some of them have experienced inflation when ‘subsumed’ 
into the anti-war movement: ‘What was called anti-capitalism has gone 
into kind of a decline because much bigger issues confront the people on 
the left, or on the socially active kind of wing of politics’. (Interview 4.)
In this interpretation, the anti-war movement is again situated in 
the more general framework of the left, thereby giving an impression of 
common goals and also a solidarity between their goals. It is explicitly 
argued that ‘most activists now take it for granted that war and 
globalisation are linked’ (Nineham in Murray & German 2005: 107) and 
hence resistance against them is considered linked as well. Suggestions 
that there is ‘a particular form of popular resistance which combines 
protest at the effects of globalisation with a movement against war’ (Rees 
2006: 200) also regard the globalized nature of both movements as a 
common denominator (Nineham in Murray & German 2005: 107). In 
the words of an StWC representative (Interview 4):
The anti-globalization and anti-capitalist movements were themselves 
very globalized. So, when the anti-war movement took off, there were 
networks that already existed ... So, the two were very closely connected. 
One grew out of the other but of course the anti-war movement is 
very broad. Probably the broadest what the left has been involved with 
since ... the apartheid in the 1980s, or even Suez in the 1950s. It’s a 
very very broad movement. 
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By pointing out that the anti-war movement was able to utilize the 
networks of the alter-globalization movement, the interviewee admits 
that the former has greatly benefited from this relationship while the 
latter has suffered from it. Moreover, it is implied that this relationship has 
contributed to a common political project for the left, portrayed as very 
unique in its broadness. Hence, the premises of the StWC and GR clearly 
resonate with the radical poststructuralist approach, which emphasizes 
the interconnectedness of the struggle against war and the negative effects 
of globalization (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: 67, 215, 284).  
Interestingly, whereas neither radical poststructuralists nor liberal 
cosmopolitans ever seem to question the notion of a harmonious 
relationship between the alter-globalization and the anti-war movements8, 
the empirical analysis reveals a different reality. Despite the description 
of events discussed above that conveys a smooth transition from the 
anti-capitalist movement to the anti-war movement, the development 
is not considered as consensual and positive by all organizations. Among 
the negative effects that are pointed out is that the growth of the anti-
war movement resulted in certain other causes being downplayed, and 
especially in decreased interest in the alter-globalization movement. This 
criticism does not show in the public material of the organizations, but 
comes up in the interviews. A GR interviewee, for example, reveals that 
many activists strongly resisted the view that the anti-capitalist struggle 
should have any attachment to the anti-war movement. It was justified 
mainly on the basis that there were already various struggles going on 
within the anti-capitalist movement. Some activists also feared that ‘the 
diversion’ of the anti-capitalist struggle into the anti-war movement 
would alienate trade unions. (Interview 2.) 
Despite these concerns, many interviewees do not see much difficulty 
in combining the aims and efforts of these two movements – the struggle 
for social justice and that against war – under a common struggle, at least 
in ideological perspective (it seems, though, that the ideology must be left-
oriented). However, when it comes to the more practical level, the idea of 
a common struggle is not without its problems, as already manifested in 
the criticism expressed of the role of the StWC. In this context, the StWC 
8 Even more generally, there is hardly any research literature on competition and 
rivalries between different social movements (however, see e.g. Rose 2000). 
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is regarded as such a strong group that many anti-capitalist activists put 
‘all their energy’ into the anti-war movement instead (Interview 2/GR; 
Interview 7/GR). In other words, the popularity of the StWC in the 
anti-war movement is regarded as a cause of declining interest in the anti-
capitalist movement (Interview 2/GR):
And then suddenly there was a decline and we didn’t know what 
had happened … no anti-capitalist event but there was many many 
Stop the War groups and then we were told that a lot of the people 
[went] locally to these Stop the War groups … So, then it was a bit 
disappointing not to have anti-capitalist activity.
According to another GR interviewee, many anti-capitalist activists have 
‘put in quite a lot of time’ working for the StWC, and therefore ‘their 
energy is sort of split’ (Interview 7).9 The StWC does not deny this; it 
openly admits that the growth of the new anti-war movement may have 
had some negative effects on other causes (Interview 4):
The critique that was developed by the anti-capitalist movement has 
been blunted somewhat because we’re now talking about war ... You 
can’t talk about global capitalism when you’re discussing this with 
trade unions or even with the right-wingers. It means you have to 
think very differently about how your approach is. 
In other words, it is acknowledged that the increasing popularity of the 
anti-war movement has influenced other movements that may share some 
– but not necessarily all – of its goals. According to the StWC, its leading 
role has nevertheless had positive effects, for it has succeeded in creating 
a new kind of a movement. One interviewee emphasizes that the StWC 
has contributed to the formation of a very broad front of resistance in the 
form of a ‘majority movement’. (Interview 4.) This is underlined by the 
CND as well when explaining the StWC’s ‘massive and broad support’ 
due to the broadest possible call for action and efforts to be ‘as inclusive as 
possible’, which the CND helped to ‘ensure’ (Hudson 2005: 242). 
9 However, it is not argued that the anti-war movement has put a total end to 
the anti-capitalist movement: ‘I know there has been a lot of stuff being said … that 
anti-capitalist movement is dead, but it isn’t dead, it’s just that it carved up, and it’s 
carved up in another way’ (Interview 7/GR).
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From the StWC’s perspective, it is understandable that it would describe 
itself as a leader of the new anti-war movement in Britain. Leadership 
suggests power and influence when it comes to defining primary goals, 
main opponents, preferred strategies, suitable partners and forms of 
cooperation. The StWC’s ‘leadership’ is constructed clearly in its public 
material and by its interviewees, but also by some interviewees from other 
organizations (yet only very rarely in their public material). Although the 
StWC’s role is often discussed in relatively neutral terms by the other 
three organizations, this is not always the case. WRI is especially critical 
of the StWC’s strong position in the movement. According to the WRI 
representative, there have been problems right from the beginning, since 
there was not a serious enough effort to build a broad steering committee 
for the Coalition: ‘There was no attempt to get other people on board. It 
was not possible at all. They were quite undemocratic.’ (Interview 3.) 
This same process is described very differently by the StWC, which 
argues, on the contrary, that by adopting ‘the straightforward demand 
“Stop the War”, without piling any other baggage on top’, it ensured 
that the campaign remained ‘genuinely open to all who shared that 
aim’ (Murray & German 2005: 56). Somewhat paradoxically, it is 
simultaneously admitted that, especially in the beginning, the StWC ‘was 
overwhelmingly a left organisation in conventional terms’, which was 
‘reflected in the membership of its first steering committee’ consisting 
mostly of people active in the SWP (Murray & German 2005: 55). Yet 
the organization does not seem to realize, or at least it does not publicly 
acknowledge, that such a strong orientation might have led some groups 
to believe that they were not welcome to join the Coalition despite much 
talk about diversity and accommodating everyone in the movement. 
Instead of reflecting upon these problems, the StWC points a finger at ‘a 
minority who simply wanted to make their own points rather than build 
a united campaign’ (ibid: 48, emphasis added):   
Every small political sect in London was represented by its most 
argumentative cadre. The fact that the bombing of Afghanistan 
was only days away failed to impose the slightest self-discipline on that 
minority, who heckled and barracked repeatedly. 
Here, the StWC criticizes some groups for wanting to draw up their own 
agenda. More explicitly, it claims that the attempt ‘to demand that all 
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those who oppose the war also oppose imperialism was defeated, as was 
a call by the peace group Arrow to campaign against terrorism as well 
as against war, and to adopt a whole series of pacifist demands’ (Murray 
& German 2005: 49, emphasis added).10 These kinds of arguments 
could easily be read as hostility towards pacifist groups. Alternatively, it 
can be understood as a reflection of difficult circumstances in which it 
became clear that incorporating a wide range of political and ideological 
views is not as easy in practical terms as it is symbolically in speeches 
and statements. In fact, the StWC stresses that it had to make special 
efforts geared to ‘ensuring a stable collaboration’ with the CND (ibid: 
52, 56). Although the StWC regards the CND as the best-established 
peace organization in the country, it was not self-evident that they would 
become close partners. Indeed, the CND chair discloses that many of its 
members opposed involvement with the StWC, as they feared that its 
‘left-wing leadership’ might ‘take extreme positions’ and end up alienating 
the broad support of the CND (Hudson 2005: 242). Eventually, though, 
‘the overwhelming majority’ of CND members supported cooperation 
with the StWC (ibid). 
The CND explains that it has had some ‘areas of disagreement’ with the 
StWC that have been ‘resolved through discussion’ (Hudson 2005: 243). 
One of these occasions was when the StWC wanted to have ‘Blair must go’ 
as the official slogan of the demonstration following the invasion of Iraq. 
The CND disagreed because it was concerned that this ‘would make it 
difficult for trade unions and many Labour party members who opposed 
the war to participate’ (ibid: 244). According to the StWC, this issue 
caused ‘more controversy within the anti-war movement than any other 
tactical decision’ (Murray & German 2005: 196). While some groups 
considered ‘removing Blair’ as irrelevant, others feared problems with trade 
unions and some believed that ‘an extra-parliamentary movement calling 
for the replacement of the prime minister was an act of constitutional 
lese majeste’ (ibid). From the StWC’s perspective, the slogan was not ‘a 
call for overturning the government (still less parliament)’, because it 
10 Rees (2006: 225) describes this process in more neutral terms: ‘Attempts to 
narrow the campaign so that it adopted specifically anti-imperialist objectives, thus 
potentially excluding pacifists or those simply opposed to this war for particular 
reasons or, most importantly, those just coming into the movement who had not had 
the opportunity to become anti-imperialists on principle, were rejected’.   
33
emphasized that ‘any replacement premier would, of course, rest on the 
existing parliamentary majority’ (ibid). The issue was negotiated between 
different groups with the result that in the end ‘Blair must go’ did not 
become an official slogan (Hudson 2005: 244) although StWC members 
did use it in the demonstration. Generally, this can be regarded as a good 
example of how organizations with contradicting perspectives can, if they 
openly communicate these differences in a trusting relationship, resolve 
differences that might otherwise lead to a more serious conflict. 
However, there are also many contrary examples that need to be 
discussed in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the 
challenges in the relationship between different anti-war organizations. 
The StWC, for example, publicly claims that the CND was not able to 
‘give leadership to the united movement’ because its connection ‘to the 
political left has always had a touch of ambivalence’ which could have 
resulted in internal divisions (Murray & German 2005: 56–57). It also 
argues that during the anti-nuclear campaigning in the 1980s the CND 
members ‘were united more by the understandable desire to avert nuclear 
war than any more general perspective on humanity’s future’ (ibid: 52, 
54). Here, CND policies and the future of humanity are contrasted in 
quite a powerful way. A very strong emphasis on unity by the StWC also 
becomes evident when it disparages the CND for not always aspiring ‘to 
unite those who marched under its banner around a common view of 
global political issues’ (ibid: 56). On the one hand, the StWC criticizes its 
close partner strongly for not seeking and valuing unity enough; on the 
other hand, it admits that without the CND’s ‘prestige, name recognition 
and national network of committed supporters’, it would not have been 
possible to make the movement as united as it became (ibid: 57).  
The StWC’s criticism does not pertain only to the CND. The StWC 
argues more generally that its founding proved to be problematic due 
to ‘familiar vices of the British left’ (Murray & German 2005: 48). 
Paradoxically, elsewhere in the same material it is claimed that ‘the unity 
of purpose’ was developed ‘almost instantly’ by transcending ‘many 
ancient animosities on the left’ (ibid: 6; also Rees 2006: 225–226). Even 
if the political left is described in terms of ‘familiar vices’ and ‘ancient 
animosities’, the emphasis on its unity is strong. Revealingly, the StWC 
publicly states that right from the beginning one of its main aims was 
to align ‘the left around a single campaign against the war, rather than 
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allowing several organisations to emerge in competition’ (Murray & 
German 2005: 49, 52). Viewed in this context, the rhetorical celebration 
of diversity by the StWC becomes somewhat questionable. It seems that, 
after all, unity is what the organization is striving for, so much so that 
it starts to seem some sort of ‘imposing’. Especially the argument that 
the CND should have a ‘more general perspective on humanity’s future’ 
(ibid: 49, 52) underlines the fact that the StWC wants a unified approach 
to the problem of war, preferably the one it advocates itself. 
These examples show that the StWC regards not only unity but 
also centralized leadership as important qualities for the anti-war 
movement. They are legitimized, for example, by pointing out that a 
major problem with left-wing campaigns in Britain is that they ‘tend to 
commence on a united basis and then proceed swiftly to a split’ (Murray 
& German 2005: 48), which can be a negative development as regards 
the effectiveness of resistance. Hence, the StWC seems to subscribe to a 
traditional Marxist approach with a classical input/output orientation 
in which clear strategies and strong unity are regarded as necessary for 
the sake of efficacy. As Gillan (2006: 115) points out, in revolutionary 
socialist organizations, ‘centralism is justified on the basis of effectiveness’ 
but what is not publicly articulated is their ‘commitment to hierarchy’. 
Although clarity and simplicity are good qualities where the aim is to 
create a unified mass movement that can become convincing and more 
powerful in its political demands, this approach is not without problems. 
A very strong emphasis on unity and consensus is especially problematic 
in the beginning, when a movement is starting to grow. It can make it 
difficult, and even totally undesirable, for some groups to get involved in 
the first place. Furthermore, it can easily lead to misunderstandings that 
would not necessarily take place if there were more open communication 
between different organizations and continuous as well as practical 
efforts to accommodate diversity. For example, an interview with the 
WRI representative shows that some groups feel that there is unnecessary 
competition within the movement. He argues that in the beginning, 
when there was still ‘more independent activism’, the StWC organized 
an event on the very same day as his organization did. Due to negative 
experiences of the founding of the StWC, he is inclined to conclude that 
the competing event was planned on purpose, which is, however, likely 
to be a misinterpretation. (Interview 3.) The WRI interviewee regards the 
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StWC and its leading role as problematic also more generally – a point 
which he makes very explicitly (ibid):  
The problem is to the movement that one organization such as the 
Stop the War Coalition is one organization ... claims to represent the 
whole movement. That … becomes then difficult. Movements are 
normally much more diffuse and there’s not really one spokesperson 
or organization claiming to be the movement which also makes it 
more difficult to see what the movement stands for but ... at least 
you don’t have the same accountability problem. We have one self-
acclaimed spokes-organization for the movement and you, I guess, you 
could call it a party.
According to this interpretation, other organizations have not had 
enough opportunities to engage in the new anti-war movement led by 
the StWC. The unfortunate result is that ever since the founding of the 
StWC there has been friction between some organizations. Nevertheless, 
it seems that some of these contradictions could not have been easily 
avoided. When the WRI representative is explicitly asked whether he 
believes it would have been possible to make the movement genuinely 
broader had more people from various groups been invited to the StWC 
Steering Committee, his reply is categorically skeptical (Interview 3):    
The Stop the War Coalition is clearly undemocratic. So, I don’t know 
if there would have been a chance to get a real impact on the political 
agenda they are trying to set … I find it very problematic and I 
wouldn’t be sure it’s possible ... to have any impact ...  The history of 
Socialist Workers’ Party in this country is Stop the War Coalitions’. 
They always try to dominate ... it’s very difficult to counter that. 
Here, the interviewee detaches the organization he represents from 
the general framework of the left, thus representing a departure from 
the other three organizations. Moreover, his views clearly illustrate the 
difficulty of having a unified and diversified movement simultaneously. 
When viewed from the perspective of the theoretical debate, this invites 
many critical questions, in particular with regard to the concept of the 
Multitude, which radical poststructuralists conceptualize as a consensual 
and unified, yet diverse collection of singularities (Hardt & Negri 2000; 
2004). 
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4.2.2 Historical Contextualization and New Characteristics
Views regarding to the ascendance of the ‘new’ movement are closely 
linked to those pertaining to the general history of the anti-war movement. 
Here, too, there are differences between the organizations, for example, 
in terms of what are regarded as most important historical points of 
reference and how the current movement is considered to qualitatively 
differ from its predecessors. Unsurprisingly, the most common case of 
comparison for most organizations is the Vietnam War, which radically 
shaped the politics of a whole generation of young people and inspired 
new forms of political activism and new models for political organization 
(e.g. DeBenedetti & Chatlfield 1990; Chatfield 1992). 
The movement against the Vietnam War is mentioned particularly 
often by the StWC (e.g. Murray & German 2005: 21; Rees 2006: 231–
232) but also by other organizations. In the CND history, the Vietnam 
War is discussed in great detail due to the organization’s involvement in 
campaigns against it, ones that were especially active from 1965 onwards 
(Hudson 2005: 87–102). For the newer organizations, the StWC and 
GR, which do not have first-hand organizational experience of the 
Vietnam era, the war is often a point of comparison that prompts an 
emphasis on differences rather than similarities between the ‘new’ and 
the ‘old’ movements. For the CND and WRI, which were active during 
the Vietnam War, the conflict serves as more of a contextualization of the 
current movement: they tend to understand resistance towards the wars 
in Iraq and Vietnam in similar terms. 
Bearing in mind the internal problems discussed in the previous section, 
it is interesting to learn that for the older organizations the Vietnam War 
posed a challenge similar to the difficulties the new movement has faced in 
deciding consensually on a clear strategy. There was a heated debate about 
whether the CND, as an organization which ‘had been set up as a single-
issue organisation to achieve nuclear disarmament’, should get involved in 
anti-war activism at all (Hudson 2005: 92).11 Although many supporters 
regarded the war as a ‘conventional war’ that had no direct relevance 
for the CND, the organization ended up playing ‘a significant role in 
11 On internal struggles inside the CND during the Vietnam War, see e.g. 
Minnion 1989: 167–168; Young 1987a: 18.
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campaigning against the Vietnam War, although the degree of priority 
given to this varied’ (ibid: 93–94). WRI confronted similar problems 
although they were more closely related to the question of pacifism, these 
emerging when it had to take a stance in regard to liberation movements 
resorting to violent means, as in the case of the National Liberation Front 
(NLF) of Vietnam. As a pacifist organization, WRI had not approved 
the use of violence, but had decided not be ‘hostile to revolutionary 
movements’ even if it disagreed on ‘certain fundamental issues’ (Prasad 
2005: 385; also 498). In other words, WRI indirectly supported the NLF 
while also actively campaigning against the Vietnam War12.      
Another frequent historical point of reference is the Cold War, 
which served as the broader political backdrop to the Vietnam War. 
Comparisons to the Cold War era are made by the StWC especially when 
discussing the political framework of the new movement or explaining 
the transformation of imperialism to new imperialism (e.g. Rees 2006: 
10–13, 17, 44–47, 81–83, 89–90, 200–201; Murray & German 2005: 
13). In fact, the co-founder of the StWC, John Rees (2006: 222), argues 
that the most important social process behind the revival of the anti-war 
movement is the advancement of ‘the 25 year long neo-liberal offensive 
that has resulted in greater inequality, cutbacks in welfare provision, 
privatisation, deregulation, an increase in corporate power and an assault 
on trade unions’. He refers to the end of the Cold War and the ‘Moscow 
dominated vision of socialism’ that have, in his estimation, helped the left 
to re-unite while making opposition to neo-liberalism the most urgent 
issue on its agenda (ibid: 223–224). 
Rees suggests that after the fall of the Soviet Union ‘the dividing line 
in society as well as on the left was between those who were in favour 
and those who were against resurgent global capitalism’ (ibid: 224). He is 
convinced that this directly relates to the third social process that explains 
the birth of a new kind of an anti-war movement – the rise of new 
imperialism after the end of the Cold War (ibid). Although neither the 
first Gulf War nor the wars in the Balkans13 managed to ‘break beyond 
12 WRI organized several campaigns against the war, including direct action, 
leafleting and support for consientious objectors (e.g. Prasad 2005: 371–381). 
13 For the StWC, both wars are common points of reference when talking about 
the movement in historical terms (e.g. Murray & German 2005: 37–39; Rees 2006: 
16–19, 20–25, 28, 50, 83–85, 224).  
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the limits of the traditional left and peace movements’, they nevertheless 
‘drew together a core of people who would be central to the opposition 
to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq’ (ibid). 
The Cold War is a common point of reference for the CND as well. 
This is due, to a large extent, to the life cycle of the organization: it was 
founded in the late 1950s. During the first decades of the Cold War, it 
organized many anti-nuclear campaigns (e.g. Hudson 2005: 120–153, 
154–182), for example during the Berlin crisis (ibid: 75–81) and the 
Cuban missile crisis (ibid: 82–86). Often it is stressed that the power 
structures and political motives behind the Iraq War are similar to those 
which kept the Cold War going on for so long. Sometimes it is suggested 
that the current political situation, with its focus on the War on Terror, is 
even more dangerous than the Cold War ever was. (Interview 1; Interview 
6.) It is maintained that the Cold War was more rational as ‘both sides 
needed the other and were prepared to negotiate’, whereas the current 
situation is much more complex and potentially explosive (Interview 
6). Nevertheless, the present political atmosphere is regarded as similar, 
with the exception that the ‘communist’ label has now been replaced 
by the ‘terrorist’ label: ‘Throughout the Cold War it used to be called 
communism or communist, the most evil person in the world … now 
everything that is undesirable is terrorism.’ (Interview 2/GR.)
In regard to the changes taken place in the movement since the 
Vietnam War, three new characteristics are usually mentioned: the speed 
of mobilization (large demonstrations held even before the war started), 
the sustained nature of opposition (from 2001 onwards) and the size and 
broadness (‘globality’) of the movement. The central argument regarding 
the growing speed of mobilization is that the new movement managed to 
organize massive demonstrations against the war before it even started, 
whereas it took ‘four years before there were any serious demonstrations 
against the Vietnam War’ (Interview 6/CND; Interview 4/StWC)14. 
The StWC regards the current movement also as a much broader and 
more popular type of movement (Rees 2006: 222–223; Interview 5). As 
a StWC interviewee puts it (Interview 4):
14 This has also been a common argument within the US anti-war movement 
(e.g. Hayden 2007: 127).
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Now of course we’ve gone on better because ... significantly larger 
protests, and we had them before the war … after six years ... our 
demonstrations are generally bigger than their demonstrations were 
at the height of the Vietnam War. 
GR, too, stresses that the anti-war movement of the Vietnam era ‘never 
had demos of the size we’ve had’ (Globalise Resistance 2008f ). The size 
and broadness of the new movement is mainly articulated by referring 
to the February 2003 demonstration as the largest demonstration ever 
organized. It is also emphasized as a positive new development that the 
number of young people interested in politics is continuously increasing 
(Murray & German 2005: 4; Interview 1/CND; Interview 2/GR; 
Interview 6/CND). One interviewee, for example, stresses that the 
movement and demonstrations are now ‘bigger than ever’. He is especially 
impressed by the fact that people from different age groups and ‘from 
hugely different political backgrounds just stay together’. (Interview 6/
CND.) Another interviewee points out that while in the 1960-70s people 
were more ideological ‘about the possibilities of change’, today they are 
‘more cynical, much more pragmatic’ (Interview 7/GR).
Where the sustained nature of the new movement is concerned, it is 
mainly the StWC that stresses this aspect. However, its arguments are 
somewhat confusing. On the one hand, the StWC notes that it was unclear 
‘whether [it] would be a shortlived, ad hoc body that would protest briefly, 
gloriously and unsuccessfully, and then die, or whether it would evolve 
into something more permanent’, which resulted in decisions made ‘with 
no more than half an eye on the longer term’ (Murray & German 2005: 
48–49). On the other hand, the StWC argues that it ‘was always unlikely 
to be a short-lived or one-off movement’ but that it ‘has become much 
more of a permanent movement than was perhaps envisaged when it was 
set up’ (ibid: 6). Hence, it is unclear what kind of a life cycle was originally 
expected from the organization. It is clear, however, that when the StWC 
refers to the sustained nature of the movement from 2001 onwards, it 
is invoking a time scale very different from that used by the CND and 
WRI, which have been involved in the movement for decades.
The broadness of resistance is often articulated as a ‘globality’ of the 
movement, which some regard as a new characteristic (e.g. Nineham 
in Murray & German 2005: 106–107; Rees 2006: 222–223). Not all 
organizations emphasize this aspect equally much, which becomes evident 
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especially in the interviews. While some maintain that the ‘global reach’ 
of the movement is something characteristically new, others point out 
that the movement has always been international. An StWC interviewee, 
for example, says that ‘these movements have always been global and 
they have been getting more global as time goes on’. Referring to new 
political circumstances, he suggests that the ‘regrouping of the left after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union’ has resulted in people recognizing that 
‘we are all confronting the same issue’. As a point of comparison, he 
brings up the events of 1968. Hence, for him, the relevant time period 
for comparison is longer than for some others. (Interview 4.) 
Although a member of a much older organization, the WRI 
interviewee refers to the 1980s when linking the anti-war struggle to 
struggles for women’s, gay and other minority rights. Whereas the other 
organizations are more eager to underscore changes which have taken 
place, the interviewee maintains that the anti-war movement and its 
strategies have basically remained the same:  ‘Since the 70s and 80s … 
the peace movement of the early 80s ... the socialist groups had the same 
approach, big demonstrations, working through the trade unions, but 
not direct action. It didn’t change.’ (Interview 3.)  
4.3 Conclusions
This chapter has reflected upon the theoretical debate on the political 
agency of resistance in which the current anti-war movement, its 
ascendance and central characteristics have been interpreted in highly 
globalized terms by academic globalists. The analysis has proceeded by 
examining empirically how the above-mentioned aspects are understood 
within the current anti-war movement. The aim has been to determine 
the extent to which the understandings within the anti-war movement 
‘resonate’ with those of the three theoretical approaches, and what the 
main convergences and divergences are this regard.
The chapter has shown that the four organizations studied 
contextualize the movement and define its central characteristics in quite 
different terms each of them. For example, there are several different 
accounts of how, where and when the movement was born and how 
it differs qualitatively from its predecessors. Some organizations even 
4
question the very interpretation that there is something to be described as 
a ‘new’ movement. In regard to the political circumstances and political 
opportunities whereby the movement is regarded as either being ‘born’ or 
having experienced a political revival, at least four different explanations 
were found. Most often it is described as a reaction to the developments 
of world politics, especially 9/11 and the War on Terror, and as such it 
is regarded as something new and independent of previous movements. 
Alternatively, the movement is understood as a continuation of the 
alter-globalization movement of the late 1990s. While some regard it as 
the latest manifestation of the long-term traditional peace movement, 
for others it represents a new phase in the long-term struggle against 
imperialism. 
The recently founded organizations – the StWC and GR – tell a rather 
uniform story of the ‘birth’ of the new anti-war movement, whereas the 
long-term organizations – the CND and WRI –  contextualize the current 
movement in a different way. They tend to emphasize long-term traditions 
and the history of the movement and are less willing to accept recent anti-
war activities as evidence of something new. Moreover, as organizations 
they emphasize being part of the long-term peace movement fighting 
against war and militarism in more general terms (WRI) while opposing 
nuclear weapons in particular (CND). The StWC, although it describes 
itself as a leading organization of the new anti-war movement in Britain, 
often refers to a long-standing struggle against imperialism, while GR 
stresses its close relationship with the alter-globalization movement.
In point of fact, the organizations do not always even refer to the anti-
war movement when representing themselves as a part of ‘the movement’.15 
Bearing in mind that these four organizations constitute only a small 
part of the broader movement, the situation at large must be even more 
complex. Thus, the current British anti-war movement can be regarded 
as a mixture of not only a wide variety of different organizations with 
varying views about anti-war politics, but also of elements from many 
different movements – the traditional peace movement, anti-militaristic, 
15 Moreover, the organizations primarily refer to themselves as ‘organizations’, but 
also occasionally as ‘movements’ (especially the StWC), which makes it challenging 
to analytically distinguish when they are referring to themselves as a movement and 
when they consider themselves as an organization that is part of a movement.
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anti-nuclear, anti-imperialist and environmental movements, as well as the 
alter-globalization movement.While obviously very rich indeed in terms 
of diversity, these complex relationships with other movements, as well 
as political and ideological differences between the organizations, are also 
a source of contradictions within the movement. Even in its ascendance, 
the movement faced many difficulties at the national level when trying 
to make collective decisions and to define its underlying goals, strategies 
and preferable forms of action. One of the main problems seems to have 
been that the StWC strongly articulated the political purpose of the 
new movement as an effort to ‘unite the left’, which was not a position 
supported by all. Its effort to frame the movement in terms of a struggle 
against imperialism also caused some friction. 
The organizations contextualize the anti-war movement differently in 
terms of historical references and analogies, for example when making 
comparisons to the Vietnam War and the Cold War, which served as 
its political context. While the long-standing organizations – the CND 
and WRI – look to the wars for points of similarity with the current 
movement, the newer organizations typically seek points of divergence. 
In other words, they prefer to underline differences between the current 
movement and those of the Vietnam era, bringing up new characteristics 
of the movement to illustrate how it is ‘better’ than its predecessors. New 
elements that are cited in particular are the speed of mobilization and 
the size and broadness of the movement, with the growing number of 
active young people and the increasing diversity of the movement also 
frequently mentioned in the same connection. These characteristics are 
viewed in quite similar terms also by the long-standing organizations.   
When it comes to the ‘globality’ of the movement, three organizations 
(all except WRI) bring up the same evidence: the demonstration on 
15 February 2003. It seems to be a kind of a ‘norm answer’. Much of 
the ‘globality’ talk concentrates on this one issue. There are, however, 
differences in how the organizations interpret the demonstration’s political 
meaning. Those organizations that were actively involved in coordinating 
the demonstration – the StWC and CND – refer to it repeatedly, 
constructing an exceptional role for it in terms of both size (the largest 
demonstration ever) and timing (prior to the war). Domestically, the 
political meaning of the demonstration is articulated as an embodiment 
of the failure of representative democracy, manifesting the gap between 
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the electorate and the elected. Internationally, the February 2003 
demonstration is usually portrayed as having produced different kinds of 
collective subjects or described in terms of the numbers of people whom 
it activated. Sometimes it is even explicitly argued that the anti-war 
movement and/or the organizations involved in it somehow represent the 
majority of people not just in Britain, but all over the world. The British 
movement is not exceptional in this regard, because other studies have 
found that the February 2003 demonstration has inspired movements all 
over Europe to argue that they have been ‘able to gain consensus across 
all countries in the world’ (Ruzza & Bozzini 2006: 123). 
Those organizations which were not as actively involved in organizing 
the demonstration have a somewhat different understanding of its 
political meaning. For example, GR regards it as a sign of collective anti-
war politics on the European level while strongly underscoring the role 
of the alter-globalization movement and the ESF. In WRI material, the 
demonstration is barely mentioned. The WRI interviewee questions the 
overall rationale of mass demonstrations, and shows particular skepticism 
where the political significance of the February 2003 demonstration is 
concerned. On the whole, it can be concluded that most of organizations 
share the interpretation of academic globalists (e.g. Castells 2008: 
86; Hardt & Negri 2004: 215, 284) regarding the demonstration’s 
extraordinary character, sometimes even celebrating it as a manifestation 
of an example of ‘new kind of democracy’ taking place at the global 
level. Nevertheless, it is clear that both liberal cosmopolitans and radical 
poststructuralists emphasize the global aspects and new characteristics of 
the movement substantially more than is the case within the movement 
itself. It is more common for all of the organizations studied to regard the 
movement from a national or international than a global perspective. 
The theoretical literature often suggests that the anti-war movement 
represents some sort of a continuation of the alter-globalization movement 
(e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: 215, 284). Only one organization, GR, shares 
this view clearly. The StWC and CND occasionally refer to the alter-
globalization movement but more often frame the movement against 
the Iraq War as an independent movement of its own. Interestingly, the 
relationship between the anti-war and the alter-globalization movements 
is not as harmonious as usually assumed. The rise of the anti-war movement 
is believed to have decreased interest in the alter-globalization movement, 
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a development which has caused some friction and criticism.
How can the similarities and differences between the organizations 
discussed above be explained? Apart from their political and ideological 
differences (to be discussed in more detail in following chapters), one 
important factor seems to be that the organizations are in different 
phases in their life cycles. Obviously, the older organizations have much 
more experience than the newer ones and hence their perspective on 
both anti-war politics and movement activities is more comprehensive 
and multifaceted; significant changes in society, the state and social 
movements have taken place since their founding. The predecessor of 
the CND, the DAC, organized the first Aldermaston March over fifty 
years ago, and WRI was founded shortly after the First World War. It is 
only natural that these organizations contextualize the new movement 
differently than the more recently established ones. 
One particularly important characteristic of the older organizations 
is their relative openness about internal debates and conflicts, which 
are brought up, for example, when reflecting upon the history of the 
movement. There are always certain power structures and political struggles 
going on inside any organization, a fact that the older organizations 
disclose at least to some extent, whereas the newer organizations do not 
discuss such conflicts at all. What the analysis reveals more clearly is that 
there are power struggles and competition taking place between certain 
organizations within the movement. Although there is hardly anything 
about past, current or potential contradictions in the organizations’ 
public material, the interviews reveal that beneath the surface there is less 
unity than might appear to prevail on the outside. 
In this regard, the arguments of the interviewees can at least partly 
be interpreted as revealing an attempt on the part of the organizations 
to portray the movement on the surface (publicly) as being as united 
as possible. Indeed, an emphasis on unity seems to be one of the 
central characteristics of the StWC. While its leading role is more or 
less accepted by some organizations (the CND and GR), others (WRI) 
are less enthusiastic in this regard. Here, it has to be noted that since 
only four organizations have been studied, critical views of the StWC are 
probably more widespread among the movement at large.   
Inside any social movement there are bound to be differences and 
contradictions, although this is not necessarily serious. Often a movement 
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can act on a common goal even if there are some internal differences and 
minor conflicts (e.g. Rochon 1998: 97). To put it in Leonard’s (1990: 261) 
terms, it is possible to have commitment to both solidarity and plurality 
at the same time. However, it is not always possible to reach a consensus. 
When some groups feel that their views are not heard or regarded as 
important, even a minor question can become extremely politicized 
and cause severe internal conflicts and splits within a movement16. The 
fact that some organizations are always a bit more powerful and better 
positioned to make decisions that affect the whole movement can cause 
problems. In dealing with these issues it is important to recognize that 
many kinds of power relations exist whenever political actors come and 
work together, even if they are ‘on the same side’.   
Summing up the findings of this chapter, it can be concluded that 
the interpretations made by academic globalists are in many regards 
quite different from the understandings of the anti-war organizations 
studied. The interpretations made in regard to the ‘globality’ of the 
movement and the significance of the February 2003 demonstration 
seem to be to some extent overstated. Many organizations do celebrate 
its political significance, sharing the idea that the movement has become 
increasingly international. Some even speak of a global movement 
that has new some characteristics. However, these are not the only or 
necessarily the dominant understandings. The new wave of anti-war 
activism is often contextualized in more historical and national terms, 
with the current movement regarded as continuing the long-term work 
of the international peace movement. It has been maintained that, due to 
somewhat exceptional political circumstances, national movements have 
managed to cooperate more closely than is usually the case.17 Accordingly, 
international coordination in the context of the Iraq War is not regarded 
as evidence of a permanent phenomenon or the start of a totally new 
kind of political project in the context of the anti-war movement. As one 
activist puts it, although ‘increased mobilization and some coordination 
16 This was the case, for example, within the US anti-war movement during the 
Vietnam War (Chatfield 1973b: xxvii; DeBenedetti & Chatfield 1990). The British 
movement has also historically had its share of internal rivalries and divisions (e.g. 
Taylor & Young 1987b: 295–296; Young 1987a: 5–10, 18).
17 Similar kinds of observations have been made in other studies as well (see 
especially Gillan et al. 2008: 96–98, 102–103, 112–117, 128–129, 189). 
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offer hopeful signs’,  a ‘renewed movement has not yet firmly established 
itself ’ (Speck 2005: 27).
Indeed, as some social movement scholars have noted, since the 
February 2003 demonstration, the movement has not ‘reproduced’ 
anything on a similar scale (Gillan et al. 2008: 186). Moreover, rather 
than merely celebrating the global perspective, many organizations locate 
the February 2003 demonstration’s primary political meaning more 
closely to the national context18, describing it as a reaction to the failure 
of representative democracy in Britain. For many of the organizations, 
the new phase of anti-war activism has also proven that the left is finally 
in the process of uniting both nationally and internationally19. In this 
regard, some organizations also subscribe to the interpretation of radical 
poststructuralists whereby the anti-war movement is not a single moment 
of protest but part of a longer and continuing radical movement against 
imperialism and neo-liberal capitalism. Some organizations (mainly GR) 
hope that even more struggles will be incorporated into the context of the 
anti-war movement, thus echoing the idea of the Multitude espoused by 
the radical poststructuralist approach. 
Although some resonance with the radical poststructuralist approach 
was found, there are also many contrary and more skeptical views. The 
chapter also showed that, contrary to the common narrative by radical 
poststructuralists20, the transformation from the alter-globalization to the 
anti-war movement is not always considered a smooth and unproblematic 
process. Neither can the ‘birth’ of the new anti-war movement at the 
national level be regarded as a very easy or consensual process, for there 
have been many difficulties. One of the leading organizations is often 
criticized for not having an open enough attitude towards groups with 
different political and ideological views while itself attempting to frame 
the whole movement in characteristically anti-imperialistic terms. 
Although these differences were mainly put aside in order to create a 
mass movement against the war, certain elements have made it difficult 
18 See also Gillan et al. 2008: 97, 104, 112, 115, 118–120, 124, 128–129, 190.
19 For discussion on the ‘global left’, see e.g. Santos 2008. 
20 Radical poststructuralists, or liberal cosmopolitans for that matter, never seem 
to question the harmonious relationship between the alter-globalization and anti-war 
movement. There is no discussion about possible contradictions between the two; 
rather, it is taken for granted that their relationship is one of peaceful co-existence.
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ever since for some organizations to take part in the movement. 
On the whole, the fact that many organizations have divergent views 
in regard to the movement and its central characteristics and that there 
have been problems and even some conflicts in this regard, shows that 
that the kind of consensus that academic globalists believe is taking place 
at the global level is a highly idealistic assumption. Consensus seems to 
be quite difficult even at the national level, let alone the global level. The 
relationship between the alter-globalization and the anti-war movement 
is not either as harmonious as academic globalists assume by dint of their 
idea of growing global consciousness and solidarity between different 
struggles and movements. In other words, there seems to be at least some 
sort of a gap between the political reality experienced within the anti-
war movement and the interpretations made by academic globalists. This 
preliminary analysis seems to confirm the argument by the critical state-
centric approach that academic globalists tend to project ungrounded 
utopias into social movements in conceptualizing the struggles of the 
movement in highly globalized and consensual terms. 
Usually the processes in which social movements are born are explained 
in social movement theory in terms of political opportunity structures. 
In other words, movements do not ‘pop’ unexpectedly out of nowhere: 
as social and political phenomena they are constructed and produced 
by certain actors in certain political situations. It is not uncommon that 
political situations and opportunities brought by them are interpreted in 
different ways by various actors, producing thus competing views about 
preferred forms of action that may even result in conflicts and power 
struggles between the actors. This is not surprising, since there are always 
many sorts of political struggles and competition within any movement 
in different phases of its life cycle. Particularly interesting and important 
are, however, those struggle that take place at the very beginning of a 
campaign, when the main goals, principles and strategies are discussed 
and decided upon. These will have a great influence on the movement’s 
overall strategy and the relationships between different groups within 
the movement. Therefore, it has been very useful to gain a first glimpse 
of how different groups view the movement in general and how they 
articulate their own roles in that context. It furnishes a salient backdrop to 
the more detailed analysis in the following chapters of the organizations’ 
views concerning the main aims, targets and strategies of resistance.  
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‘Something big is happening. But something big is happening because the thing we are opposing is  also very big, and that’s the trouble’.       
                                                 Walter Wolfgang (CND), ‘The World against War’ Demonstration, 15 March 2008, London 
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     ‘Troops Out’  Demonstration in front of Downing Street 10, the Stop the War Coalition,  20 March 2008,  London
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      ‘The World against War’ Demonstration, 15 March 2008,  London                                       
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5     ANTI-WHAT? AIMS AND TARGETS OF RESISTANCE
5. Introduction
This chapter reflects on the theoretical debate by analyzing empirically 
how the what and why of resistance are understood within the current 
anti-war movement. The first question encompasses the aims and targets 
of resistance (what is resisted), the definition of which relies on the focus 
of the second – the causes of the war and its broader political context 
(why there is resistance). The aim of the chapter is to determine the extent 
to which the understandings within the anti-war movement ‘resonate’ 
with those of the three focal theoretical approaches, that is, to ascertain 
what the main convergences and divergences are in this regard. 
In the theoretical debate the more general question of what (the 
definition of the main aims and targets of resistance) and the more specific 
question of why (the causes of the Iraq War and its broader political 
context) have been conceptualized in various and often contradictory 
ways. Liberal cosmopolitans are inclined to regard the Iraq War as an 
evidence of an exceptionally dominant, but transitory role of the hegemonic 
US in world politics. Although strongly criticizing the US for ignoring 
international law, they consider the situation exceptional and ephemeral. 
It is thought that the US behavior will be constrained by pressure from 
the international community (of states) and global civil society (e.g. 
Dunne 2003: 303–304, 315–316). In terms of the primary targets of 
resistance in the context of the Iraq War, this conception would suggest 
that the anti-war movement should aim at inspiring more opposition 
at the level of global public opinion, which can then bring influence 
to bear ‘on political behavior, on voting patterns, and on decisions of 
governments’ (Castells 2008: 90). 
In contrast, for radical poststructuralists the Iraq War is yet another 
manifestation of the radical transformation of global power structures 
towards a permanent state of exception and a global state of war. For them, 
the leading role of the US is significant, but does not in itself explain 
the transformation from a system led by nation states to a system of 
decentralized forms of power and governance in which war serves as the 
main instrument of the global order. (E.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: xii–xiii.) 
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When the Iraq War is interpreted from this more structural perspective, 
it follows that resistance cannot be targeted against any particular nation 
state; the entire system must be resisted. Hence, the approach echoes 
the postmodern ‘being against’ mentality with no easily identifiable 
opponents. As Hardt and Negri (2000: 210–211) put it: ‘The first 
question of political philosophy today is not if or even why there will be 
resistance and rebellion, but rather how to determine the enemy against 
which to rebel’.
Both of the approaches are questioned by the critical the state-centric 
approach, which challenges the concept of a global state of war as well the 
argument that power in the international system has been fundamentally 
transformed. The state-centric approach suggests that the War on Terror 
(as well the Iraq War) should be seen as resulting from the weakness 
and inability of the US and/or other western states in defining a clear 
enemy and determining how to respond to new kinds of security threats 
(e.g. Chandler 2009a: 21–22; 179–182; 2009c: 260). In other words, 
it maintains that the absence of a clearly defined enemy has led western 
states to conceptualize opponents in highly abstract terms. This can 
be regarded as echoing the fact that nation states can no longer build 
their definitions of ‘the enemy’ using the traditional identity-political 
approach derived from Carl Schmitt’s conception of the political as a 
clear distinction between a friend and an enemy. More generally, in 
regard to targets of resistance the state-centric approach argues that it is 
useless to fight against abstract enemies, which cannot become strategic 
objects of resistance (e.g. Chandler 2009a: 18; 2009b: 541). If one wishes 
to influence actual decision-making, it is governments and the political 
institutions of nation states that should be targeted instead. 
This very contradictory theoretical debate is reflected on in this chapter 
by analyzing empirically how the Iraq War and its broader political 
context are understood within the anti-war movement and how the main 
aims and targets of resistance become defined and articulated. To this 
end, the empirical analysis investigates the research material through the 
following questions: Why is the Iraq War resisted? How are causes of the 
war defined and articulated? How is the war understood in its broader 
political context? What are the main aims of the movement? What are 
the main targets of resistance? 
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The chapter will demonstrate that the Iraq War and its broader 
political context are conceived quite differently within the British anti-
war movement than the three focal theoretical approaches would suggest. 
Rather than explaining the war as due to an exceptionally dominant but 
transitory role of the US (liberal cosmopolitan approach), a permanent 
state of exception serving the global regime of biopower (radical 
poststructuralist approach), or the weakness of the West (critical state-
centric approach), many of the organizations subscribe to a traditional 
Marxist analysis in that they regard the war as an imperialist endeavor of 
the US. Hence, the chapter will also show that most of the organizations 
define the main targets of resistance in quite traditional terms – as 
nation states and governments rather than, for example, abstract forms 
of governance. This locates their reasoning closest to that posited by the 
critical state-centric approach. Yet, when it comes to the long-term aims 
of the movement, many understandings can be found which correlate 
with liberal cosmopolitanism and to some extent also with radical 
poststructuralism. The results are thus mixed, indicating that there can 
simultaneously be clearly articulated state-level opponents as well as more 
abstract targets of resistance. Contrary to what the theoretical debate 
would assert, within the movement it is recognized that both can exist at 
the same time.
However, the chapter will show that are substantial differences between 
the organizations in regard to the broader struggles to which they link 
their resistance. While some regard resistance against the war as closely 
connected with the anti-imperialistic struggle, others contextualize it as a 
part of anti-militaristic struggle or link it to issues of global social justice 
and environmental conservation. There thus exists a great variety of more 
abstract targets of resistance, which indicates that, apart from opposition 
to the Iraq War, it is quite difficult to build a clear and coherent political 
project for the anti-war movement more generally. Since the movement’s 
component organizations define their main goals in different terms, 
their views on the relationship between the short- and long-term goals 
of the movement are also different. Hence, one can see ongoing internal 
political conflicts as well as power struggles within the movement. 
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5.2 Against the War on Terror and the US Government 
5.2. The Anti-Imperialistic Focus 
Of the four organizations studied, the StWC is most explicit in its 
opposition to the US and the War on Terror. It defines its main aim 
as stopping the war against terrorism being waged by the US and its 
allies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The StWC points out that a war against 
terrorism cannot solve the problem of terrorism but ‘will simply add 
to the numbers of innocent dead, cause untold suffering, political 
and economic instability on a global scale, increase racism and result 
in attacks on civil liberties’ (Stop the War Coalition 2008a; Murray & 
German 2005: 6).1 Therefore, the StWC is ‘committed to opposing any 
racist backlash generated by this war’ and also fights ‘to stop the erosion 
of civil rights’ (Stop the War Coalition 2008a). Although this three-fold 
objective is quite broad, the main focus clearly lies on resisting the Iraq 
War in the context of the broader War on Terror. Thus, the main target 
of resistance is the US (ibid, emphasis added):
The “war on terror” has progressed through a number of stages, and 
naturally the slogans of the day have changed to fit. It has also had 
consequences far beyond the immediate US-led military attacks on 
Afghanistan and Iraq, but in each case, it has been the US-led drive 
to war which has been the prime cause of these crises, backlashes and 
other repercussions. 
In fact, the StWC describes its opposition to the US as the main aim of 
not only the organization itself, but also of the whole anti-war movement2. 
In this way, it implies that there is a clear consensus about the main target 
1 According to the StWC, terrorism is not something the US opposes in principle, 
since it has itself, for example, ‘sustained a terrorist campaign against the elected 
government of Nicaragua throughout the 1980s’. Other examples are also presented, 
such as encouraging apartheid in South Africa, the cases of Cuba and Indonesia and 
previous US support for al-Qaida. (Murray & German 2005: 10–11.) 
2 It is argued that ‘if there is a consensus running through the broader anti-war 
movement, it is based on the belief that defeating the policies of the US government 
is the most urgent priority in world politics’ (Murray & German 2005: 20).
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of resistance, which is not quite the case, however, as further analysis 
reveals. For the StWC the War on Terror represents ‘an open-ended war 
against peoples and states across the world’ being ‘fought to impose a 
US-dominated new world order’ (Murray & German 2005: 9). Although 
arguing that the war was ‘planned long before’ 9/11 (ibid), in contrast 
to some more radical interpretations, the StWC does not support any 
conspiracy theories. It explicitly stresses that 9/11 ‘was not carried out 
by the US government’ despite the fact that the Iraq War had been just 
a matter of time, given that the war drive was manifested ‘in black and 
white in the words and deeds of the US government’ (ibid: 12; also Rees 
2006: 28–29). Since Saddam Hussein’s regime was to be changed in Iraq 
‘sooner or later’ (Rees 2006: 85), 9/11 was used ‘as a means’ for arriving 
at this goal (Murray & German 2005: 17). 
Rather than ‘an entirely new departure’, the StWC regards the ‘Bush 
doctrine’ as ‘an extension of US foreign policy’ that evolved since the 
first Gulf War3 and aimed at ‘remaking the planet in the image of the 
US – with mandatory adoption of a free-market economy as its bedrock 
organising principle’ (Murray & German 2005: 10, 17). As a strategy 
for ‘unilateral assertion of US power in the world’, the Bush doctrine 
is regarded as demanding ‘the submission of all to US interests’ and 
using force ‘to achieve that submission’ (ibid: 13). The StWC stresses 
the expanding scale of the war, which has reached ‘far beyond Iraq and 
Afghanistan to touch the Philippines, Pakistan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, 
Somalia’ while also ‘menacing’ Cuba, North Korea, Syria and Iran (ibid: 
9). It is described as an effort ‘to encircle China with US bases and leave 
Israel as the dominant military power in the Middle East’ (ibid). The 
StWC goes on to represent the War on Terror as ‘the most far-reaching 
plan for world hegemony since Hitler’s demise’ (ibid: 19).4 
3 The War on Terror is regarded as a continuation of the first Gulf War waged 11 
years earlier due to the US wanting ‘no post-Cold War challenges to its power’ (Rees 
2006: 17; also Murray & German 2005: 48). 
4 It is, however, added that the US ‘is not, of course, fascist, and George Bush is 
not a Nazi’ but that ‘the scope of the ambition of the US neo-conservatives, allied 
to their disregard for international law, invites a comparison in the sphere of global 
conduct’ (Murray & German 2005: 19–20). For discussion on Anti-Americanism 
in the context of the European anti-war movement, see e.g. Isernia 2006; Ruzza & 
Bozzini 2006; also Thomas 2006, and in the US context, see e.g. Tierney 2005.  
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The StWC stresses that ‘rather than making the world a safer place’, the 
war has resulted in ‘a general political instability across the Middle East 
and beyond’ (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 4). It is believed there is a danger 
of the wars between the major and minor powers ‘turning over into a larger 
complex’ that could bear serious consequences in a nuclear age (Interview 
5; Nineham & Burgin 2008: 18). Thus, the main target of the anti-war 
movement should be the US and its imperialist aims and ‘humanitarian’ 
justifications of wars. US foreign policy is clearly interpreted as that of 
an imperialist state by the STWC, as it emphasizes that ‘the drive to war’ 
is due the country’s national interests and dependency on certain energy 
resources. In this view, competition between states in what is an uneven 
system leads to two types of imperialist conflict: conflict between major 
developed countries (the world wars) and between rich industrial and 
developing states (the Vietnam War and the Iraq War). (Rees 2006: 229.) 
Since ‘the drive to war’ is regarded as ‘endemic in the system’, the main 
ideology of the anti-war movement must be anti-imperialism (ibid: 228). 
Indeed, it is told that ‘great powers are the main enemy’ was one of the 
shared principles agreed upon at the founding of the StWC (ibid: 226). 
This obviously has clear implications for resistance (ibid: 229):
Systemic problems require systemic answers. This view directs 
the gaze of those looking for the causes of war away from merely 
ideological factors, though these too have their proper role to play in 
any full explanation of war, and towards those structural facets of the 
system that underpin the drive to military conflict.    
Echoing the analysis above, the StWC describes the US motives in the 
Iraq War as ‘oil, Israel and strategic domination’ (Murray & German 
2005: 36; also Rees 2006: 88).5 It condemns the US claims of weapons 
of mass destruction and the ‘alleged desire of the Iraqi people to enjoy 
foreign liberation’ as lies, stressing that there were alternative ways to 
‘liberate’ the Iraqi people (Murray & German 2005: 44).6 For the StWC, 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan7 mark a new phase of neo-liberalism.
5 Oil as a motive is discussed at length (e.g. Rees 2006: 68–91). 
6 It is pointed out that ‘many Iraqi individuals and groups advocated alternative 
means of deposing the Saddam regime, through international political action and 
solidarity’ (Murray & German 2005: 44).
7 Rees (2006: 30) argues that the war in Afghanistan ‘gave the Bush administration 
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In this way, the relationship between neo-liberal capitalism and the 
war system is underscored, although competition between imperialist 
states is regarded as the main cause of wars.8 In this context, the StWC 
represents the War on Terror as essentially a desperate effort by the US to 
sustain the status quo. It is argued that the ‘underlying position of the US 
militarily and politically can only grow relatively weaker over the next 20 
or 30 years, even without allowing for dramatic turns in the international 
situation which could accelerate this process’ (Murray & German 2005: 
13). In other words, the combination of ‘relative economic decline and 
absolute military power’ is where ‘much of the meaning of US strategy 
in the 21st century is to be found’ (Rees 2006: 13; also 37, 49, 67). The 
War on Terror is viewed as a US attempt to sustain its share of power 
and resources despite the gradual decline of its share in world production 
(Murray & German 2005: 13): 
Military power cannot outstay economic power indefinitely. Even if 
US arms spending does not decline absolutely (clearly the US right 
will try to cut everything else first), other powers, growing relatively 
stronger in economic terms, will eventually be in a position to 
challenge Washington. 
More specifically, the StWC regards US aggression as ‘driven by fear 
of economic competition from China and other emerging powers’ 
(Nineham & Burgin 2008: 22). It is suggested that although the US was 
economically, militarily and politically the most powerful state after the 
Second World War, the oil crisis in 1973 revealed the country’s weakness 
in economic terms; moreover, its political support ‘has been ebbing away’ 
over the last fifty years (Interview 4):  
The idea that America morally led the world is gone … Whatever was 
left of that, was blasted away after the Iraq War … what they were left 
with was their overwhelming military power which they chose to use 
to … regain some of that economic power by controlling the second 
or the third largest oil reserves in the world. Now, that’s gone really 
badly for them … America globally is weakened. 
the momentum it needed to settle the new imperial design in stone and thus pave the 
way for the attack on Iraq’. 
8 The leading role of the US in the global economy is criticized in particular (e.g. 
German 2007: 7; Rees 2006: 2). 
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Regarding the war as a sign of weakness of the superpower, an StWC 
interviewee argues that the US is ‘in the process of breaking down the 
hegemony’. He regards the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as ‘based on 
fundamentally a weakness rather than strength’ and points out that 
‘hegemony isn’t about exercising absolute power’ but rather an ability to 
control ‘without having to physically intervene’. Since US efforts have 
failed, it no longer has ‘the ability to intervene and tell people what to 
do’. (Interview 4.) More often the StWC, however, argues that due to the 
country’s ‘vulnerable position in the world’, wars and occupations are 
going to continue as ever (e.g. Nineham & Burgin 2008: 22). 
This analysis echoes to some extent the radical poststructuralist 
understanding of war as a defining character of the international system, 
but the overall perspective is quite different. The StWC clearly considers 
US imperialism to be a main cause of the war, whereas in post-Marxist 
analysis, wars cannot be explained in relation to a single nation state, 
even if it is the superpower US. For radical poststructuralists, the global 
power structure is a significantly more comprehensive factor (e.g. Hardt 
& Negri 2004: xii–xiii).9 It should be noted that the StWC is not always 
pointing a blaming finger solely at the US either. It recognizes that other 
liberal powers are part of the problem, also historically (Interview 4): 
What America has done in last fifty or hundred years, but in 
comparison what Europe has done in last five hundred years, it 
pales … Also we, as Europeans, have a long colonial experience and 
probably won’t … do it over again, or I should hope they don’t want 
to do it again, whereas the Americans are beginning to learn that it 
ain’t pretty running the world. 
Although the above argument as such is quite exceptional, critical views 
of European colonialism are common among all organizations studied. 
The history of British imperialism certainly gives a strong flavor to most 
of their analyses. Nevertheless, the StWC’s position represents a clear 
departure from that of radical poststructuralists, for whom nation states 
are no longer the most significant power-holders, making resistance against 
9 The interpretation that the war should be regarded as a desperate effort on the 
part of the US is not very far from the view of critical state-centric approach either. 
However, while the critical state-centric approach is skeptical of the whole idea of US 
dominance, the StWC clearly is not.
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them considered ineffective. In sharp contrast, for the StWC, nation 
states are important and powerful players and hence obvious targets of 
resistance when struggling against the war (e.g. Rees 2006: 6–7). Whereas 
Hardt and Negri see the battle as taking place between Empire and the 
Multitude, the co-founder of the StWC, John Rees, speaks of three titans 
– the nation states, the international economy and the working class (ibid: 
3). This theory is well illustrated in the following somewhat lengthy but 
very apposite excerpt (ibid: 6–7, emphasis added):   
Modern imperialism is defined by the conflict between these three titans. 
They are bound together as three facets of a single contradictory 
totality. Without the competitive dynamic between the individual 
economic units of the system they would not find themselves 
constantly pitted against others in a battle for survival. Without the 
states and their armouries such economic competition would not 
ultimately also involve military competition. Without competitive 
economic expansion the working class would not grow. Nor would it 
find its livelihood under the constant economic and political pressure 
which is the initial spur to resistance.  
Rees (2006: 201) explicitly challenges Hardt and Negri’s theory when 
he criticizes theorizations whereby the ‘the new form of empire’ is very 
‘different from what went before’. He claims that new conceptualizations 
‘underestimate the contradictions inherent in the relationship between 
competing units of capital and nation-states, thus attributing greater 
strengths to the system than it actually possesses’ (ibid: 201). It thus 
seems that the anti-imperialist stance of the StWC can be regarded as 
resting mainly on modernist and traditional Marxist interpretations 
and is therefore not readily compatible with the post-Marxist approach 
advocated by radical poststructuralists. 
5.2.2 The Anti-Nuclear Focus 
For the CND, the US is also an obvious enemy to be resisted. This is not 
only due to the Iraq War but also because ‘the US approach for decades has 
been to seek to use weapons, both conventional and nuclear, in a variety 
of military and political ways to secure its goals’ (Hudson 2005: 221). 
Since the CND was originally an anti-nuclear organization, its approach 
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is quite different from the StWC’s. However, it is a versatile organization 
whose aims have expanded over the years. The CND chair argues that it 
must not ‘allow itself to be outside the mainstream of popular concerns 
on issues of war and peace, especially at a time when nuclear weapons are 
so central to war-fighting policies’ (ibid: 243). Indeed, the CND took a 
strong stance against the Iraq War right from the beginning, producing, 
for example, many inquiries and statements regarding the legality of the 
war (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 2008c).  
The CND’s analysis of the causes of war is very close to the one of 
the StWC. It maintains that the US would have eventually resorted to 
military force in the Middle East: in its view, 9/11 only ‘stripped away 
any lingering obstacles to Bush’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy’, 
showing ‘a huge re-emphasis by the US leadership on nuclear weapons’ 
during the next few years (Hudson 2005: 218, also 221, 229). The 
CND also shares the StWC’s interpretation whereby the US ‘uses its 
military pre-eminence to compensate for its relative economic decline’ 
(ibid: 224). Since the US can no longer secure its global domination 
economically, it seeks to do so militarily (ibid).10 The CND closely links 
war and militarism more to economic and military-industrial interests, 
and especially those of the US. Oil is regarded as the main motive behind 
the Iraq War, seen as a response to the neo-conservative imperative to 
‘fulfil the needs of a lots of arms complex and arms industries going on in 
the States’. (Interview 6.) 
Contrary to the StWC, the CND links the issue of nuclear weapons 
directly to the War on Terror and the Iraq War. It regards the current 
situation as the worst in history, because the US is not only ‘seeking 
global governance’ but has also threatened to ‘use nuclear weapons first’. 
The CND argues that there is a ‘global struggle’ going on in which ‘the 
American desire for supremacy’ dictates ‘the global configuration’. It is 
also suggested that there is ‘a race against time’ since ‘the war drive’ may 
result in ‘either the world or a continent’ being destroyed. (Interview 1.) 
Similar apocalyptical views are evident elsewhere in the CND material 
(e.g. Hudson 2005: 2). In other words, in the context of the Iraq War 
10 The logic is regarded as simple: ‘as the US economy becomes less competitive 
it increasingly uses its military pre-eminence to impose its interests’ (Hudson 2005: 
219, also 223). 
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the CND is concerned about not only imperialist US aims but also 
the spread of militarism more generally and the possibility that nuclear 
weapons will be deployed in the new political context. Interestingly, 
this emphasis becomes politicized when the StWC criticizes the CND’s 
position (Murray & German 2005: 56, emphasis added):
This is a world of regular wars of great destructiveness, in which 
nuclear weapons are neither used nor threatened – a world in which 
the threat of human annihilation through the use of the ultimate 
weapons of mass destruction has been replaced, in some measure, by 
the reality of imperialist wars of intervention. Of course, this does 
not make CND’s core campaigning issue redundant. The “nuclear 
issue” touches on world politics in many ways – the US-proposed 
“Star Wars” plan being the most significant … However, to take a 
stand on the totality of the war danger in today’s world requires moving 
beyond the mainly moral opposition to nuclear opposition which has 
formed the core of CND’s agitation.  
Here, it is argued that the CND’s analysis of the main problems is somehow 
out of date, as it has had to struggle ‘to adapt to the new realities of the post 
Cold War world’ (Murray & German 2005: 56). The CND suggests, on 
the contrary, that its ability to ‘play a leading role in virtually every peace 
campaign since its birth’ is due to its understanding that ‘only a movement 
open to different views can adapt and develop in an ever-changing world’ 
(Hudson 2005: 4). It stresses that it has always linked issues to ‘the reality 
of what is going on in the world’ and ‘been most successful and effective 
when it has related directly to people’s most pressing concerns’ (ibid: 5). 
For the CND, recent global political developments, especially the run-up 
to the Iraq War, demonstrate ‘an increased danger of the use of nuclear 
weapons’ (ibid: 2, also 220–221, 229) in a ‘striking’ parallel to the first 
Gulf War, where ‘two nuclear-armed powers were prepared to use nuclear 
weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state’ (ibid: 181–182, also 220–
221). Indeed, the CND considers nuclear weapons highly relevant in the 
context of any war (Hudson 2005: 184):   
Nuclear weapons do not exist in a vacuum – they are part of a war-
fighting machine – of a military arsenal – and they are also part of a 
political arsenal that enables nuclear weapons states to maintain their 
extraordinary leverage over world affairs. It is no accident that every 
permanent member of the UN Security Council possesses nuclear 
weapons. 
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The CND thus counters StWC’s claims by stressing that the end of 
the Cold War did not remove the danger that nuclear weapons would be 
used (Hudson 2005: 181–182).11 Rather, the fact that the US and UK are 
developing a new generation of nuclear weapons that are easy to use on 
the battlefield illustrates a ‘qualitative shift in nuclear policy’ (ibid: 249, 
also 2, 243, 236). When these two states, themselves possessing a huge 
arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), justified the war on the 
basis of Iraq’s supposed WMDs and non-compliance with disarmament 
resolutions, they exposed their double standards, for they ‘have never 
complied with their own obligations to disarm’ in the context of the 
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (ibid: 230). For the CND, the ‘hypocrisy 
of the US and UK governments’ became even more striking when both 
above-mentioned justifications for the war proved to be lies (ibid).
The notion that nuclear weapons are inseparably connected to the 
power and hegemony of the US places the CND quite close to radical 
poststructuralists, since the organization sees the threat of absolute war 
posed by nuclear weapons as lying at the core of the global state of 
war (Hardt & Negri 2004: 18–19). Although subscribing to a similar 
analysis in many other respects, the StWC and the CND clearly disagree 
on this position.12 While the StWC regards the anti-nuclear emphasis as 
outdated, the CND is convinced that recent developments prove that the 
organization ‘is as relevant today as at the time of its foundation’ (Hudson 
2005: 251). Accordingly, the history of the organization is titled CND – 
Now More than Ever. It is clear that the organization feels a need to reframe 
its focus and adapt to the changing political situation in order to make 
sense of its analyses and policies for its members. Moreover, reframing 
may be necessary in order to ensure that it will not lose out completely 
when competing with newer organizations, such as the StWC. 
11 While the Gulf War is described as a US attempt to ‘consolidate its global 
domination’, the US is now criticized for trying to make the use of nuclear weapons 
‘acceptable’ even in peacetime as tactical nuclear weapons could be used in pre-
emptive strikes against ‘rogue states’ (Hudson 2005: 185–186).
12 This can mainly be explained due to their different focuses, but the criticism 
expressed by the StWC towards the CND might also, at least partly, reflect the 
fact that the Socialist Workers’ Party (which is very influential in the StWC) has 
traditionally been very critical of the Labour Party (which plays an important part in 
the CND). The SWP has been criticized quite often for not acknowledging ‘the other 
ideological approaches’ (Taylor 1987b: 179, emphasis in original).
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From a theoretical point of view, both the StWC and CND resonate 
with the liberal cosmopolitan and critical poststructuralist approaches in 
emphasizing US exceptionalism. However, the organizations are clearly 
closer to the liberal cosmopolitan approach in this regard (although 
rather critical of western neo-liberalism generally), because both explain 
the Iraq War as due to the weakness rather than the strength of the US 
given that it is trying to maintain its dominant position despite economic 
decline. The claim by radical poststructuralists that this is a permanent 
state of exception, a global state of war, does not receive much support 
from the StWC and CND –  despite the fact that they do sometimes 
use terms such as ‘global struggle’, ‘global power’ or ‘global dominance’ 
in their political rhetoric. However, the content of these concepts is not 
the same for them as for radical poststructuralists.13 Instead of regarding 
power or dominance as qualities of the decentralized power structure, 
the organizations clearly locate them in imperialist nation states. When 
talking about imperialist endeavors and the military-industrial complex, 
the StWC and CND are not referring to Empire but to the hegemony of 
the US as an imperialist state. Hence, it can be argued that in this regard 
they are closer to the liberal cosmopolitan (and even the critical state-
centric) than to the poststructuralist approach. 
5.3 Against the British Government 
The second main target of resistance, the British government, is 
portrayed as an opponent of the anti-war movement for two different, 
but interrelated reasons. The first is its involvement in the Iraq War, 
which has occasioned two interpretations of the nation’s role: a ‘poodle’ 
of the US, that is, a close ally not wanting to jeopardize the transatlantic 
relationship; or more of an independent actor taking part in the war due 
to national (mainly economic) interests of its own. The second reason why 
the government is a target of resistance is that it is seen an undemocratic 
form of government that did not take the opinion of its citizens into 
account when making the decision to participate in the war effort. Next, 
13 The StWC is also very critical of post-Marxist scholars in more explicit terms 
(e.g. Rees 2006: 201, 212–220; Interview 4; Interview 5; see also chapter 6).
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these two different aspects are discussed in separate sections, although 
the views are so closely connected that it is often difficult to distinguish 
them analytically.  
5.3. The Transatlantic Relationship 
All the organizations studied express deep disappointment over the 
foreign policy of the British government, a feeling illustrated in their 
public material in various ways. The StWC and CND usually represent 
Britain as a close ally of the US that has little power of its own. Britain 
and its current government are described essentially as subordinates to the 
will and power of the US. For example, it is suggested that former Prime 
Minister Tony Blair’s support for the War on Terror was not ‘conditioned 
by his personal feelings’ but must be understood as springing ‘from the 
evolution of the foreign policy of “New Labour” and the interests in 
Britain this seeks to represent, much as George Bush’s policies express 
definite interests in the US’ (Murray & German 2005: 22).14 In this 
context, London is described as ‘a global centre of finance’ aiming to 
make it ‘safe for profit-making’ throughout the globe by supporting ‘the 
sort of world order outlined in the national security doctrines of the 
Bush administration’ (ibid). The StWC maintains that Blair’s policies are 
directly based on pleasing the US (ibid: 25, emphasis added): 
So Blair’s main orientation is clear. The world must be reordered 
along free-market capitalist lines, and Britain, because of its imperial 
past, has a particular part to play in this reordering – as Washington’s 
first help-mate.
Here, Britain is described as subordinate to the US and its national and 
economic interests. There is also discussion about British imperialism 
being driven by similar interests that ‘have retained their commanding 
position in Britain’ (Murray & German 2005: 22). The StWC points 
out that as ‘a British colony for the first 12 years of its existence’, Iraq 
was a creation of the British Empire (ibid: 31). The interests of Britain 
14 The StWC also talks about Blair’s ‘nostalgia for empire’ as well as ‘overt “liberal 
imperialism” of the Victorian times’ (Murray and German 2005: 28).
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back then are regarded as similar to those of the US today – oil and 
strategic domination of the wider region (ibid: 33). Oil is also linked to 
the operation of the world economy and ‘the profit margins of the big 
oil companies’ looking ‘forward to the war’ (ibid: 38). These interests are 
regarded as ‘woven into the power structure’ of imperialist nation states, 
the US and UK (ibid). 
The CND’s understanding of the ‘special relationship’ between the 
US and UK is rather similar. It points out that Britain has been very 
dependent on the US ever since the end of the Second World War 
(Hudson 2005: 48). It also observes that during the Cold War the US 
supplied the UK with nuclear technology, with the latter acting ‘as a 
junior partner in the prosecution of the Cold War’ (ibid: 53). The CND 
regards the US/UK Mutual Defence Agreement (1958) as still relevant, 
for it continues to keep Britain ‘in the framework of US foreign policy, 
often a mistaken approach to follow, seen with such tragic effects recently 
in Iraq’ (ibid: 54–55). Challenging the ‘special relationship’ between these 
two countries is thus considered a central goal of the CND (ibid: 52). 
In the public material of GR or WRI, the British government is rarely, 
if ever, mentioned. When interviewed, however, the WRI representative 
presents criticism of Britain and its current government that is qualitatively 
distinctive from that voiced by the other organizations. He explicitly 
questions the popular representation of former Prime Minister Tony 
Blair by the anti-war movement as ‘Bush’s poodle who doesn’t have his 
own idea, his own reasons to go to war’. In the interviewee’s opinion, this 
analysis of power totally neglects the fact that Britain has certain interests 
in going to war along with the US. He points a finger at ‘leftist activists’ 
who do not ‘look at why … their own government, their own country 
[is] really involved’. In a word, the argument that the UK government 
is just ‘a poodle’ of the US is considered problematic, as it fails to take 
notice of deeper causes behind the war. The interviewee also notes that 
although Germany was publicly against the war, it tacitly approved it. 
(Interview 3.) In this way, he brings out the general stance of WRI that 
wars are due to militarism and nation states acting on their own interests 
without paying much notice to the views of their citizens.
To sum up, the organizations studied all share a view of the US as 
the main party responsible for the Iraq War, but also emphasize the 
liability of Britain. Some organizations stress the responsibility of Britain 
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more than others – a distinction which becomes most apparent in the 
interviews. The StWC and CND representatives maintain that Britain 
aims at pleasing the US or that it has somehow been forced to participate 
in the war due to the will of the US. This interpretation accords with 
the views expressed within the liberal cosmopolitan as well as the radical 
poststructuralist approach in that they both stress the exceptional role 
of the US in the international system, where other states have become 
less sovereign. However, it seems that the views of the StWC and the 
CND are, again, closer to those of the liberal cosmopolitan (as well as the 
state-centric) than the poststructuralist approach, since the main targets 
of resistance are again defined in terms of imperialist nation states, not 
decentralized power structures (Empire). 
5.3.2 The Iraq War and the Crisis of Democracy
 
Many of the organizations strongly criticize the UK government for its 
‘contempt of democracy’ in not taking into account the opposition to 
the war by its own citizens. They often refer to a crisis of democracy, or a 
crisis of the legitimacy of democracy. They bring up the issue in different 
ways, some referring only to the national level, others also mentioning 
the European and even the international levels. For the StWC the 
circumstances preceding the war illustrated that Britain was not only 
facing ‘an impending war’ but also ‘a democratic crisis’ stemming from 
the fact that the views of the majority of citizens were very different 
from the views of those in power (Murray & German 2005: 177). Some 
emphasize that a crisis of democracy has developed over a long period 
of time, with the Iraq War merely making it more visible. It is pointed 
out that the crisis had already appeared prior to the war in the form of 
dropping voting figures and a general distrust of politics (Interview 4):  
Because for ten years before that people have had been saying ‘No-
one is interested in voting anymore, politics is boring’ but in actual 
fact people were very interested in voting but they had nothing to vote 
for. That’s still the case in Britain today because of course both major 
parties support the war in Iraq and so you find that voting figures are 
dropping all-time lows.
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Indeed, the voter turnout in the general election in 2001 was only 
59 per cent, which is the lowest percentage since universal suffrage was 
granted in 1918 (Gillan et al. 2008: x). The Iraq War made the situation 
even worse, since it became difficult for many to vote for either of the 
major parties: both supported the war, unlike the majority of citizens. In 
the CND material, this difficulty is illustrated, for example, by describing 
political debates on electoral politics in which ‘many peace activists felt they 
could not, in all conscience, vote Labour after the Labour government’s 
participation in the illegal US-led invasion of Iraq’ (Hudson 2005: 60). 
As one of the CND interviewees, a long-time activist who is also involved 
in party politics in the Labour Party, describes the situation: since the 
Labour systemically and continuously supports the Iraq War, there are 
now ‘two conservative parties in Britain’ (Interview 1). 
Similarly, a GR interviewee considers it unfortunate that the Labour 
government ‘is as left as it gets under the present system’. In her opinion, 
the Iraq War has resulted in huge mistrust towards politics, the main 
problem being the lack of alternatives: ‘if one does not vote for the 
Labour, who do you get, you get the conservatives’. The interviewee 
suspects that regular Labour voters might in the future even give their 
votes to the conservatives – not because they would agree with them but 
in order to show dissatisfaction with the Labour government. (Interview 
7.) Indeed, at the time of the interview, the popularity of the Labour 
Party was reported to be very low. Later, it reached its lowest level ever. 
The StWC emphasizes that Britain still has ‘a government that is deaf 
to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the country’ (Nineham 
& Burgin 2008: 20). Or, as an interviewee of the organization puts 
it, there is a ‘huge gap’ between ‘what people believe in and what the 
government believes’ and this is only ‘getting bigger’. He is convinced 
that the connection between people and politicians is eventually going 
to ‘snap’, leading people to totally ‘drift away from mainstream politics’. 
(Interview 4; also Rees 2006: 234.) In this and similar interpretations, 
it is maintained that the lack of real alternatives available in the political 
system makes political engagement in social movements, such as the anti-
war movement, the only way to effect political change. Moreover, rather 
than trying to gain power in the parliamentary system, many believe the 
system itself should be challenged or that at least it should not be supported 
by taking part in it. Hence, there seems to be clear resonance with the 
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liberal cosmopolitan as well as the radical poststructuralist positions in 
this regard. Both schools of academic globalists have stressed that social 
movements may not only complement democracy, but also refresh it by 
challenging existing forms of power and politics. However, they usually 
regard this as a reason to take political activity and resistance to the global 
level, which many of the organizations studied here do not necessarily 
regard as essential or rational. It seems that many would rather have the 
domestic political institutions and political parties reformed such that 
they better reflect the will of the people and are more democratic in a 
true sense. The lack of political alternatives also seems to be one of the 
main concerns.
Indeed, in the theoretical debate it has been argued that in liberal 
western democracies citizen-voters may lack ‘the possibility of identifying 
with a differentiated range of democratic political identities’ – a weakness 
in those societies primarily due to ‘the blurring of the frontiers between left 
and right and the absence of an agonistic debate among democratic parties, 
a confrontation between different political projects’ (Mouffe 2005: 69). It 
is suggested that the ‘loss of legitimacy of democratic institutions’ easily 
results in a void to be ‘occupied by other forms of identifications’, which 
can be ‘problematic for the working of the democratic system’ (ibid: 64, 
69). If established political parties cannot provide political alternatives, 
politics becomes consensual by nature, which leads to a growing appeal 
of so-called anti-establishment and populist right-wing parties as people 
seek collective identifications outside traditional parties (ibid: 69–70). 
Indeed, this may explain the substantial appeal and popularity of the 
British anti-war movement to a significant extent.15
While the discourse of the crisis of democracy may be strong within 
the British anti-war movement, it is not the only point of view where 
democratic politics is concerned. The analysis shows that it is common 
15 It is somewhat paradoxical in Mouffe’s argumentation is that, on the one 
hand, she regards consensual politics as a serious problem for the proper working 
of democracy but, on the other, seems to be troubled by the growing appeal of anti-
establishment and populist right-wing parties: these are some of the very few groups 
that can be regarded as properly political as well as radical in her own terms. However, 
although Mouffe does not discuss the anti-war movement in her book, she would 
probably consider it in quite positive terms, as it can be regarded as properly political 
but still not as anything as radical as some of the anti-establishment organizations.   
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to be simultaneously very critical of the current political situation but 
nevertheless consider it important to seek change through political parties. 
For example, despite their contempt towards the parliamentary politics in 
the context of the Iraq War, the StWC and CND clearly believe that they 
should try to influence politics by putting pressure on political parties 
and institutions. In fact, they have many symphaticizers in Parliament 
and political parties (see chapter 6). Both organizations invest their hopes 
in possible political reforms inside the parliamentary system. They both 
refer to attempts to ‘refresh’ it from within, for example, by forming new 
political parties. As an StWC interviewee points out, there are some new 
and smaller parties ‘growing up under the left and the right’ which may 
possibly ‘fill in’ the gap between the people and the current government. 
While convinced that new parties will inevitably bring some sort of a 
change also in more general terms, he emphasizes that the Liberal-
Democrats have grown substantially ‘because they opposed, and have 
continued to oppose the war’. (Interview 4.) In regard to the Labour 
government, however, the StWC is highly critical. Stressing that there 
still has not been ‘a full accounting for the Iraq War’, it argues that ‘the 
future of British democracy itself is at stake’ unless ‘those responsible for 
the war are brought to justice’ (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 19). 
To sum up, within the British anti-war movement there seems to 
be ever-growing skepticism towards representative democracy as well as 
parliamentary politics. In this regard, the idea of ‘popular disengagement’ 
from mainstream politics to which the critical state-centric approach 
often refers (e.g. Chandler 2009a: 2; 2009b: 531) can capture quite well 
indeed the nature of current mistrust towards political parties and the 
institution of representative democracy. The views of many organizations 
also seem to echo those of liberal cosmopolitans, who suggest that 
democratically elected governments, together with political elites, act only 
for their own interests and not those of their citizen-voters. For liberal 
cosmopolitans, the crisis of the legitimacy of representational politics and 
democracy represents a possibility of constructing new forms of collective 
engagement, a process which should, however, take place primarily at 
the global level (e.g. Beck 2000: 102–103; Castells 2008: 82–83). When 
viewed in the British context, the crisis has yet another layer to it. 
From the perspective of the British anti-war movement, the fact that 
people are turning away from traditional forms of political activity has a 
72
justification – the lack of real alternatives in as much as both major parties 
support the Iraq War. In other words, rather than considering the political 
system as such to be the main problem, in the particular context of the 
Iraq War especially some leftish anti-war organizations highlight that the 
Labour government’s policies have stood in stark contrast to their own 
anti-war stance and political views more generally. Participation in the 
current anti-war movement seems to be very much ‘boosted’ due to the 
political crisis perceived in the domestic sphere, which is simultaneously 
regarded as a crisis of democracy. One must ask whether there are 
actually two different kinds of crises taking place simultaneously that are 
sometimes confused by both activists and scholars: a crisis of democracy, 
manifested in dropping voter turnouts and an increasing distrust of 
politics in general terms, as well as a crisis of the left, which exacerbates 
the first crisis in not providing any alternatives for people on the left. 
Viewed from this perspective, the fact that people are increasingly 
turning away from representational politics and investing their political 
engagement into the anti-war movement invites an interesting question. 
Can this phenomenon, which some have claimed to represent the ‘death 
of politics’, be interpreted in terms of going back to the roots of politics, 
given that political parties were originally born out of social movements? 
If the growing interest in engaging in politics solely through social 
movements is not interpreted in terms of any of the three theoretical 
approaches – as disengagement from politics and a retreat from 
democratic politics (the critical state-centric approach); as a new form 
of political engagement avoiding being trapped in the ‘old’ categories of 
representation (liberal cosmopolitans); or as search for ‘direct democracy’ 
(radical poststructuralists) – could it be defined instead as an attempt to 
re-define and re-formulate politics as it was before political parties became 
established and corrupted by power? Could the intensifying interest in 
social movements thus be interpreted as an effort to bring politics back 
into politics?16 This would represent a quite different idea from, for 
example, those that the alter-globalization movement has advocated in 
emphasizing more of an ‘anti-political’ stance, as is illustrated below. 
16  This kind of an idea could also inspire interesting redefinitions of representational 
democracy in that it clearly maintains that democracy as it is understood now is not 
the only possible model or ideal.
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5.4 Against Global Neo-Liberalism and International 
              Institutions 
Of the organizations studied, GR is closest to radical poststructuralists in 
its approach. It does not generally regard nation states or their governments 
as main targets of resistance, but rather primarily opposes the neo-liberal 
policies of international institutions such as the G8, IMF, World Bank 
and WTO. It also differs from the other organizations in that it defines 
itself as ‘an anti-capitalist and anti-war organisation’ located within the 
alter-globalization movement (Globalise Resistance 2008a, emphasis 
added). The GR website features popular slogans such as ‘No to racism, 
privatisation and war’ and ‘Another World is Possible’. The site notes that 
while the organization aims to ‘campaign, organise and mobilise’ within 
the alter-globalization movement, it seeks also to make the movement 
more ‘radical’ in order to enhance ‘its chances of building a better world’. 
(Ibid.)
GR strongly emphasizes the interconnectedness of different kinds of 
problems and injustices. In pointing out examples such as privatization of 
electricity and water to show that ‘the profits of multinational corporations 
are prioritised above people’s well being’. It also argues that neo-liberal 
policies have ‘a devastating impact on the environment, particularly 
climate change’. Although not underlining the anti-war stance as much 
as the other organizations, GR’s arguments put forward the strongest 
links between war and other forms of injustices taking place in the world. 
(Globalise Resistance 2008a.) It is argued that war is becoming more 
business-like now that multinational corporations play increasingly 
important roles in conflicts (Interview 2):    
Corporations that go in … they benefit from cheap labour, from 
cheap land … they’re sort of sucking the heart out of the country. It’s 
presented as creating employment, creating opportunities but it’s not 
… it’s sucking the countries dry. So, militarism on the one hand but 
… corporate offences … on the other ... they are side by side really. 
The military goes in and creates the opportunities for corporations to 
go and then clean up. 
In the analysis above, it is suggested that mechanisms of a new kind of 
imperialism are at work in current conflicts. GR explicitly agues that it 
resists ‘all imperialist wars and their subsequent occupations’, such as the 
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ongoing Israeli occupation of Palestine, and supports resistance movements 
(Globalise Resistance 2008a), a stance in which it comes close to the 
StWC. When interviewed, both GR representatives emphasize fighting 
against different forms of imperialism and post-colonialism. They point 
out that military force was used to invade Iraq and take over its national 
resources, after which the ruling classes were maneuvered, trying to ‘make 
them favourable to the occupying force’ (Interview 2). GR frames the 
Iraq War in terms similar to those used by the StWC and the CND: 
it was not a mere reaction to 9/11, but a central part of the ‘Project 
for the New American Century’, which already shaped the US foreign 
policy agenda for years before the terrorist attacks (Globalise Resistance 
2008c). GR shares many other interpretations with the StWC and CND: 
it maintains that the US has become militarily more aggressive because 
it is economically weakened,17 and suggests that the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq serve ‘purely to impose US hegemony, politically, economically 
and militarily, on the world’ (Globalise Resistance 2008a, also 2008g). 
Thus, although GR regards neo-liberalism, western-governed 
international institutions and their unjust policies as main targets 
of resistance, this stance does not exclude opposition to the US. Its 
hegemony and imperialism are explicitly considered the main causes of 
the Iraq War. One interviewee points out that one unfortunate effect of 
the imperialist US foreign policy is that the concept of democracy has 
become a ‘curse word’, because so many ‘bad things’ have been done in 
its name. Hence, he believes that the anti-war movement should have 
the clear goal to not ‘only to stop the war but stop barbarism’. (Interview 
2.) More generally, too, GR is highly critical of the western rhetoric of 
‘spreading democracy’, which in its view should be recognized no more 
than a means to lubricate or justify the co-opting of natural resources, 
labor and state power (ibid): 
How do you spread democracy, really? But because the intention is 
not to spread democracy but to use the natural resources … there’s 
no genuine aim of actually resorting to the will of the people what 
actually ... divert away from the power so the occupying force can 
actually use the state, the country.
17 This is illustrated, for instance, in the argument that ‘Where the economic 
power fails, the military get involved’ (Globalise Resistance 2008e). 
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Here, liberal western powers are criticized for forcing their will on 
weaker nations while seeking solely to protect and promote economic 
interests of their own. It is emphasized that, instead of imposing 
democracy by military force, Britain should have supported opposition 
against Saddam Hussein in Iraq18. The Iraqi people should have been 
allowed to decide for themselves how to run their state and their lives, 
for democracy means ‘people taking charge of their life and deciding 
what to do with their natural resources’. Instead, every sector in Iraq has 
been privatized, with foreign contractors gaining ground. In this context, 
Britain is often equated with the US as a partner in crime. (Interview 
2.) Yet much stronger criticism is expressed towards the US. As one 
interviewee puts it, situation in Iraq depends directly on the US (ibid):
All that needs to be done on a global level is that America will stop to 
act its role as if it’s the policeman of the world and just keep to itself. 
Hopefully it will do some steps to promote ... the benefits of its own 
citizens but just leaving the world for its own will be enough ... We 
don’t need the America to manage us. 
To sum up, in many respects GR’s analysis of the causes of the Iraq 
War, as well as of war in general, is quite similar to that of the StWC 
and CND. Nevertheless, GR’s views are somewhat closer to the radical 
poststructuralist approach, because the organization’s broader analysis 
emphasizes more strongly the role of multinational corporations 
and western-governed institutions than that of nation states. GR also 
constructs connections between global capitalism and war similar to those 
put forward by radical poststructuralists, bringing broader structural 
aspects into the discussion instead of accusing merely the US and/or UK 
of imperialism. These views probably stem from the alter-globalization 
movement, which is defined as the ‘home base’ for GR. Although both 
have many members of the SWP in their steering committees, GR’s 
arguments are nonetheless closer to those put forward in post-Marxist 
and poststructuralist analyses than the StWC’s.  
18 As one interviewee puts it: ‘I mean Saddam Hussein was a tyrant …absolutely 
no question … but it was sophisticated and functioning country. Okay, it was 
functioning under a repressive regime but you look at it now, the infrastructure is 
just ... it is a disaster.’ (Interview 7/GR.)
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5.5 Against War, Militarism and the Authority of the State
As the only pacifist organization in the study, WRI has quite a different 
approach to the question of war and defines its targets of resistance in a 
distinctive way. It questions all forms of violence, of which the Iraq War 
is regarded as but one example. On the organization’s website, its main 
objectives are defined as being to ‘promote nonviolent action against the 
causes of war, and to support and connect people around the world who 
refuse to take part in war or the preparation of war’. While working ‘for a 
world without war’ (War Resisters’ International 2009a) by resisting war 
and militarism in all forms, WRI has the most abstract targets of resistance 
of the organizations studied. However, they are not as abstract as it may 
first seem, for war and militarism are defined as institutions constructed 
and maintained by nation states – a stance which pits WRI firmly against 
the authority of the state (Prasad 2005: 83, emphasis added): 
The authority of the State itself is often one of the causes of war. 
Hence, one of the things that has to be confronted is the compulsion 
exercised by the State to make people do things under its authority. 
The pacifist struggle is not only against military conscription but 
conscription in its every form; in other words to liberate the individual 
and humankind as a whole from the absolute authority of the State.   
Since WRI believes that nation states force people to do things ‘harmful 
to the humankind’ (Prasad 2005: 84), it views nationalism very critically. 
It stresses that the concept of nationalism is often exploited by the ruling 
class ‘to confuse people’s feelings of love and respect for their homeland 
with faithfulness towards their rulers’ (ibid: 37). It is stressed that ‘[t]he 
State exists for man, not man for the State’ (ibid: 100). 
While arguing that ‘under the garb of national defense’ the state 
tries and often succeeds ‘to subjugate the population – condition it to 
be able to keep it under control by all sorts of methods’, WRI does not 
distinguish between democratic and other forms of governance (ibid: 
84). It explicitly asks: ‘Are not all the States, be they communist, Fascist, 
capitalist or so-called democratic, not authoritarian to different degrees 
in their treatment of the individual?’ (ibid: 162). In a word, the people 
are under power of the state, from which they need to be liberated (ibid: 
123). Although it generally operates on a very different kind of approach, 
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in this particular respect WRI seems to have something in common with 
radical poststructuralists, as it here uses almost the exactly same words 
as they do when they speak about the biopower of Empire that controls 
people all over world. The difference is that WRI resists nation states which 
are not primary targets of resistance for radical poststructuralists.19  
WRI explains current wars as ‘nothing less than mass-scale murders’ 
falsely argued to be fought ‘for the sake of justice’ (Prasad 2005: 24). The 
organization condemns imperialism and refers to it as an ideology of the 
great powers (ibid: 124), just like the other three organizations studied 
here do as well. WRI also actively resists military alliances between states 
and is especially critical of NATO. Opposition to NATO has been on 
the agenda at least since the early 1960s (ibid: 369), and continued in 
different forms ever since. It is important to note that WRI does not limit 
its resistance to great powers and military alliances, but directs it to all 
nation states (ibid: 147; Interview 3). 
Resistance to states is due not only to war and militarism but to other 
forms of injustice as well. It is stressed that ‘wars go on taking place unless 
their socio-political causes [are] eradicated from society’ (Prasad 2005: 
294). For WRI, peace does not mean only an absence of war but entails 
other elements as well, such as freedom, social justice and equality, and 
therefore the organization must aim at revealing ‘the connection between 
militarism and economic power’ (Willoughby in Prasad 2005: 19). 
As such, this understanding is quite similar to that of the three other 
organizations, which are leftist by definition. However, WRI differs in 
that it has always been critical of both capitalist and communist systems. 
The view that all oppressive and corruptive systems should be resisted, 
whether capitalist or communist, has been made clear in the course of 
WRI’s history (Prasad 2005: 323–324, 384).20 While capitalism has 
been accused of competition and exploitation (ibid: 98), communism 
has been criticized for centralism, totalitarianism as well as fascism (ibid: 
19 Moreover, WRI sometimes admits that although government by state is 
‘necessarily totalitarian in nature’, it is ‘a necessary evil’ (Prasad 2005: 253). As 
Hinton (1989: 73) notes, socialistically oriented pacifists have usually ‘looked to 
the evolution of a transnational civil society and the gradual withering away of the 
nation state as the key to human progress’.  
20 On non-totalitarian, anti-Stalinist approach and the anarchistic tradition of 
the anti-war movement, see e.g. Horowitz 1970: 18–23.
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129, 161, 384), with the Cold War in particular confirming ‘the sterility 
of both the communist and capitalist models’ (ibid: 294).  
Interestingly, whereas socialism clearly, in one form or another, 
provides the basis of the other three organizations’ ideology, WRI argues 
that socialism often has had negative side-effects on pacifism, especially 
during the Cold War.21 Nevertheless, during WRI’s history even ‘a 
synthesis of socialism and pacifism’ has been discussed, acknowledging 
that attaining peace would require ‘a fundamental change in the 
economic base of society’ (Prasad 2005: 249). These debates have usually 
been accompanied by ‘considerable disagreement about the direction 
of the changes necessary’ (ibid: 249). Instead of promoting socialism or 
communism, WRI has advocated its own idea of ‘Good Society’ based on a 
‘nonviolent revolution’ (ibid: 118–119)22 or establishment of a ‘nonviolent 
social order’ (ibid: 83, 157). Within the organization, these ‘utopias’ are 
sometimes criticized. While some emphasize that resistance against war 
and militarism should remain WRI’s main focus, others underline the 
need for broader social analysis. Most arguments for the latter view have 
been ‘based on socialist and enlightened anarchist principles’ (ibid: 119), 
although to varying degrees depending on circumstances and changes 
taking place in the wider political context. 
5.6 Against One or All Wars? 
In regard to the question ‘what to resist’ in the context of the Iraq War, 
the clearest and perhaps most fundamental difference between the 
organizations is whether resistance is to target primarily the Iraq War, the 
Iraq War along with some other wars, or war in general. Partly, this is a 
question of the organizations’ attitudes towards pacifism. While pacifist 
organizations obviously believe all wars and violence must be resisted, 
for non-pacifists this is not necessary. Indeed, in the theoretical literature 
21 For example, it is argued that when communist regimes became ‘all-powerful’, 
many pacifist activities died down. Moreover, the establishing by the USSR of a non-
pacifist World Council of Peace (WCP) is said to have attracted many workers away 
from the pacifist cause. (Prasad 2005: 293, 305.) 
22 On the idea of nonviolent revolution, see e.g. Overy 1982: 13–18; Cortright 
2006; 2008: 211–232.  
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peace movements are often categorized as movements to end all wars and 
movements to prevent or end particular wars (e.g. Overy 1982: 2–4). 
For purposes of the analysis in chapters to follow, it is important to take 
a closer look at how the question of pacifism is debated and dealt with in 
the current movement, since this has a clear bearing on what strategies 
and tactics of resistance are regarded as effective and how the effects of 
resistance are evaluated. Moreover, the issue relates to the global-local 
debate in that it illustrates very explicitly the sorts of contradictions that 
political differences in a very diverse movement can cause at the national, 
not to mention the global, level. In a word, reflecting on the issue here, 
however briefly, will23 not only help to contextualize the analysis of 
strategies, tactics, effects and power, but also gives some indication of 
the kinds of differences and internal debates – and thus issues prone to 
politicization – that exist in and between the organizations.       
Generally speaking, the issue of pacifism is not much discussed in 
the public material of the three socialist organizations. While obviously 
its most fundamental issue as the sole pacifist organization studied 
here,  WRI does not often discuss pacifism publicly in political terms; 
rather, it concentrates on outlining its own nonviolent perspective. In 
other words, in public material WRI does not usually politicize the issue 
by contrasting its own approach with those espoused by non-pacifist 
organizations. However, in the interviews, the question of pacifism clearly 
arises as an issue that causes some controversies within the movement. 
For example, an StWC interviewee reveals that the hierarchy of issues in 
his organization is very different from that in the pacifist organizations. 
For the StWC, the anti-war movement is ‘not a peace movement as such’ 
but, more specifically, ‘a movement for peace in the Middle East’ as well 
as ‘a movement against wars in Iraq and Afghanistan’ (Interview 4): 
Obviously, we are called the Stop the War Coalition and those words 
are important … it’s not Stop War Coalition. Although most people 
in the coalition are opposed to war generally, I don’t think that you 
can conflate every war and say we want to stop them all. Stop the 
War refers to a particular war that grew out of 9/11. 
23 Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to take part in the broader 
debate about pacifism (and pacificism) versus non-pacifism which, as an extremely 
broad and contested issue, has also been studied and covered in great depth (e.g. 
Cortright 2006; 2008). 
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Here, the StWC is described as closely connected to a particular 
political context, which means that its main task is not to ‘call for peace 
in the world’ but to tackle ‘the most urgent’ issues first. A distinction 
is drawn ‘between people who are peace activists and people who are 
against the war in Iraq’,  as in the case of the latter group ‘there may be 
wars which with they agree’. The interviewee refers to people who are 
‘otherwise’ opposed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan but who at the 
same time may feel it is ‘important to go on and fight in another war’. 
In other words, it is very explicitly stressed that not ‘everyone who is 
involved, is a peace activist’. Additionally, it is emphasized that the StWC 
has members who have been or even currently are in the military. Since 
these people have been ‘trained to fight and to kill’, the interviewee argues 
that they cannot be regarded as peace activists. (Interview 4.) In this 
respect, the organization clearly echoes the Marxist-Socialist tradition, 
which has always been ambivalent in its relation to pacifism given that 
Marxism usually tends to positively identify ‘with military struggle as a 
means of spreading the international revolution’ (Shaw 1987: 61).24     
In regard to the issue of pacifism, the StWC and CND representatives 
frame their stance similarly. A CND interviewee stresses that the anti-
war movement in Britain is ‘not a sort of a bourgeois peace movement’, 
this being a reference to political and ideological differences between 
leftist and pacifist groups. In his view, the issue of pacifism creates some 
complications, because there is ‘always a risk of going off on every issue 
that comes and finds its way in’. (Interview 6.) However, it is also argued 
that people from the pacifist tradition are ‘all aware’ that ‘they would be 
welcome to Stop the War Coalition’, or the CND (ibid):    
We always make very minimal positions on everything. We don’t 
attempt to provide a solution to ... an analysis of every issue around 
the world. They will make their own speeches and their own things. 
Our purpose is to provide a platform, the widest ever in this country, 
to people to come to. 
This comment indicates that it is up to the pacifists to join the StWC 
and to realize that the debate about contradictions between pacifist 
24 On the relationship between peace, pacifism and the Marxist Left within the 
peace movement, see e.g. Taylor 1987b; Cortright 2008: 260–269.
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and non-pacifist approaches is ‘a slightly sterile debate’ (Interview 6). 
The interviewee does not seem to even consider that from the pacifist 
perspective there might be anything problematic in the approach 
advocated by the StWC. The other CND interviewee also refers to the 
StWC as not being pacifist because it ‘contains everybody’ (Interview 1). 
Moreover, he explicitly stresses that his organization is not pacifist and 
will not become such in the future either (ibid):
You’re facing a new challenge now and it’s a new challenge of a global 
disaster … whether you’re an absolute pacifist or not, it doesn’t matter. 
CND has never been pacifist. We’re now in a new situation. We’re in a 
global war that has to be avoided ... and this is larger than the pacifist 
question. I have every respect for pacifists, but it isn’t the same thing.
Here, it is suggested that in the current political situation, referred to as 
a ‘challenge of global disaster’ or ‘global war’, pacifism as such cannot be 
an adequate approach. Pacifism seems to be out of the question also in 
more general terms: the CND is not going to turn pacifist in the future 
either. This seems to be the case with GR as well. A representative of the 
organization argues that, being Jewish, he cannot escape the history of the 
Second World War and the holocaust: ‘I’m not a pacifist coming from the 
place I’m coming from’. By referring to the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto 
who took up violent resistance against the Nazis, he emphasizes that 
‘people should be able to defend themselves organized’ even with violent 
means if they are under the threat of being killed. He does not believe 
pacifism is the right ideology for the anti-war movement. (Interview 2.)
In sharp contrast to the views presented by the left-oriented 
organizations, the WRI interviewee underlines the importance of pacifism 
for any kind of resistance against war. He explicitly criticizes the StWC 
for not subscribing to such a position (Interview 3):
The problem is certainly that they don’t claim to be nonviolent. 
Nonviolent is not the word. So, there is certainly a very wrong 
impression about what does anti-war politics mean. 
In other words, the main problem from the perspective of WRI is that 
the StWC does not advocate nonviolent resistance and therefore can be 
criticized for giving a ‘wrong impression’ about the real nature of anti-war 
politics. According to the interviewee, there are no easy answers when 
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it comes to war and peace; their relationship is very complex. Again 
referring to the StWC, he argues that opposing something is easy but 
when ‘you ask more detailed questions what they’re really opposed to, 
then you will already find differences’. (Interview 3.) It is thus suggested 
that the analysis of the causes of war by the StWC is different from the 
pacifist understanding, which is represented as being more adequate and 
comprehensive. While critical of non-pacifist organizations within the 
movement, the WRI interviewee, however, criticizes pacifist groups as 
well, for not engaging often and systemically enough in cooperation 
with non-pacifists groups. In working independently for the most part, 
small pacifist groups do not provide enough visibility for the nonviolent 
approach within the anti-war movement (ibid):  
They’re all happy in small little groups and do their small little things 
independently but for the movement it does not create visibility … 
unless the more pacifist groups would get more organized there is 
nothing you can change. 
To conclude, as a pacifist organization WRI resists all wars, while the 
three non-pacifist organizations are primarily concerned about the Iraq 
War in the context of the new anti-war movement. However, even for the 
left-oriented organizations the Iraq War is not the only war to be resisted, 
because they also oppose the war in Afghanistan and the occupation of 
Palestine. Nevertheless, these three organizations do not share the view 
that all wars should be resisted: in the interviews, their representatives 
make it clear that pacifism is not their cup of tea. Moreover, all three 
leftist organizations seem to regard pacifism as something that is not 
really that important for the current anti-war movement, and they often 
more or less explicitly suggest that pacifist groups should make the effort 
to adapt to the broader anti-war movement, not the other way around. 
The WRI interviewee regards the situation in exactly the opposite terms, 
arguing that, as a very influential organization within the movement, the 
StWC should take pacifists into account better and consider adopting a 
nonviolent position itself. 
Since conflicting views were not discussed in the public material 
of the organizations, but often emerge in the interviews, one might 
receive the impression that there is some kind of a common agreement 
or understanding not to discuss these issues publicly in order to avoid 
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negative publicity for the one common cause shared – resistance against 
the Iraq War. However, as it seems that the issue of pacifism can easily 
lead to misinterpretations on both sides of the anti-war and the peace 
‘camp’, it might be a more productive approach to discuss these issues 
more openly – at least within the movement, but perhaps even publicly.  
5.7 Conclusions
This chapter has reflected on the theoretical debate concerning the 
definition of the aims and targets of resistance (what is resisted), which 
necessarily derives from an analysis of the causes of the war and its 
broader political context (why is resisted). The discussion has proceeded 
by analyzing empirically how these two questions are understood within 
the current anti-war movement. The aim has been to determine the extent 
to which the understandings within the anti-war movement ‘resonate’ 
with those of the three theoretical approaches, and what their main 
convergences and divergences are in this regard.
Since the anti-war movement’s analysis of the causes of war and the 
movement’s aims determine the primary targets of resistance, it may easily 
be assumed that primary targets of resistance in the struggle against the 
Iraq War are readily recognizable and definable. However, as the analysis 
in this chapter has illustrated, when causal relationships between different 
phenomena, as well as power relations between different political actors, 
are far from clear and simple, such recognition and definition are not 
always straightforward tasks. In both academic and activist realms, there 
are multiple competing analyses in regard to the Iraq War (as well as 
war in general) and therefore it can be difficult to determine the enemy 
whom one is to resist. 
Interestingly, some organizations talk about a ‘global enemy’. Yet, the 
term is defined in different ways by the organizations: It is sometimes said 
to be the global hegemony of the US or the imperialism of the western 
powers, sometimes the international institutions or the G8 countries and 
their neo-liberal policies. In this regard, the global enemy is almost like 
‘an enemy with a thousand faces’25, a kind of a chameleon. However, 
25 On different definitions of enemies, see e.g. Harle 2000. 
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hardly ever does any of the organizations point to a purely abstract global 
enemy in the sense that radical poststructuralists would have it; rather, 
the main targets of resistance are generally articulated quite clearly. Four 
main categories were found when views in regard to the Iraq War were 
analyzed in a broader context. Some of them are concrete and clear, while 
others are somewhat more abstract. 
Firstly, while all organizations regard the US as the main perpetrator 
of the Iraq War, they are very critical of the US hegemony and power in 
more general terms as well. The War on Terror is most often regarded as 
a cover – an excuse – for the Iraq War, and therefore it is maintained that 
the anti-war movement needs to oppose both. Secondly, all organizations 
share the view that the British government is also an important target 
of resistance due to its involvement in the war. However, whereas two 
organizations (the StWC and CND) stress the importance of resistance 
against these two imperialist states and their governments, two others 
(GR and WRI) clearly maintain that resistance against nation states and 
their governments as such is insufficient in the struggle against the war. 
Accordingly, they define their targets of resistance in broader terms. 
Thus, thirdly, in addition to resisting the US and UK governments, 
GR opposes neo-liberal international institutions such as the World Bank, 
the WTO and the IMF and their policies. These institutions are regarded 
as servants of neo-liberal global capitalism, which is the primary target of 
resistance for GR more generally. Although the organization emphasizes 
the role of the global political economy, multinational corporations and 
the military-industrial complex more than the StWC and CND do, its 
analysis of the causes of the Iraq War is very similar to theirs. The Iraq 
War is considered to be a result of a new kind of imperialism by the US, 
which is loyally supported by its close ally, Britain. Therefore, both the US 
and UK governments need to be resisted simultaneously. Fourthly, WRI 
maintains that, like all wars, the Iraq War must be resisted by targeting 
nation states but in a different sense than the other organizations urge. 
For the pacifist WRI, it is necessary to resist the authoritarianism and 
militarism embedded in every nation state and not concentrate solely 
on imperialist and great powers. However, the organization also believes 
that there is a direct linkage between economics and militarism, whereby 
it asserts that socio-economic problems and injustices must be tackled in 
order to remove causes of war.   
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In terms of primary goals, the StWC mainly struggles against the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, but at the same time points out that its aims are 
continuously expanding. For example, the Palestinian issue has gained 
an especially important place on its agenda and it has campaigned ‘pre-
emptively’ against possible military action against Iran (often prematurely 
referred to as ‘the War on Iran’). The same is true of the CND, which, in 
addition to struggling against the above-mentioned wars in the context 
of the new anti-war movement, campaigns against nuclear weapons 
and the arms industry more generally. In opposing neo-liberalism and 
global capitalism, GR concentrates on not only anti-war but also anti-
capitalist activities in the framework of both the anti-war and the alter-
globalization movements. WRI’s long-term work is based on promoting 
nonviolent approaches to war and thus, as it aims at the elimination of 
all wars, it does not concentrate solely on the Iraq War. 
These differences are not surprising since all the organizations studied 
are originally built on different premises. They define and articulate 
their main opponents, as well as the broader context of their political 
struggle against the war, in distinctive ways. Although the three leftist 
organization (the StWC, CND and GR) share an interpretation of the 
Iraq War as being due to a new kind of imperialism of the economically 
weakened but militarily more aggressive US, the overall framework of 
the war is nevertheless regarded in a slightly different way by each of 
them. The analysis of the StWC seems to rest on a traditional Marxist 
approach, in which war is seen as the result of economic rivalry between 
great powers26. This interpretation is partly shared by the CND, which, 
however, strongly emphasizes that wars are intimately connected to 
the arms trade and power politics and stresses in particular the role of 
nuclear weapons. GR, for its part, underlines the role of multinational 
corporations and international institutions in the global capitalist system, 
and WRI regards war and militarism as institutions of nation states.  
Two of the organizations – the SWC and CND – strongly emphasize 
the importance of resistance against the national government27. The 
26 Indeed, anti-imperialism has always been one of the main ideologies within the 
movement (e.g. Scherer 2004: 16; Phillips 2009: 242–243). 
27 Partly, this confirms the findings by Gillan et al. (2008: 88) that ‘the British 
anti-war movement’s target ‘is primarily national and primarily the government’. 
However, this is not the whole truth, as the analysis in this thesis illustrates.
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British government is usually portrayed as a target of resistance for the 
anti-war movement in two different ways. Firstly, due to its involvement 
in the Iraq War, it is represented as either a ‘poodle’ of the US, obeying 
the latter’s will in the context of the transatlantic ‘special relationship’, or 
as more of an independent actor which has its own political/economic 
motives for participating in the war. There are thus differences in emphasis 
in how the organizations regard power and the motives of – as well as the 
alliance between – the two governments, a foreign and a national one. 
Interestingly, those organizations that oppose the British government 
actively (the StWC and CND) tend to represent Britain as a subordinate 
of the US. Logically, this means that they should concentrate much more 
of their efforts on resisting the US government than they in fact do.    
Secondly, the British government is represented as an opponent of the 
anti-war movement due to its refusal to respect the will of the majority 
of its citizens, who opposed the nation’s involvement in the war. Many of 
the organizations refer to a crisis of democracy, which is given different 
and partly overlapping meanings. For some people, the crisis stems from 
growing mistrust of political parties and parliamentary politics generally, 
whereby they regard participation in social movements as an alternative 
form of political engagement. For others, a crisis of democracy has more to 
do with the Labour government’s decision to go to war despite opposition 
by the citizen-voters. It is often stressed that both major parties support 
the war, there are no real political alternatives and therefore the only way 
to engage politically in this context is through the movement. 
While the two other left-oriented organizations consider anti-war 
resistance against the national government crucial for the movement, GR 
takes a broader and more structural perspective. It stresses the importance 
of resisting international institutions that maintain the status quo based on 
structural violence, which produces concrete violence and war. According 
to this view, resisting the US and UK governments on account of their 
policies is important, but not sufficient in itself to stop or prevent wars. 
WRI regards the issue from an even broader perspective, emphasizing 
that the main targets of resistance should be war and militarism as 
institutions of the nation state. The organization doubts that opposing 
the US or the British government even in regard to one particular 
war could be effective as such, because there are always deeper causes, 
ideologies, power relations and structures at work. Therefore, resistance 
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to governments and their policies is conceived as an incomprehensive 
approach; war and militarism must be resisted in much broader terms. 
WRI nevertheless recognizes that there can be various approaches in 
regard to some particular, ongoing wars and it thus indicates that the 
current division of labor between different organizations can be accepted. 
While some groups work for long-term goals and concentrate on, for 
example, educating people about causes of war, others can raise public 
awareness and concentrate on mass mobilizations. These issues are 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
To sum up, all the organizations studied have quite clearly defined 
targets of resistance, although the analyses and emphases they bring to 
bear in mounting resistance to war vary. It is noteworthy that none of 
the organizations is shy or hesitant about specifying the opponents it is 
struggling against – be they governments or more abstract opponents, 
such as militarism, imperialism, capitalism, neo-liberalism, and like 
forces. In fact, the organizations present so many different targets of 
resistance that it is sometimes difficult to determine the primary ones. 
Nonetheless, this shows that these organizations are not just resisting 
something totally abstract; they do not represent a movement without 
opponents. Accordingly, the movement cannot be criticized for having 
an overly general ‘being against’ attitude, which the alter-globalization 
movement has been criticized for. 
Then again, it cannot be argued that the two movements have no 
similarities. Moreover, there seems to be quite a common understanding 
within the British anti-war movement that both the national government 
and the US government need to be resisted and that the power and the 
political, military and economic interests of the two states are closely 
intertwined. For most of the organizations, it is not, however, only states 
and their policies which need to be resisted. It is commonly maintained 
that there are structural aspects of power at work, too, which need to be 
first revealed in order to tackle them in the struggle against (the) war. 
Usually it is not very easy on the theoretical level to separate these from 
state level opponents, for their practices play out in arenas where the 
influence of these power structures and the dominant ideologies are 
manifested and embodied in concrete terms.
Although analyses of the war and definitions of main targets of 
resistance vary, the organizations studied within the new British anti-war 
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movement have at least one clear and common goal: stopping the Iraq 
War. As an interviewee puts it, all are opposed to the Iraq War ‘but then 
it becomes a bit more complicated with Afghanistan’ and with other wars 
(Interview 4/StWC). Indeed, while it seems that all agree on this particular 
goal, beyond it there is a great deal of diversity and complexity when it 
comes to the primary aims within the movement. For the most part, 
this diversity does not prevent most of the organizations from working 
together, although it makes cooperation difficult to some extent.  
If one critically evaluates the organizations to ascertain which of 
them is (are) in a better position to influence how the primary targets 
of resistance are conceptualized within the movement, the StWC and 
the CND clearly emerge as quite powerful. As a rule, issues which touch 
upon the organizations using their influence within the movement 
to define justified objects of criticism or legitimate opponents are not 
publicly debated. In the interviews, however, these issues were cited quite 
often, indicating that there are political conflicts and even power struggles 
going on beneath the surface despite the movement’s appearing relatively 
united on the surface.
Concluding in light of the main convergences and divergences 
between the premises of the four organizations in relation to the three 
theoretical approaches, it can be said that the approaches of the StWC 
and CND do not resonate much with any single theoretical approach as 
such. Although the two organizations share a highly critical view of the US 
with radical poststructuralists, they have a less critical understanding of 
global power structures in not ‘believing’ in Empire. Instead, they define 
their main targets of resistance in terms of nation states and governments. 
Although the StWC and CND share the notion of US exceptionalism 
with liberal cosmopolitans, the organizations differ in that they do not 
regard the situation to be transitory, but maintain that imperialist wars 
will continue at least as long as the US can compensate for its economic 
weakness by military power. As these two organizations regard the Iraq 
War as an imperialist endeavor of the US, they come close to traditional 
Marxist analysis. Their analysis is not easily compatible with the post-
Marxist approach espoused by radical poststructuralists or the ‘third way’ 
social-democratic approach advocated by many liberal cosmopolitans. 
The analysis detailed in this chapter suggests that the radical 
poststructuralist approach has common ground with only one of 
89
the organizations studied, GR. Both can be said to regard power as 
decentralized and having shifted out of the control of nation states into 
the sphere of influence of global corporations. However, even in this case 
the resonance is only partial, because in discussing ‘new imperialism’, 
GR seems to conceptualize imperialism in quite traditional terms. WRI 
considers all wars to be caused by militarism and is highly critical of the 
authority of the state generally; it thus defines its main aims and targets 
of resistance in a way that distinguishes it from the other organizations 
and the theoretical approaches studied in this thesis. On the whole, it can 
be said that the organizations involved in the British anti-war movement 
understand the main problem, the Iraq War, as well as its broader political 
context, quite differently than the proponents of the three theoretical 
approaches studied. This implies that the solutions, means and strategies 
proposed by those approaches might not be easily compatible with 
the organizations’ views (to be analyzed in chapter 6). Moreover, the 
organizations differ form each other in many other respects, which makes 
achieving a coherent perspective anything but easy.
In this context, it is useful to view the three theoretical approaches in a 
somewhat more philosophical perspective. While the liberal cosmopolitan 
approach maintains that a social movement does not necessarily need to 
define adversaries, the radical poststructuralist approach argues that it is 
impossible to define clear adversaries in the global era. Hence, they both 
adhere to the idea of ‘being against’ something without clearly defining an 
enemy or a target of resistance. In this way, there is a convergence between 
them in theoretical terms. It is often argued that the unwillingness and/
or the difficulty of clearly defining opponents and targets of resistance 
reflects the paradigm shift from modern to postmodern, whether one is 
talking of mainstream or critical approaches to political philosophy. 
Whereas modern critical theory challenged the normative basis of IR 
in such a way that there were clearly defined enemies and opponents 
to be found (and thus, it was possible also to have clear strategies for 
resistance), it has been argued that postmodern critical approaches have 
to some extent ‘lost’ this ability.  This development is attributed to their 
tendency to regard violence and other forms of injustice as caused by 
structures and processes of faceless governance rather than political actors 
and institutions that can be concretely resisted. In contrast, the critical 
state-centric approach views both the liberal cosmopolitan and the radical 
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poststructuralist approaches very skeptically, because it maintains that 
there should always be clearly defined goals identifying who and what to 
oppose. The approach explicitly stresses that a clear political project is a 
basic requirement for politics and thus also for resistance.
The fact that the British anti-war movement has some clearly defined 
opponents and goals may prove the concern of the critical state-centric 
approach unnecessary in this context. However, not all organizations are 
as clear about their main targets of resistance, and for some organizations, 
especially in the case of long-term goals, these are sometimes quite 
abstract. What the analysis in this chapter has shown is that within the 
movement against the Iraq War there can be clearly articulated state-
level opponents (the US and UK) and more abstract targets of resistance 
simultaneously, a situation which admittedly partly resembles the kind of 
being against mentality characteristic of new social movements such as 
the alter-globalization movement. Therefore, it can be suggested that in 
terms of defining its aim and targets of resistance, the current anti-war 
movement is in between these two approaches; actually, it can be better 
characterized as adhering to both at the same time.
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6       HOW TO RESIST? STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE
6.     Introduction
This chapter deals with the how of resistance. It reflects on the theoretical 
discussion concerning the most effective political strategies (how to resist), 
which is intimately linked to the the primary context of resistance (here, 
national or global). This theoretical debate is discussed by empirically 
analyzing how the above-mentioned issues are understood within the 
current anti-war movement. The aim is to determine the extent to which 
the understandings within the anti-war movement ‘resonate’ with those 
of the three theoretical approaches and what the main convergences and 
divergences are this regard. 
The three theoretical approaches have conceptualized strategies of 
resistance and their primary context in very different terms. The liberal 
cosmopolitan approach maintains that because social movements have 
gained power at the expense of nation states in the global era, they not 
only can, but should, target their political action directly to the global level 
and hence bypass territorialized boundaries of nation states altogether. 
The global context is regarded as the primary context for political 
engagement, whose main emphasis lies on symbolic politics. The aim 
there is to pressure states and governments ‘from below’ by influencing 
global public opinion. It is explicitly suggested that ‘social movements 
must think local’ but ‘act global – at the level where it really matters 
today’ (Castells 2004: 143, also 2008). 
Radical poststructuralists argue that since power has escaped from 
nation states to decentralized and global Empire, resistance must take 
a similar, deterritorialized and global form in order to be effective. They 
maintain that social movements, unlike states, have a capacity for this kind 
of action because they are organized in a networked and non-hierarchical 
fashion. Global coalitions and solidarity are thus regarded as crucial for 
effective resistance. Local and traditional leftist forms of resistance are 
regarded as old-fashioned and ineffective where the aim is to link as many 
struggles as possible to form a common global movement of opposition. 
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Whereas the main slogan for liberal cosmopolitans is ‘think locally, act 
globally’ (see above), radical poststructuralists explicitly argue that we 
must ‘think globally and act globally’ (Hardt & Negri 2000: 207).  
In contrast, the critical state-centric approach stresses that the most 
effective strategies for resistance are state-based, not global. It argues that 
social movements, which increasingly scale their political action to the 
global level, are likely to be less influential in that they fail to target the 
genuine subjects of power, that is, nation states. Therefore, instead of 
suggesting that movements should target abstract enemies and embrace a 
strategy of global resistance, the critical state-centric approach emphasizes 
the need for strategic thinking, coherent and clearly defined goals, and 
collective political engagement that is not based on mere symbolic action 
in the abstract (e.g. Chandler 2009a: 18–22, 207–208; 2009b: 541–
542). In recognizing the deterritorialized nature of political ideas and 
ideologies (e.g. Chandler 2009a: 16), the approach stresses that concrete 
political action or resistance has to be ‘necessarily territorialized in terms 
of the specific strategies and articulations of those demands to put those 
demands into practice’ (ibid: 17). Hence, it can be argued that from this 
perspective social movements should ‘think globally but act locally’. 
This highly contradictory theoretical debate is reflected on in this 
chapter by analyzing empirically how effective strategies and tactics of 
resistance, as well as their primary context, are understood within the anti-
war movement, the ‘current agent’ of resistance against war. Specifically, 
the empirical analysis addresses the following questions: What strategies 
and tactics of resistance against (the) war are regarded as the most effective, 
and why? How is the relationship between national and global strategies 
understood? How is the primary context of resistance defined? How are 
the national and global levels articulated in relation to each other?
The chapter will show that instead of defining effective strategies of 
resistance in either purely nationally or globally oriented terms as the 
theoretical approaches do, most of the anti-war organizations studied 
advocate a ‘both-and’ approach; that is, they regard both state-based and 
global strategies as important for the movement, although for different 
purposes. However, the chapter will also illustrate that the organizations 
differ in the context they emphasize – either national or global – as the 
primary level of resistance and that there is also considerable disagreement 
between them on which strategies, and especially tactics, they regard 
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as the most effective. Of all internal divisions the one related to main 
strategies and tactics seems to cause the most controversy.  
Before introducing the findings, it must be noted that any analysis 
of ‘how to resist’ is closely linked to the questions of ‘what is resisted 
and why’, which were analyzed in the previous chapter. Clearly, the 
organizations’ views concerning effective strategies of resistance are 
connected to their analysis of the causes of the problem, their definition 
of the main targets of resistance and their interpretations of the source 
and quality of the opponent’s power. Much as the previous chapter found 
that there are many different views among the organizations about the 
primary opponents and targets of resistance, it is evident here that there 
is also a great deal of diversity of views on how resistance should be 
effectively organized against these different opponents. The logic of this 
chapter is to first introduce the organizations’ views regarding strategies 
and tactics of the movement against its main opponents and then proceed 
to discuss the strategies invoked against more abstract opponents.  
6.2     Strategies of Resistance against Governments
6.2.   Resisting the British Government
Those organizations which regard the British government as the primary 
target of resistance believe that there are two main strategies which can 
be used effectively against it. Firstly, it is maintained that the government 
can be resisted by creating as broad as an anti-war movement within 
the country as possible and thereby influencing public opinion, which 
in effect puts pressure on the government. For this, there are generally 
two main strategies: a mass mobilization and a direct action strategy.  A 
mass mobilization strategy means organizing mass demonstrations or 
other forms of public action involving large numbers of people, whereas 
a direct action strategy means nonviolent action such as sit-ins and 
blockades of military bases by small groups of people. Secondly, it is 
maintained that the government can be effectively influenced by direct 
political engagement on the part of the movement, which means it that 
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participates in, supports or otherwise tries to influence political parties 
and parliamentary politics. In this same vein, cooperation with trade 
unions and other national or local groups working on related issues is 
considered necessary.
Mass mobilization is emphasized by the StWC and CND in particular, 
both of which have been very active in this regard: together they have 
organized dozens of mass demonstrations as part of the new anti-war 
movement. Nonetheless, both of these organizations also advocate the 
second strategy, direct influence on the political system. GR is also active in 
both respects, but in a different primary context. Next, the organizations’ 
views on mass demonstrations are presented in more detail. 
Mass Mobilization as a Strategy
Of all the organizations studied, the StWC promotes most strongly the 
role of mass mobilization as an effective strategy of resistance against the 
Iraq War and war in general. Its view is based on ‘the assumption that 
mobilization is a requisite of achieving its aims’ and thus ‘wars will be 
stopped […] if people are marching in large numbers, if they effectively 
harass leading politicians wherever they might appear, if they publicly 
express their anger for all to see’ (Gillan et al. 2008: 137–138). As an StWC 
interviewee argues in the context of the War on Iraq, the organization 
aims ‘to create a movement which makes it difficult for British troops to 
stay there any longer and makes it easier for Gordon Brown to take the 
easy way out’ (Interview 4). 
Indeed, the StWC has organized over twenty national demonstrations 
since 2001 and taken part in coordinating some of the ‘global action days’. 
On its website and in other public material, the role of demonstrations is 
usually articulated directly in regard to the power of the movement (see 
chapter 7). In the interviews, demonstrations are described as one of the 
most effective ways to have a political impact. They are also considered 
important because they are open to everyone (Interview 5): 
If you’re a pensioner or a school child, or if you’re disabled or if you’re 
working and don’t have much time, demonstrations are something 
which absolutely everybody can participate in. And the effect of 
demonstrations is not just on those who come to demonstration. For 
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every person who comes … they probably talk to ten or twenty or 
thirty people about the demonstration. And I think it has massive 
effect on the wider public opinion. 
As suggested in the excerpt, demonstrations are considered an effective 
form of political contestation due to their impact on public opinion. 
The StWC often emphasizes that the February 2003 demonstration is 
cited officially in the Guinness Book of World Records as ‘the largest 
ever in British political history and the largest ever global demonstration’ 
(Interview 5). Participation in any demonstration is regarded as an 
excellent way for individuals to collectively ‘begin to effect change in 
the anti-war movement’. However, it is also suggested that other forms 
of mass mobilization, such as mass civil disobedience in demonstrations, 
school strikes, walk-outs and blockading roads, can be effective as well. 
(Interview 4.) Thus, the StWC emphasizes that it does not rely solely on 
demonstrations (Interview 5):  
When the war broke out, we were very very effective in forming 
direct action. We blocked the roads in many major cities, and when 
the war broke out, we had to challenge the government in order to 
march. Last October we had to break the exclusion order which exists 
around the Parliament in order to march. The publicity stands that 
we’ve have been very successful often. So, there’s variety of different 
forms of action. 
In social movement theory it is often suggested that mobilization is ‘in 
itself educative and, as such, a form of consciousness raising’ (Gillan et 
al. 2008: 139). In this respect, the approach of the CND is very similar 
to that of the StWC. For the CND, the idea that mobilization is a form 
of consciousness-raising has been always important in the organization’s 
opposition to nuclear weapons. In the course of its long history, the CND 
has organized quite a few large demonstrations against nuclear weapons1. 
An interviewee maintains that ‘demonstrations are a very effective way 
1 To mention just a few examples, one of the major demonstrations was held in 
October 1980, gathering over 80,000 protesters in the Trafalgar Square. The CND’s 
biggest demonstration was held in October 1983, assembling 400,000 people in 
Hyde Park. The demonstration of 1985 drew around 100,000 participants, as did 
one that was organized in 1987. (Hudson 2005: 135, 150–151, 161.)
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because they make it clear that a lot of people are opposed to government 
policy’ (Interview 1). However, the impressive repertoire of methods used 
by the organization during five decades of campaigning clearly illustrates 
that mass demonstrations are only one technique among many. It has 
organized and been part of ‘vigils, lobbying, mass demonstrations, raising 
issues in elections, human chains, peace camps, non-violent direct action, 
theatre, letter writing, educations, leafleting, street stalls, poetry and art, 
festivals, die-ins (lying on the ground, symbolising death), petitioning, 
walks, music, fasts, and a host of other imaginative forms of work’ 
(Hudson 2005: 3). This list shows that the CND is quite dynamic and 
flexible. It believes that various forms of action not only complement 
each other, but also inspire more interest in different methods. Taking 
part in demonstrations can convince people to do something else as well. 
Different forms of mobilization are thus regarded as useful and necessary, 
because in the end ‘anything adds to a bigger sum’. (Interview 6.)
GR explicitly underscores that it is a ‘mobilization organization’2. 
It regards mass mobilization combined with direct action as ‘the best 
answer to corporate globalization’ (Globalise Resistance 2008a). Hence, 
it actively mobilizes people at international summits of institutions such 
as the WTO, G8, IMF and EU (ibid). Mass demonstrations are valued, 
because they make it possible to ‘show the extent of solidarity’ (Interview 
2). Although only a ‘tiny percentage’ of people are said to be active outside 
them, demonstrations indicate that the cause is important enough to 
mobilize a large number of people. When people are politicized, the anti-
war movement can seek to channel their interest to other activities as well. 
(Interview 7.) In the context of the Iraq War, GR has engaged in many 
anti-war demonstrations organized by the StWC together with the CND 
and Muslim organizations (Globalise Resistance 2008d). Suggesting that 
the movement must keep an open attitude towards new methods, both 
GR interviewees point out that demonstrations are only one technique 
among many in the struggle against war (Interview 2; Interview 7).
However, demonstrations can have multiple tasks. As social movement 
scholars point out, they can ‘turn sympathizers into participants, 
2 As an interviewee puts it: ‘We are not a political party or not a youth movement 
or not a NGO or a pressure group. We aim to mobilize people.’ He also describes the 
organization as ‘a revolution machine’. (Interview 2.)
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neutralize opponents, and turn indifferent onlookers into sympathizers’ 
(Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 70). Demonstrations also create potential for 
uniting people under one cause in that they help to make unified claims 
against common targets (ibid). It seems that for the above-mentioned 
reasons mass demonstrations are especially significant for the three leftist 
organizations studied here. The fourth organization, WRI, does not even 
organize demonstrations in Britain, but it has participated in and even 
organized some demonstrations against NATO in Belgium and Germany, 
for example3. Yet, many in the organization feel that it is not enough 
merely ‘to demonstrate at the front doors of decision-makers’ (Teršelič 
2005: 8). The role of demonstrations is regarded as challenging because 
of their limited impact. Referring to the ‘political naivety’ manifested 
in the belief that it would be enough just to let the British government 
know that people are opposed to war, the WRI representative criticizes 
the current anti-war movement, and especially the StWC, for a lack of an 
effective strategy (Interview 3):  
Well, these [demonstrations] happen once every year. They get smaller 
and smaller over the years because there’s no strategy … For people it’s 
not enough to just give a witness statement. They want to show that 
they can actually achieve something … For that you need to have a 
visible strategy which people can see that it makes sense … I don’t see 
that the Stop the War Coalition talks about strategy at all. How do 
they want to stop the war from happening? The illusion is that you 
can stop the war from happening by just going on a demonstration 
once a year.
By emphasizing that more discussion about strategies of resistance is 
necessary, the interviewee indicates that a more comprehensive analysis 
of power and the causes of war is required as well. Moreover, he suggests 
that because people want to feel that they are making a difference, a step 
towards more engaged forms of resistance should be taken. (Interview 
3.) These views echo the general philosophy of WRI, which advocates 
strong commitment on the part of the individual. It is maintained that 
when individuals make strong commitments to work for the cause in 
3 The first proposal to organize a ‘mass march to NATO Headquarters’ was made 
in 1963 (Prasad 2005: 341). In 1966 it was suggested that WRI ‘should dramatise 
opposition to NATO by organising resistance to any attempt to establish the NATO 
headquarters in another country’ (ibid: 369).
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their daily lives, then – and only then – it becomes possible to resist war 
effectively. WRI considers it necessary to engage people in very concrete 
forms of action, which in turn develop in them a stronger sense of 
commitment.  Nonviolent direct action is regarded as the most effective 
form of resistance to this end. It is discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter in conjunction with the more general strategy of nonviolence. 
Involvement in Parliamentary Politics 
The second main strategy of resistance against (the) war is to try to influence 
the government directly through political parties and the parliamentary 
system. In social movement theory it is suggested that ‘party alliances 
offer to the peace movement its most direct access to policy-making 
circles’ (Rochon 1988: 167, also 155). It is not, however, that they would 
guarantee it and there might be also problems, for example, due to the 
fact that parties may be ‘internally divided on issues as defence policy 
(ibid: 168)’ as it has often been the case with the Labour Party, famous 
for continuous balancing between its left and right wings. Moreover, as 
we have already, and will continue, to see, party alliances are only one 
among many strategies of the anti-war movement.
Within the anti-war movement involvement with political parties as 
a strategy is often described as a ‘long march through the institutions’ 
(Interview 4/StWC). In the material studied here, particularly that of the 
StWC contains many references to involvement in party politics. Some 
connections are portrayed as very significant and beneficial, but there is 
also criticism of certain political parties. 
First of all, it is very openly emphasized everywhere that the Socialist 
Workers’ Party (SWP) is an extremely important partner. It is described 
as ‘by far the biggest and most dynamic of the organisations of the far 
left’, the one which was able to lay ‘the bedrock for the unity’ which is 
regarded as the first of the ‘foundation stones’ of the StWC (Murray & 
German 2005: 54). The SWP contributed to the evolution of the StWC 
‘to the point where its members nationally and locally could play the 
largest single part in creating and sustaining the anti-war movement’, 
which is described as working very much ‘to the movement’s general 
advantage’ (ibid):
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Without it [the SWP], there would have been the greatest risk of a 
fragmented, and hence, futile anti-war movement, in which the more 
traditional and well-established peace organisations would have 
campaigned in one place, big sections of the active left in another, 
Muslims in yet another, trade unions someplace else again – and 
the majority of people eventually mobilised by the campaign most 
probably nowhere at all.   
The StWC also mentions co-operation with the Liberal Democrat Party, 
which contributed significantly’ to the ‘breadth and political impact’ 
of the anti-war movement (Murray & German 2005: 163). However, 
the Liberal Democrats are criticized for being ‘more against the idea 
of war than its reality’ because after the war started, they supported it 
(ibid: 167). Thus, the StWC regards the party’s claim to be ‘the anti-war 
party’ as ‘open to legitimate challenge’ (ibid). It also briefly describes its 
relationship with the Green Party, which at some point became ‘more 
integrated into the Stop the War Coalition’ (ibid: 177). Although it 
points out that the anti-war movement has even received some form of 
‘support from Tories and Whitehall’, the StWC acknowledges that this 
has been regarded by many as ‘unnecessary, or even undesirable, for a 
left-led mass movement’ (ibid: 167). Its aim of building a truly popular 
mass movement is clearly illustrated in the argument that all forms of 
collaboration are necessary because ‘winning a majority for anything in 
British politics requires convincing some of those millions who regularly 
vote the Conservative Party’ (ibid). According to the StWC, all political 
connections have been created without the anti-war movement ‘diluting 
its campaigning slogans or tactics’ (ibid).
The StWC’s conception of politics and power seems to be very 
traditional in the sense that political change is sought by influencing 
those in power, either by pressuring the government indirectly through 
the mobilization of public opinion or by directly collaborating with 
certain political parties within the political system. In this regard, the 
StWC reflects the Marxist, and especially the Trotskyist, traditions within 
the broader British peace movement, which have always emphasized the 
importance of extra-parliamentary mass action (e.g. Taylor 1987b: 174). 
Since it is accepted that this can involve some forms of cooperation 
even with parties that have supported the war, the approach cannot be 
regarded as particularly critical or radical. The StWC does not seem to 
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have any problems in working with the establishment as long as this 
collaboration contributes to the wider cause.4 From the perspective of 
building as broad as possible an anti-war movement, this approach must 
definitely be regarded as rational, but, as we will see later, it also leaves the 
organization open to criticism and may result in its alienating groups that 
view cooperation with elites and state authorities skeptically. 
The CND does not shy away from party politics either. Over the years, 
it has very actively tried to bring change through the Labour Party (e.g. 
Hudson 2005: 41–43), in which it also currently has many representatives 
sympathetic to its cause. There is even a section called ‘Parliamentary 
CND’, which is defined as ‘a cross-party group of MPs who regularly 
raise our campaigning priorities but need CND supporters to maintain 
pressure on their own MPs to ensure the nuclear weapons debate stays 
on top of their agenda’ (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 2008d). In 
the research literature it is pointed out that not only has the Labour Party 
been crucial for the CND’s strategy historically but the CND has been 
very important for the Labour  Party (Taylor 1987a: 101).5 In the 1960s, 
also the Communist Party was influential in the CND, and since the late 
1970s the SWP and various Trotskyist groups have impacted the work 
of the organization as well. (Taylor 1987b: 162)6. As mentioned already 
(see chapter 5), the SWP has traditionally been very critical of the Labour 
Party, a policy that might partly explain some of the StWC’s criticism of 
the CND. 
4 However, there are also critical views within the StWC in this regard. One             
interviewee, for example, says that taking part in traditional party politics cannot be        
considered a reasonable choice anymore. He believes that joining the Labour Party 
and ‘trying to change it from the inside’ is now regarded as ‘the most discredited’ 
option. In his experience, many people who have joined political parties ‘have 
ended up doing exactly what they criticized them for’, with this only reinforcing 
the observation that people are no longer interested either in voting or becoming 
themselves active in political parties. (Interview 4.)
5 In fact, some peace movement scholars point out that while the CND was 
‘partly a product’ of the struggle in the Labour Party in the late 1950s (Hinton 
1988: 154), the CND leadership saw the Labour Party ‘as the natural vehicle in 
implementing CND policy’ (Taylor 1987a: 100). In the 1970s their relationship 
grew even closer (ibid: 101). For more on their relationship, see e.g. Hinton 1989; 
Overy 1982:65–68; Rochon 1988: 156–178; Taylor 1987a: 100–130. 
6 On Trotskyism and the peace movement, see e.g. Taylor 1987b: 173–179; 
Cortright 2008: 260–269. 
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The CND history tells openly that the relationship with political 
parties is a controversial one. The extent to which the organization should 
be engaging in parliamentary politics has been a much-debated subject 
(Hudson 2005: 59, 65; also Taylor 1987a: 127). The general position 
seems to be that although the CND ‘should not formally support one 
party over another’, it should nevertheless ‘intervene politically in the 
electoral arena to press support for anti-nuclear policies’ (Hudson 2005: 
59–60). In practice this means, for example, organizing ‘peace hustings’ 
before elections, at which candidates are asked about their views on 
nuclear policy, war and peace (ibid: 60). Both CND representatives 
articulate the issue in a very a positive way in their interviews. They stress 
that engagement in party politics is an important strategy because it gives 
direct access to political power (Interview 1):
I think you should also be … in a political party like myself … in 
a political party which can take power. I’m not in favour of small 
parties even if … I might agree with some of them what they stand 
for, but in a sense, you should do both.
It must be noted that both CND interviewees are themselves active in party 
politics, one being a Member of Parliament (MP) for the Labour Party 
and the other a member of the party’s national executive. Hence, their 
views may not represent those of the entire organization. Nonetheless, 
the interviewees do not so much emphasize their own political activity as 
invest their hopes in the ‘new generation’. In their view, the new anti-war 
movement has demonstrated that there are more politically interested 
and motivated young people in Britain than ever before, especially in 
regard to international affairs. However, it is recognized that, at the same 
time, the national political context makes it difficult to get young people 
engaged with traditional political parties. (Interview 1; Interview 6.). The 
legacy of former Prime Minister Tony Blair is often brought up in this 
connection. He is blamed for trying to ‘tame’ the Labour Party, turning 
it into ‘a tame establishment institution’ (Interview 1):
There is more interest among young people in politics and in foreign 
policy today than there’s ever been … but they shy away from 
traditional political parties because they feel that the choice they have 
been given is a choice between two conservative parties. 
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While engaging with the political system is clearly important for the 
two left-oriented organizations mentioned above, the third one, GR, 
does not emphasize this as much. It has, however, a strong connection to 
party politics, with six out of sixteen members of its steering committee 
being members of the SWP. This is not often mentioned in its public 
material, except when introducing the Steering Committee on the website 
(Globalise Resistance 2008b). In the interviews, both GR representatives 
refer to their ‘socialist comrades’, probably meaning members of the 
SWP. They stress that pressuring political parties and MPs is a useful 
strategy for the anti-war movement and note that people from the Green 
Party, Labour Party and other parties ‘left of the Labour Party’ have been 
involved in the work of GR. (Interview 2; Interview 7). While especially 
enthusiastic about the role of new political parties in this regard, one GR 
interviewee is disappointed that an emerging new left party, the Respect 
Party, had a split. In her view, splits are ‘something that only seems to be 
happening on the left’. (Interview 7; also Murray & German 2005: 48.) 
As a pacifist organization, WRI is the most skeptical of party politics in 
particular and the political system more generally. Its website and public 
material contain no references to any political parties or traditional forms 
of political engagement. The skepticism of WRI towards political parties 
is clearly articulated by its interviewee, who argues that connecting with 
political parties is not beneficial for the anti-war movement. In the British 
context, he is especially critical of the SWP’s connection to the anti-war 
movement through the StWC. He expresses this stance explicitly, for 
example, in a reference to Germany as a country where the movement is 
not ‘dominated by the Trostkyians or the Socialist Party’. (Interview 3.)
Cooperation with Trade Unions 
Throughout history, trade unions have been significant partners for the 
anti-war movement in campaigns against war. In Britain, trade union 
involvement in the movement has traditionally been very strong. The 
unions have been considered to be among the most valuable allies of all, 
‘for they link the peace movement to organizations that are accustomed 
to influencing public policy’ and which in turn link them to social 
democratic parties, such as the Labour Party (Rochon 1988: 140). The 
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significance of the trade unions is clearly manifested in the materials of 
the organizations studied here, with one exception. WRI is not directly 
connected to any trade unions. In fact, the WRI interviewee is not too 
enthusiastic about their influence in the anti-war movement, because 
they are closely connected with socialist groups, which he generally views 
in quite critical terms (Interview 3). 
On the contrary, the CND history mentions trade unions as highly 
important partners (e.g. Hudson 2005: 63, 97, 242). A close relationship 
with unions has characterized the organization since its foundation due 
to its intimate relationship with the Labour Party (Taylor 1987a: 108–
110; Rochon 1988: 141). In the context of the current movement, too, 
it is stressed that there is ‘big trade union involvement’ (Interview 6; 
Hudson 2005: 242). GR also emphasizes the importance of collaboration 
with trade unions, for example on its website, where they are publicly 
mentioned as partners of the organization (Globalise Resistance 2008a). 
Both interviewees stress that trade unions are necessary in any coalitions 
against war (Interview 2; Interview 7). 
Of the four organizations, the StWC most often refers to trade unions, 
also in critical terms. It argues that it was crucial to get trade unions 
involved in the new anti-war movement for four reasons. Firstly, they 
‘have been at the centre of almost every progressive political campaign in 
Britain for the past century’ and secondly they ‘could provide a degree of 
logistical support not easily found elsewhere’ (Murray & German 2005: 
168). Thirdly, trade unions are considered important for their ability to 
pressure the government ‘through their influence within the Labour Party’ 
and fourthly for ‘their potential for mobilising mass action, including 
possibly industrial action’ (ibid). 
Regardless of these characterizations, in referring to a ‘shift in the 
balance of importance between trade unions and other social movements 
in terms of political struggle’ (ibid: 172), the StWC implies that trade 
unions are not as important for the movement as they used to be. Most 
of the largest unions were not yet affiliated with the StWC at the time 
of the February 2003 demonstration, meaning that the anti-war protest 
‘was built and sustained independently of most of the unions’ (ibid). In 
fact, convincing the trade unions ‘to take an active part in the anti-war 
movement’ is described as ‘a hard battle’ (ibid: 168, emphasis added):  
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[O]vercoming inertia in the larger unions proved difficult, 
notwithstanding that many had longstanding policies on peace and 
international questions. This was rooted in several factors, but above 
all a desire to avoid giving offence to a Labour government.  
Traditionally, most trade unions in Britain (as well as in Germany and the 
Netherlands, for example) have supported the main aims of the anti-war 
movement (Rochon 1988: 142). However, there are also many factors 
that may discourage or limit trade union support (ibid: 142–145), as was 
the case in Britain, where trade unions were first very cautious in their 
approach because of the Labour government.   
6.2.2  Resisting the US Government
The public material of the four organizations contains remarkably 
little discussion about how the anti-war movement could resist the US 
government, despite the fact that the US is often described as one of the 
main targets of resistance (see chapter 5). In the interviews, however, 
where all representatives are explicitly asked about resistance against the 
US government, three different strategies are brought up. Firstly, it is 
suggested that the US government can be effectively resisted by putting 
pressure on the countries and governments that support the US in its 
military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. A second influential strategy 
cited is encouraging and supporting the American anti-war movement in 
its struggle against the US foreign policy. Thirdly, it is maintained that 
the US can be effectively resisted by creating as broad and international 
an anti-war movement as possible, thereby influencing world public 
opinion, which in turn can put pressure on the US government. 
In the case of the first the strategy, it is common to stress that pressuring 
the British government to withdraw its troops from Iraq can help to 
encourage other states to follow its example. An StWC representative, for 
example, argues it is an efficient strategy, because it can result in ‘leaving 
Bush isolated’ and bring the war to a close much more quickly (Interview 
4). The view is shared by all organizations, but especially emphasized by 
the WRI interviewee, as he believes it is impossible for the British anti-
war movement to confront the US government directly (Interview 3).
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Encouraging the anti-war movement inside the US is regarded as 
an ‘extremely important’ strategy (Interview 1/CND). It is suggested 
that anti-war activists in other countries should ‘make a lot of contact’ 
with activists in the US and give them support (Interview 7/GR). Some 
believe that supporting the American movement is the only effective way 
to struggle against the war and hegemony of the US (Interview 3/WRI): 
We really need to look into … supporting much more the US peace 
movement because they’re doing a very very difficult job … without 
challenging the US hegemony in the US per se, it will not change.
Indeed, many interviewees argue that the anti-war movement in the US 
has become broader than ever in the context of the Iraq War7. According 
to British activists, opposition to the war in the US ‘has kind of moved 
mainstream’ as ‘more people are waking up’. (Interview 1/CND; Interview 
6/CND.) Some also regard the new American movement as quite 
powerful and believe that opposition to the war is only going to grow 
due to the unpopularity of President Bush (Interview 7/GR). In regard 
to the third strategy against the US government, all interviewees stress 
that trying to create a broad international anti-war movement makes it 
possible to influence public opinion both nationally and internationally. 
Moreover, many suggest that international coordination of the anti-war 
movement and working together with some other social movements 
(and sometimes also with actual resistance movements) is a key factor 
in building up effective resistance. This view is discussed in more detail 
below as a strategy which can be applied against both the UK and US 
governments.  
6.3 Coalitions, Solidarity, Support to Other Movements
The foregoing analysis has discussed what strategies the organizations 
consider effective against more concrete targets of resistance, which in this 
context mean the US, the UK and their governments. However, as noted 
7 Activists in the US emphasize this as well (e.g. Benjamin & Evans 2005; Hayden 
2007; Robbins 2008). 
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earlier (see chapter 5), all organizations articulate resistance to broader 
struggles than the campaigns against the Iraq War. Whereas the StWC 
struggles against imperialism, the CND against nuclear weapons, and GR 
against neo-liberal capitalism, WRI fights militarism and war in general. 
These broader agendas require different strategies than those aimed at 
concrete, state-level opponents. In this regard, the organizations argue 
that one of the most important strategies is support for and collaboration 
with other like-minded groups and movements. 
Firstly, the organizations consider it essential to express support for 
anti-war organizations and movements in other countries. Secondly, they 
maintain that it is necessary to support and enhance co-operation with 
other social movements struggling against related issues. A third contention 
is that supporting resistance movements in conflict areas enables more 
effective resistance against war. While each of the organizations studied 
brings forward all of these aspects, each clearly has different emphases. 
In fact, these differences are quite revealing in ascertaining how the 
organization regards the primary context of resistance. 
6.3. Supporting Anti-War Organizations and Movements 
A general strategy of resistance on which all studied organizations agree 
is providing support for anti-war organizations and movements in other 
countries. International cooperation, coalitions and networks between 
anti-war organizations and movements around the world are considered 
extremely significant. Nevertheless, the four organizations studied here 
differ in what they regard as the most important elements of international 
collaboration and how they conceive their own role in it.  
In the StWC material any support for other anti-war organizations 
and movements is mainly articulated by reference to solidarity, although 
the organization has also been active in concrete terms through its role in 
coordinating worldwide demonstrations8. The organization’s emphasis on 
8 There have been attempts ‘to extend the impact of international coordination 
beyond the setting of dates for demonstrations’ in that the StWC has, for example, 
participated in international meetings (Gillan et al. 2008: 114). There common 
declarations have been made offering ‘a brief analysis of the global situation’ and 
suggestions for ‘paths that movements might follow to make social change’ (ibid). 
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comparatively abstract forms of support is explained by an interviewee, 
who argues that the StWC strategy must be nationally oriented since its 
main aim is to pressure the British government to withdraw its troops 
from Iraq (Interview 4). Importantly, he points out that strategies in the 
British context are necessarily different from those in countries where 
popular opposition to the war has become a political force powerful 
enough to take down governments supportive of the war (ibid): 
In other countries, the option is open to elect a new government … In 
France and Italy ... they’ve had their movements but of course, theirs 
is a right-wing government. The left-wing government promised to 
withdraw troops from Iraq … and so that government got elected. 
Ours is a left-wing government and therefore we don’t have the option 
of just electing a new government. 
In other words, Britain’s involvement in the war under the Labour 
government has greatly influenced the anti-war movement’s pressure 
strategies. For example, an StWC interviewee emphasizes that in countries 
such as France, Italy, Spain, Australia and the US it has been possible to 
take ‘a different approach’ to ending the war. He points out that while 
the anti-war movement in the US can support the Democrats, in Italy 
and Spain people already achieved ‘a re-connection’ when they voted for 
a government that would withdraw the troops. (Interview 4.)
Since its own organizational strategy is nationally oriented, the StWC 
suggests that the entire anti-war movement should have a primarily 
national focus. Emphasizing that it is difficult ‘to give a lead to people in 
other countries whose politics are very different to our own’, an StWC 
representative implies that a more international focus would entail some 
difficulties. Explicitly, he argues that ‘it becomes complicated when you 
talk globally’. Because political forces and domestic politics vary in each 
country, anti-war movements are very different and they need to ‘have 
autonomy in how they operate’. (Interview 4.) Nevertheless, the StWC is 
sometimes portrayed as a global role model of sorts by emphasizing the 
‘global role [it had] to play’ in the February 2003 demonstration (ibid):   
We have globalized our movement … we coordinated in the sense what 
happened in Czechoslovakia and what happened in Paris, happened 
at similar time but was separate this time … the February 2003 was 
coordinated very closely and deliberately. It was not something that 
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happened accidentally … We have coordinated internationally in a 
way that we haven’t done in a long time. 
The other StWC interviewee shares this interpretation. Referring both 
to the February 2003 and March 2008 demonstrations as international 
days of action, he suggests that this kind of a ‘global reach’ is new for 
the anti-war movement. Unlike some others, he does not equate the 
current situation with the Vietnam War where the US lost due to ‘the 
opposition in the occupied country and the opposition of the people of 
the occupying country’, that is, the most crucial dynamic in resistance. 
(Interview 5.) In the context of the War on Terror, however, there are 
more problems, which he regards as international in nature (ibid):  
I think that every country is affected by the War on Terror. I think 
civil liberties are being eroded on the international scale. I think the 
Islamophobia and racism are being stoked on the international scale. 
So … everybody has an interest to be part of it. 
The importance of international links is also emphasized by arguing that 
now ‘we are all confronting the same issue’. One of the StWC interviewees 
stresses that the organization already has ‘exceptionally good international 
links’ and strengthening them can help ‘to learn the experience of other 
movements’. He first says that the potential for international link-up at 
the moment is ‘stronger than ever’. Interestingly, when discussing the 
issue in more pragmatic terms, international cooperation seems to be 
considered more of a challenge than an opportunity: ‘Where you do have 
transnational agreements, you keep them as limited as possible’ because 
‘the movement being international throws up different challenges for 
each movement’. (Interview 4.) Although international cooperation is 
regarded as especially important for showing solidarity and support, it is 
recognized that in practical terms cooperation is not always that easy. 
The CND’s approach, once again, resembles that of the StWC. 
Although closely linked to the political decision-making system at the 
national level, the CND also believes that international coordination with 
like-minded groups and movements in other countries is crucial for the 
anti-war movement. In its public material there are many references to the 
WSF and the ESF, in which the organization has been involved since 2002 
(Hudson 2005: 240). Stressing that the organization is ‘very conscious 
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of having to make’ transnational ties and cooperate internationally, an 
interviewee argues that ‘you should have as much cooperation as you 
can’. Sometimes a more international anti-war movement is represented 
as a necessity or as a reaction to ‘a new challenge of a global disaster’. It 
is argued, for example, that there is a ‘global struggle’ going on due to 
‘the American desire for supremacy’. Moreover, it is suggested that this is 
recognized as a ‘global problem’ by not only the CND, but also people all 
over the world. (Interview 1.) The February 2003 demonstration is again 
brought up as an example of a ‘global way’ to resist the war. It is claimed to 
represent a ‘rise of global consciousness’, which means that people ‘regain 
a new consciousness in the West of an interdependent world’. This, in 
turn, is believed to result in people working more closely together for 
common goals worldwide. (Interview 6.) Thus, the argumentation of the 
CND resonates substantially in this regard with the framings of academic 
globalists (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: 215–216, 284–285; Kaldor 2003a: 
112; Castells 2008; also Beck 2000: 49–50, 90–91).  
For GR, too, resistance against war and other injustices of the world 
requires international coordination with, as well as support from and 
to, like-minded groups. Having a very close relationship to the alter-
globalization movement, GR usually cooperates with a wide variety of 
groups and organizations in the context of the ESF. These include anti-
capitalist and environmentalist groups as well as trade unions that share 
the anti-war stance of the organization. (Globalise Resistance 2008a.) In 
cooperating, for instance, with local groups of the World Development 
Movement, the Friends of the Earth and Amnesty (Interview 2), GR seeks 
‘to increase collaboration between different strands of the movement’ 
(Globalise Resistance 2008a).
In the WRI material, the organization is characterized as belonging to 
the broader peace movement, with explicit discussion about ‘international 
solidarity’ (e.g. Speck 2005: 24, 29). Thus, the primary level for resistance 
is clearly international. The principal purpose of the organization is to 
‘promote nonviolent action against the causes of war, and to support and 
connect people around the world who refuse to take part in war or the 
preparation of war’ (War Resisters’ International 2009a, emphasis added, 
also Prasad 2005: 450). In working closely with its members and affiliates 
in different countries, WRI cooperates mainly with other pacifist groups 
in Britain and elsewhere. It stresses that the British groups with which 
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it is affiliated are not in any way involved in the StWC. (Interview 3.) 
Cooperation with non-pacifist groups is considered useful but WRI 
‘must retain its specific pacifist character’ and enhance ‘the philosophy 
and technique of nonviolence in all fields’ (Prasad 2005: 338).  
The WRI history tells the organization was not originally projected 
‘as a European or Western organisation’, but its outlook was ‘global and 
secular’ right from the start (Prasad 2005: 94). Nonetheless, it has not 
always been easy to implement a global and non-western outlook in 
practical terms. For example, a proposal to move the WRI headquarters 
to India caused some heated debate in the 1960s, as ‘people who had the 
maximum say in such matters were not sympathetic to the idea of moving 
the WRI headquarters to a third world country’ (ibid: 335, emphasis in 
original). It was felt that India’s political and social climate were not 
suitable for WRI, ‘for which freedom of action and keeping worldwide 
contacts were essential part of its program’ (ibid). This argument must 
be viewed in light of the fact that even today, in the so-called ‘global 
information age’, the WRI headquarters remain in London. 
In general terms, however, WRI can be regarded as truly international 
when it comes to networking and cooperation. It has an impressive 
network of sections and associations all over the world9 and it organizes 
international conferences every year or sends representatives to take part 
in international conferences organized by other groups10. It collaborates 
also to some extent with some more formal partners and institutions. 
One of these is the UN, which is said to help to ‘achieve small changes’, 
for example, in human rights issues. The problem from the perspective 
of WRI is that the UN system ‘is not opposed to war in principle’, 
which makes it impossible to ‘abolish war using the UN’. (Interview 
3.) The UN has been viewed critically by the organization throughout 
its history. It is criticized for relying on arms in the enforcement of its 
authority, not respecting pacifism, and lacking the power, mandate and 
‘even imagination to try non-military methods to eradicate militarism 
altogether’ (Prasad 2005: 294, 304). This illustrates, again, the degree 
of skepticism that WRI has towards states and formal institutions even 
9  WRI consists of 90 groups in as many as 43 countries.
10 The WRI representative says that it is often quite difficult to get people from 
poor countries to participate in international conferences due to limited financial 
support; nor is collaboration equally easy or intense in every country. (Interview 3.)
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though they might be working for similar, or at least related, aims. 
Sometimes participation in anti-war conferences and other 
international meetings is also problematic for WRI. The organization’s 
representative argues that this is ‘quite difficult’, for example, in the context 
of the WSF, since the views of many dominant groups do not always 
resonate with the pacifist direct-action approach of his own organization. 
In other words, discussing and defining the objectives of the anti-war 
movement among many different groups is anything but easy. Although 
skeptical of cooperation between pacifist and non-pacifist groups to a 
certain extent, the WRI interviewee feels that some responsibilities can 
nevertheless be shared. In his view, traditional peace organizations and 
new anti-war groups cannot even be kept apart, because ‘in a movement 
everyone is involved’. However, he points out that movements are diffuse 
and also very complicated. (Interview 3.)
Interestingly, although portraying the pacifist movement as an 
international movement, the WRI representative does not always 
give the same credit to the anti-war movement. For him, the anti-war 
movement is not an international or global movement as such, but rather 
a multiplicity of several movements working in different countries. One 
important source of criticism regarding the current anti-war movement 
is that ‘a lot of what is called international is basically Western-European’ 
(Interview 3; also Speck 2005: 28–29). The interviewee nevertheless 
regards international coordination as rational and desirable for the anti-
war movement (Interview 3): 
These common days of action ... one day it was demonstrations 
almost everywhere. Of course that helps to see ... it gives a global 
identity and strengthens the impact. To have demonstrations in 
different days, it doesn’t become as visible. So, some coordination on 
a global level makes sense, but if you don’t do your homework and 
develop membership that makes sense in your own country … it 
doesn’t help you very much. 
Thus, although the interviewee speaks of the ‘global level’ and even 
‘global identity’, he argues that there cannot be a unified strategy that 
would make sense everywhere, not least because political coalitions vary 
in each country. Moreover, he stresses that the potential of the anti-war 
movement is always connected to the domestic political context in a 
very concrete way. For example, if their country is not involved in the 
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war effort, it is difficult to activate people to take part in the anti-war 
movement. However, if the war can be linked to some local issues, it is 
possible to avoid remaining at too abstract a level. (Interview 3.)  In other 
words, any local concern can become a question of strategy as well.
6.3.2 Supporting Other Movements 
All the organizations studied maintain that it is important to support and 
cooperate with other social movements struggling against injustices related 
to the problem of war. This perspective is emphasized most strongly by 
GR and the CND, but also to some extent by the other two organizations. 
In this regard, many different movements are mentioned, thus linking 
the anti-war movement to several other broad contexts. For instance, 
the organizations bring up the alter-globalization, environmental and 
pacifists movements, as well as the movement against nuclear weapons.
The StWC material contains many references to the alter-globalization 
movement. It is highlighted that resistance against war should include 
anti-imperialist elements (e.g. Rees 2006: 228–240). Often it is suggested 
that the aims of the anti-war movement can be advanced by supporting 
the organization of the working class (ibid: 200–220). It is thus indicated 
that the anti-war movement reflects the interests of the working 
people and vice versa. Hence, supporting any movement with socialist 
principles and goals can be regarded as an effective, if not a necessary, 
strategy of resistance against war. For the StWC, support for the alter-
globalization movement seems to represent such, at least to some extent. 
Here, resonance with the radical poststructuralist approach is obvious, 
although the Multitude as a concept is much broader than the proletariat 
(Hardt & Negri 2004: xiv, 100–115, 129). For radical poststructuralists, 
the anti-war and the alter-globalization movement are part of the same 
‘new global cycle’, reinforcing each other (ibid: 215–216, 284). 
The CND also refers to the alter-globalization movement quite 
often, but cites the environmental and anti-nuclear movements as well. 
These three are regarded as closely connected to the goals of the anti-war 
movement and it is thus implied that anti-war politics can be enhanced 
by supporting any of them. It is pointed out that the CND shares ‘a 
lot of common ground with the environmentalist movement that began 
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to emerge in the 1970s’ (Hudson 2005: 109). It has campaigned with 
Greenpeace, for example, which was in fact originally founded in 1971 
by twenty scientist-activists who opposed nuclear testing (Miles 2008: 
154). Although Greenpeace shares the CND’s aim to struggle against 
nuclear weapons, the latter does not necessarily share all the goals of the 
environmental movement. Stressing that its individual members ‘do not 
have uniform views’ on the question of nuclear power, the CND welcomes 
individuals and organizations with different views ‘to participate and 
argue their position’ (Hudson 2005: 110–111). 
In regard to the alter-globalization movement, it is the roles of the 
WSF and ESF that are emphasized in particular (Hudson 2005: 240). The 
CND speaks highly of the ESF’s work in London in 2004 as it managed 
to link ‘the issues of neo-liberalism, third-world debt, racism and war in 
a way that had wide resonance against the backdrop of the US war drive 
against Iraq’ (ibid: 187). These issues are said to represent a ‘convergence 
of the peace movement’, with NGOs and trade unions addressing issues 
such as ‘the environment and third world poverty’ (ibid). Thus, it is 
suggested that there is an obvious link ‘between war and poverty, war and 
human rights abuse’ (ibid: 240). Diverse social movements are seen as 
‘developing a common understanding of the relations between the unjust 
workings of the international economic institutions led by the US and 
the increasing use of military force by the US to impose its interests’ (ibid: 
187). The way in which the CND represents the interconnectedness of 
different problems is extremely interesting (ibid: 245, emphasis added):  
 
[T]he second demonstration included campaigners against 
globalisation, against oppression in the occupied territories, against 
debt, against the arms trade, and much more.  It was as if a sudden 
realisation had occurred, of how all these events and problems in the 
world are actually linked together and are part of a huge process. 
Here, it is maintained that the causes of war and other global problems 
are increasingly intertwined, which clearly echoes the poststructuralist 
approach. Even the main problem is the same: neither the theory nor 
the CND discusses in concrete terms how these problems are linked and 
whether there really can be a common understanding by all. The CND 
merely argues that it works with other organizations and movements ‘to 
raise our demands in every arena’ (Hudson 2005: 240, emphasis added). 
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In the case of GR, the interconnectedness of different problems 
provides the basis for the organization’s analysis. The argument that 
anti-war politics can be effectively advanced by global social movements 
supporting and cooperating with each other is articulated very explicitly. 
An interviewee explains the broad character of the anti-war movement 
through its connection to other ‘anti’-movements. The aim is ‘to link 
struggles to the trade union issues, social justice issues, anti-privatization 
issues, education and health and everywhere else, anti-war policies’. 
Together these issues are said to constitute ‘one struggle, one entity’. It 
is pointed out that many activists already work for several causes – they 
may be engaged simultaneously in many movements, such as the anti-war 
and the alter-globalization movements, which the interviewee considers 
closely interrelated. (Interview 2.) Moreover, it is claimed that the goals 
of these two movements include environmental causes as well, since ‘a lot 
of the activists, are actually in all those circles’, the environmental, the 
alter-globalization and the anti-war movement (ibid): 
In a way, everyone is trying to do as much as they can and in the field 
that they are operating. Some people decide to be fulltime activists 
and pulling certain aspects of the struggle at hand … Some people 
have started in Globalise Resistance and then … on to the Stop the 
War Coalition because they felt that this is a more urgent thing to 
do. Other people move on to the climate change campaign from 
Globalise Resistance because they felt that this is the field that they 
would like to contribute to.
When asked if people really understand the connection between all these 
three causes, the interviewee says that he is convinced they do. In his 
experience, people may find it more difficult to understand war and 
terrorism, ‘but everyone understands climate change’. The interrelation 
between different causes is explained by ‘the contradictions of capitalism’ 
whereby some parts of the world ‘need to be living in poverty and 
other parts need to live in high consumption’. (Interview 2.) In this 
interpretation, ‘pseudo-peace’ and the status quo are maintained despite 
structural violence and large scale injustices taking place in the world. 
Hence, there is no clear separation between the national and international 
contexts of resistance. Here, the question of poverty is also framed in a 
manner very similar to that seen in the radical poststructuralist approach 
(e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: 129–131). 
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The other GR interviewee refers to a broad range of activities that have 
taken place ‘within a sort of generalized ideology of anti-privatization 
or socialist view of the world’. These views can be ‘deconstructed into 
many sorts of activities’ which can ‘energize people’. She herself joined 
GR because it is a network that brings together activists from around the 
world and emphasizes the interconnectedness of issues as well as people. 
While convinced that role of privatization in the world is crucial, the 
interviewee suggests that analyzing a local matter that has to do with 
privatization11 makes it possible to ‘get an insight into the big picture’. 
It can also help to understand the relationship between employers and 
workers across the world. (Interview 7.) Indeed, the interviewee repeatedly 
refers to local circumstances throughout the interview, thus making 
frequent connections between the local, national and the international 
levels. This kind of an analysis of global capitalism regards everything as 
interconnected, suggesting a dissolution of the local-global level much 
like that asserted by the radical poststructuralist approach.  
Since the most challenging task is to make people realize that 
privatization is ‘not just something that is very local’, but a process taking 
place all over the world, it is suggested that one of the main responsibilities 
of activists is to inform people of the interrelation between different 
problems accelerated by globalization. Therefore, various organizations 
and movements should interact and help each other through solidarity. It 
is considered a significant strategy of resistance to support workers, trade 
unions and activists in other countries, as these actors can learn from 
each other. (Interview 7.) 
A similar idea of global solidarity is articulated by the other GR 
interviewee when telling about his trip to India, where he met activists 
working on land ownership issues. Although they were fighting for a 
specific cause, he felt there were no barriers in terms of understanding 
what they were fighting for more generally. (Interview 2.) This view brings 
to mind the radical poststructuralist notion of separate but connected 
struggles, which, it is hoped, will result in an accumulation of grievances 
(e.g. Hardt & Negri 2004: 99–102, 268–285). 
11 For example, the same multinational corporation can be responsible for 
privatization of water in South America and a doctor’s surgery in North London 
(Interview 7).
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Furthermore, GR stresses that networking and international 
cooperation is crucial not only for the organization itself but also for 
the movement as a whole. The WSF in particular is regarded as a good 
opportunity to meet like-minded people around the world who ‘speak 
the same language’ and ‘feel at home’, and it is seen as a platform for 
addressing local issues in the context of the ‘big picture’. (Interview 2; 
Interview 7.) Again, these understandings come close to those of the 
poststructuralist approach. It can be concluded that GR resonates with 
the radical poststructuralist approach substantially more than the StWC 
and CND do. Given that it often is ‘in the context of economic struggles’ 
where the ‘capacity to see a clear connection between local problems 
and wider structural dynamics has been developed most powerfully’ 
(Walker 1988: 65), this is not a very surprising discovery as such since 
GR is intimately linked to the anti-capitalist movement. Indeed, it is 
perhaps more surprising that despite their traditional Marxist analysis, 
the StWC and CND have nevertheless adopted post-Marxist views (or 
at least rhetoric) to some extent, although they often otherwise criticize 
poststructuralist and post-Marxist conceptualizations. 
Generally speaking, the views of WRI on the issue of cooperation 
with other social movements are in line with those of the three other 
organizations. As an organization, it is based on the notion that the 
movement must not only be anti-militarist and anti-armament, but ‘a 
movement for nonviolent social change’ as well (Prasad 2005: 405). In 
other words, resisting war and militarism requires fighting also other 
forms of injustice (e.g. Speck 2005: 23, 29). WRI thus needs to ‘keep 
in close contact with and support movements such as the anti-nuclear 
weapons and human rights campaigns’ (Prasad 2005: 337). Usually it 
is underlined, however, that while supporting other causes, WRI should 
never compromise its pacifist principles. On the one hand, it is admitted 
that if pacifists want to gain political power, they need to form alliances 
with non-pacifists, which can indicate acceptance of ‘the methods of 
authority’ (ibid: 302). On the other hand, there are many activities in 
which WRI can participate ‘without compromise of principle, and where 
effective work could be done to advance the policy of the general peace 
movement’ (ibid: 135). Cooperation with non-pacifists can even be 
regarded as rational, because it may do ‘more for the pacifist cause than 
conscious efforts to spread pacifism within such groups’ (ibid: 251). As 
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peace movement scholars note, this kind of an internal debate is typical 
of pacifist-anarchist groups, who feel that they must ‘develop a strategy 
either of co-operation with all sorts of other groups in order to win them 
over gradually to the non-violent revolutionary position or of maintaining 
a subculture which stays true to its own beliefs and gradually wins over 
converts’ (Overy 1982: 15, emphasis in original).  
6.3.3 Supporting Resistance Movements in Conflict Areas
One form of support regarded as especially important by the three 
left-oriented organizations is that given to resistance and liberation 
movements in conflict areas. Although this is most often brought up in 
the context of the Palestinian conflict, it is also discussed in the context 
of the Iraq War. Indeed, the issue has caused some controversy within 
the movement. Some pacifist organizations have publicly criticized the 
new anti-war movement for not condemning violent forms of resistance 
taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan, pointing especially to the StWC 
in this regard. The StWC has announced that it stands ‘for justice for 
the Palestinians, and would support anything the Palestinians themselves 
recognise as such’ (Murray & German 2005: 87, emphasis added). This 
view is clearly shared by GR, and at least to some extent by the CND. 
A GR representative explicitly argues that ‘people should be able to 
defend themselves organized’ even with violent methods as long as it is 
for the cause of social justice, national liberation or self-determination. 
He brings up the Hitler’s Nazi government several times as an example: 
‘What should the Jews have done in terms of resisting the Nazis – taken 
nonviolent direct action?’ (Interview 2.) Here, he directly refers to the 
Israel-Palestinian conflict (ibid): 
Israel is such a powerful state that presents itself as a very weak one 
because in the psyche of the citizens they are the weak and they need 
to defend themselves but the army is the strongest in the area. Against 
this strongest army, the Palestinians don’t have much weapons … not 
in the same scale that the Israeli army is equipped, they cannot do 
targeted assassinations with helicopters ... so, they’re using riffle, 
they’re using hand-made bomb ... It’s quite a complex question again. 
What are the tools that were left for the occupied against occupier 
when all other means are not working?
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In other words, it is stressed that although ‘less bloodshed and less people 
suffering is better’, these issues are ‘very complicated’ as well as being 
‘really context-related’. When asked about the nonviolent resistance 
manifested in Mahatma Gandhi’s teachings, the interviewee argues that 
the conditions in India were very different than they are currently in 
Palestine. In India there were hundreds of millions of people against 
‘quite weak’ British forces, but in the case of Palestine and Israel, forces are 
more equal in terms of numbers. Pointing out in his comments that the 
Palestinians did try a nonviolent intifada, but without success, he stresses 
that violent methods of resistance are justified against an oppressive 
power which is ‘threatening to kill you’. (Interview 2.)
All of the above arguments are countered by the WRI interviewee. 
He is convinced that supporting violent resistance movements will not 
help to end wars. Specifically, he points out that he cannot support the 
political leaders of Hezbollah, which he accuses the StWC of: ‘You can 
hear a lot of support for Hezbollah or Iraqi resistance which is not a 
positive for nonviolent resistance’. (Interview 3.) This view represents a 
long-term stance of WRI. It was argued in 1968 that ‘nonviolent methods 
of struggle are best suited and most likely to gain the goal of producing 
a political arrangement which would permit Jews and Arabs to live in 
harmony’ (Prasad 2005: 403). 
In other words, WRI is very skeptical of supporting ‘one but not 
the other’ (Interview 3). Due to its advocacy of nonviolent means of 
resistance, it cannot support resistance movements that advocate violent 
means. However, this does not mean that WRI would be ‘hostile’ towards 
revolutionary movements (Prasad 2005: 498; also 382, 385, 401). It can 
support objectives of liberation and resistance movements even if it does 
not accept the violence they use. The following section analyzes WRI’s 
strategy of nonviolence in more detail.  
6.4 Nonviolence as a Strategy against War and Militarism 
WRI believes that there must be a more profound and comprehensive 
approach in resistance against war generally than targeting only policies 
of nation states and their governments. For the organization, resisting war 
necessarily requires resistance to militarism as an institution of the nation 
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state. In this regard, it advocates a strategy of nonviolence. What is more, 
WRI regards nonviolence as a way of life (War Resisters’ International 
2009a, emphasis added):  
For all of us, it is a form of action that affirms life, speaks out against 
oppression, and acknowledges the value of each person. Nonviolence 
can combine active resistance, including civil disobedience, with 
dialogue; it can combine non-cooperation – withdrawal of support 
from a system of oppression – with constructive work to build 
alternatives.  
WRI demands that ‘those committed to non-violence must never give 
any moral support to the conventional methods of defence, or any action 
in which they would think it wrong to participate as individuals’ (Prasad 
2005: 323). The organization aims at affirming ‘the power of active 
nonviolence as an alternative to the military war machine in settling 
conflicts between nation states’ (Willoughby in Prasad 2005: 19). This 
ambition requires educating people about ideologies which advance wars 
as well as increasing awareness of the causes and effects of war. Educational 
work necessitates long-term commitment: it cannot be connected to any 
single conflict, but must be built on a holistic approach. 
In viewing strategies of resistance in terms of enhancing general anti-
war and anti-militaristic sentiment internationally, WRI bears some 
resemblance to adherents of the liberal cosmopolitan approach, who also 
believe that it may eventually be possible to abolish war if global civil 
society helps lead the reformation of the international system (e.g. Kaldor 
2003a). Indeed, liberal pacifism is one of the oldest traditions within the 
peace movement (e.g. Ceadel 1987; Cortright 2008: 233–259). However, 
while liberal pacifism is characterized by its reformism and legalism, the 
approach of WRI is clearly more anarchistic in nature. Moreover, the 
organization is very critical of western powers in general. It is stressed, for 
example, that not only western militarism, but also ‘the Western way of 
life’ must be questioned (Speck 2005: 29). 
Yet, there are also structural understandings in the WRI approach, as it 
works for a world ‘not only without militarism, but also injustice’ (Prasad 
2005: 334; also Speck 2005: 29). It is maintained that refusing military 
service is not enough; social change is also required (Sheehan in Prasad 
2005: 18). Already in 1968 it was stressed that ‘[t]he key to revolution 
220
is the change in relationships, which must in turn entail change in the 
structures, in the social structures, economic structures and so on, but the 
key is what we are as human beings and how we relate to other human 
beings’ (Prasad 2005: 405). For the WRI as an organization, this means 
two essential tasks. At the grass-roots level, people need to be informed 
and educated ‘to create themselves a pattern of life opposed to militarism 
in every respect’, which can in effect help to ‘create the climate for letting 
peace grow from below’ (ibid: 61, 449). In the theoretical literature this is 
usually regarded has as a ‘pedagogic type’ of an approach, one commonly 
employed by nonviolent groups and supporters of conscientious objection 
(Bobbio 2007: 59, emphasis in original). 
As ‘word alone can never be effective in bringing nonviolence and 
pacifism to fruition’ (Prasad 2005: 61), concrete action is also needed, 
a view emphasized also in theoretical literature on nonviolence (e.g. 
Cortright 2008: 339). Generally, these concrete forms of action are quite 
similar to those of the other organizations when it comes to holding 
meetings and conferences, making appeals, giving statements, and so 
forth. However, WRI stresses that it is not enough to ‘make appeals and 
publish statements’, but ‘concrete steps with full personal commitment 
and responsibility’ need to be taken as well (ibid: 61, also 127).12 Beliefs 
and principles have to be applied and practiced at the personal level in 
order to fight violence and other forms of injustices, which requires deep 
commitment on the part of the individuals involved. 
Accordingly, it has been argued in the theoretical literature that peace 
making always ‘starts with oneself ’ (Overy 1982: 13) and that therefore 
nonviolence is an ‘immediately political’ method (Bobbio 2007: 81). 
WRI believes it envisages a process or, rather, ‘a praxis – of restructuring 
social power from the grassroots’ (Clark 2005: 20, also Moretti 2005: 
11; Bhave 2005: 14) in which empowerment is also a central goal (Clark 
2005: 22). This echoes the Gandhian perspective, which emphasizes that 
ends and means are ‘not distinct categories of analysis but complementary 
components of the same reality’ (Cortright 2006: 17; 2008: 215).  Where 
it is maintained that creating ends is more important than serving them 
12 As social movement scholars point out, pacifist organizations have ‘priorities 
others than mobilization onto the streets’ (Gillan et al. 2008: 140), for they aim to 
educate, inform and activate people to take more active roles (ibid: 167). 
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(Cortright 2008: 215; 2006: 17–18), empowerment of participants is 
regarded as an essential part of the process. In this context, a nonviolent 
approach means primarily nonviolent direct action, which is regarded as 
the most effective form of resistance against war13.  
6.4. Nonviolent Direct Action 
Originating from the Gandhian idea of nonviolence, nonviolent direct 
action can be defined as ‘any action which does not involve violence 
undertaken by individuals or groups against a social or international 
evil or for the purpose of resolving conflicts’ (Prasad 2005: 324). In the 
theoretical literature it is described, for example, as ‘force more powerful’ 
or a ‘form of coercion, and a means of exercising political power’ (e.g. 
Cortright 2008: 211, 220). The best-known examples of the method 
in the twentieth century are the movements led by Gandhi in India 
and Martin Luther King in the US14. As a simulation of ‘Gandhian 
tactics of civil obedience’, direct action became ‘noticeable’ in the anti-
war movement in the mid-1960s (Horowitz 1970: 10; DeBenedetti & 
Chatfield 1990: 42–43). 
For WRI, the idea of nonviolent direct action was one main themes 
in the conference it held in India in 1960. While nonviolent direct action 
may require ‘defiance of the law or established custom, non-cooperation 
and individual protest’, proponents argue that it seeks to ‘develop 
goodwill and understanding between all concerned’ (Prasad 2005: 324). 
In other words, it may be necessary to create conflict in order to remove 
‘international or social evil’ (ibid). 
WRI’s stance on nonviolent direct action remains basically the same, 
although there have been many debates about the issue and new forms of 
nonviolent direct action have been invented along the way. During its long 
history, WRI has organized a great variety of direct-action campaigns. The 
interviewee from the organization strongly suggests that the new anti-war 
13 However, as Overy (1982: 16) has observed, within the groups of nonviolent 
revolutionists such as WRI, there have been disagreements as to whether non-
violence should be regarded as ‘a tactic or a principle’.   
14 On Gandhi, see e.g. Cortright 2006: 9–35; on Martin Luther King, see e.g. 
Cortright 2006: 53–71.
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movement should more nonviolent direct action, because he believes its 
impact to be much more immediate than that of demonstrations. He 
is hoping for ‘a step from protesting to resisting’, meaning blockades 
and other kinds of nonviolent action. Demonstrations should not be 
completely dismissed but the movement should ‘not just have some big 
demonstrations every now and then’. Interestingly, the interviewee argues 
that one problem with the demonstrations of the current movement is 
that they are legal and arranged with the knowledge and approval of the 
police and other authorities. (Interview 3.) Thus, he implicitly highlights 
the more anarchistic characteristics of his own organization. 
Some interviewees from other organizations have quite a different 
approach. For example, when telling about the StWC’s demonstration 
‘blocking the city of London’ with four hundred thousand protesters 
during President Bush’s visit in 2004, a GR interviewee says it was ‘a 
bit humoristic to know that the police had suddenly felt completely 
incapable of containing the massive number of people’ (Interview 2):
The high police officer phoned one of the organizers of Stop the 
War and said ‘Well, it’s seven thirty, congratulations, you managed 
to stop the town’. Nobody planned a direct action as such but it 
became a real manifestation of people’s power, very democratic and 
very genuine. 
Clearly, there are different understandings among organizations about 
what nonviolent direct action involves in practice. A GR interviewee 
stresses that one does not need to be an anarchist or a ‘very very brave’ peace 
activist in order to take part in mass direct action during demonstrations 
(Interview 2). The WRI interviewee defines direct action much more 
rigorously. He points out that although demonstrations can block a whole 
city for a day, ‘it’s the city of London, it’s not where the war is being fought’. 
Moreover, he argues that if the government can ‘easily give us a bit of the 
city of London as long as their planes can take off, when the troops can be 
moved and everything’, demonstrations do not pose any actual threat to 
military action. In contrast, direct action, such as a blockade of a military 
base, is believed to pose more of a concrete challenge. (Interview 3.) The 
line between those advocating demonstrations and those preferring direct 
action is quite clear (Interview 4/StWC):
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If you take five or ten people off and train them up and take them off 
to invade an army base, take a part playing in a submarine, you don’t 
get very far. You end up in court …often you get acquitted. It gets in 
the media a little bit but it doesn’t go much further than that. 
For the StWC, a ‘small direct action approach’ does not represent 
an effective tactic. Instead, the interviewee talks about ‘mass direct 
action’ (Interview 4), referring to the ‘the biggest series of direct action 
campaigns so far in Britain’ (Murray & German 2005: 98) organized by 
the StWC and CND. Indeed, direct action has been important for the 
CND throughout its history. Since direct action often means breaking 
the law, its role has been one of the ‘key debates’ within the organization 
since its inception (Hudson 2005: 66–69, also Hinton 1989: 165–170). 
Its predecessor, the DAC, regarded nonviolent direct action as a more 
effective method of campaigning than ‘working through the established 
political process’ (Hudson 2005: 66).15 It was maintained that nonviolent 
direct action requires deep personal commitment (ibid), a position also 
shared by WRI. While direct action ‘really engages a person much 
more’, it also makes it difficult to get a large number of people involved 
(Interview 3):
 
It’s hard to think about a way of to make it easy for new people 
to make the step to confront the police and sit down and get arrested 
because it’s the first time that’s always the hardest. Once you’ve done 
it several times, you don’t mind getting arrested. It’s easy. But the 
first time was quite a hard step. To get rid of your fears ... overcome 
your ideas that you have to follow the authorities and you cannot do 
something illegal and it’s so bad to be arrested. 
15 It is noteworthy that the question of direct action has had quite remarkable 
impacts on the entire CND. One of the main episodes of ‘sharp conflict’ in this 
regard occurred in 1959, when the CND president, philosopher Bertrand Russell, 
challenged Canon Collins, the chair of the organization, arguing that the CND’s 
approach was too conventional. Eventually, this led to a split, with Russell planning a 
new movement, the Committee of 100, which concentrated on mass civil obedience 
aimed to attract wider public support. Russell resigned as president of the CND in 
October 1960 before the new organization was officially launched. Later, nonviolent 
direct action became a more accepted tactic in the CND. For more on the CND and 
the Committee of 100, see e.g. Hudson 2005: 70, 75; Miles 2008: 101, 107; Randle 
1987: 148–150, 158; Rochon 1988: 110; Overy 1982: 68. 
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Given that direct actionists often get arrested – indeed, it is one of the aims 
of such action – the WRI interviewee observes that proper training and 
advance legal briefing are crucial for the participants. Such preparation 
will enable them to make enlightened decisions as to whether they 
really want to take part in this kind of action. In other words, potential 
participants need to understand what they are getting into and to be well-
informed regarding possible consequences. As a cautionary example, the 
interviewee cites a sit-down in Trafalgar Square encouraged by the StWC 
during one of its demonstrations. (Interview 3.) He criticizes it for not 
providing people with relevant information on the possible consequences 
or with instructions in case they were arrested (ibid): 
They told their own young people to sit down. They had had no 
training. They had no legal briefing, nothing. They didn’t know 
what kind of laws they are breaking here, what the punishment can 
be, what’s the procedure. It is all very important information. You 
need to be aware of what can happen to you. And it’s actually quite 
dangerous to ask people to direct action unless they know what can be 
the consequences ... They told that okay, now we call for direct action 
but even in their website there was no legal briefing, nothing.
It is stressed that there should have been proper instructions on the 
StWC website for the participants, but that these were not provided. 
In contrast, the WRI website offers very detailed instructions. It is 
possible, for example, to download the WRI Handbook for Nonviolent 
Campaigns, which covers issues such as ‘legal support’ and ‘jail support’ 
(War Resisters’ International 2009b; 2009c). Reflecting upon legal and 
arrest-related procedures is important because, as noted in theoretical 
literature, the moral principle behind nonviolence derives from the 
idea that those ‘who claim a moral right to refuse to give a particular 
policy their co-operation on grounds of principle, and even physically 
to obstruct with non-violent means, must also be prepared to accept the 
legal consequences of their actions’ (Randle 1987: 143). 
In other words, the participants are expected to ‘endure hardships, fines 
and imprisonment’ (Randle 1987: 144, also Overy 1982: 69). As WRI 
stresses, they ‘must be prepared for suffering and sacrifice’ (Prasad 2005: 
324). Indeed, this is why Gandhi suggested that ‘nonviolent methods 
are for the strong, not the weak’, for it ‘takes courage not to fight’ as well 
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as ‘to suffer for a cause and not respond with violence’ (Cortright 2008: 
231, also 2006: 28–34, 65–66, 130).
It is here that the more philosophical divergence between WRI and 
the three other organizations becomes most apparent. Whereas the three 
leftist organizations believe that it is difficult for individuals to try to effect 
change on their own, and thus emphasize the importance of mass action 
under the united left, the WRI stresses that all change necessarily begins 
with the individual. In social movement theory, it has been pointed out 
that this kind of an approach might be understood as ‘essentially alien 
to the radical working-class tradition, which emphasizes collective action 
and is strongly focused on economic issues’ (Randle 1987: 151, emphasis 
in original). Although mass action is not be something totally undesirable 
or ineffective from the perspective of WRI, it does strongly emphasize 
that individuals need to be acting in a more sustained and committed 
way. In this sense, one can understand WRI’s tendency to regard those 
who promote state-based strategies and tactics within the political system 
of the nation state as preservers of the status quo and view themselves as 
the ‘real’ challengers of dominant power structures. 
Nevertheless, as some scholars have pointed out, it is not obstruction 
as such that is important ‘but the symbolism of the action, its power to 
communicate and its potential to create moral and political dilemmas 
for the government’ (ibid: 144, emphasis added). In other words, 
by influencing public sentiment via the sacrifice and suffering of the 
participants, it becomes possible to ‘win political sympathies of those 
upon the exercise of political power’ depends (Cortright 2008: 217, also 
2006: 130–136). Because ‘power ultimately rests on the consent of the 
governed, it is maintained that altering the ‘political and moral dynamics 
of the struggle’ may result in changing ‘the balance of power’ (Cortright 
2008: 225; also 2006: 119,121–122, 131, 136, 191–193).           
To sum up, nonviolent direct action seems to be a method which all 
of the organizations studied have used but which, at the same time, is a 
controversial tactic because they view its usefulness and effectiveness very 
differently. As we have seen, definitions of the concept differ among them. 
Nonviolent direct action is clearly the main method for WRI, whereas 
the other three organizations consider mass demonstrations substantially 
more important. All four organizations, however, suggest that different 
methods can be used simultaneously. In this respect, WRI is the most 
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puritan in its repertoire, as it does not value mass demonstrations or 
direct engagement with the political system. 
When viewed in historical terms, the views described above reflect 
more generally the debate about nonviolent direct action in the context 
of the British anti-war movement. Mainly the debate has revolved around 
whether it can be regarded as ‘a morally justified’ tactic in parliamentary 
democracy and whether nonviolence as such constitutes an effective 
political strategy (Randle 1987: 131, also Gillan 2006). Similarly, in the 
anti-war movement literature, direct action is either characterized by its 
ignorance ‘of the chance for immediate political success’ (Horowitz 1970: 
19) or, alternatively, described as ‘the most effective form of political 
action available to the movement’ (Rochon 1988: 189). 
With regard to both academic and activist circles, it is interesting that 
the debate between demonstrating and direct action in the late 1960s was 
very similar to what it is today. After the Vietnam War, it was argued that 
‘lack of concreteness, lack of specific direction in response to the state’ led 
the anti-war movement to become much more oriented towards direct 
action (Horowitz 1970: 11). The fact that the anti-war movement of the 
late 1960s was marked by a ‘shift from the politics of symbolic opposition 
to the actual prevention of war activities that support and sustain war’ 
(ibid: 44) offers an intriguing contextualization for the current situation, 
in which the movement seems, on the contrary, to be moving towards 
‘the politics of symbolic opposition’. 
Yet it is unclear how valid a categorization this actually is. With most 
activists within the movement said to ‘believe that civil obedience should 
be used as a form of symbolic opposition only’ – in other words, not used 
to resist the authority of the state as such but to influence it (Rochon 1988: 
190) – it may at first seem that there is a contradiction with the approach 
of WRI, given its campaigns to blockade military bases, for example. 
Nonetheless, although these kinds of acts of confrontation appear to be 
coercive in nature, it is possible to interpret them as symbolic forms of 
political opposition whose aim is not to challenge the state as such but to 
influence public opinion (ibid: 200).16
16 For additional research on nonviolence and nonviolent direct action, see e.g. 
Randle 1987; Cortright 2006; 2008: 218–232. 
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6.5 Towards the Multitude? Working Class against War
The strategies of resistance against war and imperialism promoted by the 
three leftist organizations are usually linked to organization of the working 
class. As pointed out in the theoretical analysis (see chapter 2), this is the 
primary context for resistance envisioned by radical poststructuralists, 
for whom the Multitude is some sort of an ‘updated’ conceptualization 
of the working class (Hardt & Negri 2004: xiv, 100–115, 129). None 
of the organizations studied here has adopted the new concept as such, 
and even those organizations that are closely connected to the SWP are 
critical of new conceptualizations of imperialism and the working class. 
For example, while the co-founder of the StWC argues that ‘We are for 
the self-organization of working people, not least because we believe 
that such self-organization will lead to a more effective struggle against 
imperialism’ (Rees 2006: 232), he criticizes post-Marxist scholars. 
Rees (2006: 201) directly refers to Hardt and Negri when criticizing 
new theorizations based on the belief hat ‘the old methods of analysis 
and resistance are of little use’. He claims that these conceptualizations 
‘underestimate the potential power of those who oppose the modern 
imperial system’ (ibid). Moreover, they lead to an interpretation that 
‘the polarity in the modern world is no longer to be seen as between a 
highly centralized capitalist and imperialist ruling class and the working 
class, but between the dispersed power of empire and the self-defined 
democracy of the multitude’ (ibid: 219). For Rees, the Multitude is ‘a 
shallow generalisation’ and a failed attempt to redefine the working class, 
which is ‘not smaller on a global scale than before but larger’ (ibid: 218). 
He is convinced that it has not ‘been replaced by a socially indistinct 
‘multitude’ nor lost the capacity to resist the system’ (ibid: 220). 
Criticizing redefinition of the working class as a network of organizations 
which ‘displace authority in collaborative relationships’, he argues that it 
‘could never produce a practical organisational conclusion’ (ibid: 219): 
Successful resistance depends on an accurate appreciation of both 
the strengths and weakness of the system and of those who oppose it. 
Neither ‘pro-war left’ who have taken the argument about ‘democratic 
imperialism’ or the ’clash of civilizations’ at face value, nor those on 
the left who reflect the triumphalism of those at the helm of the 
‘one remaining superpower’, have been able to provide a suitably 
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accurate account of the balance of the forces as it has unfolded in 
recent years.
According to Rees (2006: 222), Hardt and Negri misunderstand the 
nature of resistance because there ‘has long been an adage on the left that 
the breadth of a movement was inversely related to its political depth’. 
He points out that while ‘single issues mobilise large numbers, complex 
political analyses are narrower in appeal’, now the alter-globalization 
movement has ‘turned the received wisdom on its head’ in representing 
a ‘broad critique of free-market capitalism, an aspiration for an entirely 
different system-wide set of priorities’ (ibid). Despite its breadth, Rees 
suggests the alter-globalization movement has ‘the capacity to mobilise 
greater numbers than many pre-existing single issue campaigns, trade 
unions or political parties’ (ibid). Although skeptical of the concept 
of the Multitude, he seems to be articulating opposition to war and 
globalization in terms rather similar when, for example, he speaks of 
‘a particular form of popular resistance which combines protest at the 
effects of globalisation with a movement against war’ (ibid: 200).17 
Moreover, Rees (2006: 112) celebrates the alter-globalization movement 
for having provided ‘a common language and identified a common enemy 
in a way that has not been true of any international movement of revolt 
since the defeat of the last great upturn in struggle in the mid-1970s’. 
Suggesting that the struggle ‘is far from being homogenous in methods 
or aims’, he even goes on to argue that its subjects ‘would not necessarily 
recognise each other as allies nor agree on strategy or tactics’ (ibid). In 
a word, Rees maintains that there is a united political project against 
war and other global problems although the people and groups that are 
part of it are not necessarily conscious of each other – a view which very 
much resembles the arguments of radical poststructuralists (e.g. Hardt 
& Negri 2004; xv, 91–93). Another very similar view is embedded in 
Rees’s conviction that a ‘revolt from below’ can ‘express a real alternative 
to the global ruling elite’ (Rees 2006: 111). In a very Hardt-and-Negrian 
17  Rees’s view also comes close to Hardt and Negri’s (2004: 13, 93–95) argument 
that the regime of biopower has to control and manage the biopolitical production 
of the Multitude continuously. This is illustrated in his argument that ‘democracy as 
the aim of working people has forced ruling elites to reformulate their own notion of 
democracy as the ‘best forms of government for capitalism’’ (Rees 2006: 127). 
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manner, he argues that since solidarity ‘arises from below’, resistance, too, 
must derive from below, resulting in ‘united action’ by non-state actors 
(ibid: 234). Hence, although he criticizes radical poststructuralists, his 
ideas do not seem to differ radically from theirs. The main divergence is, 
of course, that the struggle is not being fought between Empire and the 
Multitude, but ‘between nation-states, corporate competition and the 
resistance of working class and poor – our three titans’ (ibid: 200).   
In the interviews, when discussing their understanding of constituents 
of global resistance, all representatives were explicitly asked about their 
knowledge of and opinions about the theory by Hardt and Negri. 
Although not all of them are familiar with the theory, many of them refer 
to the concept of ‘globalizing resistance’ or frame some issues in a similar 
way. Interestingly, while interviewees familiar with Hardt and Negri 
express quite critical views, those without a specific knowledge of the 
theory refer to the concept of global resistance in a more positive vein. 
The StWC interviewees, both familiar with the theory, are 
straightforward in their criticism. One argues that the theory by Hardt 
and Negri is ‘absolutely rubbish’. Nonetheless, he often uses concepts 
similar to theirs when describing the anti-capitalist struggle between 
the left and the forces of global capitalism. For example, he claims that 
‘the breadth of the movement brings strength’, which is one of Hardt 
and Negri’s central arguments. The interviewee considers the anti-war 
movement as ‘the broadest what the left has been involved with’ for a 
very long time, but does not regard it as globalized in the way that Hardt 
and Negri describe the Multitude. Rather, he understands the anti-war 
movement as international in nature. He compares the February 2003 
demonstration with the events of 1968, contextualizing it by likening 
it to ‘what happened in Czechoslovakia and Paris’. (Interview 4.) The 
other interviewee is concerned with the possible challenges that Hardt 
and Negri’s celebration of diversity causes in terms of defining clear goals 
(Interview 5). According to him, diversity is good when it succeeds in 
making the anti-war movement stronger (ibid): 
And therefore beyond the question of diversity lies the question of 
common approach and understanding that in particular times the 
struggle will be focused in particular places and particular issues, and 
it has to have the ability to draw from that diversity and to focus on 
those global critical points ... Hardt and Negri have missed this. 
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One of the CND interviewees is familiar with radical poststructuralist 
theory. While arguing that there is no need for a new theoretical analysis 
of imperialism, he stresses that anti-imperialism ‘needs popularization 
rather than some new analyses’. (Interview 1.) The other interviewee, 
not aware of the theory, uses a definition of ‘worker’ that echoes Hardt 
and Negri’s concept of ‘immaterial labour’ (2004: 103–115, 129–138) 
when he brings up the need for a more united working class. In his view, 
workers include not only those working, for example, in a car factory, but 
also highly educated people who are ‘pressing buttons on a computer’. As 
the interviewee puts it in more familiar terms: ‘you might go to work on 
a car, you might wear a suit but you’re still a worker’. (Interview 6.)
The GR interviewees are not familiar with Hardt and Negri, but their 
organization arranged a public debate between Antonio Negri and Alex 
Callinicos18 in Paris in 2003.  This extremely popular event19 dealt with 
the question of the organized and non-organized left. An interviewee 
recounts that the broadening of the concept of working class was fiercely 
debated, with the public especially criticizing the Multitude as something 
‘incidental’ and ‘almost not conscious of its activity’. The interviewee 
himself argues that it is not necessary to have a new definition of the 
working class. (Interview 2.) Nevertheless, he often brings up the issue of 
global poverty and injustice in much the same way as Hardt and Negri 
do, stressing that without tackling broader questions of social injustice, 
inequality and oppression taking place globally, it will not be possible to 
tackle the problem of war (ibid):       
I think that nobody will fight if they have everything they need for 
their living ... the strongest principle in social justice. I’m sure that if 
people will have education, health, security, good living conditions, 
they will not fight ... I think the way that the world is organized is 
completely irrational: half of the world, third of the world is living 
well and the other half is living shit …  It’s very clear, there will not 
be any peace if that’s the situation. So, this is my conclusion, it has 
always been my ethical guideline. 
18 Alex Callinicos is Professor of European Studies at King’s College in London. 
19 The interviewee reports that there were three hundred places but that over 
three times as many people came. When left outside the lecture hall, people ‘started 
to bang on the doors and make a real noise because everyone wanted to hear Negri 
and Callinicos’. Eventually the sound system was taken outside the hall so that 
everyone could at least listen to the debate. (Interview 2.)
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In another argument bearing a resemblance to Hardt and Negri’s 
(as well as Foucault’s) position, the interviewee advocates the idea of 
permanent resistance. For him, resistance should not be manifested only 
in ‘micro-actions’; rather, there should be a more general analysis guiding 
different acts of resistance ‘towards the same direction’. In this regard, he 
refers to the need to globalize resistance but in a more organized way than 
Hardt and Negri suggest. (Interview 2.) The other GR interviewee brings 
up the need for global solidarity as a means of encouraging workers to give 
support to each other in different countries in their specific struggles. She 
says she knows from her ‘socialist readings’ and her ‘revolutionary socialist 
comrades’ that in order to change anything there must first be real change 
in how the society is run. Hence, she stresses the need to act organized. In 
highlighting the importance of local and practical (organized) resistance 
she stresses the international character of the working class, thus, clearly 
subscribing to a more traditional definition of the working class than 
Hardt and Negri. (Interview 7.) On the whole, GR’s views are, however, 
closer to those espoused by the radical poststructuralist approach than are 
the views of any of the three other organizations. 
In regarding the working class as ‘a bit of a simplifying concept’, the WRI 
interviewee is critical towards not only post-Marxist conceptualizations, 
but traditional leftist concepts as well. He stresses, for example, that the 
working class is ‘not necessarily the most progressive’ political force. He 
regards the idea of the international working class as problematic, because 
‘when you look at it globally, you see that working class here globally 
benefits from the exploitation of the South’, that is, those who are poor 
in the West are ‘quite high up’ when evaluated globally. (Interview 3.) 
When it comes to the new concepts of Empire and the Multitude, the 
interviewee brings out a very important point, one not discussed by any 
other interviewee or theorist studied in this thesis. He argues that the idea 
of globalizing resistance is problematic because there are so many different 
views and ideologies which ‘might be opposing each other’ (ibid): 
So, there’s an Empire, there’s western capitalism and you have a lots 
of different people, movements opposing neo-liberalism, globalizing 
capitalism. But they are very different. They might be opposing each 
other. Some of them are right-wing fundamentalist forces, ours are 
more progressive ... you cannot just throw them all together. The world 
is too complex for any kind of simple answers or simple analysis.  
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The analysis presented here is extremely interesting, because it addresses 
one of the main problems of not only the approach advocated by radical 
poststructuralists such as Hardt and Negri, but also that promoted by 
liberal cosmopolitans. Neither of these theoretical approaches seriously 
engages in a discussion about possible political competition between 
different groups, organizations or movements within the Multitude or 
global civil society.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter has reflected on the theoretical debate regarding effective 
political strategies (how to resist) and the primary context of resistance 
(national or global) by empirically analyzing how these are understood 
within the current anti-war movement. The aim has been to determine 
the extent to which the understandings within the anti-war movement 
‘resonate’ with those of the three theoretical approaches, and what their 
main convergences and divergences are in this regard.
The analysis has revealed that within the British anti-war movement 
there are several different understandings of the question ‘how to resist’, 
whether the focus is strategies or tactics of resistance. All organizations 
share the view that both the national and international levels are 
important, but view their importance and functions differently. While 
some stress the primacy of the national level, others are more inclined to 
regard resistance against the Iraq War (or any war) as a matter requiring 
an international, or even a global, approach. They also connect resistance 
against the Iraq War to many other struggles and issues. Although their 
views about strategies and tactics of resistance are closely connected to 
the their broader ideological approaches, not even those organizations 
that are based on similar ideologies necessarily have similar views.  
Since the organizations define their main targets of resistance in 
different ways (see chapter 5), it is not a surprising finding that their 
views about primary strategies and tactics also vary. However, in regard 
to resistance against the US government, there are primarily three main 
strategies that all the organizations consider in rather similar terms. 
Firstly, it is maintained that the US government can be effectively resisted 
by putting pressure on the states and their governments which support 
233
the US in its military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secondly, it is 
argued that the US can be resisted by creating as international an anti-war 
movement as possible, thereby influencing world public opinion, which 
exerts pressure on the US. Thirdly, it is maintained that encouraging the 
American anti-war movement to resists US foreign policy within the 
country is an influential strategy. On the whole, it is somewhat surprising 
that the organizations do not generally discuss strategies against the US 
more often – given that in their political rhetoric they often regard the 
US as the main opponent of the anti-war movement.   
In regard to the national context, the organizations regard different 
strategies as important in pressuring the national government. In 
particular, the StWC and CND – which emphasize the national level 
due to their understanding that the most effective way to resist the war is 
to put pressure on elected representatives – believe that it is important to 
mobilize public opinion and that this can be best advanced by organizing 
mass demonstrations. In other words, both organizations strongly 
advocate the strategy of mass mobilization. Despite this emphasis, both 
of these currently very influential organizations within the new anti-
war movement also take part in party politics through their political 
representatives in the SWP and the Labour Party. Their understanding of 
politics and power is quite traditional in that they seek political change by 
influencing those in power, either by pressuring the government indirectly 
through mobilization of public opinion or by directly collaborating with 
certain political parties.20 GR also has an intimate connection to the 
political system through the SWP, but it nevertheless seems to regard this 
kind of an engagement as less important than the StWC and CND do. 
WRI is the only organization that has no connections with the political 
system. It is also unique among the organizations in not cooperating with 
trade unions, a form of collaboration in which the other three engage and 
which they consider important.
The StWC and CND emphasize their international contacts and 
networks, especially in relation to the coordination of worldwide 
demonstrations such as those organized, for example, in February 2003 
20  Hence, although it is argued that the current anti-war movement is ‘more            
jaundiced about established political parties’ than its predecessors (Gillan et al. 2008: 
189) and ‘less inclined to follow a parliamentary focus’ (ibid: 73), these arguments 
must be viewed in relative (historical) terms. 
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and five years later in March 2008. There are many references to the 
global context, although these often overlap and are partly detached 
from the discussions concerning international cooperation. The StWC 
connects the anti-war struggle to the struggle against imperialism 
practiced by great powers and stresses the importance of a united front 
and the organization of the working class. Its views are based mainly on 
traditional socialist understandings rather than the post-Marxist approach 
advocated by radical poststructuralists; to be sure, in certain contexts the 
organization has ‘updated’ its traditional analysis to some extent and now 
conceptualizes resistance in more global terms. Nevertheless, the struggle 
is not regarded as taking place between Empire and the Multitude but 
between ‘three titans’ – nation states, corporate competition and the 
working class and poor. In other words, strategies of resistance against 
war are conceptualized mainly in terms of the working class struggle 
against imperialist nation states. 
Due to its anti-nuclear focus, the CND usually connects resistance 
against war to the movement against nuclear weapons but sometimes 
also to the environmental movement. In the context of the Iraq War, 
it regards the causes of war and other global problems as intertwined 
also in a broader, more structural sense. Hence, it is suggested that the 
international objectives of the anti-war movement are connected to those 
of the alter-globalization movement. The CND believes that different 
social movements are in the process of developing a common analysis of 
interconnected problems that stem from unjust international economic 
institutions. The common struggle is not, however, against an abstract 
Empire but against the unjust international system led by the US as an 
imperialist nation state.    
GR can be considered an internationally oriented organization by 
virtue of the issues that it is struggling against, in particular war and 
other global injustices, which it regards as inseparably interconnected. 
The alter-globalization movement provides the main context for the 
organization, with the ESF functioning as an especially significant 
platform. Connections to the anti-war movement are both international 
(via the ESF) and national (through cooperation with the StWC and other 
British anti-war groups). GR regards itself primarily as a mobilization 
organization, activating people to demonstrate against international 
institutions. It also emphasizes the importance of local-level activities. 
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Resistance against war is regarded to some extent in poststructuralist 
and global terms, although the national level is still considered quite 
important in the current anti-war movement.        
WRI is by definition more internationally oriented than the other 
organizations. It has member associations in over 40 countries, but 
because it cooperates primarily with other pacifist organizations, it has 
no cooperation with any of the British groups involved in this study. 
The interview with the WRI representative reveals that the organization 
is quite skeptical of the current anti-war movement and especially the 
leadership of the StWC. Although there are some problems when it comes 
to immediate causes such as the Iraq War, one gets the impression of a 
peaceful co-existence with the other organizations in which differences 
can be put aside to at least some extent. Nevertheless, the WRI stresses 
that long-term work promoting peace through nonviolent direct 
action is more important and far more effective than organizing mass 
demonstrations or working through the political system. 
The main difference between the three leftist organizations and WRI is 
that while the last connects resistance against (the) war to issues such as the 
expression of individuality and freedom from big collectives, centralized 
organizations and state rule, the others consider the struggle to be more a 
question of freedom from imperialist, neo-liberal capitalist domination. 
This, in turn, is viewed as a force to be challenged by creating unified 
and large political collectives with a strong sense of solidarity, and often 
one of unity as well. Whereas WRI draws on liberal as well as libertarian 
ethics, regarding autonomy of the individual as more important than 
that of organizations or collectives, the three other organizations clearly 
value collectivity more than the individual. For them, the struggle against 
the war is usually linked to the struggle against imperialism, a policy 
reflected in, among other things, the explicit demands they voice in the 
socio-political sphere.
All the organizations regard resistance against the Iraq War as 
connected to other causes, these spanning global capitalism and unequal 
power structures, the military-industrial complex or the western culture of 
violence and militarism. As the Iraq War is considered an issue connected 
to broader struggles, all the organizations share the belief that resistance 
against (the) war can be enhanced by supporting the objectives of other 
social movements, although the organizations differ as to the particular 
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movements with which they articulate connections. Agreeing that 
support and cooperation with anti-war organizations and movements in 
other countries are necessary, the organizations examined here refer to 
many other social movements, ranging from the anti-imperialist, anti-
nuclear, anti-capitalist to pacifist and environmental movements. This 
clearly illustrates that all organizations share an understanding of the 
interconnectedness of different aims and levels of resistance, albeit from 
different perspectives. 
Often the organizations establish connections in more or less abstract 
terms, not outlining specific forms of support or collaboration in detail, 
but articulating these through references to global solidarity. From a 
theoretical perspective it can be argued that there are elements which 
bear a resemblance to the idea of global resistance advocated by radical 
poststructuralists (especially in the case of GR but also to some extent 
where the CND and StWC are concerned) and to the idea of global 
civil society advanced by liberal cosmopolitans (the StWC, CND and 
WRI). When referring to interrelated goals and common struggles, most 
of the organizations seem to assume that all the different movements 
and objectives are somehow automatically compatible with each other, 
this being the case especially with the left-oriented organizations. The 
analysis conducted here reveals that there is virtually no discussion about 
how the diversity of aims of different struggles and movements can result 
in political conflicts or contradictions. This is an interesting finding 
given that the analysis also shows that there is a wide range of issues 
about which the organizations in fact disagree; that is, issues that can 
potentially become politicized within the movement, particularly if some 
organizations feel that their primary goals may be endangered.  
Only one interviewee from one of the organizations reflects upon 
this issue, pointing out that the idea of global resistance is problematic 
because great diversity necessarily means that there are views and 
ideologies that conflict with each other. This perspective is extremely 
interesting, as it squarely addresses one of the main problems of the 
consensual approach advocated by not only radical poststructuralists 
but also liberal cosmopolitans. Neither of these theoretical approaches 
seriously engages in discussion about possible political competition 
between different groups, organizations or movements that might lead to 
conflicts and contradictions within the movement. Liberal cosmopolitans 
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tend to overemphasize the consensual aspect of the new forms of political 
activity within the global civil society, whereas radical poststructuralists 
do not seriously address the question of possible contradictions within 
the Multitude.
This chapter has demonstrated that although all organizations share 
a feeling that they should work more closely together, in reality political 
and ideological differences cause some problems, whereby coordination 
between them is not as intense or as fruitful as it could be. Some of the 
organizations are quite adamant about certain issues, creating ‘blocks’ 
where different strategies and tactics are concerned. These views also 
cause some friction within the movement. The fact that the organizations 
have some common practices and understandings but that cooperation 
does not usually go deeper than that seems to confirm arguments that 
in the abstract (at the symbolic level) it is quite easy to share ideas, but 
in practice there are difficulties because all organizations want to protect 
their autonomy (e.g. Gillan et al. 2008).
To sum up, it can be said that when the understandings of effective 
strategies are evaluated in relation to the three theoretical approaches, only 
GR’s views of effective strategies and the primary context of resistance 
resonate clearly with the radical poststructuralist approach. It emphasizes 
the importance of large international gatherings and demonstrations 
against international institutions and stresses the interconnectedness of 
different struggles that can be advanced by common strategies of global 
opposition. Two of the leading organizations of the British anti movement, 
the StWC and CND, clearly resonate more closely with the critical state-
centric approach in advocating clear strategies and collective political 
engagement at the national level. They regard pressuring the national 
government with a strategy of mass mobilization as the most effective 
way to oppose the war and also readily engage in parliamentary politics 
through their close political contacts in the Labour Party and the SWP. 
Cooperation with trade unions is also considered important because of 
their broad membership base, which can be utilized, for example, in the 
form of industrial strikes. 
However, by the same token, these two organizations also believe 
that it is important to engage in international campaigning and have 
taken part in organizing some international (often referred to as ‘global’) 
demonstrations. In other words, they represent a sort of a mixture between 
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different theoretical approaches in that they also consider symbolic politics 
at the global level to be important. In advocating this kind of a ‘both-
and’ perspective, they actually represent quite a traditional approach by 
international social movements, and differ from new social movements 
of the postmodern era in that they do not necessarily regard the global as 
the primary level for engagement. 
This internationalism also becomes evident when the two leading 
organizations connect resistance against the Iraq War to other issues, 
such as the anti-militaristic and the anti-imperialistic struggles, in which 
international coordination is considered necessary.21 When referring to 
the working class (which is regarded as especially important in the context 
of the anti-imperialist struggle), the framework is also represented as 
international rather than global in the sense that radical poststructuralists 
would have it. 
Yet another standpoint is illustrated by WRI, which regards resistance 
against war from a more traditionally defined international perspective: 
it does not seem to adhere to the postmodern singularities project, 
but rather chooses to engage in international cooperation with pacifist 
organizations internationally. In the case of specific strategies and 
tactics, WRI represents a very distinct approach compared to the other 
organizations or the theoretical approaches examined here in that it 
advocates a strategy of nonviolence and nonviolent direct action. While 
clear and strategically goal-oriented in their own context, nonviolence 
and direct action differ quite radically from collectively and politically 
oriented mass mobilization strategies. On the whole, it can be said 
that the strategies of resistance in the anti-war movement are informed 
primarily by the critical state-centric approach, although they do show 
some resonance with liberal cosmopolitan understandings and the radical 
poststructuralist approach as well.
21 The StWC and CND do sometimes use concepts such as global resistance 
and global struggle, which resemble certain concepts employed by radical 
poststructuralists. However, the concepts do not generally have similar content for 
them. The organizations often mean ‘international’ even when they say ‘global’. 
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7         THE POWER OF THE MOVEMENT 
7. Introduction
This chapter deals with the question of power in the context of the new 
anti-war movement. It reflects on the theoretical debate concerning the 
power of social movements (what is power) by empirically analyzing 
how power is understood within the current anti-war movement. The 
aim is to determine to which extent the understandings within the anti-
war movement ‘resonate’ with those of the three theoretical approaches 
examined in this study, and what their main convergences and divergences 
are in this regard. 
The power of the new anti-war movement as a ‘peaceful superpower’ 
has been vigorously debated ever since the February 2003 demonstration 
day. One the one hand, it has been argued that the anti-war movement 
has become a powerful challenger of US foreign policy and hegemony, 
that is, a superpower in its own right own whose power should also be 
conceptualized in globalized terms (e.g. Cortright 2007a; 2006; 2008). 
One the other hand, these arguments have been challenged by pointing 
out that the ‘superpower’ has been powerless against its mighty opponents, 
for the war continues (e.g. Ritter 2007). Although not directly reflecting 
on the power of the anti-war movement, the three theoretical approaches 
all conceptualize the power of social movements on a more general level. 
While both liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists maintain 
that social movements (as well as other non-state actors) have gained more 
power at the expense of nation states, the critical state-centric approach is 
much more skeptical in that regard. 
More specifically, liberal cosmopolitans regard the power of social 
movements as depending on their ability to mobilize broad public 
support at the global level with their informational and soft-power 
resources. Shaping global opinion is regarded as the most effective form 
of power, as it can be used for putting pressure on states and governments 
while challenging their official foreign policy goals (e.g. Castells 2004: 
161; 2008: 82–82, 90; Beck 2000, 70; Nye 2004a: 90, 31–32, 97–98, 
105–106, 137). For radical poststructuralists the logic is basically the 
same: they maintain that globally oriented social movements and non-
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state actors, although not capable of challenging the military might of the 
global regime of biopower as such, can nevertheless resist and challenge it 
with instruments of soft power. The power of social movements thus lies 
in their ability to execute ‘moral interventions’ against Empire (e.g. Hardt 
& Negri 2000: 35–36). The critical state-centric approach challenges 
the arguments of both approaches and suggests that symbolically and 
abstractly oriented global social movements are less of a challenge to 
governments and power elites than movements which understand that 
politics means essentially a struggle for power in the domestic context. 
Accordingly, the approach stresses that current social movements in 
fact escape power to the extent that they lack strategic engagement and 
concentrate only on symbolic manifestations of resistance at the global 
level. (E.g. Chandler 2009a: 18; 2004: 334.) 
This very contradictory theoretical debate is reflected on here by 
analyzing empirically how power is understood and conceptualized within 
the anti-war movement, the ‘current agent’ of resistance against war1. To 
this end, the analysis poses the following questions: How is power of the 
anti-war movement articulated and defined? What elements and factors 
are regarded as constituting power and giving strength to the movement? 
How are different power elements articulated in relation to each other?
The chapter will demonstrate that each of the organizations studied 
has generally a broader and more multifaceted understanding of power 
than any of the three approaches in the theoretical debate. While the 
theoretical debate is based on a clear ‘either-or’ logic, where power is 
conceptualized in either purely symbolic terms (academic globalists) 
or purely instrumental terms (critical state-centric approach), most 
organizations combine these two notions and consider both important in 
1 Understanding how power is conceptualized within the movement is of course         
significant also from the perspective of other issues that have been analyzed in this 
study, because ‘purposive action must be related to some conception of agency and           
some conception of power’ (Gillan 2006: 46). When working for social change what 
is required is also ‘a belief in the power of one’s agency and a desire for change’, that 
is, ‘an empowering understanding of one’s capacity to change that injustice’ (ibid: 
56). A political actor such as a social movement must not only have power, but 
also be prepared to use its power for advancement of its goals in order to make a 
difference. As power is a complex concept that is understood in many different ways, 
the present research has confined its focus in this chapter to the question of how 
power is defined and understood by the actors themselves.  
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the struggle against (the) war, although each emphasizes them in different 
proportions. The chapter will show that the organizations conceptualize 
the power of the anti-war movement mainly in relation to three elements: 
public support through public opinion or public action, the unity of 
the movement, and the diversity of the movement. Almost all debate 
concerning the power of the movement revolves around these three 
elements, which are interrelated. In the sections to follow, these elements 
are presented for each organization in turn, after which similarities and 
differences between the organizations are discussed. The analysis starts 
with public support as an element of power and then moves on to the 
issues of unity and diversity. 
7.2 Public Support as the Main Element of Power
Public support is clearly regarded as the single most important constituent 
of power for the anti-war movement. Three of the four organizations 
studied subscribe to the view that the power of the anti-war movement 
derives directly from the public, with the fourth adhering to this view 
only partly. The significance of public support is emphasized repeatedly 
in the StWC, CND and GR material, although there are some differences 
in emphasis between the organizations. The StWC and CND emphasize 
public support especially at the national level, whereas GR is more 
inclined to stress the importance of public support, especially in the 
form of public opinion, at the global level. WRI is quite skeptical of all 
forms of power by definition, including that of the anti-war movement, 
and even questions the ability of the movement to provide an adequate 
analysis of power. Nevertheless, a closer examination reveals that, unlike 
it may seem at first sight, WRI does not consider all forms of power to be 
corrupt and oppressive.   
While some new social movements (such as the alter-globalization 
movement) have become well known for arguing that they do not seek 
power, or that they somehow wish to abstain from power, the findings 
here show that this is not the case within the anti-war movement, at 
least the new British movement. For example, the StWC can hardly be 
regarded as diffident about power when it explicitly refers to the anti-war 
movement as the world’s second superpower (Interview 4): ‘We’ve always 
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talked about ourselves as the second superpower, you know, the anti-war 
movement’. The argument is interesting, because in public as well as 
theoretical debate it has been ‘world public opinion’, not necessarily the 
anti-war movement, which has been referred to more often as the second 
superpower (e.g. Chomsky 2003; cf. Hardt & Negri 2004: 258–264; 
Cortright 2007b). However, after the February 2003 demonstration, the 
former view has gained more ground, indicating that the movement is 
thought to represent ‘global public opinion’ when challenging the actions 
as well as the rhetoric of the first superpower, the US (e.g. Cortright 
2007b). Indeed, an StWC interviewee argues that at the international 
level the anti-war movement derives its power from people across the 
world. He nevertheless stresses that the most important sources of public 
support are ‘the populations that are in the belligerent countries and the 
populations in the countries attacked’. (Interview 5.)  
The StWC defines the power of the British movement in a similar 
way, that is, directly in regard to public support at the national level. 
This is usually done in two different ways. The first is to articulate it 
through popularity: ‘The Stop the War movement is the most powerful and 
influential popular political movements of my lifetime and possibly of any 
period of our history’ (Benn in Nineham & Burgin 2008: 1, emphasis 
added). Here, the power of the anti-war movement is articulated as 
support via popularity, that is, public opinion. The second approach is 
to describe the power of the movement as popular support via public 
action, especially in the form of mass demonstrations. These are explicitly 
defined as ‘the backbone’ of the movement (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 
23, also Murray 2008) and thus public action is represented as the main 
constituent of power – a view that also becomes evident in the interviews. 
For example, an StWC interviewee argues that the power of the anti-war 
movement lies largely in the fact ‘that people went out in the streets’. 
Hence, he regards public mobilization as the main element of power of 
the movement and in this way the difference lies in public action rather 
than public opinion. (Interview 4, also Interview 5.)
Underlying this conception of power is the belief that the most effective 
mechanism for resisting war is to have the movement put pressure on 
elected representatives via public pressure; this in turn depends directly 
on its popularity, as best manifested in mass demonstrations. Some 
would argue that this can be regarded as democracy by extension, since 
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the movement is regarded as depending on public support for its power 
in much the same way as political parties are dependent on their voters. 
This view of power reflects the idea of representative democracy – in 
contrast to, for example, the idea of direct democracy, which some other 
organizations promote – in that people are regarded as being represented, 
albeit not as members of the electorate, but of the anti-war movement. 
The StWC argues that the anti-war movement has become an increasingly 
powerful actor in the electoral process (Interview 4):
This is a democracy, after all, therefore they have to continue winning 
elections in order to stay in power … that strengthens our hand as 
long as we can make it look if they might not win in an election and they 
might withdraw the troops in order to win it.
The conception of power espoused by the StWC here puts the anti-
war movement and the government it opposes in direct confrontation 
with each other. Since public support is also important for those in 
government, whom the anti-war movement opposes, the government and 
the movement are actually competing head to head for public support. 
This can thus be regarded as a properly political struggle over power in the 
sense suggested by the critical state-centric approach (e.g. Chandler 2004: 
334; 2009a: 7–18; 2009b: 531–532). While liberal cosmopolitans might 
regard this kind of a state-based struggle as an old-fashioned, unnecessarily 
partisan or ineffective form of political engagement for social movements 
of the global era (e.g. Castells 2004: 141–143; 2008: 82–83), radical 
poststructuralists would argue that the anti-war movement is engaging 
in a useless local struggle, one that poses no challenge to global power 
structures (e.g. Hardt & Negri 2000: 45–46). 
In the material of the CND, the power of the anti-war movement is 
articulated in very similar terms. Public support through public opinion 
or public action is usually regarded as the main mechanism for pressuring 
elected officials and thus influencing politics. Public support is regarded 
as the key to power for not only political parties but also the anti-war 
movement. Both CND interviewees stress that public support provides 
the anti-war movement with the rationale, or the justification, for its 
existence. They also underline that government policies have activated 
and motivated people to support the movement. It is argued that people’s 
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power is manifested on the streets, where the anti-war movement keeps 
on demonstrating against the war. (Interview 1; Interview 6.) At the same 
time, however, it is recognized that it is difficult to conceptualize the 
power of the anti-war movement (Interview 1). Both CND interviewees 
also express quite critical views in regard to public opinion. For example, 
when describing Britain’s involvement in different wars over the past 
hundred years, one interviewee stresses that most wars have actually been 
very popular in Britain (Interview 6). It is pointed out, for instance, that 
while there was at first strong opposition to the First World War, this soon 
evaporated and demonstrations were held in support of the war (ibid):
In the inter-wars years there was a big movement towards peace … 
Second World War, there was no opposition to it at all, of any size. 
Since then, it’s got all the colonial wars and everything Britain has got 
involved with, the only ones there’s been any opposition to is Suez for 
a short time … Vietnam which Britain was not involved with anyway 
… and hardly any opposition to the Falklands War in 1982. It was the 
Gulf War in 1991 and later Iraq and Afghanistan which provoked the 
opposition. The public opinion has changed. 
In this interpretation, it is maintained that over the years the British 
public have somehow grown more critical towards war as well as Britain’s 
involvement in military interventions. However, the other CND 
interviewee is not at all convinced that public opinion has changed that 
much. He does regard public opinion as important, saying ‘the truth of 
the matter is that in the end public opinion matters’, yet goes on to argue 
that the British anti-war movement ‘has taken off on the whole in spite 
of the public opinion’ (Interview 1). Here he seems to be referring to the 
fact that prior to the Iraq War, before major demonstrations took place, 
many people supported it. According to polls conducted before the war, 
only 20 per cent of the British were opposed to the war with or without 
the approval of the UN (Isernia 2006: 145). 
In other words, the interviewee believes that the anti-war movement was 
first operating in a difficult pro-war atmosphere but over time managed to 
influence public opinion and create and inspire more opposition towards 
the war. It is noteworthy that in this interpretation the movement has 
not so much reflected the views of the public as influenced them. The 
power of the movement becomes defined here from a different angle – as 
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a capability to influence public opinion, which is more closely related to 
the achievements and effects of the movement (see chapter 8). 
In the GR material, the power of the movement is not discussed at all 
as such. In the interviews, the GR representatives refer to public support 
as one of the main elements of the movement’s power. However, the 
emphasis is more on the global level, since they usually refer to ‘global 
public opinion’ and rarely bring up the concept of public opinion in 
the national context. (Interview 2; Interview 7.) This can perhaps best 
be interpreted as reflecting GR’s connection to the alter-globalization 
movement, which mainly focuses on the global level in its opposition 
to international institutions. The WRI material makes little reference to 
public opinion as such, and even less in terms of the power of the anti-
war movement. Instead, there is a lot of discussion about empowerment, 
this occurring, however, in the more general context of nonviolence and 
pacifism rather than the anti-war movement (e.g. Bhave 2005; Clark 
2005; Moretti 2005; Teršelič 2005; Speck 2005). 
In this regard, it is maintained that rather than participating ‘in the 
existing power structures’, empowerment should aim at ‘transforming 
power relationships through transforming one’s self ’, which can result 
in changing cultural patterns and relationships in society (Teršelič 2005: 
7, also Moretti 2005: 11; Clark 2005: 20). Although power is often 
considered a corruptive force (Moretti 2005: 12) or even something 
‘wicked’, it is stressed that nonviolence should ‘contribute in a way that 
will lead to shifts in power relations’ (Teršelič 2005: 7, also Moretti 
2005: 11). It is recognized that ‘no human being who is part of our 
contemporary world can claim to be completely innocent as far as the use 
of power is concerned’ (Bhave 2005: 13–14). Thus, it is necessary to ‘deal 
with power’ (Teršelič 2005: 7; Moretti 2005: 11), even take ‘steps closer 
to power, on both a conceptual and working level’ (Teršelič 2005: 9). 
At the same time, ‘the power of freedom’ is strongly emphasized, 
referring to the idea that it is possible to ‘transform situations of injustice’ 
and ‘make decisions autonomously’ but also in solidarity with others 
(Moretti 2005: 11–12). It is stressed that the aim is to ‘strengthen people’s 
power-to-be and power-to-do’ (Clark 2005: 20). In emphasizing the power 
in each individual (Bhave 2005: 14), power is not regarded in terms of 
‘power over’ something, which indicates some form of domination, but 
rather power in relation to that something (Clark 2005: 20–22).
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This multifaceted conceptualization of power perhaps explains why WRI 
regards the issue of power in the context of the current anti-war movement 
in highly skeptical terms. When interviewed, the representative of WRI 
frames and articulates the power of the movement quite differently from 
the interviewees of the other three organizations. Very skeptical of the 
movement’s power in general terms, he is not convinced that the public 
support manifested in demonstrations constitutes any considerable power 
for the movement. According to him, neither the anti-war movement nor 
the British citizens have any power over the current government. This 
argument is based on the fact that almost two million people marched 
against the Iraq War at a time when almost eighty per cent of the citizens 
were opposed to the war, but even together these did not prevent the 
government form getting involved in the war. (Interview 3.) 
In this interpretation, the power of the anti-war movement becomes 
evaluated in terms of concrete influence on government policy; this is 
clearly not the case with the three other organizations, which consider the 
movement powerful despite its failure in this regard. It is quite interesting 
that the WRI interviewee regards the power of the anti-war movement 
solely in terms of power over the current government, clearly subscribing 
to an instrumentalist view of power here (also Teršelič 2005: 7–8). 
This position is somewhat contradictory in the sense that, as a pacifist 
organization, WRI itself has not often been very powerful if evaluated 
from a purely instrumentalist perspective. Furthermore, in regard to 
its own objectives, the organization has continuously emphasized that 
nonviolent resistance against war and militarism requires long-term 
work and that no quick results are to be expected. In this sense, power 
or influence by non-pacifist organizations within the anti-war movement 
becomes evaluated from a different perspective and using different criteria 
than those applied in assessing the power of pacifist organizations.   
The above-mentioned stance becomes even clearer when the WRI 
interviewee argues that it is ‘political naivety’ to believe that opposition 
to war manifested in demonstrations would as such be enough to compel 
the British government to do anything. In his opinion, this sort of 
an analysis denies any kind of power issues. He argues that there is ‘a 
tendency in movements to ignore issues of power’, which leads them to 
rely on ineffective strategies. (Interview 3.) In a word, it is claimed that 
the current anti-war movement, which advocates mass mobilization as its 
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main strategy and demonstrations as its main tactic, cannot realistically 
challenge government policies. Although WRI is strongly against state 
authority and state power generally, it does not accept the view that 
the current movement could challenge these forces, at least not by 
demonstrating alone. As pointed out earlier (see chapter 6), there is a deep 
divergence between the strategies and tactics advocated by WRI and those 
preferred by the other three organizations. Instead of putting confidence 
in mass protests and relying on public support, WRI accentuates that 
the anti-war movement should move ‘from protesting to resisting’ which 
involves blockades and other forms of nonviolent direct action. (Ibid.) 
However, within the organization there is also critical debate regarding 
the efficacy of direct action. For example, it is pointed out that ‘activists 
sometimes confuse symbolic power and the espoused goal, especially when 
movements employ direct action’ (Clark 2005: 20, emphasis added). 
On the whole, WRI conceptualizes the power of the movement in 
terms quite different from the other three organizations, which emphasize 
popular support, democracy by extension and extra-parliamentary 
politics. From WRI’s perspective, anti-war politics becomes defined as 
confrontation rather than a form of cooperation with the state and state 
authorities. Hence, power, too, becomes conceptualized in a different 
way. As scholars often note, for nonviolent revolutionist groups political 
power – whether the opponent’s or the movement’s – usually represents 
a form of oppression (Overy 1982: 14). It is indicated that ‘power is 
based on the consent of those governed’ and when ‘this consent is actively 
withdrawn, power crumbles, it ceases to exist’ (Speck 2005: 25, emphasis 
in original). However, WRI simultaneously emphasizes the importance 
of international solidarity, referring to ‘the power that comes from the 
sense of belonging to an international movement’ (ibid: 26, also 29).   
7.3 Unity and Diversity as Elements of Power
The power of the movement is also articulated in relation to its unity 
and diversity. They are both regarded as elements of power that, it is 
claimed, give strength to the movement. Unity is most often discussed 
by the StWC and CND, but also to some extent by GR and WRI. The 
way in which the four organizations discuss unity – or diversity – and the 
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meanings these concepts are accorded in relation to power differ quite 
significantly. The StWC material usually articulates unity as a power 
resource for the movement or as a prerequisite for collective political 
action. Indeed, it is argued that unity was one of the founding principles 
of the StWC, a position justified on the basis of the claim that ‘those who 
oppose governments only have two fundamental strengths, their number 
and their ability to organise’ (Rees 2006: 225). Making use of these 
strengths requires unity and commitment from the anti-war movement 
in order to ‘maximise the forces’ fighting for common aims (ibid). Hence, 
the power of the movement is conceived as deriving from a unity of aims 
and having the maximum number of people working for those aims. 
This view is substantially constricted where unity of the movement is 
defined explicitly as the unity of the left (Murray & German 2005: 54). 
According to the StWC, the Socialist Workers’ Party was able to lay ‘the 
bedrock for the unity which was the first of the Stop the War Coalition’s 
foundation stones’ (ibid). Despite this strong national emphasis, unity at 
the global level is emphasized as well (Interview 4):  
It’s about unity and of course that is what the world anti-war 
movement has been about. It’s about uniting, first of all movements 
in countries, and then uniting those movements together internationally 
... It’s all about unity and kind of bringing people together. 
Despite the fact that the StWC regards the movement as most powerful 
when united, its material contains even more references to diversity as a 
constituent of power. Both StWC interviewees represent diversity as ‘one 
of the key strengths for the movement’ (Interview 5). It is accentuated 
that as ‘a majority movement’ the anti-war movement is very broad, this 
breadth giving the movement its strength (Interview 4). In other words, 
its heterogeneity is seen as making it more effective. However, since it is 
simultaneously underlined that diversity as such is not enough but needs 
to be concentrated, diversity becomes actually defined in a way that can 
be read as an effort to create more unity. One StWC interviewee says that 
diversity is good ‘if many streams flow into a single river’, because then it 
makes the movement stronger; but if these streams ‘remain single streams’, 
it does not help. Therefore, beyond the question of diversity there lies a 
more important question of ‘common approach and understanding that 
in particular times the struggle will be focused in particular places and 
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particular issues’. In short, the movement needs to have an ability to 
‘draw from that diversity’ when focusing on critical issues. (Interview 5.)
In more general terms, diversity becomes articulated extremely often 
in relation to the February 2003 demonstration. The StWC chair stresses 
that it was a protest ‘such as Britain had never seen before, all-embracing 
in its diversity and imposing in its unity of purpose’ (Murray 2008). 
Thus,  again, diversity and unity are mentioned simultaneously, seemingly 
without any contradiction. They are articulated in connection to each 
other in more explicit terms, for example, when the anti-war movement 
is described as ‘a genuinely integrated and diverse movement, involving 
those of all religions and none, old, young, gay, straight, female and male’ 
(German 2007: 10). Here, diversity becomes defined as diversity of people, 
but when it comes to the aims of the movement, unity is clearly valued 
over diversity. In short, for the StWC diversity refers to people and unity 
to the cause. It is indicated that too much diversity can pose a challenge 
to the movement (Murray & German 2005: 62, emphasis added):  
A genuine “mass movement”, reaching beyond the usual suspects, 
will inevitably encounter all sorts of views, prejudices and ideas 
which do not fit with the principles of the left, for so long polished 
in splendid isolation. The movement, if it is to maintain its breadth 
and momentum, must accommodate that range of outlooks while 
remaining focused on its central objective, and not indulging behaviour 
which would be unacceptable under any circumstances. 
While recognizing the diversity of the current movement, the StWC in 
fact articulates quite a strong call for unity. Since the argument that the 
movement should not accept ‘behaviour which would be unacceptable 
under any circumstances’ is not specified, it leaves quite much room 
for interpretation in regard to what is considered acceptable. If viewed 
critically, it can be said to represent sort of a ‘unity wanted, diversity 
tolerated’ approach. Nonetheless, an StWC interviewee stresses several 
times that anti-war organizations and movements are ‘all very different 
and the direction they take has to be decided by them’ (Interview 4):
It’s very difficult for us to impose on any other movement what they 
should believe but we all work very closely together because in general 
what brings us together is more significant than what separates us and 
most people can see through that. 
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In this view, political or ideological differences between organizations 
are not regarded as anything serious. Rather, the underlying assumption 
is that everyone understands they have common interests, which are more 
important than the differences. It is also emphasized that all organizations 
have their own tasks within the broader movement and that the StWC 
does not try to ‘impose’ its own ideas, values or beliefs on others. An 
StWC interviewee emphasizes that although in charge of mass action 
and mobilizing large numbers of people into the streets in Britain, his 
organization tries not to ‘run too far ahead’. Here, he refers to more 
radical, smaller groups in Britain and internationally. Indeed, the above-
mentioned arguments in regard to unity and diversity are made mainly 
with reference to the national context. Where the broader anti-war 
movement is concerned, the StWC argues that it is ‘almost impossible to 
impose’ anything because national groups decide upon their own views 
and ‘use their own slogans’. (Interview 4.) Nevertheless, the importance 
of cooperation in the current situation is emphasized (ibid): 
Today we confront a global enemy and one that isn’t our country 
in a very real way but it’s the same problem that exists in for the 
poor people in America or poor people in Pakistan or Thailand or 
wherever. So, we do confront the global enemy and that forces us to 
make links we wouldn’t do otherwise. 
What exactly these links are that the StWC would not do otherwise is 
not specified. When explicitly asked if traditional peace organizations 
and newer anti-war organizations should combine their efforts, some 
interviewees argue that they already have – through the StWC. A 
representative of the CND, for example, describes the StWC as a ‘very 
successful model’ since it has affiliated with all major trade unions as well 
as Muslim organizations, cooperation with which he considers especially 
important. In his view, the StWC has illustrated that the ‘capacity to 
mobilize across the society and to incorporate under an umbrella lots of 
different strands is a strength for the movement’. (Interview 6.) Hence, 
it is not surprising that the CND views the issue of unity and diversity 
similarly to the StWC, a closer analysis revealing that the emphasis on 
unity is usually much stronger. Unity is rarely mentioned on its own 
but becomes often articulated implicitly when discussing diversity (e.g. 
Hudson 2005: 252). 
25
The CND argues that in order for the anti-war movement to be powerful 
and effective, it must sustain ‘that broad unity which characterised the 
Iraq anti-war movement’ because ‘It is not every day that the Pope, the 
Socialist Workers Party and the Muslim Association of Britain are all on 
the same side’ (Kent in Murray & German 2005: 259, emphasis added). 
Here again, unity is articulated as people from very different backgrounds 
being ‘on the same side’. ‘Broad unity’ is regarded as desirable as well as 
possible. The CND chair argues that the unity of the movement has 
been ‘remarkable’, as organizations which have been working together 
already for years ‘have all recognized the need for cooperation to keep 
the movement strong’ (Hudson 2005: 243). Cooperation is considered 
especially important in regard to ‘further challenges’, such as ‘the danger 
of attack on Iran’ (ibid). In this interpretation, unity is represented as a 
necessary condition for a powerful movement that can be flexible where 
changing problems and new political opportunities are concerned.  
At the same time, the CND refers to diversity as a power resource. It 
explicitly argus that ‘over the years CND has generally benefited from 
this diversity and been strengthened by the different approaches to 
campaigning that this inevitably brings’ (Hudson 2005: 59). No details 
are given, however, on how this takes place in concrete terms. It is merely 
suggested that being ‘very pluralistic, both in perspectives and methods’, 
the CND has ‘always been a very broad organisation, encompassing in 
its membership an extremely diverse range of political views, ethical and 
moral considerations and social backgrounds’ (ibid). It is argued that in 
the current movement diversity is manifested by people demonstrating 
against ‘globalisation, against oppression in the occupied territories, 
against debt, against the arms trade and much more’ (ibid: 245). This is 
believed to result in ‘bringing together and linking the issues and making 
us all stronger by being and working together’ (ibid, also 252).
The organization thus argues that problems which have been previously 
seen as separate are now regarded as closely interrelated, making the 
movement stronger. In this respect there is usually no discussion about 
possible contradictions that different views might cause. Nonetheless, the 
CND is more open about internal contradictions than, for example, the 
StWC. It admits that diversity has resulted in ‘major and heated debated 
between different views within the movement’ (Hudson 2005: 59), even 
to the point that during its 50 years of history the organization has been 
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occasionally ‘wracked by intense internal controversy’ (ibid: 77, also 92–
93). In the experience of both CND interviewees, there have always been 
some sorts of contradictions as well as ‘occasional moments of intolerance’ 
within the anti-war movement, but at the moment differences are put 
aside ‘as a token of appreciation of what the challenge is’ (Interview 1; 
Interview 6). The movement as a whole is considered ‘very harmonious’ 
(Interview 6) – in other words, consensual and united. Indeed, diversity 
is here again seen as giving strength to the movement (Interview 1): 
Obviously the fact that people from various traditions and people 
from various viewpoints come together to do this does give strength 
to the movement … you cannot get the illusion of coherence where 
there is no coherence, and at the moment there isn’t. So, the fact that 
it’s varied. I think it’s sort of strength. 
Extraordinarily, this particular interviewee gives a concrete example of 
how diversity can provide more strength to the movement. According to 
him, those people who previously viewed anti-war activism in negative 
terms ‘used to say that critics of American foreign policy were just a faction 
inside the Labour Party’. Due to growing diversity this has changed: ‘As 
soon as people came from various traditions that couldn’t be said anymore, 
and the movement became more powerful.’ (Interview 1.) Here, it is 
maintained that the power of the movement was enhanced because its 
critics could no longer portray it as a representative of a small minority. 
Indeed, the CND points out that its explicit purpose, together with the 
StWC, has been ‘to provide a platform, the widest ever in this country, 
to people to come to’ (Interview 6). It is stressed that they do not seek to 
interfere too much with other organizations’ priorities, because the CND 
is generally ‘opposed to western powers telling other people what to do’ 
(Interview 1). It is also argued that diversity in the anti-war movement 
guarantees that it cannot be dominated by any one organization (ibid), 
which is not, however, a view shared by all the organizations. 
GR’s material has little discussion about unity as such, although the 
framework of the organization is regarded as global. It could be assumed 
that some sort of unity would be desirable for an organization that explicitly 
aims to globalize resistance. However, the exact opposite seems to be true. 
It is stressed that ‘the broader the movement and the more inclusive it 
is, the greater its chances of success’ (Globalise Resistance 2008a). Both 
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interviewees argue that diversity gives strength to the movement, because 
it engages a broad variety of people from different traditions, for example, 
from religious and minority groups as well as grass-roots members of 
socialist parties. (Interview 2; Interview 7.) Thus, diversity rather than 
unity is seen as constituting power for the movement.  
Interestingly, in contrast to the argument made by the CND, a GR 
interviewee says that the anti-war movement has been criticized ‘from 
the right’ for its diversity, not being coherent or not having clear enough 
goals. This critique has now been proven wrong, as British activists 
have managed to fulfill their ‘dream since the 70s, since Thatcher time’, 
succeeding as they have in organizing ‘all the different diverse specific 
struggles into one movement’. Although ‘fragmented in its ingredients’, 
the anti-war movement should not be regarded as ‘tame’. GR’s 
interpretation comes close to the view of the radical poststructuralist 
approach in that diversity is seen not only as a diversity of people but 
also as the interconnectedness of many different causes, such as economic 
and social justice, anti-privatization campaigns, education and health, 
trade union issues, and anti-war politics. For GR, these are not issues 
to be dealt with only in the national context, but ones that need to be 
tackled in broader forums. When asked about possible contradictions 
that diversity can cause, a GR interviewee argues that that different aims 
and struggles do not compete, because it is possible to ‘co-operate and 
work on the same platform without excluding groups’. However, when 
telling about diversity in more practical terms, he admits that a very ‘open 
form of democracy’ can also lead to some problems. (Interview 2.) For 
instance, he describes the ESF in London as a ‘nightmare’ because there 
was a large number of groups discussing a variety of issues (ibid): 
It was very very difficult to get to a conclusion but we did get in the end, 
we did get an event going, we did get clear goal. It doesn’t mean that 
you want uniformity that you want regimented … movement. No, 
the whole strength of the movement, its power to overcome differences 
in light of a much stronger goal.
In other words, when very diverse groups come together, it is not easy to 
reach conclusions or a consensus. While some might argue that reaching 
a consensus or creating unity is not even the main point of these kinds of 
events, the interviewee asserts that the strength of the movement in fact 
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lies in ‘its power to overcome differences in light of a much stronger goal’ 
(Interview 2). In the end, then, unity is considered more important than 
diversity when assessing the power of the anti-war movement. It seems 
that for GR most problems in the world result from the unified ideology 
and power structures of global capitalism. Therefore, it accentuates that 
all different struggles should be combined together in a unified attempt to 
challenge the ‘mother cause’ of all problems. Here, its position comes very 
close to the poststructuralist idea of the Multitude, where diversity and 
unity are also emphasized simultaneously without seriously engaging in a 
discussion of the problematic relationship between these two concepts. 
The cases of StWC and CND also illustrate that while there is much 
talk about diversity and it is commonly portrayed as a power resource, 
unity is regarded as a more salient quality, at least when understood in 
terms of strength or an ability to work effectively. The fact that the anti-
war movement is very closely tied to the unity of the left means in practice, 
however, that some groups and activists find it difficult to participate in 
the movement, as shown by the case of WRI described below. 
WRI is the only one of the studied organizations that does not directly 
connect the power of the movement to its unity. Interestingly, however, it 
has the broadest definition of unity. The organization is characterized as ‘a 
part of the history of humankind in its sadhana (endeavour, ‘meditation’ in 
Sanskrit) to be liberated from the bondage that stops it from realising the 
importance of human unity’ (Prasad 2005: 21); or, put more specifically 
(ibid: 23, emphasis in original):
Humankind has to prepare itself to be able to know the difference 
between good and evil. And to be able to do that humans have to 
realise that they are one among the many, that they have to own the 
whole of which humankind is an integrated part. 
Although referring to the unity of humankind (which some may find a 
problematic term) as an important element of its pacifist ideology, WRI 
generally regards diversity as a more important element than unity in the 
context of the anti-war movement. Most importantly, WRI differs from 
the three other organizations in that it does not define diversity solely in 
terms of a diversity of people from different backgrounds. It often also 
refers to a diversity of ideas, ideologies and political convictions. The 
WRI history notes that WRI was ‘the first pacifist organization which, 
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from its foundation, aimed to address all men and women living in any 
part of the world, irrespective of their philosophical or political convictions, 
religion, faith, colour or creed’ (Prasad 2005: 20, emphasis added). It 
is suggested that the WRI ‘does not make any kind of discrimination: 
religion, faith, conviction, sex, race or colour’ (Willoughby in Prasad 
2005: 19, emphasis added). What is left unsaid, however, is that the 
above-mentioned philosophical, ideological or political convictions must 
not seriously conflict with the general ideology of pacifism. For WRI, 
too, there is a line where unity of purpose defines how much diversity 
– or, rather, what kind of diversity – can be accepted.
In regard to efforts to produce unity from above, WRI has emphasized 
that it is not ‘a centralised body to dictate or even ‘guide’ the individual 
members or the groups associated with it’, because such a body is ‘neither 
possible nor desirable’ (Prasad 2005: 93, 145). Centralization is regarded 
as impossible for practical reasons and undesirable due to the philosophical 
and political differences of its affiliates (ibid: 93). Therefore, WRI should 
sooner be regarded as a body bringing together like-minded individuals 
and groups, organizing common projects and doing ‘some basic group 
thinking, both constructive and analytical’ (ibid: 94).
Although WRI, unlike the other three organizations, does not discuss 
the concept of diversity explicitly in relation to the power of the anti-war 
movement, it is possible to determine the organization’s stance on the 
issue by analyzing how it regards unity in the same context. The WRI 
interviewee underlines that the most important element of movements 
‘is that they don’t have streamlines’. In his opinion, they ‘set off issues 
which have to be the same on all different levels’, resulting in ‘more or 
less stability’, which he regards as a negative thing from the perspective 
of effectiveness of resistance. (Interview 3.) In short, stability and too 
much emphasis on unity are believed to restrict the movement and hence 
decrease its power. The interviewee brings up other problems caused by 
strong emphasis on unity in the context of the movement. He feels that it 
is too much characterized by the SWP and the trade unions and views the 
StWC as a ‘self-acclaimed spokes-organization for the movement’ due to 
its leading position. Accordingly, he maintains that the overall situation 
for pacifist groups within the British movement is ‘very difficult’. (Ibid.)
It is interesting that while demanding that the new anti-war 
movement should take a more open and tolerant approach in regard 
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to pacifist organizations, the WRI representative is very critical of the 
StWC’s strong connection with another minority group, namely, British 
Muslim organizations. In his view, one of the main problems is that 
pacifists cannot give speeches or take an active role in events organized 
jointly by the StWC and Muslim organizations, because it could be 
interpreted as an expression of support for Hezbollah and violent forms 
of resistance. From the perspective of pacifist organizations it would be 
thus better if there were more ‘progressive Muslim groups’ involved in the 
British anti-war movement. Cooperation with non-progressive Muslims, 
characterized as ‘homophobic’ and ‘bigamist’ by the interviewee, would 
pose a serious problem, he believes, because it would require putting 
aside struggle for women and gay rights. (Interview 3.) This illustrates 
that not even WRI, which seems to have one of the most embracing 
definitions of diversity, can be regarded as truly tolerant of all the kinds 
of views expressed within the movement. On the contrary, many other 
organizations and  scholars (e.g. Gillan et al. 2008, especially 73–102) 
have celebrated the incorporation of Muslims as a new group into the 
movement as something quite extraordinary and positive. 
Importantly, the StWC has not tried to deny the problems that a 
diversity of views brings in this particular respect. It has publicly admitted 
that there is a problem in regard to representation of women, since the 
leadership of the MAB is ‘entirely composed of men’ who are ‘mainly of 
Middle Eastern origin’ (e.g. Murray & German 2005: 88). However, the 
StWC points out that MAB does have a women’s section and stresses 
that women are not that well-represented in non-Muslim organizations 
either, pointing a finger especially at the trade unions (ibid):
Anyone remotely acquainted with the British trade union movement, 
for example, will be aware that neither sexism nor homophobia 
are uncommon in its ranks. The organisations generally have the 
appropriate policies, yet women can be subjected to more crude 
sexist behaviour than they might be likely to encounter within the 
Muslim Association of Britain. No one would suggest that an anti-
war movement should have no truck with trade unionism until its 
ranks are 100 percent cleansed of such behaviour. Yet this is good 
enough as a stick to beat the Muslims with.
The StWC suggests that the above-mentioned attitude can be interpreted 
as ‘a form of racism’ due to the ‘desire to hold their organisations at arms 
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length for flaws which are, in some measure, tolerated in ours’ (Murray 
& German 2005: 88, emphasis in original). Although ‘homophobia and 
attacks on women’ should be opposed ‘from whatever source’, the StWC 
stresses that ‘such views are far from being held by all Muslims, and are 
certainly not unique to Muslims’ (ibid: 268):  
It is absurd to insinuate that homophobic attacks or wife-beating 
are exclusively Muslim problems … Of course, some Muslims 
– like many non-Muslims – hold views on some social issues that 
are more conservative than those of the socialist and liberal left. But 
that should not be a barrier to collaboration over common concerns. 
Would a campaign for gay rights, for example, insist that all those 
who took part share the same view of the war in Iraq? 
7.4     Conclusions
This chapter has reflected on the theoretical debate concerning the power 
of social movements (what is power) by empirically analyzing how power 
is conceptualized within the current anti-war movement. The aim has 
been to determine the extent to which the understandings within the 
anti-war movement ‘resonate’ with those of the three focal theoretical 
approaches, and what the main convergences and divergences are.
The chapter has shown that the organizations studied clearly articulate 
three elements that are believed to constitute power for the anti-war 
movement: public support, unity of the movement and diversity of 
the movement. Almost all debate concerning the power of the anti-war 
movement revolves around these three issues in one way or another. Public 
support is usually articulated either by reference to public opinion or public 
action. As one of the main organizers of large national demonstrations and 
some global action days, the StWC strongly emphasizes public action in 
the form of mass demonstrations and defines it as a power resource for the 
movement. Mass demonstrations are regarded as manifestations of public 
support, which is considered the main constituent of the movement’s 
power – especially at the national, but also the global level. The StWC 
emphasizes public action significantly more than the other organizations, 
the CND being closest to it in this regard. 
GR is more inclined to regard global, and not national, public support 
as the main power resource of the movement. WRI defines the power of 
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the anti-war movement in different terms than the other organizations, 
viewing it, quite surprisingly, from a very instrumentalist perspective and 
remaining skeptical of the current movement having any power over the 
government. In this particular context, power is defined merely in terms 
of power over those in power, although more generally the organization 
subscribes to a more multifaceted conceptualization of power. 
That most of the organizations studied conceptualize the power of 
the anti-war movement in terms of public support is logical, since public 
support is generally regarded as ‘the ultimate resource and the final arbiter 
between contending political organizations’ in any democratic system 
(Rochon 1988: 25). When viewed from this perspective, gaining public 
support can be considered as important for political parties competing 
with each other in the electoral arena as it is for social movements aiming 
to gain popular support outside the political arena in order to influence 
political decision-making by the political parties currently in power. In 
fact, it is usually argued that social movements are much more directly 
dependent on public support than political parties are. While political 
parties ‘are much better able to endure periods in which they are out of 
touch with the views of their publics’ (ibid: 25), social movements must 
always primarily aim at maintaining their public support, because without 
it they simply cease to exist (ibid: 101). Due to their organizational 
existence, political parties can concentrate their efforts on influencing 
policies (ibid), but social movements cannot take such risks (ibid: 25). 
Hence, it can be concluded that the great emphasis put on public 
support as a source of power for the anti-war movement by the 
organizations reflects the prevailing conceptualizations of power in the 
context of social movements. The anti-war movement is no exception, 
because its power is also regarded as resting on ‘its ability to convince 
others that it has extensive support’ (Rochon 1988: 101). Put differently, 
it is dependent ‘on the political legitimacy’ it has been ‘able to acquire in 
public discourse’ (Ruzza & Bozzini 2006: 113). 
Yet an interesting as well as important feature in the context of this 
study is that discussion about public support of the movement by the 
organizations is very often articulated in connection to the debate on 
the crisis of democracy. It is argued that people are not able to use their 
political power as voters and citizens of their country and that they 
therefore try to influence political decision-making through the anti-war 
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movement, which is believed to reflect and act on their political views and 
beliefs better than any of the political parties in the parliamentary system. 
In other words, it is argued that in the current political situation citizens 
are capable of exercising political power only outside the representational 
political system, whereby many have chosen to give their support to the 
anti-war movement instead of political parties and professional politicians. 
However, if viewed critically, support for the anti-war movement instead 
of political parties – at the end of the day also an attempt to influence 
political decision-making – is nothing very radical, because it can be 
regarded as more of a change of channel than as a radical effort to change 
existing power relations and structures.  
The above-mentioned views are not uncommon elsewhere in the world, 
either. Particularly in countries which have approved or participated in 
the US war effort in Iraq, similar views have been commonly expressed in 
public debate as well as in statements by anti-war organizations in these 
countries (e.g. Ruzza & Bozzini 2006: 125–127). This sort of reasoning is 
becoming increasingly popular in many other social movements as well, 
and as we have seen, is increasingly often reflected in theoretical debates 
featuring approaches from liberal to radical. They suggest that social 
movements have become essential bodies for political participation. While 
both the liberal cosmopolitan and radical poststructuralist approach argue 
that traditional forms of political engagement in the representational 
political system are ineffective2, the state-centric approach maintains 
that traditional forms of political engagement are the most effective way 
forward when the aim is to influence political decision-making.    
Although there clearly are very critical views of the political system 
within the anti-war movement, as reflected in the amount of explicit 
discussion about the crisis of democracy, the arguments of some of the 
organizations, such as the StWC and CND, actually resonate much more 
2 As illustrated in chapter 2, liberal cosmopolitans maintain that political 
engagement is not, and should not be, any longer linked only to political parties, 
classes or representative democratic politics. It is argued that the most important and 
urgent problems are not solvable in the context of the traditional political system. 
The radical poststructuralist approach makes essentially the same argument, although 
from a more structural perspective. It maintains that the decentralized power of 
Empire can only be challenged by decentralized forms of political organization, an 
achievement which only social movements are capable of, since they are organized in 
a networked, non-hierarchical and deterritorialized fashion.   
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with the those of the critical state-centric approach than those of the 
liberal cosmopolitan approach. These organizations have attempted to 
create a broad mass movement at the national level, an ambition that can 
be regarded as explicitly political in that it is directly defined as a form of 
opposition to the existing government. Although the movement as such 
does not take part in parliamentary politics, both the StWC and CND 
have actively tried to put pressure on the government through traditional 
political platforms. By drawing on their political contacts, members in 
political parties and major trade unions, they also seek power in more 
concrete terms within the political system. Hence, in regard to the 
national anti-war movement, the two organizations’ conception of power 
echoes the more traditional, instrumental view of power advocated by the 
critical state-centric approach. Yet, they are not hostile towards liberal and 
radical conceptualizations of symbolic power, for, at the same time, they 
consider it possible to engage politically outside the political system of the 
nation state and seek soft power via symbolic politics in the international 
context. In short, they have a ‘both-and’ approach, although the national 
context and power within the political system seem to be considered 
more important than symbolic power gained at the global level. 
GR, too, operates on a ‘both-and’ logic, but its emphasis is the 
opposite. Its conception of power is closer to that of academic globalists, 
as the organization promotes symbolic forms of political engagement, 
and preferably at the global level. GR’s approach actually comes closest 
to that of radical poststructuralists, as the organization seems to believe 
in some sort of global power that comes with global resistance. Only one 
of the organizations studied conceptualizes power in terms other than 
popular support, WRI. It is very critical of the power of the current anti-
war movement, pointing out that it has not been able to put enough 
pressure on the UK or US governments to stop the war. Here, the power 
of the movement actually becomes evaluated from a very instrumentalist 
perspective. WRI does not seem to believe that the anti-war movement 
can have much concrete power in the first place. Moreover, it argues that 
the movement does not have a proper analysis of power: since the power 
of the opponent is not understood properly, it is also impossible for the 
movement to make use of its own power effectively. The criticisms that 
WRI presents are quite similar to those expressed by the critical state-
centric theoretical approach, although the two critiques derive from 
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almost opposite premises. Contrary to what proponents of the state-
centric approach might urge, WRI is highly critical of engaging with the 
establishment and skeptical of other forms of power as well.   
While the StWC, CND and GR usually understand power in terms of 
collective power – that is, power of the masses – WRI explicitly criticizes 
this view in the socialistic framework. WRI itself has the most optimistic 
view in regard to the ability (power) of an individual to make a difference 
on her own. It is believed that an individual, no matter how powerless 
she might be considered, always has some form of power at her disposal. 
The most effective way to use it is by refusing to obey any official laws 
and restrictions set by authorities that the individual finds unjust or 
oppressing. In this view, an individual is not merely an object of the power 
of the state, but has power over authorities in her relationship with the 
state which can be used by refusing to obey, or by actively breaking, the 
law. This power is seen as manifested most effectively in civil obedience. 
Despite its strong emphasis on the power of the individual, WRI does not 
seem to totally disregard the idea of collective power. Nonviolent direct 
action campaigns are based on the idea of many individuals choosing to 
combine their efforts, using their power in a similar way when coming 
together. To some extent, the CND shares this view, especially when 
articulating the power of the movement in regard to certain forms of 
resistance, particularly direct action campaigns. However, when referring 
to the new anti-war movement, the CND views power in terms more 
similar to those used by the StWC and GR.
One interesting observation is that power as a concept is usually 
articulated by the organizations only when discussing the power of 
their opponents or the achievements of the movement; the power of the 
organizations themselves is rarely discussed, and the power of the anti-war 
movement is hardly ever evaluated critically. In other words, discussion 
about power struggles between different organizations or different 
ideologies within the movement is almost non-existent. Neither is there 
much critical discussion about the fact that as a part of the western and/
or the European anti-war movement, the organizations do not always 
reflect ideas and values embedded in other cultures very well. Only the 
WRI interviewee brings this up explicitly as an issue, but not even he 
puts very much emphasis on it. On balance, the organizations hardly ever 
consider the power of the movement from a critical perspective. In failing 
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to reflect upon power issues in their own context, they are essentially 
guilty of the same obliviousness to relations of power that they often 
accuse western governments of. 
When it comes to other elements that are believed to bring power to 
the movement, both unity and diversity are defined as power resources. 
The fact that unity is regarded as one of the major constituents of power 
is hardly surprising in the context of social movements. It is a commonly 
shared notion that a certain amount of cohesiveness is required of any 
social movement for it to be effective and reliable in its political demands. 
Thus, within the new anti-war movement, unity is also often regarded 
as a necessary condition for making collective claims and forming 
a powerful political body of resistance in the struggle against the war. 
However, there is much less explicit discussion about unity than about 
diversity. Indeed, one might get the impression that the importance of 
unity has been overwhelmed by that of diversity, given that the latter 
is constantly celebrated in almost all possible contexts. This perception 
would be flawed, however, as a closer analysis of how the organizations 
define and articulate unity and diversity reveals that much of the debate 
about diversity is actually related to issues that bear on the unity of the 
movement. In other words, when arguments are dissected, it becomes 
clear that, from the perspective of the power of the movement, most of 
the organizations ultimately consider unity more important.
Where diversity is explicitly discussed, it is argued to be an increasingly 
important factor, giving more strength and power to the movement 
(strength and power are for the most part used as synonyms). In this 
context, diversity is not so much of a value in its own right as a means to 
an end – one that helps to increase power. An interesting finding is that the 
organizations do not usually regard the concepts of unity and diversity as 
contradictory, but rather as complementary. It is of course true that there 
can be a certain level of unity and diversity at the same time. However, 
to regard the two simultaneously as equally important power resources is 
only possible when unity and diversity refer to different things – unity to 
the cause, and diversity to people. Only in this way is it logically possible 
to regard them as working in the same direction. 
One reason for the popularity of the ‘diversity discourse’ within the 
anti-war movement might be that achieving unity when defining the 
primary goals, targets and strategies of resistance seems to be remarkably 
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difficult at the national level, let alone the global. Alternatively, it could 
be argued that the discourse of globalized politics and resistance has 
made the celebration of diversity necessary, as in the case of the alter-
globalization movement. If power is not sought through unity (a clear 
definition of goals, enemies and strategies), then it be must be sought 
via mass participation on a much more abstract level. Hence, celebration 
of diversity as a power element is connected to ‘the logic of numbers’ 
(Gillan et al. 2008: 84–85). The difference might also be understood 
as ‘a distinction between political pragmatists and ideological purists’ as 
well as ‘between those who stress the political mission of the movement 
and those who give it chiefly a social role’ (Rochon 1988: 90–91). 
Political pragmatists tend to stress the political mission of the movement, 
ideological purists the social role of the movement. For the first group, it 
is more important to get the maximum number of supporters, while for 
the second the crux of the issue lies in the ability to acquire supporters 
‘who are fully committed to the movement’s ideology (ibid: 91). While 
the three leftish organizations – the StWC, CND and GR – can clearly 
be placed in the first category, the fourth, WRI, belongs to the second 
category. For all of them, however, the issue of unity and diversity 
always seems to come down to the question of power and thus also to 
the definition of power, that is, which element is believed to be more 
important from the perspective of power of the movement.  
Although not all organizations discuss the issue publicly, it is clear that 
the lack of debate about unity and diversity in relation to the power of 
the movement cannot be attributed solely to the numbers game or a need 
to keep the ideology as pure as possible. In addition, the organizations 
are likely to recognize that imposing unity on others can lead to internal 
conflicts3 just as readily as extreme diversity can lead to  tensions between 
different groups where a great number of competing views and interests 
emerge4. It is important how the organizations deal with each other, since 
3 Moreover, attempts to create more unity can ‘lead to superficiality and a 
curtailment of debate’ (Gillan et al. 2008: 98). 
4 Organizations do, however, compete with each other even within unified 
movements. As Rochon (1988: 95) points out, many outsiders have too ‘romantic’ 
a view about the peace movement when they imagine a ‘late-night planning sessions 
over numberless cups of strong coffee’, not recognizing that ‘the debates at such 
meetings are as likely to be about how to vanquish rival movement organizations as 
they are about how to join forces to abolish nuclear weapons’. 
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rivalries ‘may not only deflect them from their chief task’ but ‘also weaken 
the claim of any one of them – or of the whole set of them – to speak in 
the name of the movement’ (Rochon 1988: 81). In short, both unity and 
diversity can be problematic: too much emphasis on unity may produce 
internal conflicts, but too much diversity can as well. Although conflicts 
are more likely to arise when a movement is in decline, as happened to 
the anti-war movement in the 1960s (Taylor Young 1987b: 296), even 
during growth periods conflicts arise ‘between those who see membership 
growth as desirable and are willing to sacrifice movement goals to continue 
that growth, and those who do not believe that membership growth is 
important and may even be alarmed by it’ (Rochon 1988: 90). 
The analysis in this as well as previous chapters has demonstrated 
that there are many disagreements and even some conflicts between the 
organizations studied. Their differences are not usually discussed publicly: 
their websites and other promotional material contain hardly any mention 
of such problems, but in interviews they are brought up more openly. The 
interviews reveal that beneath the surface there is less unity than it might 
appear on the outside. It is interesting that many of the organizations seek 
to represent such a strong image of unity and consensus in the eyes of the 
public. While they seek publicly to de-politicize themselves in this regard, 
politics comes into the core privately in the interviews. The fact that there 
is not much discussion about differences or conflicts within the British 
anti-war movement more generally has been interpreted by some social 
movement scholars as a ‘deliberate strategy on behalf of many to create 
a welcoming and accommodating space of resistance to war’, reflecting 
the ‘desire to accommodate everyone within a diverse and heterogeneous 
movement’ (Gillan et al. 2008: 98, emphasis in original). 
While it is easy to celebrate diversity on the surface, in practical terms 
an increasing degree of diversity means a growing number of conflicting 
views and interests within the movement, which can weaken its claims. 
Finding the right balance between unity and diversity can thus be regarded 
as an extremely difficult task. Growing diversity and inclusiveness might 
increase the power of the anti-war movement (if power is defined in 
terms of numbers of people involved), but even this can take place only 
to a certain extent. In the end, there is a dividing line somewhere, a 
point at which more diversity starts to equal less effectiveness or power 
(again, of course, depending on definition of power). More diversity may 
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result in broader public support and more people becoming active in the 
movement, but at the same time it may mean that the movement’s aims 
and goals must be defined in considerably more abstract terms than in a 
more unified movement with clearer goals. 
Here, defining the primary context of resistance becomes significant 
as well. Do the central organizations aim to make the anti-war movement 
an increasingly broad movement that relies on mass support at a global 
level and thus advocates mainly expressive politics in a search for symbolic 
power? Or do they aim to create a more unified and exclusive movement 
with more clearly defined goals in the national context, which might allow 
them to more effectively pressure those in power in the political system? 
Or do they wish to continue with the approach they seem to adhere to 
currently – pursuing both simultaneously but for different purposes?  
As we have seen, these debates are not new within the anti-war 
movement, but they have gained new relevance and taken on new 
characteristics with the increased popularity of the discourse of globalized 
politics and resistance in both activist and academic circles. The idea that 
diversity brings more power to a movement seems to have become a 
mantra of sorts for new social movements, and has now become popular 
within the anti-war movement as well. Viewed from the perspective of the 
theoretical debate, it is important to note that the liberal cosmopolitan 
and radical poststructuralist approaches regard social movements as more 
or less consensual within themselves, working toward common goals in 
peace and harmony towards their stated objectives. In other words, the 
currently dominant globalist frameworks do not discuss any potential 
problems caused by a simultaneous celebration of unity and diversity. 
Only the critical state-centric approach succeeds in illustrating the 
conceptual tension between diversity and unity. As Chandler (2009a: 
220) points out, ‘without clear goals and interests it is not possible to 
think strategically about collaboration and cooperation’. None of the 
three approaches, however, provides any suggestions as to how conflicting 
interests should be discussed and handled within movements in order to 
avoid their being undermined by internal controversies that may result 
in less power and efficacy. This issue will be reflected upon more in the 
concluding chapter when discussing the shortcomings and failures of the 
theoretical approaches in their connection to political practice.     
To conclude with a more general perspective on the issue of power, the 
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alter-globalization movement provides an interesting case of comparison, 
because it has challenged some traditional understandings of power 
while arguing that it wants to abstain from power altogether. Chandler 
(2009a: 20) regards these arguments as alarming, interpreting them in 
terms of popular disengagement from politics as well as power: ‘The more 
we engage in politics without a strong sense of collective social power 
the more we see power as alien and threatening to us’. While these are 
certainly legitimate concerns, ones that may have manifested themselves 
in the alter-globalization movement, the analysis here indicates that rather 
the opposite is true in the case of the British anti-war movement. The 
majority of the organizations regularly bring up the importance of power 
and evaluate the movement in terms of its effectiveness and achievements 
(see also chapter 8). Given that organizations represent the movement 
even as the ‘world’s second superpower’, they can hardly be regarded as 
reluctant to broach the issue of power. They clearly articulate that power 
is an important, if not the most important, constituent of resistance. 
This chapter has demonstrated, firstly, that the organizations regard 
the anti-war movement as striving for power, having power and using 
it to achieve its goals. Secondly, the chapter has demonstrated that the 
organizations conceptualize the power of the movement mainly in terms 
of public support, unity and diversity. Thirdly, and most importantly, the 
chapter has shown that each of the organizations studied generally has 
a broader and more multifaceted understanding of power than any of 
the three theoretical approaches analyzed. While the theoretical debate 
is based on a clear ‘either-or’ logic – power being conceptualized either 
in purely expressive and symbolic terms (academic globalists) or purely 
instrumental terms (critical state-centric approach) – most organizations 
combine these two and consider both important in the struggle against 
(the) war. In other words, the organizations sooner advocate a ‘both-and’ 
approach, although there are slightly different emphases in their views. 
Despite the fact that power has been defined in this chapter in 
many different ways, it remains unclear what the power of the anti-war 
movement is, and what it can be, in more concrete terms. In order to go 
beyond the abstract level, the final empirical analysis chapter examines 
what the organizations believe the anti-war movement has been able to 
achieve while struggling against the Iraq War.
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8         WINNING WHILE LOSING? SUCCESSES
           AND FAILURES  
8.       Introduction
This chapter deals with the question of the effects of resistance. It empirically 
analyzes how the organizations studied understand the successes and 
failures of the current anti-war movement (what have been its effects). 
The chapter differs from the previous empirical analysis chapters in that 
it seeks to broaden and deepen what in the previous chapter was a rather 
abstract analysis of the different conceptualizations of power in the anti-
war movement. 
Hence, it is useful to probe the issue of power in relation to that 
of effectiveness, which means analyzing what the anti-war movement is 
thought to have achieved with its power when struggling against the Iraq 
War. The empirical analysis to that end addresses the following questions: 
What are regarded as the main achievements and effects of the new anti-
war movement? What are regarded as its main failures and shortcomings? 
How are both successes and failures justified and explained?5 
The chapter will demonstrate that the four organizations of the case 
study understand the achievements and successes of the movement 
quite broadly, defining them in both instrumental and symbolic terms 
as well as in both national and global terms. They differ, however, in 
what they consider the movement’s most important achievements to be 
and what they expect it to be able to achieve. This indicates that they 
have different understandings more generally of how the effectiveness 
of resistance should be evaluated. In the conclusions, these observations 
help to contextualize findings of the previous chapter, which dealt with 
the question of power. 
5 As the nature of these questions clearly illustrates, the purpose is not to make              
any kind of impact analysis, or claims about ‘real’ outcomes and effects of anti-war 
activism, but to analyze how they are understood within the movement.         
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8.2 Perspectives on Achievements and Successes  
The organizations studied differ quite much in how they consider the 
main achievements of the new anti-war movement. Whereas one of them 
(the StWC) presents a great variety of remarkable achievements and 
successes both at the national and the global level, two are more cautious 
(the CND and GR), and one is very skeptical about any achievements 
(WRI). The section to follow presents the organizations’ views about the 
main national achievements of the movement. Thereafter, the chapter 
introduces their views concerning broader impacts.   
8.2. National Achievements 
Constraining the Government and Shaking the Establishment
According to the StWC and CND material, one of the main achievements 
of the new movement has been to constrain the British government’s 
actions and political decision-making in regard to the Iraq War. It is 
argued, for example, that due to pressure by the movement, the number 
of British troops in Iraq has been decreasing continuously. While pointing 
out that the number is four thousand at the time of the interview (March 
2008), an StWC interviewee stresses that the Prime Minister has been 
‘forced to promise to withdraw’ the remaining troops. (Interview 4.) 
However, it is admitted that it is difficult to evaluate the extent of the 
movement’s influence since there are no ‘figures saying the Stop the War 
movement has reduced the number of troops in Iraq to this level’ (ibid): 
Our movement has a very important role to play even though we don’t 
always see it… and you never get a pat on a back for what you do 
... but by constantly raising it as an issue you make it very difficult 
for governments to maintain troop levels there. And of course the 
nature of a resistance movement is not that you defeat the occupying 
power but you make it so expensive for them to maintain their 
occupation and so politically difficult for them at home to maintain 
their occupation that they want to leave.
Although it is admitted that any direct influence is difficult to evaluate, 
at the same time it is maintained that the movement has pressured the 
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government into reducing the number of troops in Iraq. Similarly, a 
CND interviewee argues that the movement can be credited with the fact 
that ‘on the whole, the troops in Iraq couldn’t be increased but they were 
reduced’ (Interview 1). Some interviewees are concerned that people fail 
to recognize that government reductions in troop numbers are due to the 
pressure by the anti-war movement. For instance, an StWC representative 
says that he understands people may be frustrated due to the lack of 
progress in ending the war, but that he is disappointed because they do 
not ‘look at the actual progress that has been made’ (Interview 4). 
The StWC also argues that the recruitment numbers of the British 
army have ‘dropped off sharply as a consequence of anti-war campaigning’ 
(Murray & German 2005: 274). The argument is supported by pointing 
out that the army itself has been ‘forced to acknowledge publicly that the 
Stop the War Coalition has had an impact on levels of recruitment’ (ibid: 
3). Moreover, it is stressed that government decisions and policies ‘have 
been exposed to public scrutiny as never before’ (ibid: 274). It is also 
claimed that the movement ‘deterred the government’ from implementing 
its plans ‘that Iraq was to be followed by more interventions’ (Curtis in 
Murray & German 2005: 27). This is regarded as ‘a major public success, 
a sign of how significant a force of popular protest can be, and how 
it can push elites off course’ (ibid). Indeed, the StWC stresses that the 
movement ‘has shaken the political establishment in Britain’ (Nineham 
& Burgin 2008: 23) while reflecting ‘the rising discontent with the world’s 
one remaining superpower and its loyal allies in the Blair government’ 
(Murray & German 2005: 5). The anti-war movement is described as a 
‘transformative movement’ that has ‘helped to change British politics’ and 
claims that it is now considered ‘part of the debate in unions, political 
parties and religious communities’ (ibid: 6). Here, the movement is 
represented as ‘central to the political culture on the left’ and the belief is 
that it will continue ‘to shape the course of politics’ not only where the 
Iraq War and the transnational relationship are concerned, but also in 
regard to how ‘Britain is governed’ (ibid: 6, 202). 
One very interesting argument is that the movement has not only 
made an impact on the current government but can potentially influence 
governments of the future as well. The StWC indicates that the anti-war 
movement could be ‘accepted as a permanent feature in decision making 
by all future governments’ (Benn in Murray & German 2005, emphasis 
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added). Simultaneously with this remarkable optimism, however, the 
organization points out elsewhere that the current government is still ‘deaf 
to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the country’ (Nineham 
& Burgin 2008: 20). In other words, there is some ambivalence in the 
arguments. In any case, directly influencing the government can be 
regarded as one of the most challenging tasks for any social movement 
(Rochon 1988: 108). As social movement scholars note, direct influence 
is usually only possible by putting ‘so many people into the streets that 
the government would fear for its electoral life if it did not respond to 
the movement’s demands’ or by ‘by gaining the support or at least some 
parties in the governing coalition’ (ibid). 
Getting Rid of Tony Blair
One of the most common arguments in regard to the achievements of the 
movement is its ‘getting rid of ’ Prime Minister Tony Blair of the Labour 
Party. Broader impacts on the popularity of the Labour Party are also 
brought up. These arguments are found mainly in the StWC and CND 
material, are very rarely mentioned by GR, and not put forward at all 
by WRI; the same distribution applies in the interviews. By referring to 
its campaign slogan ‘Blair must go’, the StWC straightforwardly argues 
that the anti-war movement was Prime Minister Tony Blair’s ‘nemesis’ 
(Nineham & Burgin 2008: 23). More specifically, it is maintainded that 
the mass demonstrations against the war organized by the movement 
‘ended his career’ (Interview 4). Or, as a CND representative puts it, the 
movement ‘wrecked Blair’ (Interview 6).
Some interviewees describe the role of the anti-war movement a bit 
differently in this context. For instance, a GR representative says that 
some StWC members ‘would claim that Blair would have stayed longer 
in office if there hadn’t been pressure from the Stop the War’ (Interview 
7). By wording her comment in this particular way, she implies that 
the argument is not necessarily very convincing. Even the StWC itself 
admits that, prior to the build-up against Iraq, Blair had ‘already lost 
much of his credibility’, being ‘widely resented within his own party and 
among his own natural supporters’ (Murray & German 2005: 29–30). 
It is also recognized that the doctrine of ‘liberal imperialism’ advocated 
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by Blair does not have a ‘great reservoir of support’ in Britain (ibid: 
30). Here, the claim that the anti-war movement ended Blair’s career 
assumes an altogether different content.6 Nevertheless, it is argued that 
the movement posed a challenge to the Labour Party in more general 
terms as well. According to the StWC, the movement takes credit not 
only for Tony Blair being forced out of Downing Street, but also for 
the fact that other central supporters of the war ‘have been driven from 
office’ (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 4). Similarly, a CND intervieww 
suggests that there has been ‘enormous long-term damage to the Labour 
Party’ and large numbers of members have resigned from it (Interview 
6). None of the arguments evaluate or speculate on the extent to which 
certain developments might be attributed to the war itself instead of, or 
in addition to, the anti-war movement. 
Impacts on British Society and People
Influencing Public Opinion 
Many of the organizations regard shaping public opinion at the national 
level as a central achievement of the new British anti-war movement. The 
impact on domestic attitudes is mentioned often in both the promotional 
material and the interviews, especially by the StWC. One interviewee 
argues that the demonstrations organized in the course of several years 
have had a ‘massive effect on the wider public opinion’ (Interview 5):  
We have had since the early days the majority public opinion in this 
country and the other countries around the world are against the war. 
And I think that the capacity of the movement to continue mobilizing 
throughout that period has been central to chancing public opinion 
on that scale. 
In discussing the anti-war movement’s ability to shape public opinion, 
many interviewees refer to the February 2003 demonstration as the single 
most important political event (Interview 2/GR; Interview 4/StWC; 
6 Moreover, the StWC points out that although Blair did leave office ‘early and 
in disgrace over the war’, things did not turn out too badly for him, as he was later 
appointed UN peace envoy to the Middle East (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 19).
272
Interview 5/StWC; Interview 6/CND). Some also refer to the critique 
that the movement has received in this regard (Interview 4/StWC):  
People say marches don’t change anything but ... in terms of public 
opinion it’s important that you continue to march, and that people 
can continue to see that you march so they know there is opposition 
to what has happened … of course the fact that people continue to 
march across the world … suggests that the movement that has been 
created is kind of sustaining itself over the years and years. 
Here, not only the size of the movement, but also its sustained nature 
is emphasized. These same features are accentuated by the other StWC 
interviewee, who stresses that the demonstration taking place at the time 
of the interview (20 March 2008) is already the organization’s twentieth. 
He believes that the anti-war movement has succeeded in many ways 
in changing the atmosphere in the domestic context, with increasing 
numbers of people have turned against the Iraq War. (Interview 5.) The 
StWC history suggests that the justification for the war has been ‘largely 
discredited’ because the anti-war movement’s arguments have prevailed 
and ‘been vindicated’ (Murray & German 2005: 3). 
Both CND interviewees emphasize the movement’s influence on 
domestic politics via mass demonstrations that have shaped public 
opinion (Interview 1; Interview 6). They argue that it is obvious that ‘the 
huge demonstrations have made a difference’ by changing the ‘atmosphere 
and the cynicism which the public views the state, military and political 
leaders who [fight] that war’ (Interview 6). In this and similar arguments, 
the organizations active in the anti-war movement are clearly regarded 
as opinion leaders who have put and keep the war on the public agenda. 
Nonetheless, it is very difficult to evaluate how much the movement 
has influenced public opinion7. Opinion polls generally only tell what 
people think about the war at different times. Even if people were directly 
asked how much they believe the anti-war movement has affected their 
opinions, it would be very difficult for them to evaluate the influence of 
a single factor among many. Some people certainly would have opposed 
7 This difficulty has been acknowledged within the anti-war movement. It has 
been argued, however, that although it is difficult to prove a causal relationship 
between the movement and public opinion, it does not make sense to deny any 
impact by the movement on public opinion (e.g. Hayden 2007: 134). 
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the war even without the anti-war movement. When talking about 
beliefs and opinions, it is important to note that influence of this nature 
and magnitude circulates not only through a movement to people, but 
also from people to the movement (and from people to people). Thus, 
the movement was simultaneously reflecting the anti-war attitude and 
inspiring more of it. It also needs to be noted that influencing public 
opinion is one thing, and making public opinion politically effective 
is quite another. As social movement scholars point out, a common 
shortcoming within movements ‘is the difficulty of translating large 
numbers of demonstrations into political power’ (Rochon 1988: 109).   
Getting People Interested in Politics Again, Waking Up a New Generation
Many of the organizations maintain that the new anti-war movement 
has managed to inspire interest in politics at a difficult time when there 
is generally deep mistrust towards political parties and representational 
democracy more generally. It is often stressed that the political system, 
and especially the Labour government, has misused its power in making 
war-related decisions the majority of its voters do not approve of. It is 
argued that the anti-war movement has compensated for this lack of 
democracy by offering at least some ‘real alternatives’. In particular, the 
February 2003 demonstration in London is embraced as a proof of this. 
For example, an StWC interviewee says that ‘when you have a march of 
that size, you can no longer talk about political apathy’. (Interview 4, also 
Rees 2006: 119.) In this interpretation, instead of voting, people express 
their opinions and manifest their power through participation in the 
anti-war movement and its demonstrations. Indeed, as social movement 
scholars point out, the great ‘mobilization of anti-war support took place 
at a time when it was commonplace to point to declining participation 
in elections in established democracies’ (Gillan et al. 2008: x, also 182). 
Despite (or due to) declining interest in traditional forms of political 
engagement, the anti-war movement has managed to attract millions of 
people to join demonstrations. 
Another accomplishment brought up by the organizations – most 
often by the StWC and CND – is that the anti-war movement has 
succeeded in awakening the interest of  young people who have not been 
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politically active previously. For example, the StWC suggests that an e-
mail received after the February 2003 demonstration probably expresses 
‘the view of millions’ (Murray & German 2005: 161, emphasis added):
I would just like to assure you that there are many of us virgin marchers 
of this year who will not forget, not be quiet, and not take injustice 
lying down any more. The marches of this year, however much or 
little difference they made to the decisions or policies of government, have 
made deep impressions on the lives of the marchers.   
Some interviewees portray the February 2003 demonstration as sort of a 
‘key experience’ for young people, which, as their first big demonstration, 
has a long-term effect on their opinions (Interview 4/StWC; Interview 6/
CND). It is not, however, the only event which is believed to have had an 
impact on the younger generation. For example, hundreds of thousands 
of pupils and students marching out of schools to oppose the war during 
the period of school strikes is described as proof of a generation ‘woken up 
to political involvement on the basis of the anti-war movement’ (Murray 
& German 2005: 191). According to the StWC, this shows that the new 
generation has shaken off ‘its undeserved reputation for political apathy 
and passive consumerism’ (ibid). It is also believed that young people 
becoming politically active ‘on a mass scale for the first time in more than 
a generation’ will be an important factor ‘in years to come’ (ibid: 276). 
Another achievement of the movement that becomes articulated in 
the above-mentioned context is empowerment of the participants. As one 
interviewee puts it, participation in the anti-war movement is a process 
that has the effect of changing the views of participants (Interview 2/
GR). In other words, it is a learning process in which new meanings 
and interpretations are negotiated and constructed along the way. In 
social movement theory, empowerment has been described as a process 
that ‘generally leads to an enhanced feeling of personal capability and of 
control over events’ (Rochon 1988: 107). Hence, it is suggested that the 
deepest impact of any social movement activity ‘is on the participants 
themselves’ (ibid: 106). Additionally, it can lead to previously separate 
issues as well as groups of people being seen as connected to each other. 
This aspect is discussed in more detail below. 
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Uniting People from Different Backgrounds
Uniting people from different backgrounds is regarded as yet another 
achievement of the new anti-war movement. Indeed, scholars commonly 
point out that just as wars have the capacity to unify people via ‘bonds of 
patriotism’, the peace movement can unite ‘those of divergent backgrounds 
and interests under a common cause’ (Peterson 1973: 130). In the context 
of the new British anti-war movement, it is pointed out especially often 
that the movement has succeeded in providing a platform for the British 
Muslim community. Most frequently this is accentuated by the StWC 
and CND, which have cooperated with Muslim groups and associations 
(e.g. Murray & German 2005: 82). Pointing out that the idea of Muslims 
‘playing a leading part in a peace movement had apparently not occurred 
to anyone’, the StWC stresses that now they ‘have been brought into a 
campaign with the broader community on an unprecedented scale’ (ibid: 
57, 274). The wording is a little bit unfortunate as it gives the impression 
that the StWC ‘brought’ the Muslims in without the latter having much 
to do with the decision themselves. In a somewhat similar fashion, the 
StWC argues that the British Muslims have now established a connection 
to the socialist left (ibid: 61, emphasis added):  
One of the consequences of the work of the Stop the War Coalition 
and the Muslim Association of Britain has been to intensify the 
isolation of such groups, both by bringing millions of Muslims into 
alliance with the socialist left and other sections of political life, and by 
demonstrating the power of the collective progressive politics. 
More generally, it is suggested that ‘the Stop the War movement’ has 
succeeded in building ‘an alliance that brings people from all nationalities 
together including Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Jews and Buddhists which 
will stand us in good stead in the future and build a strong international 
foundation for justice and peace’ (Benn in Nineham & Burgin 2008: 2). 
Both of the examples mentioned above illustrate that the StWC regards 
uniting people from different backgrounds as a significant achievement 
insofar as it succeeds at the same time in producing and maintaining 
unity. In more explicit terms, maintaining unity of the movement ‘is one 
of the achievements of the Coalition’ (Murray & German 2005: 55), this 
unity referring to the unity of the left (ibid: 276, emphasis added): 
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The left itself has been united in struggle – no small achievement, given 
its fractious history, and essential for it to make any future progress.
   
As the StWC’s close partner, the CND more or less celebrates all of the 
achievements presented by the StWC, as is well illustrated in a claim 
by the CND chair that the greatest achievement of the StWC has been 
to ‘have the political understanding, vision and commitment to provide 
an inclusive framework which has embraced the breadth of people 
protesting, to articulate the moral outrage of very diverse communities, 
and to facilitate the protest of millions against the horrors of war and 
the plain lies that preceded it, and the injustices and barbarity that have 
followed’ (Hudson in Murray & German 2005: 68). The CND suggests 
that while a coalition of socialists and Muslims has been regarded as 
‘strange bedfellows’, there have been other kinds of ‘strange alliances’ in 
the new movement, proving that it has truly managed to unite people from 
different political backgrounds. For example, the fact that cooperation 
has taken place between the anti-war movement and the Conservatives is 
regarded as an extraordinary development. (Interview 6.)  
8.2.2   Broader Impacts      
Enhancing Global Consciousness, Creating a Sense of Solidarity 
Shaping public opinion at the international level is considered one of 
the wider-ranging achievements of the new anti-war movement. It is 
emphasized mainly in the materials of the three left-oriented organizations 
– the StWC, CND and GR. References to international or global public 
opinion are especially common in the context of the February 2003 
demonstration. As an StWC interviewee puts it (Interview 4): 
What we said was ‘We know you’re lying and when you find out, it 
will be problematic for you’. But also we said ‘If this fails, if you get 
this wrong ... 30 million people across the world might say ‘We think 
you’re getting it wrong’’. So, by creating the kind of mess that they 
have created … there are 30 million people in the world now who are 
sitting back saying ‘I told you so’, and probably substantially more. 
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In the same context it is maintained that the movement has played an 
important role in enabling ‘a rise of global consciousness’ by continuously 
informing the public on the causes and effects of the war. According to the 
StWC, the anti-war movement has ‘informed, organized and radicalized 
millions of people’ (German 2007: 8) and thus ‘helped unite the people 
of the world for peace’ (Nineham & Burgin 2008: 3). Interestingly, while 
most organizations in this context refer to the effects of the anti-war 
movements internationally, an StWC interviewee stresses that the British 
anti-war movement ‘has convinced people to oppose the war where their 
countries are involved with it’, referring to countries such as Poland, Italy 
and Spain. (Interview 4.) A CND interviewee makes a similar point, 
arguing that there has been ‘a rise in understanding and a rise in a sense 
that international peace movements can make a difference’. This, in turn, 
can result in people regaining ‘a new consciousness in the West of an 
interdependent world’ that encourages them to work with people in other 
countries. (Interview 6.) It is suggested that anti-war demonstrations can, 
especially if televised, ‘encourage people in other circumstances’ (ibid):
It might not mean much in London because there’s so many 
demonstrations but it means a huge amount in Gaza. So, one has to 
think of the impact elsewhere. It also encourages people to do other 
things, more direct action. It all adds, anything adds to a bigger sum. 
The significance of expressing global solidarity is strongly emphasized by 
both GR interviewees. According to them, the new anti-war movement 
has provided people all over the world with an opportunity to express 
solidarity and hence helped them to understand that they are working 
for a common goal. On the whole, the work of the anti-war movement 
is believed to be resulting in ‘a growing number of people that are aware 
and are active’. (Interview 2; Interview 7.) 
Preventing Future Wars and Terrorist Attacks
One of the most interesting arguments to be found in the present material 
is that the anti-war movement has managed to prevent certain future 
wars. The StWC maintains that strong opposition to the Iraq War ‘has 
made further wars by George Bush less likely, and a comparable level of 
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involvement in them by Britain almost impossible to envisage’ (Murray 
& German 2005: 274). Or, as it is claimed more explicitly: ‘The strength 
of the anti-war movement has forced the US to put its plans for an attack 
on Iran on hold’ (Nineham & German 2008: 23). In short, it is argued 
that the movement has stopped the ‘next war’. StWC chair Andrew 
Murray put forward this argument in an article titled ‘We didn’t stop that 
war, but may have stopped the next’, published in the Guardian (Murray 
2008). One StWC interviewee refers to it directly (Interview 4): 
As Andrew Murray says in his article for the Guardian a couple weeks 
ago, he said that ‘We may have not stopped this war, but we may 
have stopped the next one, the Iran war’. It goes back in the agenda but 
falls off again but essentially I think that we went somewhere towards 
preventing it from happening. 
While the interviewee admits that the movement failed to stop the Iraq 
War, at the same time he argues that it ‘probably prevented an attack 
on Iran’. Demonstrations are given a very substantial role in this regard: 
‘When they [the Americans] think about attacking Iran, they think a 
similar size and scale of demonstrations, probably bigger’. Put differently, 
possible demonstrations are believed to ‘derail invasion plans’. (Interview 
4.) A similar argument is made by the CND (Corbyn in Murray & 
German 2005: 205, emphasis added): 
Yes, we lost. Yes, tens of thousands have died. However, it has built 
anti-war sentiment and a sense of purpose all around the world. 
Maybe it will stop other wars.   
It is suggested that the anti-war movement should not be evaluated so 
much in regard to its primary aim – stopping the war in Iraq – as in 
respect to the so-called ‘War on Iran’. A CND interviewee suggests that 
people should not be disappointed by the fact that the Iraq War was not 
prevented or stopped, but rather should consider the effect the movement 
had on preventing the war against Iran (Interview 6):  
  
Of those million, million that went in Hyde Park that day, eight 
hundred thousand probably think they wasted their time because they 
couldn’t stop the war. I would say to them ‘It’s stop the war on Iran’. 
279
The claim that the movement has succeeded in preventing a war other 
than the one it has primarily been opposing is extremely interesting. The 
same argument has surfaced also in the American anti-war movement 
(e.g. Bond 2005: 73–75; Benjamin & Evans 2005). As a claim, it is 
totally impossible to prove one way or the other, a dilemma pertaining 
to two other quite substantial claims, namely, preventing terrorist attacks 
and preventing the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the war. As regards 
the first claim, an StWC interviewee argues that since there is an explicit 
link between opposing wars and preventing terrorist attacks at home, the 
anti-war movement has helped to prevent terrorist attacks in both the 
UK and US. In his view, the movement has sent a clear message to the 
‘people in the Middle East’ that ‘there’s no point in coming and attacking 
us’ because UK and US citizens ‘are as much against the war as you are’. 
(Interview 4.) In regard to the second contention, the CND argues that 
it has helped to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in the Iraq War: 
‘Without the vigilance of world public opinion informed by organisations 
such as CND, it is possible that ‘low-yield’ nuclear weapons could have 
been used to minimise US casualties in Iraq’ (Hudson 2005: 251).
Breaking up America’s Alliances and Shaping US Policies
Additionally, the StWC argues that the British anti-war movement has 
been able to break up ‘America’s alliances’ (Interview 4) by shaking the 
‘unthinking alliance of most of the British establishment with the US’, 
which could otherwise have resulted in ‘long-term consequences in 
world politics’ (Murray & German 2005: 274). It is maintained that the 
‘conduct of the war and occupation has been in some measure constrained 
by the strength of public opinion’ activated by the movement (ibid). For 
example, President Bush’s decision to declare ‘mission accomplished’ at 
such an early stage of the war ‘can be summed up in the word “resistance”: 
millions of people around the world opposed the war from the start’ 
(German 2007: 8). Elsewhere, however, it is pointed out that the Iraq 
War is not ‘about the force of opinion’ but ‘about the force of arms’ (Rees 
2006: 36). It seems that even anti-war activists themselves evaluate the 
effects (as well as the power) of the movement from different perspectives 
– as is the case with the three theoretical approaches. Liberal cosmopolitans 
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explicitly celebrate the force of global opinion (e.g. Castells 2004: 161; 
2008: 86; 2000a; 2000b; Nye 2004a: 90, 105–106, 137), while radical 
poststructuralists also talk highly of its potential (e.g. Hardt & Negri 
2004: 258–264). The state-centric approach has not directly commented 
on the anti-war movement but is likely to be much more skeptical.
Interestingly, the organizations studied here do not bring up the 
argument that the anti-war movement succeeded in pressuring the 
UN Security Council to refuse an authorization for the use of military 
force by the US. Within the American anti-war movement this is a very 
common argument (e.g. Bennis 2005: 54, 56; Hayden 2007: 131–132; 
Weiss & Pugeda 2007: 120)8, and it is also brought up by some scholars. 
It has been argued, for instance, that preventing the ‘Bush and Blair 
governments from gaining Security Council support’ and forcing ‘them 
to proceed without international authorization’ was a ‘major victory of 
the global anti-war movement’ (Cortright 2008: 174, also 388)9.
8.3 Perspectives on Failures
8.3. The Failure to Pressure the Government to Withdraw 
                the Troops
At the time of the interviews (March 2008), one of the main failures 
of the anti-war movement at the national level is said to be its inability 
to pressure the government to withdraw all British troops from Iraq. 
While not mentioned very often in the public material, the matter is 
often brought up in the interviews. For example, it is pointed out that 
the movement has been ‘walked over’ several times by Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown. An StWC interviewee accuses Brown of trying ‘to defuse 
the issue’ by making promises which have not been fulfilled, referring to 
his announcement of troop withdrawal in two phases in 2008. At the 
8 As an American activist puts it: the movement was able to ‘delegitimize the 
Machiavellian faction who sought war at any cost’ (Hayden 2007: 134).
9 Cortright (2008: 175) suggests that a ‘creative dialectic developed between the 
Security Council and global civil society’ (including the global anti-war movement), 
representing a ‘unique and unprecedented form of global political synergy’.    
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time of the interview, there are over four thousand British soldiers in Iraq, 
which the interviewee considers ‘a far cry from the two thousand and five 
hundred that should be there’. (Interview 4.)
Later on, Prime Minister Brown announced that British troops 
would leave Iraq in 2009. After six years of war, the troops were finally 
withdrawn. As is the case with other developments discussed above, 
it would be difficult to evaluate how much the anti-war movement 
influenced this decision. It is very likely that the movement had some 
influence in terms of pressuring the government via mass demonstrations 
as well as influencing MPs and political parties inside the parliamentary 
system, but it would be misleading to argue that the troops have been 
withdrawn solely due to the efforts of the anti-war movement. Several 
other important factors may have been at work in the decision, not least 
the US government’s announcement to reduce the number of US troops 
in Iraq and to leave the country in 2011. 
8.3.2 The Failure to Prevent or Stop the Iraq War
The main publicly articulated objective of the new anti-war movement 
has been to stop the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both of these wars are 
still going on at this writing (September 2010). The Iraq War has been the 
main point of opposition for the movement since the first demonstrations 
held against the war in late 2002 and early 2003. Although there have 
been reductions in American forces and the British troops already have 
been withdrawn from Iraq, the fact remains that the movement was not 
able to prevent the war from taking place, nor has it been able to stop it. 
In public debate, the movement has been repeatedly reminded of these 
unachieved objectives and this seems to be regarded as the main failure 
also within the movement. For example, when self-critically analyzing 
the ‘weaknesses of the movement’, the StWC points out that the ‘tragic 
fact’ is that it ‘did not stop the war or British participation in it’ (Murray 
& German 2005: 200). Or, as a GR interviewee puts it: ‘You could say 
that the Stop the War Coalition wasn’t very successful because, you know, 
there is still war five years on’ (Interview 7).
As to the reasons why the movement has not been able to stop the 
war, two different types of explanations are presented. According to the 
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first, the movement came very close to preventing the war, but doing so 
would have required either more people participating in the protests or 
the use of different strategies. The second refers to the required time for 
effecting change. The first type of explanation, which is called here the ‘if 
only’ rhetoric, can be broken down into several categories.
The StWC’s stance on why the movement failed to stop the war is mixed. 
Some in the organization argue that it might have been possible if there 
had been more demonstrations and more people in the demonstrations 
prior to the war (Interview 5), while others say that it was not likely that 
‘a further demonstration would make the decisive difference’ (Murray & 
German 2005: 177). With regard to the latter claim, it is stressed that 
‘if the government could ignore 2 million people on the street, it could 
ignore 2.5 million, even if the larger number could be mobilised’ (ibid). 
The second type of argument concerns the choice of strategy, the claim 
being that the movement could have prevented the war if there had been 
more strikes in Britain prior to the war (Interview 5):
There were three hundred and fifty strikes when the war broke in this 
country. If that would have been three thousand and five hundred plus 
the demonstration, I think we could have stopped the war.
According to this interpretation, preventing a US-led war could have 
succeeded by organizing more strikes in Britain, which would have forced 
the British government to take a different stance on the whole issue of 
war. Without support from its close ally, it would have been more difficult 
for the US to start the war on its own. However, this line of reasoning is 
quite idealistic, because it assumes that Britain has a very strong influence 
on US foreign policy. Indeed, elsewhere the StWC contradicts its own 
argument by stating that ‘it did not seem that workplace-based action 
could be developed on a sufficient scale to stop Blair, although the 
Coalition did hold discussions with some union leaders to explore the 
possibility’ (Murray & German 2005: 177). The StWC is very critical of 
the role of trade unions, arguing that they should have been more active 
and taken a stronger stance against the war (ibid: 168, 172). It is even 
claimed that ‘the anti-war movement failed to stop the war because it 
was insufficiently implanted in a militant working-class movement’ (ibid: 
201). The argument that the movement was unable to influence the 
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government effectively because of ‘the state of working-class organisation’ 
(ibid: 202) suggests that the war could have been prevented if the trade 
unions had been more active and the working class more unified.  
WRI has a different approach to the issue. Since it generally considers 
nonviolent direct action as a more effective way of opposing war than 
demonstrations, its interviewee logically argues that there would have 
been better chances of preventing the war if there had been more direct 
action. More specifically, preventing the war might have been possible if 
only one per cent of the two million London protesters in February 2003 
had ‘gone to Fairport, where the US bombers took off, and blocked the 
base’. It would have been a more effective strategy since ‘the government 
would not have been able to arrest twenty thousand people’. (Interview 
3.) According to this interpretation, a different pressure strategy would 
have been more productive. However, it is again highly questionable 
whether a blockade of the US military base in Fairport in Britain would 
have prevented the US government from starting the war. Indeed, the 
argument that more direct action at US and British air bases and military 
facilities would have been more effective is explicitly challenged by the 
StWC. It stresses that only ‘a fairly small minority’ was ‘prepared for 
consistent confrontation with the state, and that would likely have led to 
their tactics, rather than the issues of peace and democracy, becoming the 
focus’ (Murray & German 2005: 202, also 177). 
More generally in regard to the failure to stop the war, the StWC 
emphasizes that it takes ‘a long time to push these things through’. 
Hence, people should understand ‘that things don’t happen immediately’. 
(Interview 4.) Some comparisons are made, for instance, with the 
suffragettes of the early twentieth century, emphasizing that they ‘had 
a decade of campaigning, including vicious repression, before their aims 
were even partially won’ (Murray & German 2005: 7). There are also 
references to the US civil rights movement, for which it ‘took years – and 
much death and repression – to win even the most basic rights for blacks 
to be treated equally with whites’ (ibid, emphasis added): 
The anti-war movement will have the same historical sweep, as millions 
around the world are forced to mobilise repeatedly against war, the 
poverty and inequality which breeds it, and the imperialism that 
launches it. 
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According to this and similar views, the anti-war movement should 
not be expected to produce any effects very fast,10 although the pressure by 
the movement is ‘probably going to bring the US troops out eventually’ 
(Interview 6/CND). It remains unclear when – that is, how soon – this 
‘eventually’ might occur. Here, it needs to be noted that the timeframe 
for expected results differs among and even within the organizations. In 
addition, they vary in what they regard as the most important short-term 
and long-term goals of the movement. A WRI activist has a legitimate 
point in emphasizing that the aims of the movement always need to be 
formulated in relation to ‘what it can achieve in a certain timeframe’ 
(Clark 2005: 20). He argues that ‘the more important it is to show results, 
the less visionary the demands become’ (ibid). Therefore, ‘the pursuit of 
the vision’ should not be abandoned because it is crucial to try to ‘find 
limited steps and possible forms of activity that enhance our capacity 
– our power-within and our power-with’ (ibid: 21, emphasis added):
We also need to look for practical and attainable objectives matched 
to our strength, which will ultimately be the steps towards realizing 
the vision: the impossible takes a bit longer. Redefining what is possible 
requires a strategy in which each phase creates a base for future 
expansion. 
In other words, it is maintained that the movement must also have 
‘impossible’ aims and objectives that can only be accomplished in the 
long run. It is, however, difficult to imagine that they could somehow 
be contradictory to the movement’s more immediate, short-time aims. 
Moreover, aims and goals may change along the way; they are not 
fixed for good. For example, although first an organization working 
on a single-issue campaign, the StWC has broadened its agenda due to 
political circumstances. Indeed, it suggests that those who argue that ‘the 
Stop the War Coalition has failed because it didn’t stop the war against 
Iraq miss the point – we are fighting against a whole set of wars and 
10 Whereas the StWC, as a quite recently founded organization, emphasizes 
the achievements it has recorded in a very short period of time, the long-term 
organizations have a very different time scale. The CND, for example, often refers 
to its achievements in regard to the Cuban missile crisis and the Vietnam War (e.g. 
Hudson 2005: 4–5, 87). Interestingly, WRI more often refers to failures and problems 
than successes (e.g. Prasad 2005: 118, 178, 434, 449; Clark 2005: 21–22). 
285
imperial adventures’ (Murray & German 2005: 7). Thus, although it has 
been stressed that the organization’s name, the Stop the War Coalition 
crystallizes its purpose, stopping the Iraq War is not regarded as the only 
goal anymore. Now, it is emphasized that the struggle against a broad 
range of ‘imperial adventures’ is going to ‘continue as long as the danger 
of such wars hangs over humanity’ (ibid).
8.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has reflected on the question of the effects of resistance 
by empirically analyzing how the successes and failures of the anti-war 
movement are articulated and understood within the movement itself. 
The aim of the chapter as a whole has been to deepen the analysis and 
findings of the rather abstract analysis in the previous chapter concerning 
the different conceptualizations of the power of the movement.
The chapter has revealed that within the British anti-war movement 
there are several different understandings regarding the question of 
effects. Although it is acknowledged that the movement has not been 
able to prevent or stop the Iraq War, it is believed to have accomplished 
many other things. In fact, some of the organizations present quite a 
comprehensive record of the different achievements of the movement. In 
the national context, the most significant achievement is said to be ‘getting 
rid’ of Prime Minister Tony Blair, who is usually represented as ‘Bush’s 
poodle’. In this regard, it is pointed out that the anti-war movement 
has shaken the political establishment, because, among other things, it 
has negatively affected the overall popularity of the Labour Party. It is 
also argued that the movement has pressured the government in many 
different ways, although at the time of the interviews Britain had not yet 
withdrawn its troop from Iraq. Especially the StWC and CND stress that 
the government has not ‘dared’ to increase the number of British troops 
in Iraq, but rather has reduced the number because of the pressure from 
the movement. Moreover, it is maintained that influencing domestic 
public opinion, uniting people from different backgrounds, empowering 
participants, getting people interested in politics again and encouraging 
young people to become politically active are among the achievements of 
the new anti-war movement at the national level.  
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When it comes to the movement’s achievements and impacts at the 
international (often articulated as ‘global’) level, the arguments become 
much more presumptuous. It is claimed, for example, that the anti-war 
movement has been effective in preventing terrorist attacks in the UK 
and US and that organizations such as the CND may have prevented 
the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the Iraq War. Of what are already 
quite forward arguments, without a doubt the most interesting is that the 
movement has prevented certain future wars from taking place, such as 
the ‘War on Iran’. Moreover, it is argued that the anti-war movement has 
been effective in breaking up US alliances and shaping its policies. The 
most common argument, however, is that the movement has influenced 
global public opinion concerning the war and thus enhanced ‘global 
consciousness’ and created a sense of solidarity at the global level.  
In regard to the main failure – not being able to prevent or stop the 
Iraq War – it is quite interesting that the organizations argue that the war 
could have been stopped if some other strategies or tactics of resistance 
had been used. Often, however, their views diverge on which strategies 
would have been effective in preventing or stopping the war. While some 
stress that it would have required more strikes and a more active effort 
on the part of the trade unions in uniting the working class, others argue 
that more and larger demonstrations might have turned the tide. Some 
believe that had there been more direct action, the war might have been 
prevented. In other words, despite the failures of the anti-war movement, 
all organizations strongly believe in the potential effectiveness of certain 
forms of collective action and the ability of the movement to achieve 
its goals by using these strategies and tactics – although they do not 
necessarily agree on which ones are the most effective.    
In terms of differences between the organizations, the StWC, the 
main organizer of national mass demonstrations and some ‘global’ 
action days, seems to be the most eager to proclaim a great number 
of achievements and effects for the movement while also downplaying 
some of the principal failures. This is approach very logical, because it 
allows the organization to promote its own role within the new anti-war 
movement and thus perhaps gain more public support as well as power 
inside the movement. The CND also emphasizes many of the successes of 
the movement brought up by the StWC, whereas GR and WRI are more 
cautious, or even skeptical, in this regard. 
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The fact that the StWC and CND have in many ways been the leading 
and most influential organizations within the new British anti-war 
movement probably explains to a great extent why they as organizations 
can and ‘dare’ to refer to so many achievements and effects. Their 
arguments about the achievements of the movement must naturally be 
viewed as an integral part of their own political campaigning. Nevertheless, 
explicitly bringing out achievements and results can be regarded as a 
positive thing from the perspective of movement as a whole. Publicizing 
achievements provides an opportunity for people, whether full-time 
activists or more passive participants, to have experiences of success that 
may further encourage their involvement in the movement. Obviously, 
the organizations also need to justify their existence to their supporters. 
As suggested in social movement theory, it is important to show concrete 
results and ‘specific political outcomes, or the temptation will grow to 
leave the movement’ (Rochon 1988: 108). The StWC and CND are 
no doubt justified in claiming that they have achieved concrete results 
at the national level, mainly because they have very actively engaged in 
the domestic political context, where they have the possibility to affect 
political decision-making more directly. Viewed from this particular 
perspective, the new British anti-war movement can hardly be accused of 
failing to engage in a political struggle domestically or of seeking change 
only at a very abstract level. 
When the findings of this chapter are evaluated in relation to 
the theoretical debate, it can be concluded that the views of the two 
organizations that regard the national level as their primary context 
resonate with the claims of the critical state-centric approach. The StWC 
and CND conceptualize the effectiveness of the anti-war movement 
mainly in terms of its ability to take part in and shape political struggle 
against government policies. Hence, their understanding of the anti-war 
movement is very similar to the view of the state-centric approach of 
‘properly political’ movements, which are regarded as effective when they 
succeed in building a popular mass movement and influence political 
decision-making in concrete terms (e.g. Chandler 2009a: 18–22, 
207–208; 2009b: 541–542). However, this constitutes only part of the 
organizations’ understanding. At the same time, many of the suggested 
broader global impacts of the movement that the two draw attention to 
are similar to those presented by GR; together these views clearly resonate 
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with the argumentation by academic globalists. When the organizations 
argue, for example, that the anti-war movement has influenced global 
public opinion and resulted in a rise of ‘global consciousness’, they 
resemble liberal cosmopolitans (e.g. Kaldor 2003a: 112; Beck 2000: 
65, 70; Castells 2008). When they frame the political significance of 
the movement in terms of uniting people with different backgrounds 
and creating ‘global solidarity’, they echo the tenets of Hardt and Negri’s 
radical poststructuralist approach (2000; 2004).      
Yet, the StWC and CND go even further than this, arguing that the 
anti-war movement has been able to prevent terrorist attacks as well as 
the ‘War on Iran’. In this regard, it is relevant to note that the critical 
state-centric approach has argued that global claims of success made by 
social movements may correlate with their limited success at the national 
level (e.g. Chandler 2004: 326, 328). In this case, the argument could 
be regarded as either correct or incorrect, depending on how the success 
of the movement is evaluated. If it is maintained that the movement can 
be considered successful only if it manages to prevent or stop the war, 
then it would be possible to conclude that global claims of success may 
correlate with the failure to achieve primary goals. In other words, it 
could be argued that there is a clash ‘between the claims made for global 
civic actors and the reality of their marginal influence’ (Chandler 2004: 
327). However, if it is maintained that the effectiveness of the movement 
should not be evaluated primarily on the basis of whether it has managed 
to stop the war or not, then the interpretation could be different. Indeed, 
in movement literature it is commonly emphasized that it is unrealistic 
to expect the movement to be able to end to wars immediately and even 
less that it could ‘topple the war-making system in the same process’ 
(Hayden 2007: 171). On the contrary, it is suggested that, rather than 
concentrating on concrete policy changes, scholars should pay attention 
to ‘private and modest successes that embolden the antiwar movement 
and sustain it from generation to generation’ (Scherer 2004: 24). It is 
argued that small victories eventually help to achieve ‘subtle and far-
reaching effects, including their impact on the next wave of mobilization 
and even on other movements’ (Chatfield 1992: xxv). 
When it is maintained that ‘peace movements tend to be concerned 
with what is possible for the future, rather than what is possible now’, 
their actions are regarded as ‘prophetic rather than immediately practical’ 
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(Overy 1982: 1). In other words, movements are defined as ‘storehouses 
of analyses, strategies, visions of possible futures’ which can ‘contribute 
to the capacity of a society to change’ (Chatfield 1992: xxv, also 180–
185). In this respect, anti-war (or any social) movements are regarded as 
characteristically different from other political actors. It is stressed that 
although political parties and social movements sometimes use similar 
tactics, the nature of the former should not be confused with the role 
of the latter (Hayden 2007: 170–171). Accordingly, the effects of social 
movements ‘must be evaluated by different criteria than those used for 
established political institutions’ (Rochon 1988: 101). 
Although the successes of social movements in regard to their 
primary aims (such as stopping a  war) are often described as partial, 
incomplete, or in some other ways compromised, it is suggested that 
they can nevertheless be successful and influential. In fact, there is a 
common saying among anti-war activists that ‘Many battles can be won 
while the war is lost’ (e.g. Green 1992: 148). Sometimes successes are 
even regarded as counterproductive, as the success of a movement can 
‘defeat’ it (Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 133). In a word, when social movements 
succeed in achieving their goals, their rationale and justification cease to 
exist11. In certain cases, this might be true, especially where single-issue 
campaigns are concerned, but in the context of the anti-war movement it 
must be acknowledged that even if the movement had fulfilled its short-
term goals – for example, ending the war in Iraq – there would still be 
many long-term objectives to pursue.  
Indeed, the difference between long-term and short-term effectiveness 
is crucial, as it is intimately connected to defining the main objectives of 
the anti-war movement. When categorizing three types of opposition to 
war, Bob Overy (1982: 2–3) suggests that the effectiveness of each type 
should be evaluated according to different criteria. These are movements 
11 Rochon (1988: 100–101) stresses that the most important issue for any 
movement is its ability to maintain itself and its popular support. While interest 
groups and political parties also have to ‘concern themselves with self-maintenance’, 
they are in a different position since ‘their organizations and the institutionalized place 
they have created for themselves in the political system frees them from concern with 
that maintenance on a day-to-day basis’ (ibid: 100). In contrast, for movements their 
own maintenance through popular support is ‘the single most important movement 
goal, greater in the short run than even policy influence’ (ibid: 101).    
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and organizations that aim 1) to eliminate all war, 2) to prevent or end 
particular wars, and 3) to prevent or eliminate particular aspects of war. 
Since the primary goals of each type are different, their main targets and 
strategies differ, and hence the criteria by which effectiveness is to be 
evaluated differ as well. When viewed from this perspective, it is obvious 
that ‘it is easier to stop a particular war – and even a particular aspect 
of war – than it is to banish war itself from human affairs’ (ibid: 3). An 
important point is also that those movements and campaigns which are 
aimed against particular wars – the Iraq War in the present case – usually 
‘operate closer to the existing political system in order to force change in 
government policy’ while those aimed against all wars concentrate more 
on attitudes and public opinion and tend to keep ‘some detachment from 
day-to-day government policies as they try to change the nature of the 
political system itself ’ (ibid: 3).  
Hence, the more ambitious the central goal of a movement and the 
broader and more long-term its agenda is, the less it should be evaluated 
from an instrumental perspective stressing immediate policy change. In 
other words, movements which aim to abolish all wars should be assessed 
in terms of how broadly they succeed in gaining popular support for their 
views. Viewed from this perspective, a movement can indeed be winning 
while it is losing. Although it might fail in stopping a particular war, it can 
nevertheless gain support for its broader cause (Overy 1982: 4). On the 
contrary, movements which aim to stop a particular war ‘can be judged 
by more pragmatic criteria’, with the crucial question, ‘Has it managed 
to stop the war?’, becoming more relevant (ibid: 3). The problem is that 
‘there is considerable overlap’ between different types of movements 
and they can also reinforce each other (ibid)12. Although it is possible 
to distinguish different types of movements theoretically, in practice it is 
not that easy and is sometimes even impossible. Most social movements 
engage in both particular, short-term struggles and broader, long-term 
12 One of the main reasons why movements are overlapping and mixed is that 
different groups (such as pacifists, anarchists, Marxists) support campaigns that do 
not necessarily reflect their primary objectives. It is regarded as rational, because 
participation ‘offers them an opportunity to demonstrate to a new audience the 
validity of their fundamental position’ (Overy 1982: 3). Therefore, for example, 
pacifists who principally oppose war in all its forms often take part in campaigns 
against particular wars.
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struggles. As we have seen in the thesis, this is particularly characteristic of 
the anti-war movement. There are also many tensions between different 
aims and timeframes (see chapter 5). It is not easy to bind short- and 
long-term goals together or to accommodate, for example, pacifist, anti-
militarist, anti-nuclear, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist struggles into 
a single movement.
This diversity and complexity makes it extremely difficult to determine 
from which perspective the effectiveness of the anti-war movement should 
be evaluated and how the proper criteria for the assessment should be 
determined. If the effectiveness of the movement is evaluated merely by 
analyzing its immediate impact on government policies, it may be too 
easy to reduce it merely ‘to a lobbying organization’ to be evaluated by the 
corresponding standards (Rochon 1988: 205). While it is very difficult to 
evaluate even the movement’s influence on government policy it becomes, 
as we will see below, substantially more challenging if the effectiveness of 
the movement is assessed from the perspective of broader achievements. 
To start with policy impacts, it is often suggested that since government 
foreign policy decisions are usually made in secrecy (Randle 1987: 158), 
it is almost impossible to evaluate how much influence the movement has 
possibly had on the substance of the policy, political accountability or the 
decision-making process (Chatfield 1992: xxv). 
Therefore, some scholars argue that many victories of the anti-
war movement ‘occur in secret, unknown even to antiwar supporters 
themselves’ (Scherer 2004: 24). It is also maintained that movements 
can usually be regarded as failing when evaluated from the perspective 
of directly influencing public policy (e.g. Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 128; 
Walker 1988: 5). Even when there are some obvious successes and effects, 
the anti-war movement rarely can be credited as the only cause behind 
change – although it often is ‘entitled to claim some effect’ (Hayden 
2007: 159–160, emphasis in original). In other words, even where it is 
possible to claim that particular decisions were influenced by the anti-war 
movement, it is still extremely difficult to evaluate to which extent this 
has occurred. Additionally, there are always impacts that have very little 
or nothing to do with policy changes (Tilly & Tarrow 2007: 128). In this 
regard, it is strongly emphasized that participation in social movements 
always has effects on the lives of the activists and ‘the social movement 
base in general’ (ibid). This view is particularly popular among those who 
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stress the significance of social movements from a broader perspective 
and regard it as difficult, if not impossible, to achieve long-term goals 
solely through parliamentary democracy13. They argue that short-term 
objectives cannot be separated out from ‘the need for long-term social, 
cultural, and economic transformation’ (Walker 1988: 152, also Chatfield 
1992: 179). 
Both of the approaches discussed above – an emphasis on long-
term versus short-term effectiveness – involve opportunities as well 
as challenges for social movements in terms of their effectiveness. As 
studies point out, movements which are based on short-term single-issue 
campaigns with clearly identifiable and immediate objectives are often 
parliamentary oriented and centralized in their organization and therefore 
often maximize their opportunities to directly influence government 
policy (Rochon 1988: 214–215). On the contrary, movements with an 
emphasis on rather long-term changes – and which thus primarily aim 
at presenting broad ideologically based critique – advocate a societal 
rather than a parliamentary strategy (ibid: 215). They are often organized 
in a decentralized fashion, whereby their ‘likelihood of achieving near-
term policy reform is slight’ (ibid). However, they are more ‘likely to 
exert revolutionary change on the values of those mobilized into the 
movement’ than movements with a parliamentary focus and narrower 
in appeal which ‘restricts the opportunity to mobilize large numbers of 
people and to change their political values’ (ibid: 214–215).    
In regard to the above-mentioned debates in social movement theory, 
it is interesting that there are not many examples of movements which 
have managed to combine the best elements from both approaches. 
For example, the new British anti-war movement seems to contain 
characteristics of both a popular mass movement and more parliamentary 
oriented elements. It also contains aspects of both the single-issue and 
ideological critique approaches, and simultaneously pursues multiple 
short-term and long-terms goals. In light of this observation, it was already 
argued that the either-or’ approach of the three theoretical approaches 
seems to be unable to relate to the ‘both-and’ perspective evident within 
the movement. The organizations studied generally conceive and assess 
13 For example, Rochon (1988: 205) argues that these kinds of broader changes 
require ‘a basic change in the international order’. 
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the achievements and effects of the anti-war movement in short-term 
and long-term, instrumental and symbolic, as well as national and global 
terms. When interpreted in the context of the discussion above, it can 
be argued that all of the theoretical approaches analyzed in this thesis are 
quite narrow. While academic globalists approach the effectiveness of any 
movement from an abstract and idealistic perspective, the problem in the 
critical state-centric approach is that it is mainly concerned with direct 
impacts on government policy, and thus fails to pay attention to broader 
and long-term goals, which take longer to materialize. Long-term goals 
are not often regarded as very exciting or revolutionary,14 because they 
cannot result in rapid changes. Since the results are less visible, they are 
also much more difficult to evaluate. Nonetheless, it is very complicated 
to assess any effects of social movements, be they short- or long-term. 
In fact, some scholars argue that this makes it is necessary ‘to go 
beyond asking questions’ about the actual successes and failures of 
social movements ‘within the existing conceptions of political life’ 
(Walker 1988: 81)15. Arguing that ‘political change is not just a matter 
of replacing one group of politicians with another’, for example, Walker 
suggests that political change involves ‘serious challenges to prevailing 
conceptions of human community, of the philosophical assumptions 
guiding people’s conceptions of what human community can possibly 
become, of what kinds of activities are to be considered as political, and 
even about where political activity is supposed to occur’ (ibid). In this 
perspective, the importance of social movements should not be ‘assessed 
only by their overt power to bring about change by themselves or by 
the credibility of their specific policy recommendations’ (ibid: 144), but 
14 As ‘radical’ is a very ambitious term and implies a political confrontation, some 
within the peace movement regard is as too strong a word (Chatfield 1992: 80). For 
others, the movement must definitely be radical as well as revolutionary. As Walker 
(1988: 155) puts it: ‘The ideal of the grand revolution is graphic and spectacular. It 
is heroic. It invites machismo. And violence. And counterrevolution. The practices of 
multiple transformations seem tame and unexciting, even evolutionary. They may be 
seen as diversions from the real goal: radical change.’  
15 Walker (1988: 169) criticizes those ‘who stress the need for a clear vision of 
the way ahead’, those ‘who understand the need for persuasive messages that will 
mobilize millions’, those ‘who have absorbed the expectations of History and have 
learned to equate local differences and plural histories with weakness, parochialism, 
and relativism’ as well as ‘those who equate success with short-term achievements’.  
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should be evaluated in relation to ‘their capacity to recognize, interpret, 
and symbolize patterns of contemporary transformations and to find new 
ways of being and acting that enhance the capacity of people to exercise 
control over the processes that affect their lives’ (ibid:144). 
This seems to be quite much expected from social movements, even 
though it is not assumed that social movements should come up with 
‘fully formed alternatives’ (Walker 1988: 82). They are mainly expected 
to ‘engage in an exploration of what such alternatives might be’ (ibid). 
In the context of the anti-war movement, this would mean, for example, 
that it should seek to ‘articulate ways of being together that enhance the 
possibilities of justice and undermine the need for violence’ (ibid: 144). 
When this debate on effectiveness, results and successes is connected 
back to the debate by the three theoretical approaches analyzed in 
this study, many critical questions arise. If it is maintained that social 
movements should be evaluated in terms of their ability to challenge 
dominant ways of thinking about politics or redefine power, why are 
they not then defined as the primary goals by the movements themselves? 
If the significance of social movements is defined in regard to their ability 
to redefine old categories of thinking about politics, can they nevertheless 
have other aims? How do these multiple aims relate to each other? What 
if the movements are not that interested in any aims other than their 
primary ones (such as to resist a war)? 
Defining the primary purpose of social movements in a very abstract 
way is too ‘easy’ an approach, because it leaves strategic considerations 
aside, according them only a secondary status. Although it is true that 
for the more radical movements it is more difficult, and sometimes even 
impossible, to pursue goals by bargaining with the established political 
system (e.g. Rochon 1988: 78), and although it is clear that effects of social 
movements ‘must be evaluated by different criteria than those used for 
established political institutions’ (ibid: 101), it is nevertheless problematic 
to totally ignore the primary aims of the movements themselves. 
Clearly, it is also necessary for the anti-war movement to have broader 
and long-term, even impossible, objectives. However, at the same time, 
these more ‘imaginative’ objectives need to bear at least some relationship 
to its short-term aims. As Rochon (1988: 108) stresses, in addition to 
long-term goals, it is necessary to have some ‘immediately achievable 
objectives in order to maintain activist commitment’. Although social 
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movements must ‘struggle for a just world peace as an ongoing process, 
not as a condition that can be specified clearly in advance’ (Walker 1988: 
5), this does not mean that there should not be any kind of specified 
objectives or strategies. There must be some kind of balance in this regard, 
just as there has to be some sort of a balance between unity and diversity 
(see chapter 7). 
The purpose of this chapter has been to analyze how the anti-war 
movement itself conceptualizes its achievements, that is, the effectiveness 
of its resistance. Analyzing the organizations’ views has clearly helped 
to broaden the discussion and debate also in regard to the findings of 
the previous chapter, which dealt with different conceptualizations of 
power. To be sure, the purpose here has not been to make any kind of 
impact analysis or claims about ‘real’ outcomes and effects of anti-war 
activism, because, as we have seen, it is very difficult to evaluate how 
much influence the anti-war movement has had. When the Iraq War 
is finally over, the anti-war movement may argue that it has played a 
central role in the process of ending the war. Undoubtedly, it will be 
as difficult to prove that argument wrong as it will be to claim that the 
anti-war movement has made no impact whatsoever. As Rochon (1988: 
23) suggests, in movement analysis ‘it is easy to overstate the significance 
of the peace movement based on the ideological claims of some of its 
leaders, or to underestimate its significance based on its immediate 
impact on policy’. 
296
9     CONCLUSIONS
This thesis set out to critically engage in the ongoing and in many respects 
polarized and contradictory theoretical debate on global resistance 
examining it in the particular context of the anti-war movement. The 
study has reflected on two currently dominant theoretical approaches, the 
liberal cosmopolitan and the radical poststructuralist as well as critiques 
of them presented by the critical state-centric approach. The aim of the 
thesis has not been to propose a new political theory of resistance for 
the anti-war movement but to critically evaluate, and thereby develop 
further, certain aspects of the current theoretical debate in relation 
to the existing movement. In this framework, my role as a researcher 
has been to act as a critical mediator between the metatheories and 
micropolitics of resistance. Accordingly, this has been simultaneously a 
study of recent and popular theoretical discourses of resistance and of the 
politics of resistance in the context of the ‘new’ anti-war movement in 
Britain. The empirical analysis has drawn on a case study of four anti-war 
organizations, carried out using a qualitative content analysis of material 
published by the organizations themselves and the author’s interviews 
with their representatives. 
Critical evaluation of the theoretical debate in regard to the anti-war 
movement has been necessary in order to discuss the conditions in which 
the theories may become not only more reflective of the current political 
practice, but also more practical in the sense of truly critical theory 
suggested by Stephen Leonard (1990) in his ‘critical theory in political 
practice’. Three main research questions were formulated in the thesis 
for purposes of the critical evaluation of the theoretical debate. The first 
is  how the three theoretical approaches resonate with (or relate to) the 
political practice of the existing anti-war movement, that is, how much 
common ground there is between the theoretical realm and the movement 
at the moment. The second asks what the theoretical approaches fail to 
consider in terms of political practice of the movement. The third goes 
on to investigate the extent to which the values and beliefs embedded 
in the broader normative political projects and visions proposed by the 
dominant theoretical approaches are similar to, or at least compatible, 
with those held in the current movement. 
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In this concluding chapter, these three questions are answered in 
separate sections. First, the main findings of each analytical chapter 
will be presented briefly in order to lay out the main convergences and 
divergences between the theoretical debate and the premises of the 
organizations studied. Thereafter the discussion proceeds to a more 
detailed treatment of the main failures of the theoretical approaches. This 
is followed by suggestions as to how the theories can be developed further 
by outlining a ‘both-and’ instead of an ‘either-or’ approach. The chapter 
then concludes by critically discussing the broader normative political 
projects and visions proposed by the theoretical approaches and finally 
also reflects upon the anti-war war movement in that perspective. 
9. Metatheories / Micropolitics of Resistance: 
              Convergences and Divergences
When talking about global struggles, suggesting global strategies for 
resistance and even constructing visions of a global collective political 
subject dedicated to resistance against war, neither liberal cosmopolitans 
nor radical poststructuralists have engaged empirically with the current 
anti-war movement, but rather have based their conceptualizations on 
what they assume of the movement and/or what they want it to become. 
In other words, instead of studying the ‘what, why and how’ of the anti-
war movement, they have considered it from above, analyzing mainly 
its concrete and visible political action. Many of the interpretations of 
academic globalists seem to be based solely on their observations based 
on the demonstration day on 15 February 2003, which is considered as 
not only a manifestation of global and consensual opposition towards 
the Iraq War but also a sign of the ‘birth’ of a new kind of an increasingly 
transnational, if not a global, anti-war movement. Clearly, February 2003 
has been a source of inspiration for their conceptualizations of a more 
permanent kind of global political subject dedicated to resistance against 
war. For liberal cosmopolitans, the event indicates the formation of a 
consensual force of opposition towards war in general (global civil society) 
on the basis of universally shared values. For radical poststructuralists, it 
represents an example of the becoming Multitude, which can in the form 
of a consensual global body of resistance wage a ‘war against war’.
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Chapter 4 reflected on these issues by analyzing how the political 
agency of resistance, the anti-war movement, its ascendance and central 
characteristics are understood within the movement itself. It was 
demonstrated that there is a gap between the political reality experienced 
by the organizations within the movement and the highly globalized 
and consensual interpretations made by academic globalists. Both liberal 
cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists emphasize global aspects 
and new characteristics of the movement substantially more than is the 
case within the movement itself. While many organizations do conceive 
some of its characteristics in new as well as global terms, the movement is 
more commonly characterized as a continuation of the long-term peace 
movement rather than a completely new and extraordinary phenomenon. 
Most organizations do resonate in some respects in outlook with the 
academic globalists, especially in regard to the celebration of the political 
significance of the February 2003 demonstration, but it is nevertheless 
more common to regard the movement from a national or international 
than a global perspective. Some contextualize the primary political meaning 
of the movement in domestic terms, for example, when describing it 
as a reaction to the failure of representative democracy in Britain. For 
others, the anti-war movement, rather than global, is characteristically 
international – more of a collection of nationally operating movements 
which, due to somewhat exceptional political circumstances, have 
managed to cooperate more closely together than is usually the case. In 
other words, international coordination in the context of the Iraq War is 
not necessarily regarded as evidence of a permanent phenomenon, or the 
start of a totally new kind of global project for the anti-war movement.  
Moreover, the chapter showed that the ascendance of the movement 
was not as easy and consensual a process – nor its relationship to the alter-
globalization movement as harmonious – as academic globalists tend 
to assume. In the British context there were many contradictions and 
internal conflicts even at the very beginning, ones which have continued 
to shape the relationship between different groups ever since. There are 
continuing disagreements within the movement, for example, in regard 
to leadership issues, cooperation between organizations, the preferred 
extent of centralization of the movement, and its connection to other 
movements. Although many differences were put aside for a while, some 
of the problems and sources of controversy still remain.
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Chapter 5 reflected on the theoretical debate dealing with the aims 
and targets of resistance (what is resisted) as well as the causes of the war 
in its broader political context (why is resisted) by analyzing how these 
are articulated within the movement. It was shown that rather than 
invoking the abstract forms of governance put forward by the radical 
poststructuralist approach, most of the organizations define the main 
targets of resistance in quite traditional terms, that is, nation states and 
governments. It clearly locates them closest to the critical state-centric 
approach. In regard to the long-term aims of the movement, however, 
there are also premises that correlate with liberal cosmopolitanism and 
also with radical poststructuralism to some extent. In other words, the 
results are mixed, indicating that there can be clearly articulated state-
level opponents and more abstract targets of resistance simultaneously. In 
contrast to the theoretical debate, it is maintained within the movement 
that these both are important, as they exist at the same time. In regard 
to the analysis of the causes of the war, there was not much resonance 
between the organizations and the theoretical approaches. Rather than 
explaining the war as due to an exceptionally dominant but transitory role 
of the US (liberal cosmopolitans), a permanent state of exception serving 
the global regime of biopower (radical poststructuralists), or the weakness 
of the west (critical state-centric approach), most of the organizations 
subscribe to a much more traditional Marxist analysis. They regard the 
war essentially as an imperialistic endeavor of the US, supported by its 
loyal ally Britain, which obeys its will while serving the transatlantic 
‘special relationship’. In this regard, the crisis of democracy was strongly 
emphasized. It was given different and partly overlapping meanings and 
explanations, of which some echoed the perspective of academic globalists 
and others resonated with the state-centric approach. 
It was discovered that there are substantial differences in regard to 
how the relationship between the short- and long-term goals of the 
movement is understood and to which broader struggles the current anti-
war movement is connected. While some regard the movement as a part 
of the anti-imperialistic, pacifistic or anti-militaristic struggles, others 
link it to issues of global social justice and the environment. Hence, it 
was concluded that, apart from its resistance to the Iraq War, it is quite 
difficult to build a clear and coherent political project for the anti-war 
movement more generally. Indeed, it became evident that there are 
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internal divisions and ongoing political conflicts within the movement 
even in regard to the Iraq War. In particular, the question of pacifism 
draws a clear division between some organizations. 
Chapter 6 reflected on the theoretical debate regarding effective 
strategies (how to resist) and the primary context of resistance by analyzing 
how these are understood within the movement. It was found that two 
of the leading organizations consider pressuring the national government 
in the form of mass mobilization as the most effective strategy; they also 
engage in parliamentary politics via their contacts with political parties. 
Cooperation with trade unions is also regarded as important. In all of 
these regards, they clearly resonate with the critical state-centric approach 
while advocating political strategies and collective action at the national 
level. One of the organizations advocates a strategy of nonviolence and 
direct action that take place in direct confrontations with state authorities, 
and thus relies on more of a localized than a globalized strategy, although 
the strategy can be applied internationally as well. One organization 
resonates with the radical poststructuralist approach in emphasizing the 
importance of global demonstrations against international institutions 
and stressing the interconnectedness of different struggles to be advanced 
by common strategies of global opposition. More resonance with liberal 
cosmopolitanism and radical poststructuralism was found in regard to 
strategies serving the long-term aims of the movement. 
These mixed results demonstrate that instead of defining effective 
strategies of resistance in either purely nationally/instrumentally or 
globally/symbolically oriented terms – as the theoretical approaches do 
– within the movement both state-based and global strategies in both 
their instrumentally and symbolically oriented forms are considered 
important at the same time, although for different purposes. While it is 
considered rational to pressure the national government, the significance 
of expressive, symbolic politics at the global level, especially in the form 
of international cooperation and solidarity, is emphasized at the same 
time. However, it was also discovered that the organizations have different 
emphases in regard to the primary context of resistance, and that there is 
considerable disagreement on which strategies are most effective. Of all 
the internal divisions, the one related to strategies is the most controversial 
and debated among the organizations.
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The two final empirical analysis chapters were closely interrelated in 
probing the issue of power and effectiveness. Chapter 7 reflected on the 
theoretical debate dealing with the power of social movements (what 
is power) by analyzing how power is articulated and defined within the 
movement. It was shown that one organization regards the power of the 
movement purely in terms of symbolic power, as an ability to mobilize 
broad public support at the global level; in this respect its perspective is 
similar to that of the academic globalists. More resonance was found with 
the critical state-centric approach, with two of the leading organizations 
conceptualizing the power of the movement in quite traditional terms, 
articulating it primarily in relation to the national context, where the 
movement can seek to pressure those in power. These organizations refer 
to public support as the main constituent of power, in the form of either 
public opinion or public action, and regard direct engagement with the 
political system and cooperation with major trade unions as necessary. 
Thus, the power of the movement is understood mainly in terms of its 
ability to influence political decision-making in the context of the nation 
state. However, this conception does not exclude the significance of 
symbolic power at the global level. Rather, what we see here is a ‘both-
and’ perspective, in which gaining power within the domestic political 
system is nonetheless considered more important. 
Interestingly, in addition to being articulated as public support, 
power was described in terms of unity and diversity of the movement, 
which revealed most clearly the tendency to understand power in terms 
of collective power, that is, the power of the masses. It was found that 
while unity is regarded as a necessary condition for making collective 
claims and forming a powerful political body of resistance, there is much 
less explicit discussion of unity than of diversity. It would be easy to get 
the faulty impression that the importance of unity has been overwhelmed 
by that of diversity, given that the latter being celebrated continuously in 
all possible contexts. A closer analysis revealed that diversity is often used 
as a euphemism for unity, which is valued more in the end. A diversity 
of political convictions and ideologies is rarely emphasized or diversity 
articulated as a value of its own; rather, diversity is regarded as a means to 
an end – helping to increase the power of the movement. In other words, 
while unity refers to the cause, diversity refers to people, understood 
mainly as numbers and masses.  
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Broadening this discussion, chapter 8 reflected on the theoretical 
debate concerning the effects of anti-war activism by analyzing how 
achievements, successes and failures of the movement are articulated by 
the organizations. It was demonstrated that achievements are usually 
conceived in both instrumental and symbolic as well as in both national 
and global terms, illustrating again the tendency within the movement to 
regard the issue from a broader perspective than the theoretical approaches 
do. However, it was also discovered that there are substantial differences 
and even disagreements in regard to what the organizations consider the 
most important effects and what the movement is expected to be able to 
achieve in a certain time frame. 
Taken together, chapters 7 and 8 showed that each of the organizations 
studied generally has a broader and more multifaceted understanding 
of the power and effectiveness of the movement than any of the three 
theoretical approaches. While the theoretical debate is based on an ‘either-
or’ logic, in which power is conceptualized in either purely symbolic 
terms (academic globalists) or purely instrumental terms (critical state-
centric approach), within the movement both of these are considered 
important in the struggle against (the) war, although the organizations 
differ slightly in emphasis. It was shown that in contrast to the alter-
globalization movement for example, the anti-war movement publicly 
acknowledges that power is an important, if not the most important, 
element of resistance and is also quite eager to promote its achievements. 
The movement is regarded as striving for power – having it as well as 
using it for achievement of its goals. Nevertheless, it is problematic that 
power as a concept is usually articulated only when discussing the power 
of the opponents or the achievements of the movement; the power of 
the organizations themselves is rarely discussed, and the power of the 
movement is hardly ever evaluated from a critical perspective. Open 
discussion about power struggles and conflicts within the movement 
is almost non-existent, only few interviewees bringing up these issues. 
Neither is there much critical debate about the fact that despite its 
being a part of the influential western-European movement, neither the 
national movement not the organizations involved necessarily reflect the 
ideologies and values of other cultures very well.
On the whole, the five empirical analysis chapters have demonstrated 
that although there is some common ground between the three theoretical 
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discourses and the current anti-war movement, substantial divergences 
nevertheless exist between the interpretations, conceptualizations and 
suggestions of the discourses, in particular that of the academic globalists, 
and the premises of the organizations studied. Many of the organizations 
resonate most in several respects with the state-centric approach, which 
defines politics as a struggle for power and argues that social movements 
are influential when they have clearly defined goals in the context where 
it is possible for them to gain political power, that is, the nation state. 
Nonetheless, all the organizations studied believe it is possible for the 
anti-war movement to simultaneously seek symbolic power at the global 
level. Thus, the aims, targets and strategies of resistance are defined in 
substantially broader terms by the movement than by the theoretical 
approaches. The fact that within the movement the understandings and 
premises are often overlapping, complex and mixed rather than clear 
and simple shows that is not only difficult but also unproductive to 
conceptualize resistance from only one single perspective. In this regard, 
all three theoretical approaches clearly prove to be inadequate. 
Why is this then problematic? Firstly, from the perspective of ‘normal’ 
political theory it is troubling that a lack of engagement with a current 
movement leads theorists to make inadequate and sometimes even false 
interpretations of its character, aims, targets and strategies or to evaluate 
its power and effectiveness only from one particular, restricted perspective. 
Secondly, and more importantly, it is problematic from the perspective 
of critical theory that the theoretical approaches are characterized by 
their inability to engage and communicate with the objects of their 
conceptualizations and/or addressees of their visions and suggestions in 
terms which could be practical, helpful, or at least somehow relevant 
to them. Thirdly, as we will see below, it is unfortunate that theorists, 
particularly in the case of academic globalists, define their political 
projects of resistance and emancipation in a way which enables their 
conceptualizations to be autonomous from practice, and their normative 
suggestions and visions to be divergent from the values and beliefs 
held within the movement. Despite the globalists’ many emancipatory 
claims, normative suggestions and even broader political projects against 
war, their connection to the political practice of the existing anti-war 
movement seems to be remarkably weak. 
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Before these findings can be elaborated on a higher level of abstraction, 
an important question needs to be asked: How generalizable can the 
empirical findings be considered when only four organizations have 
been studied in the context of one country? In other words: Would 
the empirical findings be different if, for example, German, French or 
Dutch anti-war organizations were studied instead of British groups? The 
answer is probably ‘yes’, at least in some respects. In each country there 
are historical, political and cultural factors which influence many of the 
issues studied here – for example, how the state and political system is 
being viewed by anti-war groups in different places and at different times. 
In Germany, for instance, the role of established political institutions 
has traditionally been quite weak in the anti-war movement, which is 
oriented to the grass-roots level and operates on a decentralized basis 
(Grewe 1985: 104; Kaltefleiter & Pfaltzgraff 1985: 189; Rochon 1988: 
83–97). Thus, it is likely that the German movement resonates more with 
many of the perspectives of academic globalists than those of scholars 
espousing the state-centric approach. Indeed, ideologies and coalitions 
vary in each country. Whereas pacifism has historically had a negative 
connotation in France (Dumont 1985: 138), it is deeply rooted in the 
British political tradition, deriving from a broader Anglo-American 
tradition (Kaltefleiter & Pfaltzgraff 1985: 188).1 It is important to note 
that while national anti-war movements in Europe are generally quite 
critical of their respective governments (Overy 1982: 6), the domestic 
political history has taught the British movement to be especially aware 
of the tendency of post-imperial states to emphasize global problems and 
resort to universalizing rhetoric2. Hence, the British movement might be 
more critical toward its national government and political institutions 
than movements in other European countries.3
1 For more on the differences between the relationship of the movement and 
political parties in different countries, see e.g. Rochon 1988: 163–165, 213–215.  
2 However, this has not always been the case. It has been suggested that during 
the Cold War, for example, the British movement was characterized by an inability 
to break free from the nation’s imperial history (e.g. Hinton 1989).  
3 National movements are also distintive in terms of internal divisions.The Italian 
movement is characterized by lack of unity and ‘rivalries between its different political 
and ideological components’ (Rossi & Ilari 1985: 150, 155). The German movement 
is divided between communist and non-communist organizations, while the French 
one is considered the most divided in all of Europe (Rochon 1988: 93–94).
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Due to the above-mentioned differences (and many others), it 
must be openly acknowledged that studying the premises of anti-war 
organizations in another country than Britain would surely have shown 
different degrees of resonance with the theoretical approaches under 
investigation. However, I argue that the most important finding of the 
thesis would nevertheless be the same. Even with its very limited case 
material, this thesis has clearly managed to demonstrate that the three 
theoretical approaches are excessively polarized and dualistic in their 
conceptualizations when these are compared to the understandings held 
within the movement; in that respect they all fail to relate to the movement’s 
political practice and premises. Within the anti-war movement there are 
very complex and multiple understandings in regard to all issues and 
concepts studied, ones which in the current theoretical debate are treated 
in much more restricted ‘either-or’ terms. The following section discusses 
the broader context of this problematique and its implications in more 
detail, after which suggestion can be put forward as to how it would be 
possible to improve and develop the theories further. 
9.2 Towards a  ‘Both-And’ Instead of 
              an ‘Either-Or’ Approach
When the differences between the three theoretical approaches as well 
as the divergences between their premises and those of the anti-war 
movement are evaluated in a broader context, an interesting question 
arises: Are the divergences and failures of the rival theoretical approaches 
actually due to the ‘either-or’ logic in their conceptualizations of power 
and the primary level of resistance? The liberal cosmopolitan approach 
maintains that political action should be globalized because politics has 
been globalized through external changes brought by globalization and 
the information revolution. The approach argues that any meaningful 
political engagement must take place at the global level, where social 
movements can gain symbolic power by influencing global public opinion 
through their informational resources. Radical poststructuralists hold that 
resistance should be globalized, because power has been decentralized 
and globalized. For them, too, the global level is clearly primary and 
they are blatantly hostile towards local forms of resistance. Critique by 
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the state-centric approach of both the above-mentioned ‘post-political’ 
approaches suggests that their analysis of the globalization of politics, 
power and resistance is fallacious. In order to be effective, resistance must 
be based on properly political, strategic and instrumental engagement at 
the national level, where real political power is located. 
Hence, it can be argued that while for academic globalists ‘the 
struggle is the message’, for the critical state-centric approach the 
struggle is the necessary price of success4. Although the state-centric and 
global theoretical approaches are different, even opposite in this regard, 
they all share a characteristic that is deeply problematic as regards their 
connection to the existing anti-war movement. They are all based on 
somewhat binary and totalizing frameworks. While the critical state-
centric approach succeeds extremely well in illustrating serious problems 
embedded in the global approaches, it is nevertheless based on a ‘either-
or’ logic similar to that of the global approaches it criticizes. In other 
words, in recent theoretical debate it is claimed that resistance needs to 
be either global or local to be effective, depending on how the power of 
social movements is conceptualized. This invites an important question: 
Is it not possible to have both?  
The problem with the liberal cosmopolitan approach is that when 
it conceptualizes effective resistance solely in terms of expressive and 
symbolic action at the global level – the level where social movements 
shape global opinion by communicating their values and beliefs – it ends 
up ignoring the more practical side of power. The radical poststructuralists 
make essentially the same mistake. The shortcoming of the state-centric 
approach is that its strong emphasis on the national context does not 
completely resonate with the understandings held within the anti-
war movement either (and probably not with those of other social 
movements for that matter) as it is a movement which has always been 
working both nationally and internationally to various extents. Although 
recognizing that ‘Politics has always been deterritorialized in terms of 
its conceptualisation, in terms of the aspirational content of political 
demands’, Chandler (2009a: 16) argues that power is ‘necessarily 
territorialized in terms of the specific strategies and articulations of those 
4 I have borrowed this idea from Horowitz (1970: 29), who compares the 
approaches of different civil rights movements in the US.
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demands to put those demands into practice’. As we have seen, this view 
does resonate with the understandings of many organizations within 
the movement; however, it constitutes only a part of the big picture. 
The anti-war movement has demonstrated that both elements can be 
combined. In Britain there has been a popular mass movement which 
has sought political power in the national context, but has also engaged 
in coordination of international (or ‘global’) demonstrations and other 
campaigns, where symbolic politics play a more important role. 
The state-centric approach importantly reflects on problems in 
regard to symbolic expressions of solidarity becoming the main point 
in political activism, a development understood as signalling a lack of 
political engagement, or even ‘a radical justification for the refusal to 
engage politically’ (Chandler 2004: 331). The approach argues that the 
discourse of global solidarity reflects the inability of social movements to 
convincingly articulate their political ideas to their domestic audiences 
which has led them to ‘sought legitimacy more in their international 
connections’ (ibid: 330). Although this is a legitimate concern and worthy 
of examining in greater detail, it must be noted that the above-mentioned 
aspects are not exclusive – or at least they need not to be. It is possible to 
have clearly articulated political projects at the national level but at the 
same time to express solidarity and acquire support for the cause beyond 
the nation state. Either there is ‘no reason why a particular political 
activity cannot be both expressive and instrumental’ (Rochon 1998: 
122, emphasis added). Indeed, the analysis of the anti-war movement in 
the present study has given an indication that it is possible to avoid the 
problems of primarily globally oriented abstract resistance if the global 
and national dimensions are both included in a way which does not put 
the political at risk. From the perspective of the state-centric approach, 
this requires that the national be considered primary. Nonetheless, it 
does not mean that it would be impossible or undesirable to engage in 
symbolic struggles at the global level at the same time. 
In short, the ‘either-or-logic’ embedded in the above as well as in the 
globalists frameworks seems to conceal the complexity of issues. Where 
does, then, the dualism and ‘either-or’ logic of the theoretical approaches 
derive from? Evidently, it can be explained partly due to their lack of 
involvement with the existing movement(s), an engagement that which 
would inevitably make theorists more aware of their complex nature as 
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well as multiple and overlapping premises. However, it also derives from 
the broader normative and political premises of the approaches. The 
fact that academic globalists have a strong tendency to emphasize the 
primacy of symbolic power and resistance at the global level cannot be 
separated from their highly negative views of state-based representational 
democratic politics. Because they believe that democracy in the context 
of traditional political institutions cannot serve the interests of people any 
longer, academic globalists stress that rather than trying to change specific 
policies of nation states and governments, social movements should aim 
at challenging the entire traditional political system. In contrast, the state-
centric approach, which emphasizes instrumental power at the national 
level, strongly criticizes global forms of political engagement, which in 
its view not only undermine the democratic representational system, but 
also escape power due to the abstract, global and non-strategic nature 
of ‘post-political’ struggle. While adherents of the state-centric approach 
consider more traditional forms of political engagement to be the most 
effective way forward, academic globalists regard them as ineffective 
and old-fashioned, either due to the global character of current political 
problems (liberal cosmopolitans) or the deterritorialized form of power 
in Empire (radical poststructuralists).  
Interestingly, this kind of a controversial and polarized theoretical 
debate resembles the spirited discussion between advocates of the 
‘resource mobilization theory’ and the ‘new social movement theory’ in 
social movement theory a few decades ago. The resource mobilization 
theory maintains that social movements do not primarily aim at 
challenging political institutions, but at changing certain policies. Hence, 
they are expected to cooperate with political institutions of representative 
democracy. Social movements and conventional forms of political 
participation are regarded very similarly and they are to be analyzed using 
same standards and frameworks. (E.g. Rochon 1988: xvii, 18–19.) Social 
movements are defined as ‘collective efforts to alter public policies’ deriving 
their support from those ‘who seek particular reforms’ (ibid: xvii). The 
anti-war movement is thus considered a political force primarily trying 
to change particular policies and whose success is dependent on an ability 
to gain support among influential political institutions. This logic makes 
the anti-war struggle essentially a numbers game, because influencing 
political institutions requires building up a broad mass movement with 
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enough supporters. In other words, like the state-centric approach, the 
resource mobilization theory emphasizes that in order to gain political 
power social movements need to have clearly defined aims, opponents, 
strategies and centralized organizational structures. While defining power 
and effectiveness as the ability of social movements to achieve their stated 
aims (policy changes), it is obvious that the state-centric approach shares 
an instrumentalist view of power with the resource mobilization theory.
In contrast, the new social movement theory holds that the real 
significance of social movements derives not from their efforts to change 
policies of particular nation states or governments, but from their efforts to 
pose a ‘revolutionary’ challenge to established political institutions (Tilly 
2004: 68–71; Rochon 1988: xvii; Walker 1988). When social movements 
are not regarded as instrumentally oriented but rather expressive in nature 
(Rochon 1988: 99), they are believed to be creative forces that construct 
countercultures which challenge the values and policies of their states and 
societies through collective action. In other words, they represent broad 
demands on the socio-political system while signalling ‘the disaffection of 
a growing proportion of the population from the mainstream social and 
political institutions’ (ibid: xvii). As they are taking part ‘in a more far-
reaching reinvention of political life’, social movements are not assessed 
by their ‘immediate capacity to induce existing elites to pursue more 
enlightened policies’ but their ability to find ‘new spaces in which to act 
politically’, ‘new ways of acting politically’, ‘new conceptions of knowing 
and being’ as well as to discover interconnectedness of ‘seemingly different 
movements struggling in different situations’ (Walker 1988: 8, 80). 
An extremely interesting argument is that strategies as such are not 
important for social movements because their goals cannot even be 
determined in advance. In the context of the anti-war movement, for 
example, it is argued that ‘just world peace must grow out of the ongoing 
practices of people everywhere, not be molded by those who claim to 
have a god’s-eye view of what is going on’ (ibid: 7). It is even stressed 
that it is ‘important to resist inevitable demand for hard-nosed, concrete 
solutions to particular problems’ (ibid). 
In other words, the difference between the resource mobilization and the 
new social movement theory is whether social movements are regarded as 
collective efforts ‘to delegimitize the political system, or whether exercising 
political effectiveness within the system is paramount’ (Rochon 1988: 
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xix)5. Both approaches have their strengths and weaknesses as well as their 
justifications and critiques. It is easy to agree, for example, with Rochon 
(1998: 14–15) that due to the growth of bureaucracy and governmental 
control in people’s daily lives, it is not surprising that the nation state 
is increasingly often regarded as an obstacle to human progress and has 
thus become an object of many kinds of resistances. It is also easy to agree 
that the resource mobilization theory does not answer or even address 
all relevant questions. As primarily interested in the interaction between 
social movement organizations and established political institutions, it 
concentrates mainly on the process of mobilization rather than the ideas 
and ideologies of movements. It also fails to recognize the fundamental 
critique that established political institutions are confronting across the 
western industrialized countries. (Ibid: 18–19, 122.)    
The new social movement theory certainly has its shortcomings as 
well. For example, it fails to recognize the role of national, centralized 
organizations within a movement (Rochon 1988: 22), which, as we have 
seen in this thesis, are clearly still important. It is also understandable 
that the critics of the approach argue that social movements may ‘put the 
very survival of the liberal democratic regimes in jeopardy’ when they 
‘undermine political authority by nurturing a systematic critique of the 
established political system’ (ibid: 14). This clearly represents the stance 
of the state-centric approach, which maintains that globally oriented 
forms of political engagement in particular can pose a serious challenge 
5 Within the movement, this division has sometimes been conceptualized in 
terms of the ‘high road’ and the ‘low road’. Since the high road ‘aims directly at 
existing power structures to reach established “decision-makers” and through them 
to change the system’ (Green 1992: 43), it is regarded as a straighter but also a more 
narrow approach which often fails to relate large masses of people. However, it is 
clearly strategic, as it seeks to directly influence policies. The low road, described as 
‘widespread and diverse’ and encompassing ‘a variety of grass-roots movements’, aims 
to establish ‘a new world order through the creation of new forms and institutions 
as well as new forms of living’ while, however, often failing to ‘relate to the actual 
political sources of power’ (ibid: 43–44). Peace movement scholars suggest that 
the divergence derives ‘from different ideas of the nature of peace, from different 
conceptions of the kind of changes in people and institutions that will be necessary to 
make peace possible’ as well as ‘what is considered an adequate strategy for bringing 
the required changes about’ (Washburn 1973: 153). For those who seek to transform 
politics, the primary point of resistance is the structure or leadership of power, but 
for those who seek to reform policy, it is issues and policies (Chatfield 1992: 183).
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to democratic politics6. However, the main problem of the new social 
movement theory, which characterizes also the liberal cosmopolitan and 
radical poststructuralist approaches, is that it poses extremely challenging 
tasks for social movements and invests very idealistic, sometimes even 
utopian expectations for them7. It is argued, for example, that social 
movements ‘have the capacity to extend the horizons of our political 
imagination’ while transforming ‘the boundaries of the possible’ (Walker 
1988: 3). They are believed to challenge universal paradigms and defy 
commonly held understandings of what politics and power are about and 
are therefore regarded as sources of political creativity in contrast to other 
more conventional and reactionary actors (ibid: 2). One of the most 
their central tasks is to rethink the most ‘fundamental assumptions about 
what is means to be human’ and deconstruct concepts such as peace, 
security or democracy (ibid: 4). It is suggested that social movements 
should ‘slip through or behind the familiar clichés and dead ends of 
contemporary debate about peace and justice’ (ibid: 60), because ‘the 
ability to raise interesting questions, and to do so in a way that will 
force established institutions to pay attention to them, is an exceedingly 
valuable function’ (Rochon 1988: 76). However, what is left unsaid is 
that in light of the challenge social movements face even in successfully 
influencing government policies, it is surely even more challenging for 
them to provide coherent and systematic critiques or concrete suggestions 
indicating how to better organize political life in general. 
While this kind of a polarized debate was ongoing in the social 
movement theory already several decades ago, the same dualism, 
somewhat surprisingly, seems to characterize the theoretical debate today. 
Academic globalists consider social movements that aim to gain political 
power as reactionary, old-fashioned and inward-looking, and, at the same 
time, criticize the movements for trying to control the political landscape 
(as well as political imagination). The state-centric approach regards 
6  Some social movement scholars as well have noted that global political strategies 
should be evaluated critically (e.g. Tilly 2004: 121, 131, 143, 155), which is not, as 
we have seen, an issue that academic globalists would have elaborated on.   
7 Often the expectations are also controversial. Simultaneously with many great 
expectations it can be acknowledged that ‘movements neither emanate from nor add 
up to a coherent alternative in the form of a new historical project toward a more 
acceptable and desirable future’ (Kothari in Walker 1988: x).
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more broadly oriented social movements as naïve, utopist and ineffective, 
because they mainly aim at affecting values and attitudes. Nevertheless, 
the debate has gained new characteristics in a new theoretical context. 
The current debate is different from that of earlier periods, because 
increasingly globalized conceptualizations have clearly brought in new 
flavors. Due to their adherence either on instrumental or symbolic power, 
the three theoretical approaches studied in this thesis argue very explicitly 
that it is necessary for social movements to choose between political life 
and resistance either at the level of the nation state or outside of it, and 
thus also to choose between state-based or global strategies.
In the field of social movement research, the resource mobilization 
theory has been somewhat overpowered by the new social movement 
theory, for most of the leading social movement theorists now clearly 
advocate the latter. In the field of IR, the trend seems to very similar. 
The liberal cosmopolitan and radical poststructuralist approaches have 
become dominant in the recent theoretical debate concerning the role and 
power of social movements in the context of the changing international 
system, in which nation states are believed to have lost much of their 
power to ‘global forces’, however these may be defined. The discourse of 
the crisis of democracy has also brought new flavors to the debate, as have 
popular theories of the network society and the new information and 
communication technologies. In other words, the new social movement 
school seems to thrive in the postmodern era. The problem in IR is that – 
unlike in social movement research more generally – there no significant 
counter-discourses have emerged to balance out the claims of global 
academics. It is only recently that the critical state-centric approach has 
questioned the premises of global approaches. 
Indeed, when critically evaluating the current state of theorization, 
one of the problems with especially global approaches is that they seem 
to have ‘gone wild’ on those perspectives that were articulated in what 
might be considered more down-to-earth terms in the late 1980s, 
when political theory was not as impregnated with global and abstract 
postmodern conceptualizations. In current theorizations, there seem to 
be no constraints at all: whatever social movements do, they are always 
regarded as powerful, emancipatory and contributing to the good of the 
whole world. In this regard, the suggestion that there might be ‘an inverse 
relationship between the amount of progressive ‘new characteristics’ these 
33
struggles have and their strength and influence’ seems to be relevant 
(Chandler 2004: 328). It is easy to agree that theorists advocating 
global frameworks seem to invest movements with ‘their own ideas and 
aspirations’ which ‘can then be used by any institution or individual to 
promote their own importance and moral legitimacy’ (ibid). 
At the same time, however, it must be noted that in the name of 
realism it is always very tempting to argue that social movements are 
weak, fragmented and unsuccessful in their attempts to change the world 
for the better. The view that movements can be ‘taken seriously only if 
they achieve power, if they take control of states or political parties or 
turn into mass movements capable of challenging entrenched elites and 
institutions’ is not very productive (Walker 1988: 145). It presumes that 
‘power is always and everywhere the same’ although it can be suggested 
that ‘the power to create is not measurable in the same currency as the 
power to destroy’ (ibid: 146, emphasis added). Therefore, the idea that 
social movements should not be assessed ‘in terms of some timeless notion 
of what power is but in terms of their capacity to alter our understanding 
of what power can be’ (ibid, emphasis added) is extremely interesting and 
would deserve substantially more attention in the theoretical debate. 
On the basis of this thesis, it can be argued that in any event theorists 
should not resort only to highly abstract conceptualizations, but rather 
it is necessary and at least equally important to revitalize theoretical 
discussion concerning more strategic and instrumental forms of political 
engagement as well. Fortunately, in the theoretical field new criticisms 
and perspectives are gained along the way. This thesis, too, has been an 
attempt to broaden and develop the theoretical debate further.   
Thus far in the thesis it has been illustrated that the current theoretical 
debate is not only polarized but very dogmatic in many respects: none of 
the three theoretical approaches is satisfactory or adequate in exclusivity. 
In contrast, the analysis of the premises of the anti-war movement has 
demonstrated that it would be possible to have an intermediate, a sort 
of a ‘middle’ position that could combine the advantages of several 
perspectives simultaneously. Therefore, my contribution to the theoretical 
debate is to suggest that rather than framing the issue in terms of an 
‘either-or’ logic, a ‘both-and’ approach8 should be adopted. It would not 
8 I have adopted this terminology from Fay (1998: 224). 
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only reflect more accurately the way in which the relationship between 
the local and global (as well as many other concepts) is conceived within 
the anti-war movement, but would also provide a much more productive 
and comprehensive perspective for discussing the concepts of power and 
resistance in the context of social movements more generally. 
In order to broaden the perspectives of the theoretical debate, four 
important points should be acknowledged. Firstly, it should be recognized 
that the state is not the only space where political activity and resistance 
can occur, but that it is nevertheless a space where it still can, and does, 
occur. Secondly, it would be important to understand that means and 
ends can often be viewed as dialectical elements, especially when we are 
talking about long-term aims of the movement. In other words, there 
cannot (and should not) always be a clear distinction between means 
and ends. Accepting this does not mean, however, that there should 
be no goals or any kind of strategic thinking. Thirdly, the theoretical 
approaches should recognize that there are different forms of power 
which can be important in the same context but in different sense. Both 
symbolic power and instrumental power are important because they 
are serving different purposes in the struggle. Due to its instrumental 
character, political power is useful when trying to change unwanted 
policies. Symbolic power can be important at the same time due to its 
social character, which is valuable when trying to change attitudes and 
beliefs in the long run. Fourthly, it needs to be acknowledged that social 
movements usually engage in both short- and long-term struggles at the 
same time. Therefore, even though it was accepted that in order to be 
effective social movements need to seek power where they can directly 
influence political decision-making, this does not mean they should 
not also seek support for their cause at the global level, for instance, by 
organizing global demonstrations or other kinds of events and campaigns. 
The global and local should not be regarded as competing frameworks 
for resistance, but rather as parallel frameworks that serve for different 
purposes. Both can be applied simultaneously in a manner that allows 
for political, strategic engagement at the national level as well as symbolic 
expressions of resistance at the global level.  
The kind of ‘both-and’ approach that this thesis suggests for the three 
metatheories is not a unique or a totally new perspective as such, although 
the context is of course new and distinct. For example, in the late 1980s 
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some scholars pointed out that relying exclusively on either the resource 
mobilization or the new social movement theory ‘would be to fail to 
recognize that ideology and organization are each important components’ 
of social movements, because they work both in the political and social 
arenas and thus, rely simultaneously ‘on widespread mobilization and 
on access to political institutions’ (Rochon 1988: 20–21; also Hinton 
1989: 201)9. Peace movement scholars have also emphasized that peace 
being ‘both a utopian dream and an urgent necessity’, it is necessary 
to ‘build bridges between utopian thinking and effective action in the 
world as it is’ (Hinton 1989: x; also Randle 1987: 155–156). This has 
been referred to as the ‘dual nature of the peace movement’ (Rochon 
1988: 215). In other words, it has been recognized that the movement 
is a political force that acts with the established systems of authority and 
utilizes conventional political channels but is not, however, ‘simply an 
extension of conventional politics’ as it also brings long-term visions and 
fresh perspectives into traditional politics (ibid).  
As the empirical analysis in this thesis has illustrated, all of the 
organizations studied within the new British anti-war movement 
emphasize in one way or another idea that the ‘high road’ and the ‘low 
road’ approaches need to be combined. Similar views have been also 
expressed within the new American anti-war movement (e.g. Gottlieb 
2007: 35; Hayden 2007: 119; Cagan 2005: 59). However, the fact that 
some activists within the movement consider an avoidance of binary 
positions important does not represent the view of the whole movement. 
Indeed, the issue is complex. It is controversial due to the different 
focuses, emphases and traditions of various organizations, all of which 
want to preserve their autonomy as organizations and advocate certain 
strategies and tactics in their specific struggles although they recognize 
that from the perspective of the broader, long-term movement it would be 
beneficial to accept and even to combine different approaches. Therefore, 
it can be suggested that the ‘both-and’ approach is something that could 
be more openly discussed, not only in the theoretical realm but within 
the movement as well. 
9 Reflecting on the European anti-nuclear movement of the time, Rochon (1988: 
xviii) argues that it was ‘far more integrated with established institutions than the 
new social movement theory would allow’ but that its campaigns and organization 
could not be grasped by the resource mobilization school either.
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In this thesis, it is obviously more important to stress the role of 
the theorists in this regard. They need to go beyond fundamental 
polarizations and dualisms, because when being caught in between the 
dichotomous categories of universality and particularity, political theory 
produces more unnecessary and even harmful dualisms. The ‘both-and’ 
approach not enables only global and state-based forms of political 
conceptualizations and imaginations to be considered simultaneously, 
but also allows consideration of dimensions such as theoretical-practical, 
modern-postmodern and instrumental-symbolic at the same time. As 
Brian Fay points out, dualisms and dichotomies can be overcome by 
deploying a dialectical approach in which rival perspectives are replaced 
by a more holistic and broader one. Such an approach enables one to 
take into account the premises of the original perspectives yet go beyond 
them, thereby ‘softening’ dichotomies and dualisms. (Fay 1998: 224, 
227–228.) In other words, instead of deploying an ‘either-or’ logic, social 
science and political theory can often be more fruitful when constructed 
from a ‘both-and’ perspective. In the particular context of the theoretical 
debate analyzed here, it may also enable a more reflexive relationship 
between theory and political practice, as suggested by the findings here. 
9.3 The Multitude / Global Civil Society as an
              Answer to War?
When it comes to evaluating the global political projects against war 
that academic globalists are talking about, the many divergences and 
shortcomings discussed above suggest that those efforts are not easily 
compatible with the normative premises of the existing anti-war 
movement. Moreover, it seems that the academic globalists’ suggestions 
regarding the organization of resistance, based as they are on quite different 
understandings of such central concepts as war and power, encounter the 
same problem. For liberal cosmopolitans the ideal towards which the 
forces of global civil society should be working is a cosmopolitan society 
based on liberal and universal values. For radical poststructuralists the 
ideal towards which the Multitude should guide the rest of world is based 
on a vision of a communistic but yet diverse and autonomous collective 
that relies heavily on post-Marxist understandings. Neither of these seems 
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to resonate very well with the political premises of the current anti-war 
movement. In the British movement, the premises of many organizations 
are based on a much more traditional Marxist analysis, where effective 
forms and strategies of resistance against war are conceptualized in terms 
of anti-imperialist struggle, preferably combined with international 
organization of the working class. There are also nonviolent ideals that 
perhaps challenge the liberal and radical approaches even more, neither 
being based on pacifistic ideals. Liberal cosmopolitans generally regard 
many interventions by western liberal states as legitimate, and radical 
poststructuralists do not advocate a pacifist principle when talking about 
a ‘war against war’ or ‘democratic violence’.    
These findings certainly do not help academic globalists to counter the 
criticisms they have attracted for not having a collective political subject 
that could ‘give content to the theorising of global struggle’ (Chandler 
2009: 537). This can be explained in part as due to their not concretely 
and empirically engaging with the existing movement. They are not trying 
to understand its premises and practices more closely, an undertaking 
which could help them to make more enlightened suggestions and build 
those suggestions on at least somewhat similar premises or definitions of 
the main problems and aims. One the one hand, from the perspective 
of the current anti-war movement it seems that the broader visions 
and suggestions by academic globalists do not have much to offer. On 
the other hand, one may wonder whether a closer engagement with 
the existing movement is even their purpose, as both approaches have 
already fixed their notions of the goals and normative ideals towards 
which the struggles of resistance should proceed. When the end goal is 
already determined – either a global liberal cosmopolitan society110 or a 
post-Marxist political regime – what is left to be done is merely to find 
a ‘suitable’ social movement that would lead the pre-ordained political 
project. In this way academic globalists actually put themselves above 
their forthcoming, but as yet non-existent global political subjects. Their 
arguing that resistance against war is the most important task for the 
Multitude or global civil society can be interpreted as a rational, move 
10 As Chandler (2009a: 129) states, ‘Whatever the agency, the ideal outcome is 
already established: grounding liberal claims without political subjects’.
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since most people are against war211. But the question remains – what is 
the role of the current anti-war movement here?
In this context, an especially interesting finding of the theoretical 
analysis is that while continuously celebrating diversity, academic globalists 
fail to take the diversity of the anti-war movement into consideration in 
more practical terms. As the empirical analysis has shown throughout 
the thesis, within the current anti-war movement there is a great variety 
of political positions, beliefs and ideologies which are not always readily 
compatible with one other. In fact, they are sources of many kinds of 
political conflicts and power struggles within the movement. Therefore, it is 
troubling that in the theoretical debate the collective revolutionary subject 
is viewed in ‘post-political’ terms not only in regard to its opponents, but 
also in that possible conflicting interests and power struggles within the 
global political collective are not taken into account. The lack of this kind 
of discussion is especially problematic in Hardt and Negri’s theory, since 
they claim to construct a metatheory providing a clear direction for many 
movements to take while they themselves ignore political ramifications 
as well as power issues within the Multitude. The fact that Hardt and 
Negri do discuss these problems to some extent in regard to aid, relief and 
developmental agencies indicates that they have been considering these 
issues but have ignored – or for some reason chosen not to reflect upon 
– them when discussing the Multitude. 
When it comes to liberal cosmopolitans, the problem is basically the 
same, but since they do not generally discuss power or power relations 
much – and usually not at all in terms of governance – the post-political 
and power-ignorant stance is much more predictable in their context. 
In other words, both liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists 
can be criticized for their inability to conceptualize possible conflicts and 
contradictions within their global movements. Although the state-centric 
approach does not discuss these issues either, it nevertheless seems to 
be the only one of the theoretical approaches capable of offering any 
analytical instruments for addressing the above-mentioned problems due 
to its definition of politics and the political. 
211  In this one particular respect, peace can be regarded as ‘a consensus issue’ 
since everybody is in favor of it (e.g. Rochon 1988: 158).    
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Indeed, it must noted that the anti-war movement has not yet – 
despite two hundred years of efforts – managded to create a truly global 
organization dedicated to resistance against war. Hence, taking a closer 
look at the history of the movement as well as exploring the diversity 
within the existing movement would be extremely beneficial for academic 
globalists. It would compel them to reconsider their conceptualizations of 
the Multitude and global civil society as more or less consensual political 
collectives in themselves. Although it may easily seem that there is a 
widespread consensus within the anti-war movement when viewed from 
the outside, below the surface there are many different views. Despite 
the fact that many groups have agreed upon some aspects of resistance 
against one particular war in one specific context, cooperation in broader 
terms is much more complicated. It is difficult to accommodate all the 
very different views into one national movement, let alone to a global 
one. Hence, transforming the anti-war movement into something more 
permanent and global is an extremely challenging endeavor, and one that 
cannot be established from above. Clearly, critical political theory can 
and even should play an important part in these debates, but it should 
not result in abstract intellectual projects that are independent of political 
practice and the premises of the movement. Critical political theory 
needs to communicate with its addressees in order to be emancipatory 
and practical (e.g. Leonard 1990: xiv, 14; Fay 1987: 2, 4, 22, 29). Visions 
and suggestions are definitely needed, and social movements can benefit 
greatly from new theories of political engagement and resistance. But 
such theories must not be too abstract or totally determined in advance, 
for that is probably the most certain way to ensure that the visions of 
political theories remain mere utopias. 
The inability of both the liberal cosmopolitan and radical 
poststructuralist approaches to seriously address the problems discussed 
above results in their leaving much to be desired when it comes to offering 
convincing analysis, visions or practical suggestions for resistance. There 
are many other problems in these theorizations as well. To reflect on the 
more general critique that was partly developed already in the theoretical 
analysis (see chapter 2), it can be said that the liberal cosmopolitan 
approach does not take relations of power into account sufficiently 
or address power structures adequately: it has an obvious tendency 
to overemphasize the power of social movements and to consider the 
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structural aspects of power only in very limited terms. The approach 
also seems to depoliticize some issues, as seen in its tendency to regard 
certain (liberal) values as universal and not affected by power. Moreover, 
it uncritically equates a liberal order with peace and justice. This is a 
problematic view, because for many outside the western world this order 
actually equals violence and poverty, both of which are deadly. While 
emphasizing global interconnectedness, which is supposed to bring peace 
and stability to the whole world, the liberal cosmopolitans rarely pose 
the question from whose point of view peace and stability is, in fact, 
being constructed or secured. In other words, peace is often understood 
simplistically only as the absence of war, and the ‘liberal way of war’ is 
rarely, if ever, problematized. Within the anti-war movement, peace is 
understood in much broader terms, and the British movement seems to 
be particularly critical of ‘humanitarian’ interventions and ‘pre-emptive’ 
wars launched by powerful liberal states. 
In contrast, the radical poststructuralist approach emphasizes the 
concepts of global power and global state of war perhaps too strongly 
and, at the same time, maintains a very broad and somewhat idealistic 
view of resistance that makes it difficult to propose concrete solutions 
and practical guidelines for resistance. Partly this can be due to the 
understanding that resistance precedes power, which sometimes seems 
to give Hardt and Negri’s theory a strange mixed flavor of unfounded 
optimism and omnipotence, resulting in a determinism of sorts312. 
Moreover, although their concept of ‘war against war’ could be regarded 
as an effort to construct some sort of a middle ground between ‘pacifism 
and traditions of revolutionary violence’ (Reid 2006: 120), their notion 
of ‘democratic violence’ is highly problematic in the context of the anti-
war movement. It legitimates the use of defensive violence, which is not a 
very fruitful approach from the perspective of the anti-war movement, at 
least if pacifists and other nonviolent groups are to be included. Although 
Hardt and Negri (2004: 344) argue that ‘democratic violence’ is to be used 
only for defensive purposes, it still is an extremely problematic concept. 
As Reid (2006: 105) argues, democratic violence, as a ‘conception of the 
legitimacy of violence in terms of its defensive qualities, is intrinsic to the 
312 Or, as Naomi Klein puts it on the back cover of Multitude, Hardt and Negri’s 
theory is ‘an inspiring marriage of realism and idealism’. 
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very liberal tradition of war’ which Hardt and Negri ‘are attempting to 
stand outside of ’.  
The problem with the state-centric approach is that it fails to recognize 
the legitimate critique of more of anarchistic types of approaches that 
base their resistance on the notion that it is justified to resist established 
political institutions of democratic nation states when these, in the name 
of liberal democracy, continuously resort to violence and military force. 
Moreover, by very strongly defending the representative democratic system, 
the state-centric approach is perhaps too hasty to dismiss many of the 
justified criticisms regarding shortcomings and failures of representative 
democracy put forward by both the liberal cosmopolitan and the radical 
poststructuralist approach. Even if one were to reconcile oneself with 
the view that representational democracy is the best political system that 
currently exists, it hardly can be argued that we have now achieved a 
perfect form of government that should not be criticized or cannot be 
improved. Instead of blaming people for popular disengagement from 
politics, perhaps the approach should direct more of its criticism towards 
the political parties and the political establishment, which have, as the 
anti-war movement suggests, in fact largely contributed to the crisis of 
democracy. The view by the state-centric approach that resistance should 
take place exclusively at the national level for the sake of effectiveness 
and political accountability can also be regarded as inadequate from 
the perspective of the anti-war movement. The movement does not 
conceptualize power solely in terms of instrumental power but rather also 
regards other, more symbolic forms of power as important. It also seems to 
consider meaningful political engagement, the role of social movements, 
and political life in general in broader and more multifaceted terms than 
the state-centric approach. 
The fact that none of the three theoretical approaches seems to be very 
relevant for the organizations of the British anti-war movement studied 
invites the question whether it would not have been more productive to 
consider and analyze some other, more traditional Marxist theorizations 
in this context. While it would of course have been possible to choose 
such an approach, the whole research setting would have been very 
different. It would not have served the rationale of the thesis, whose 
explicit aim has been to analyze the currently dominant theoretical 
approaches that have directly addressed the anti-war movement as well 
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as the critiques of those approaches. Therefore, it has been justified to 
rule out traditional Marxist theories: they are definitely not dominant 
or popular in the current theoretical debate, nor have they addressed 
the anti-war movement in those terms that the academic globalists have. 
However, as has been shown, Marxist analysis is quite influential among 
the organizations studied and it can thus be suggested that academic 
globalists should take these and similar premises better into account 
when providing suggestions and visions for the movement. 
Although the thesis has shown that the organizations studied have 
surprisingly little interest in deploying the visions or suggestions of 
academic globalists, it has demonstrated that liberal cosmopolitan as 
well as post-Marxist theories of resistance have started to influence the 
views and understandings held by the groups within the new (British) 
anti-war movement. For example, concepts such as ‘global resistance’ or 
‘global struggle’ are being used more commonly by the organizations, 
although the content of these concepts as used by the movement differs 
from that found in the theoretical debate. Even though the three 
theoretical approaches studied here are not the most relevant theories 
for the anti-war movement, the movement does not live in a vacuum, 
whereby it is important to recognize the interplay between the theories 
and the understandings held within the movement. Reflecting on this 
relationship has been the main rationale of the entire thesis. In fact, the 
study has demonstrated how the anti-war movement has responded 
(and adapted its strategies of resistance) to the changing international 
system in comparison to how these have been conceptualized by different 
theoretical discourses. In the future, it is likely that the theoretical 
approaches analyzed here will have more influence within the anti-
war movement as a whole, that is, beyond the organizations involved 
in the British anti-war movement. The extent to which they will have 
influence, however, depends greatly on the internal debates within the 
movement since there are constant political struggles going on in regard 
to how to define main aims, opponents, strategies and tactics. Different 
understandings of the main constituents of power of the movement and 
how power is conceptualized more generally will influence and shape the 
choice of strategies of resistance.  
To conclude by summing up some of the main problems concerning 
the relationship between the theoretical debate and political practice 
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of the anti-war movement, it can be said that all three theoretical 
approaches have been shown to be problematic. While they, like any 
conceptualizations in political theory, are necessarily based on some kind 
of empirical observations, their links to any particular movements, and 
especially to the anti-war movement, are not well grounded. The problem 
with liberal cosmopolitans and radical poststructuralists is that when they 
do refer to some particular movements – which is very rare – they mainly 
reflect upon their observations drawn ‘above’ and uncritically suggest that 
utilizing the resulting conceptualizations is the only way forward if social 
movements wish to become effective in the global era. The shortcoming 
of the state-centric approach is that it scarcely refers to any movement. 
Although it criticizes global approaches for a lack of social agency and 
political subjects in their theorizations, it does not offer these itself either. 
However, it has to be acknowledged that the state-centric approach is 
different from the two other approaches in that it must be understood 
as a critique of the dominant theoretical frameworks by definition. In 
this regard, its main arguments derive from the notion that there are no 
coherent political projects or collective political subjects at the moment. 
The argument that social movements are essentially efforts to redefine 
political life by searching for new forms of political engagement and 
rethinking what power is and what it can be (e.g. Walker 1988) is 
problematic as well. In particular, the idea that ‘political movements are 
not primarily “about” the issues that they appear to champion’ (Rochon 
1998: 17) invites many critical questions. How should we think about 
the primary goals of social movements themselves? Should those be 
abandoned altogether? If the main significance of social movements lies, 
for example, in their ‘capacity to redefine the nature of political power’, 
why not then have this as the main and clearly stated aim? If it were 
defined as the main goal, it would become possible on that basis to define 
the struggle in terms of that particular objective and start to think about 
proper strategies for working towards achieving it. Ever more strongly, it 
starts to seem that the reason why this is not the case is quite simple – 
because social movements themselves usually are not primarily interested 
in those kinds of objectives. More often they are fighting in actuality 
against those problems and injustices in the world that they believe it is 
important and necessary to struggle against. At least on the basis of this 
study it can be argued that it is fundamentally more important for the 
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anti-war movement to try to stop a war or to inform people about the 
causes and effects of war and militarism than it is to try to redefine the 
nature of political power itself. If something like that takes place in the 
process, it can be regarded as a positive development, but, importantly, 
it is only a side-effect, not the main goal of the movement. Even if this 
interpretation is false, it still is problematic that even the most progressive 
and imaginative theories do not seek to find out what movements really 
think and how they regard their struggles and resistances. 
Here, the gap between theory and political practice comes again up, 
yet in another form. Therefore, the suggestion that academic globalists 
are investing social movements ‘with their own ideas and aspirations’ 
(Chandler 2004: 328), which means that theorizing ‘becomes a political 
act or statement in itself regardless of any link to social agency’ (Chandler 
2009b: 535; also 2009a: 125), starts to seem very convincing in this 
context. While theorists see what they want to see in social movements, 
referring often to tendencies and becomings – which only can prove to them 
that social movements are heading towards the direction where theorists 
want them to go – they end up ignoring how movements themselves 
consider these issues, that is, where they believe they are heading, why, 
and how. Although very useful in revealing serious problems in global 
theoretical frameworks, the state-centric approach is also problematic in 
this respect. It either does not aim to relate to the political practice and 
social movements directly, but merely suggests that academic globalists 
are wrong and that social movements that believe their misguided advice 
will end up in an even worse situation by becoming less strategic and 
less influential. Furthermore, although criticizing academic globalists 
for being utopian, the state-centric approach does not represent too 
many alternatives either. As Chandler (2009a: 222) himself admits when 
discussing ‘Marx’s consideration of a similar crisis of political subjectivity’, 
it is ‘difficult to see an emerging political subject which can give renewed 
content to political concepts and reconstitute the political as a concrete 
sphere of contestation’. It would be extremely interesting to learn what 
kinds of proposals and ideas the state-centric approach would consider 
possible and desirable in this regard.  
On the whole, all the problems of the three theoretical approaches 
analyzed in this study provide justification to suggest that their 
connection to political practice, and thus, to emancipatory critical theory 
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is problematic and inadequate. At the same time the study has shown 
that any generalizations are difficult because movements really are very 
complex and multifaceted and it is impossible to grasp all the aspects 
of their work and to provide all-in-one solutions. Hence, I argue that 
critical theorists should aim at looking at specific movements in the 
way Leonard (1990), for example, suggests and also to engage directly 
with them, because otherwise it is impossible to establish anything of an 
emancipatory dialogue from the perspective of ‘critical theory in political 
practice’. By communicating with social movements and activists, it is also 
possible for theorists to learn many new and alternative ways of thinking 
which, in turn, may help them to transform the relationship between 
theory and political practice, knowing and being, into something more 
reflexive and dialectical. For the same reasons – although the purpose of 
the thesis has not been to ‘talk to the movement’ directly but to critically 
evaluate the theoretical debate and develop it further to reflect and address 
the movement better – it is also necessary for the researcher here herself 
to address the movement. Therefore, in the next and final section of the 
conclusions, some problematiques which have been discovered in the 
course of this research process will be reflected upon from the perspective 
of the anti-war movement. 
9.4 Unity, Diversity and the Politics of Resistance 
The political revival of the anti-war movement and especially the 
international demonstration day in February 2003 have sparked not 
only a vigorous theoretical but also political debate about whether 
the movement should adopt a more global approach and even aim at 
becoming some form of global organization. However, these kinds of 
debates are not new or extraordinary, but surface regularly within the 
movement. For example, in an article published in 1962, the WRI chair 
warned ‘of “the bewilderment of the man-in-street” at the number and 
variety of pacifist organisations’ and asked whether they could not be 
‘more closely associated with one another in some worldwide movement 
in which each will continue to fullfil its own particular functions within 
the framework of a common programme’ (Prasad 2005: 329). 
It is very revealing that in 2010 this question remains as topical 
as ever. There are thousands of different kinds of peace and anti-war 
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groups, associations and organizations across the world, some of which 
are pacifist and some of which non-pacifist. Their aims and objectives, 
ideologies and premises vary greatly. Is there something that all would 
agree upon, some sort of common ground, a common political project? 
This is a question that has been asked over and over again during the 
two-hundred-year history of the movement. Where all discussions finally 
end up is the defining line between unity and diversity: if there were a 
common project or even a global organization, how can it be guaranteed 
that diversity is genuinely accepted within it? In other words, it necessarily 
involves discussion about the least possible level of unity required and 
the ultimate level of diversity that can be accepted for the struggle to 
somehow still be coherent.    
The difference between past and current debates about unity and 
diversity is that nowadays the discussion about the importance of diversity 
takes place in a new kind of a context where it is increasingly often declared 
that resistance against war must be globalized in order to be effective. 
Put differently, it is maintained that resistance should be diversified and 
globalized at the same time. However, it is still unclear how these two are 
to be pursued and realized simultaneously. It is an intriguing question, 
because various anti-war/peace groups and organizations within the 
movement have different kinds of analyses of the causes of war, main 
opponents, strategies and tactics of resistance. There is a great level of 
fragmentation not only nationally but also internationally. Different 
‘branches’, such as anti-imperialistic, pacifistic and anti-militaristic 
groups, have all formed their own coalitions and movements, ones which 
relatively rarely come together. Already in the 1920s it was ‘generally felt 
that there was a degree of overlap’ in the activities of different movements 
and that ‘there ought to be some kind of co-ordination among these 
international movements’ (Prasad 2005: 141, also 130). The same was 
emphasized in the 1960s when demanding that the peace movement 
‘must unite and must become international in order to face the challenge 
of the cold war in general and of the nuclear age in general’ (ibid: 339). 
In other words, external changes in the political context have always 
been a source of debate concerning the necessity of producing more 
unity as well as more international forms of organization. Hence, it is 
not surprising that the events of 9/11 and the War on Terror have led 
to a similar kind of debate. Within the current anti-war movement, the 
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discussion about unity seems to have many different streams. While some 
organizations stress, for instance, the importance of unity in the context 
of the political left, others believe that different social movements could 
all be working towards common goals. Some go as far as to argue that ‘the 
ultimate destiny of humankind is not only unity within their own species 
but also with the universe as a whole’ (Prasad 2005: 27). Unity (as well 
as diversity) is a powerful concept, but one which seems to be defined in 
multiple ways by different actors. 
Finding a proper balance between unity and diversity is an extremely 
difficult task. If there is too much emphasis on unity, it may alienate 
potential members and partners who have different views on certain issues. 
Encouraging too much diversity, on the other hand, may result in even 
more fragmentation and give rise to potential contradictions and internal 
conflicts and thus prove to be counter-productive from the perspective 
of generating effective resistance against war. Indeed, fragmentation and 
‘splits’ can be regarded as a general problem of the left. Often it seems that 
non-left political forces have the ability to become and stay united while 
the strong emphasis on tolerating differing opinions and standpoints 
has led the left to become more fragmented and thus often also weaker. 
Accordingly, the left-oriented anti-war organizations’ attempt to produce 
more unity does have a certain logic to it. Nonetheless, it also poses a 
challenge, because the movement should be open to non-left groups.
Although diversity and fragmentation should not automatically be 
regarded as a direct sign of weakness, it is too simplistic to argue that 
diversity is the ultimate source of power, as many poststructuralists and 
post-modern philosophers claim. It all depends on the context, aims 
and actors, and many other things. In some situations and contexts, 
unity might be more important than diversity, and vice versa. However, 
they can also be important simultaneously. It is difficult to produce any 
general rules in this regard and therefore the dominant theoretical debate 
is problematic. It is true within the anti-war movement as well. Therefore, 
it might be suggested that if it were to discuss the issue of diversity and 
unity more openly, the anti-war movement could also help to broaden 
the theoretical debate in this regard. It is possible that anti-war activists 
reflect on this issue from a more creative and practical perspective than 
theorists, who are often trapped in their own categories of thinking about 
the issue of unity and diversity, usually favoring one over another.     
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Indeed, from the perspective of political theory, the question of unity 
and diversity is very interesting in other respects as well that bear direct 
implications for the movement. An emphasis on unity can, for example, 
be interpreted as an attempt to de-politicize the anti-war movement in 
terms of its aims, strategies and methods. When issues are represented 
as something there is a general consensus about, it sends a signal that 
there is only one universal truth. Too strong an emphasis on unity and, 
thus, consensus can be regarded as problematic also in the sense that it 
runs counter to the criticism that the anti-war movement has presented 
towards its opponents, mainly the liberal western powers. Some may 
find it hypocritical to accuse the opponents of trying to impose a unified 
perspective on the whole world when the movement can be considered to 
do the same. Emphasis on diversity, on the other hand, can be interpreted 
as an attempt to present the movement as tolerant and inclusive, although 
in practical terms it is not always as tolerant as it tends to accentuate. 
These tensions have surfaced in different ways in this thesis. It is not 
always a diversity of views and opinions which is celebrated; often those 
organizations that emphasize diversity regard it as diversity of people 
in terms of their ‘origin’. On the surface (especially in the promotional 
material) the heterogeneity of objectives of the anti-war movement may 
be celebrated, but at the practical level it is often regarded as a sort of 
a hindrance (this being revealed especially by the interviews). Thus, it 
can be argued that mechanisms of power reveal themselves in efforts to 
produce more unity despite the continuous public celebration of diversity. 
There is a deep contradiction between the common metanarrative of a 
unified struggle of resistance and the practical level, where ideological 
and political differences of various organizations create many possibilities 
for conflict and internal controversy. The fact that these difficulties have 
not produced more serious problems more often within the movement 
does not guarantee that this will continue to be the case in the future. 
Along with changes taking place in the political context and in the power 
relations between different organizations, there will be more room for 
competition and internal politicization, which may also take the form of 
a more direct conflict at some point413.
413 As Leonard (1990: 89–90) points out, ‘active confrontation may occur not 
only at the level of relations between oppressor(s) and the oppressed, but also at the 
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There are always going to be some tensions within the movement due 
to its plurality of views and understandings. Attempts are often made 
to overcome contradictions by referring to commonly shared values and 
beliefs, which are sometimes even argued to be universal. However, this 
strategy is doomed in the sense that differences and contradictions are not 
going to disappear anywhere. Common values can be sought only by first 
admitting and recognizing the diversity of views and perspectives, with 
this then making it possible to evaluate what kinds of common aims can 
be constructed. Therefore, I hope that one of the contributions of this 
thesis will be to convince the anti-war movement to have a more open 
discussion about internal differences, tensions and conflicting views. One 
especially troubling aspect is how the concept of diversity is used as sort 
of a buzzword, one that does not seem to be referring to a diversity of 
opinions, ideologies and political views, but to diversity understood in 
terms of different people from different backgrounds (hence, always lists 
of genders, religions, and so forth). If diversity is continuously celebrated 
without properly defining its meaning or addressing the problems related 
to it, it can lead to more severe problems. There should be more open 
dialogue about problems and controversies but, of course, also about 
shared understandings, common aims and new strategies. As some pacifist 
and anarchist organizations have taught us, there are alternative ways to 
think about power and many different ways to engage in resistance against 
war besides the traditional emphasis on mass mobilization. It would be a 
shame if these alternatives were not considered due to excessive emphasis 
on unity, or merely, due to a lack of dialogue.  
This is by no means an issue brought up only in this thesis. While 
pointing out that more unity does not necessarily equal a more powerful 
movement, for example, Gillan et al. (2008: 97–98) suggests that if the 
anti-war movement wishes to gain more influence, there needs to be 
more interaction and networking between various groups as ‘stronger 
and deeper ties’ require ‘more sustained interaction’. Or, as some activists 
have stressed themselves, in order to work for the removal of ‘internecine 
rivalry among those who follow different paths to the same goal’, it is 
level of relations within the empowerment struggle itself ’. In other words, ‘those 
seeking a practical overthrow of oppressive conditions may find themselves making 
choices of action that close off communication with others, rather than keeping 
them open’ (ibid: 90).  
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necessary to keep ‘channels of communication open and clear of the 
sludge of petty, inter-organizational rivalries’ (Green 1992: 46–47). 
These are extremely important viewpoints, particularly considering that 
especially the British movement has been seriously divided repeatedly 
during its history. There have been disagreements about ethics, strategies 
and tactics, for example, in the case of the First and Second World Wars 
as well as the Vietnam War (Young 1987a: 18). The British movement 
has been characterized by ‘disparity of ideological stance amongst the 
different strands’, which means that there can be ‘enormous potential 
problems and conflicts’ between different groups and organizations 
(Taylor & Young 1987b: 295). The conflicts have derived from different 
political, ideological and philosophical traditions, ranging from the 
war resistance tradition to the Marxist-Socialist, liberal internationalist, 
pacifists, Labourist, direct actionist and feminist traditions (Young 
1987a: 5–10). Although traditions or ideologies as such have not been 
the object of analysis here, many of the above-mentioned traditions 
have surfaced continuously also in this study. The CND is still closely 
connected to the Labourist tradition and WRI to both pacifist and direct 
actionist traditions. The StWC and GR are linked to the Marxist-Socialist 
tradition, although from different perspectives, since the former reflects 
the traditional internationalist Marxist and the latter the transnationalist 
(globalist) post-Marxist approach. 
This study has also confirmed the observation that usually ‘conflicts 
are the turf battles that may occur between different national groups that 
define themselves as general peace movement organizations’ (Rochon 
1988: 92). At the same time, it must be noted that conflicts, disagreements 
and power struggles ‘within and between organizations is a perfectly 
natural phenomenon’ (ibid: 97). As a long-time activist in the American 
peace movement, Tom Hayden (2007: 120) puts it, ‘organizational 
rivalries never cease’.514 Sometimes it has been even suggested that 
although a unified movement ‘would be able to speak to the authorities 
more effectively, there are certain advantages to be gained by diversity 
514 Internal conflicts and rivalries do not characterize only the British anti-war 
movement. For example, organizational and strategic tensions within the American 
movement have been covered in great detail (e.g. Chatfield 1973b: xxvii; 1973d: 68; 
1992: 56-73, 172–175; DeBenedetti 1973: 58, 62; DeBenedetti & Chatfield 1990: 
25; Martin 2007: 145; Raskin 2007: 43; Patterson 1973: 21, 24–26, 33).   
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and even by antagonism between rival movement organizations’. In fact, 
organizations within the movement can be regarded as a ‘microcosm of 
social change through conflict’ (Chatfield 1992: 183) since they provide 
‘a way for these conflicts to be resolved’ (Rochon 1998: 97). 
When it comes to a discussion encompassing globality, unity and 
diversity, there has always been some kind of an understanding of the 
anti-war movement as a loose network crossing the boundaries of nation 
states. Now, however, it has become somewhat more transnational in its 
activities. The new anti-war movement is also more closely connected to 
other social movements (such as the alter-globalization movement) than 
has been the case previously. Due to these and other developments, there 
is not only room for more cooperation but also for more controversy. 
Although contradictions are not anything new, it seems that the extensive 
public celebration of diversity may be subjecting them to scrutiny in a 
new way in the postmodern world. Indeed, the debate has gained new 
flavors due to the metatheoretical turn from modern to postmodern, 
that is, from normative universalism to normative skepticism. While in 
the modern approach it was maintained that there could be some kind 
of a universal political project for emancipation and social change, the 
postmodern approach questions the very premises of such universal truth 
claims and suggests that there should be a generalized attitude of doubt 
at work that questions all forms of unity and universality as constructions 
of power while giving prominence to the view that no-one can possess 
the truth. Hence, any kind of a clearly defined unified front of resistance 
is challenged by an understanding of resistance as diverse, decentralized 
and deterritorialized form of opposition. 
In this regard, it seems that the British anti-war movement can actually 
be regarded as a mixture of both modern and postmodern analyses and 
elements, thus being somewhere ‘in between’ new and old movements615. 
Moreover, it can be argued that there is a tendency to focus on both the 
universal (global) and the particular (national or local).716 The movement 
615 Also in terms of political practice of resistance, there are clearly traditional as 
well as new characteristics in the movement. 
716  Similar observations have been made at many different stages of the movement’s 
history (e.g. Rochon 1988: 91; Young 1987a: 20–21), which demonstrates that the 
movement has always consisted, at any particular time, of some sort of a mixture of 
both old and new elements.   
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is likely to continue to have a strong connection to the modernist school 
of critical theory as long its socialist-oriented organizations are dominant 
within the movement. Nevertheless, there are many changes that have 
started to take place within the socialist framework due to popularity 
of post-Marxist conceptualizations, for example. Also the diffusion of 
ideas from other movements as well as political opportunities brought by 
developments of world politics will undoubtedly continue to transform 
the anti-war movement. Nevertheless, on the basis of the analysis 
conducted in this thesis, it seems that the movement will not, at least 
any time soon, slip into cosmopolitan utopianism (liberal globalism) or 
poststructuralist utopianism (radical globalism), both of which share the 
view that change will come more or less automatically.   
It is good to remember that the hopes invested in the capacity of the 
anti-war movement to resist, end and even prevent wars are controversial 
in the sense that the movement is, on the one hand, expected to reject and 
challenge the universalistic paradigms which produce wars and injustice 
in the world but, on the other, to provide a coherent alternative political 
project of its own. Coherence and unity, as we have seen in the thesis, 
are not merely very difficult to achieve; it is also questionable how much 
they should be valued in the first place, because efforts to produce unity 
from above can lead to many problems. However, at the same time, it is 
necessary to discuss and have some strategies as well; respecting diversity 
should not become an excuse for wholly non-strategic thinking and a lack 
of debate on how to achieve the most important goals of the movement. 
While there has been a great deal of discussion about globality and 
locality of resistance, it needs to be noted that the resistance analyzed 
here cannot be characterized as ‘localized’ in the true sense that it would 
be taking place where the war is actually being fought, or that it would 
necessarily be constructed such that the people who are directly affected 
by these wars would believe the resistance to be effectively organized. The 
anti-war movement is a solidarity movement and not a resistance movement 
as such: thus the struggle taking place in Britain or other western societies 
against the war is being conducted on behalf of, and for the sake of, 
others. This invites some critical questions, especially since many of the 
organizations argue the movement represents ‘global opinion’ or speaks 
on the behalf of ‘humanity’. Much as it is necessary to be critical of the 
universalist claims of the movement’s opponents, its own rhetoric must 
333
be critically evaluated from same the perspective. 
Firstly, it needs to be noted that despite global labels and worldwide 
demonstrations, current anti-war activism is still heavily western-based. 
Therefore, it might be relevant to ask whether there are similar mechanisms 
of power, and even some forms of governance, at work here that may bear 
a resemblance to humanitarian and relief agencies saving ‘human species 
lives’ in crisis areas and serving to legitimate war. Secondly, if the ‘global’ 
anti-war movement means mainly a western anti-war movement it needs 
to be asked whether activism should be regarded as some sort of guilt 
relief for people of industrialized countries. Engagement in the anti-war 
movement is a relatively safe way for citizens of the developed countries 
to satisfy their need for collectivity, feeling ‘global’ and responsible. 
Indeed, the anti-war movement has always been ‘predominantly middle-
class in background’, which also explains ‘working-class and lower-class 
opposition to the movement’ (Horowitz 1970: 27, also Rochon 1988: 
149). Thirdly, given that the anti-war movement seems to be quite 
fragmented and not very radical, it needs to be asked whether it may 
even help to preserve the status quo. When taking part in the movement, 
many may think nothing else is required, which can then be regarded as 
a legitimation for actual non-engagement. Fourthly, it needs to be asked 
whether the western anti-war movement really takes into account what 
those people whose lives are on the line want themselves, or is it more of a 
symbolic power struggle between the western war machinery (mainly the 
US and UK) and western anti-war activists. After all, both the movement 
and its primary opponents come from the dominant culture, speaking 
the same language and thinking often in terms of the same categories 
(although from opposite poles thereof ).   
However, these kinds of critical views may surface precisely because 
the anti-war movement is often studied from an overly western-centered 
perspective, which has admittedly also been the case here, given that the 
thesis has analyzed organizations within the British anti-war movement. 
In retrospect, it has to be admitted at this point that the selection of the 
case study has begun to feel somewhat too ‘obvious’ or conventional.
However, as was pointed out in the introduction, it was necessary to 
limit the perspective somehow, and studying the British movement has 
been extremely interesting in many respects. For example, the debate 
concerning the political crisis as well as the crisis of democracy in the 
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British context resonates with that many other countries, inviting critical 
questions in regard to liberal democracy in broader terms. Not only the 
British, but many other western governments allied themselves with the 
US, forming the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, although the majority of 
their citizens fiercely opposed involvement in the war. Thus, the efforts 
of western ‘peace people’ should not be belittled but rather admired in 
this regard. Nevertheless, critical debate is also necessary within as well as 
outside the movement. In fact, it is more or less inevitable, since different 
approaches and perspectives are being debated and constructed within 
the movement continuously. 
To conclude by reflecting on the diversity of the anti-war movement, 
it should perhaps be admitted that it makes as much sense to try to 
produce a unified perspective for the movement as to try to develop a 
universal receipt for resistance against war in theoretical terms. Indeed, as 
Leonard has illustrated, emancipatory political projects based on critical 
theory are deeply historical and necessarily localized in their efforts to 
change a perceived injustice since otherwise ‘the ghost of universalism’ 
will bring many more problems. However, he stresses that it is not enough 
to engage only in ‘localized’ forms of critique; what is required as well is 
‘a metatheoretical self-understanding’ which accommodates ‘one the one 
hand, the need for collective solidarity, and on the other, a respect for 
plurality and difference’ (Leonard 1990: 87, also Walker 1988: 5, 157). 
While admitting that simultaneous commitment to both solidarity and 
plurality ‘is no mean task’, he argues that ‘to be anything less runs the 
risk of repeating the same mistakes that gave rise to the need for critical 
theory’ (Leonard 1990: 261). It is an ideal ‘made possible only by living 
it; it is not simply an end we should seek, but also the only means by 
which we can do so’, not assuming that it is possible to live ‘in harmony 
and agreement’ but that it may be possible to ‘live with our differences 
without resorting to coercion’ (ibid: 269, emphasis in original):
Every voice cannot be realized, and not every voice should be realized. 
Does this, then, imply a contradiction at the heart of the critical 
theory, a contradiction between the plurality it needs to respect 
and the solidarity it must pursue? Taken in the abstract, yes. But if 
this study of critical theory demonstrates anything at all, it is that 
questions about when we should act, and how we should act, cannot 
be answered only in the abstract.
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Appendix 
Summary of the Three Theoretical Discourses
Viewed Positively Viewed Critically Viewed Skeptically
Exceptionalism of the US, 
(Humanitarian Causes)
(State Building)
Global State of War Weakness of the West(Identity Politics)
Hegemony of the US Biopower/Empire Nation States
(Western)
Global Civil Society,
Global Political Action,
Consensual, Long-term
Multitude,
Global Resistance,
Permanent Resistance,
Traditional 
Movements,
State-based
Political System,
Strategic Aims/Projects
Symbolic/Soft Power
Symbolic/Soft Power
Foucauldian Power  
Political/
Instrumental Power
No Left/Right distinction Blurring the Distinction Traditional Left/Right, 
Struggle for Power
Globalization
Iraq War
Power/War
Resistance
Power
Awareness-rising / Self- Expression / Symbolic ContestationPolitics
Liberal
Cosmopolitan
Radical 
Poststructuralist
Critical
State-Centric
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Appendix 2 
Themes of the In-Depth Interviews
. Personal Motivation and Engagement in the Anti-War Movement 
2. Anti-War Activism in Action: the Practice and the Premises 
3. Defining Concepts and Context 
4. Transnational Ties and Global Connections 
5. Globalizing Resistance? 
6. The Role of the ‘Global’ Public Opinion 
7. The Role of the Media and the Internet 
8. The Question of Effectiveness and Political Impact  
9. Responses to the Critique 
0. Challenges and Visions for the Future
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This is the end / Beautiful friend 
This is the end / My only friend / The end 
The Doors
